Online International Interdisciplinary Research Journal, {Bi-Monthly}, ISSN2249-9598, Volume-III, Issue-IV, July-Aug 2013
Dipesh Karmarkar /Assistant Professor, Department of Geography, Smt CHM College, Ulhasnagar – 3, Maharashtra, India
Abstract
In the pre-industrial terms, an empire or a state was a ‘physical geographic’ concept as it reflected the control over a territorial unit bound by territorial or maritime (sea) boundaries. That’s the reason why the early rulers gave importance to conquering land and expanding an empire. In warfare, importance was given to numerical strength of arms, soldiers, horses, elephants, etc. and the location of enemy troop’s vis-à-vis the location of the ruler, but usually the nature of the terrain, where the war was fought, was given relatively less significance. To understand the value of ‘territory’ in a real sense of the term, fundamentally requires a comprehensive geographical (spatial) vision. Having a geographical vision of the empire was important, esp. when India was getting ready for the conflict with the strong maritime powers of the West during the 17th and the 18th centuries. The present paper argues that Chatrapati Shivaji Maharaj, who established the Maratha Kingdom on the Deccan Plateau in the 17th century, was the only indigenous Maratha ruler, who not only realized, but also tried to actualize the geographical vision in the empire building. The paper concludes that by neglecting the study of geographical vision of our own national characters, we are making a mockery of our own Geography.
KEYWORDS:
Empire, Geography, Geographical Vision
1.
GEOGRAPHY AND THE EMPIRE:
In
the pre-industrial terms, an empire or a state was a ‘physical geographic’ concept as it reflected the control over a
territorial unit bound by territorial or
maritime (sea) boundaries. Expansion of an empire, thus, meant inclusion
of more territory in the state and
shifting of boundaries outwardly. That’s the reason why the early rulers gave importance to conquering
land and expanding an empire. Warfare
and treaties were the chief modes of expanding the state. In warfare,
importance was given to numerical
strength of arms, soldiers, horses, elephants, etc. and the location of enemy troop’s vis-à-vis the location of
the ruler. But usually the nature of the
terrain, where the war was fought, was given relatively less
significance.
Further, in the context of ancient and medieval India, most of the kingdoms were basically land-based units, i.e. the rulers ruled over a piece of land and not over the seas. This led to a rigid definition of kingdom where expanding and defending land boundaries was given greatest importance. So the Khalji, Sultanate and Mughal empires did not give sea prowess its due. It happened so because the Turks, Tartars and Mughals came from the places which focused a little too much on the land capability and territorial army as compared to anything else (Mishra, 2009). Much before the Central Asians stepped in; the Indian religious texts too had banned religious Hindus from going overseas. Thus, a ruler who controls vast land used to be a strong ruler; thus land-area was the measurement of the strength of a kingdom. This resulted in the neglect of sea as a part of the state / empire and of sea coast as a maritime frontier. That is the reason why the local Indian rulers, including the giant Mughals, did not take the entry of Europeans seriously. They failed to realize the real motives of the European mercantile companies. However, one cannot overlook the consistent maritime expeditions made by the Cholas and Pallavas that had left a strong Indian impression on South East Asian region.
It
should be noted that till the beginning of industrialisation and
colonialism, territorial expansion was
not seen much with a resource approach. ‘Land is a container of resources. So if ruler occupies
more land, he subsequently owns more
resources.’ This kind of a resource approach was not very prominent
earlier as we were not aware of the
diversity, extracting and utility of the resources. It strongly came during the era of industrialisation.
Strength of an empire is linked with its
stability. Ancient and medieval rulers gave a lot of importance to
defending boundaries, enforcing a strict
legal-administrative system, and systematic collection of revenue, for keeping their state stable.
But taking concrete steps to create the
feeling of ‘integrity’, loyalty’, ‘love’ for the state in the mind of
the subjects was not a part of
maintaining stability of the state. Creating such feelings among the
subject’s acts as a binding force; it
becomes necessary for bringing territorial unity.
Above
discussion brings out the lacunae in the administration of the medieval/pre-modern rulers (there were few
exceptions) in general. Following things,
thus, were stressed:
1.
Lack of understanding of the terrain, which is ruled or where the war is
fought 2. Negligence towards the sea as
a part of the state / empire and towards the sea coast as a maritime frontier
3.
Failure to realize the real motives of the European mercantile companies (Such
a realization needed a geographical
vision that was lacking)
4.
Lack of a resource approach in conceiving ‘land based state’
5.
Absence of concrete steps to create the feeling of ‘nationalism’ among the subjects, which was necessary for maintaining
stability of the state
Possessing
or acquiring the above mentioned skills fundamentally required a comprehensive geographical (spatial) vision.
The present author argues that India had
produced two such visionaries during the 17th and the 18th centuries AD,
the period so crucial in the Indian
history when India was getting ready for the conflict with the strong maritime powers of the West for the
first time; the visionaries were Chatrapati
Shivaji Maharaj, who established the Maratha Kingdom on the Deccan Plateau
in the 17th century and Tipu Sultan of
Mysore, who sacrificed his life fighting incessantly against the British. The present article
attempts to throw some light on one of the
important aspects of Shivaji Maharaj’s character, his geographical
vision.
2.
SHIVAJI MAHARAJ AS THE GEOGRAPHER:
Shivaji Maharaj was a visionary geographer because his career did not reveal the above-mentioned lacunae in the administration of most of the medieval/pre modern rulers. Shivaji, since his childhood, was grown up in the difficult rugged terrain of the Sahyadri and the Deccan. His childhood activities with his maval friends helped him understand the nature of deep valleys, hill-tops, escarpments, narrow plateaus, and rivers. Moreover, his knowledge about the arrival and the nature of SW Monsoon and its impact on the changing physical landscape of the Sahyadri helped him in drawing military strategies in many wars. Due to his deep interest in geography, (he understood the seminal role of geography in empire building), he had prepared detailed maps of many regions of India. Whenever any foreigner visited him, Shivaji Maharaj used to ask him about the basic geographical, economic facts of the former’s country. So, Shivaji was an ‘applied geographer’ in the sense that he used and applied his geographic knowledge in the construction of his Swarajya. The growth of the Marathas as a single group of warriors began in late 1640s with the rise of Shivaji (1627-1680), the son of Shahaji Bhosale. In 1650s, the territory of Bijapur became a Mughal subha, when Shahaji was disowned by the Mughals as a part of a diplomatic strategy. In the process, areas around Pune, the original jagir of Shahaji was conceded to the Mughals. As a result, Shivaji fought his initial battles with the Bijapur kingdom that marked his ascent in Pune, Junnar, Indapur, Baramati, Chakan, Maval and surrounding regions (Sardesai, 1946; Gordon, 1993; Khobrekar, 2002). These initial encounters paved the way for the construction of Shivaji Maharaj’s Swarajya.
The
Deccan had already been divided between the Konkan, the Ghats and the Desh. This geographical division resulted in
a fragmented space providing diverse
potentials for various political contestants. The Ghats not only
separated Konkan and Desh but also
supplied some important strategic locations to build forts. Moreover, the Ghats being the link between the Konkan
and the Desh, control over its area by
constructing forts was of strategic significance. The Desh, mainly a
plateau, comprised unproductive areas in
the rain shadow section and a productive section to the west. Due to the said spatial division,
any realm in the Desh required to control the
Ghats to dominate the trade routes running towards the coast and the
agriculturally productive region of the
Konkan (Gordon, 1993). This geopolitical condition of the Deccan was efficiently used by Shivaji
Maharaj.
2.1 Shivaji’s Geopolitical Understanding behind the Conquest of Konkan: Shivaji Maharaj’s conflict with the Portuguese and the conquest of Konkan proves his deeper geographical understanding. After consolidating his position in Deccan, Shivaji was drawn towards the coastal waters of Konkan. The political reason for his conquest was put a formidable challenge to the presence of Mughals and the Bijapur kings there. In the geographic terms, the campaign for Konkan was for the fact that till then he was ruling over an unproductive rain shadow tract of Deccan. To feed his subjects, he needed control over the productive areas of Konkan (Karmarkar, 2005). Thus, he gave importance to Konkan as a resource rich region. Similarly, Konkan was a trade link between the imported commodities and the Plateau. The commodities downloaded on the coast were transported through Konkan Rivers upstream to the regional trade centers like Chiplun, Sangmeshwar, etc. Further these items, used to be transported to the Deccan via passes in the Ghats. Thus, control over Konkan and the connecting routes to Ghats were necessary for stable trade (Karmarkar, 2005). Konkan, in the mid-17th century, was quite sensitive due to the Portuguese naval power, extinction of Ahmednagar kingdom and beginning of the economic downfall of the Mughals. Local elite families were then in the ascension of power (Nairne, 1894). Shivaji’s geopolitical strategy in Konkan proved to be significant. At the very commencement of his campaign, the eight vital passes that traversed the Ghats from the interior to the Konkan coast and the part of Kalyan were brought under his control (Gordon, 1993). The entire Konkan came into his hands due to an agreement with the Mughals (Nairne, 1894). By 1660, south Konkan came under Shivaji’s command and Raigad was made his capital. Further, Suvarndurg, Ratnagiri, Jaigad, Anjanvel, Vijaydurg and Kolaba were built, rebuilt and strengthened. Dabhol, Jaitapur and Vengurla were plundered and burnt several times by Shivaji due to their association with the Bijapur Sultans, the British and the Dutch respectively (Nairne, 1894). Subsequently, the busy port of Surat was attacked by him in 1664 with a principal motive of accumulating wealth for strengthening his growing kingdom (Das Gupta, 1979).
Shivaji
had also fought with the British and the Dutch, who were then attempting to settle on the Konkan coast, to
safeguard his economic interests in
Konkan. Rajapur, located in south Konkan, became the centre of
British-Maratha struggles. It was a
significant port city under the Bijapur Sultanate. Following the establishment of a Dutch factory in Vengurla,
the British set up their factory in Rajapur.
It also housed the main office and the residence of the authorities of the
East India Company (Tikekar, 2004). It
was a wealthy emporium to where merchandise
from Arabia, Persia, Egypt, Africa, China and Europe was imported for
sale (Khobrekar, 2002). As the British
interfered in the Maratha-Bijapur conflict, Shivaji ransacked Rajapur in 1661 and again in 1670
and collected a large plunder. Similarly,
Vengurla was burnt and looted in 1663 as the Dutch intervened in his
conflict with the Savants of Wadi
(Tikekar, 2004), although their factories were permitted to function. Different kinds of changing alliances among
the Portuguese, the Siddis, the Savants of
Wadi, king of Jawhar to oust Shivaji off Konkan underlines the shows the
importance of Shivaji Maharaj (Kulkarni,
1996; Khobrekar, 2002; Karmarkar, 2005).
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