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Ottoman-Mughal Political Relations circa 1500-1923

 Razi Ashraf : (BA (Hons), MA (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London)  

Keywords: Central Asia, Ottoman, Turkey, Mughal, Muslim, Hindu, India, Khilafat,  

This article should be cited as: Razi Ashraf, ‘Ottoman-Mughal Political Relations circa 1500- 1923’, in The Eurasia Studies Study Journal, Vol. 2, No. 1 (February2013), at  http://eurasiahistory.com/2013-2/  

Introduction 

The early modern world saw developments in the power of the emergence of Muslim empires  that replaced the fragmented tribal alliances and minor Sultanates. These great empires  namely the Ottomans, Safavids, the Uzbeks and the Mughals all shared Central Asian Turkic  political traditions apart from Persian aesthetic understandings and a vision of conquest  rooted in Mongol aspirations of a world empire.1

Modern day historians tend to treat all Islamic civilizations as discrete entities in  terms of their colonial heritages and European style nation-state analysis. These civilizations  are as a matter of routine conceptualised according to their dynastic character and political  character. But in reality cultural contacts between Central Asia, Iran and India have always  transcended political realities. The sub-continent has been connected to the world system  since pre-historic times primarily via the mountain passes over the Hindu Kush to the North  West.2

Successive Muslim dynasties to rule over parts of the sub-continent all came from the  northwest and were mainly either Persianized Central Asian Turks or Turkified Pakhtuns all  coming from the direction of what is now Afghanistan. These successive waves of Muslim  conquerors all brought with them elements of Central Asian and Persian culture which they  added to the ever evolving mix of South Asian society. 

It should be however emphasized that it was under the Mughals that this steady  process of cultural amalgamation between Central Asia and South Asia reached its peak and in many ways showed a happy synthesis. The magnificent cultural achievements in the form  of breath-taking architecture took place entirely on Indian soil as the Mughals along with  their Central Asian political, administrative and military influences also brought painting and  architectural styles. The famous Taj Mahal as we all know was directly inspired by Timur’s  tomb in Samarqand. Never were the lines of communication and interaction more open  between Central and South Asia than they were under the Mughals. 

The same can be said for the channels leading from Iran and even the Mediterranean  world of the Ottomans. Part one of this paper will study the historical relationship between  the Turkic-Asian Mughals and the Eurasian Ottomans with a focus upon the political story.  The second part of the paper will investigate the relations between the Muslim Indians and  the Ottomans.

Part One: The Mughal-Ottoman Political Relationship 

The Mughals were the principal inheritors of the Central-Asian Turco-Persian legacy of  Timur: ‘true Timurids who enthusiastically embraced Timurid legitimacy and consciously  presided over Timurid renaissance Indian sub-continent’3

So although Arab traders had been in touch with the Indian sub-continent for quite  some time ever since the conquest of Sind by Mohammed bin Qassem in (712AD) some  historians regard this part of history as a mere episode in the history of the sub-continent as it  affected only a small portion of the vast sub-continent. It would be however a denial of fact to  say that the Arab conquest of Sind had no lasting effect on India. The conquest introduced  Islam to the Indian sub-continent. But we must not fail however to add here that the  permanent conquest of India was later achieved only by the Turks from the north. The  Muslim religion and the Persian language and the literary tradition united Turks, Iranians,  Afghans and others for nearly a millennium. 

Mughal-Ottoman relationship. 

According to Prof. Naimur Rahman Farooqi the study of this fascinating subject was not  given proper scholarly attention it deserved. The situation is no better in Ottoman  historiography either he goes on to say. Professor Karpat’s research applies especially to the  Ottoman relationship to the contemporary Muslim states. Hikmet Bayur’s Hindusthan Tarihi  (two volumes, Ankara 1947-50) has devoted only a few cursory remarks to Ottoman-Mughal  relations. Likewise Indian historians like R.C Verma have devoted only perfunctory remarks  on this great subject.4

The year 1556 marks the beginning of the diplomatic relationship between the  Mughal and the Ottoman States when Emperor Humayun (1530-1556) wrote his first and his  last letter to the Ottoman Sultan. The year 1748 on the other hand marks the termination of  Mughal-Ottoman relations. It was in this year that the last Ottoman embassy to the Mughal  court left Shahjehanabad, the Mughal capital on its homeward journey to Istanbul. After 1748  there is no record of any exchange of diplomatic missions between the two sides although  cultural contacts continued in the form of letters from minor rulers of India till the abolition  of Khilafat 1920. So this shared legacy of Mughal-Ottoman relationship has to be understood  before we actually discuss Turkish-Pakistan relationship. 

The Ottoman influence had preceded the Mughals in India particularly in the Deccan  in the south and along with the western coast of the sub-continent. Ottoman adventurers and  soldiers of fortune abounded in India. They were reputed to be expert gunners and  musketeers and were generally employed as artillery men. Several Ottoman Turks held  positions of power and considerable influence in the Sultanate of Gujarat (parts of both are in  India and Pakistan). Names like Rumi Khan and Rajab Khudawand Khan are still famous in   the sub-continent. Rajab Khan became the governor of Surat a city in Gujarat. According to   Turkish historian Farishte it was Rajab Khan who built the castle of Surat fortifying it in the  Turkish architectural fashion. The rousing reception that Sidi al Reis the Ottoman admiral  received in Gujarat bear witness to the strong position and influence enjoyed by the Ottoman  Turks in this Muslim state of the sub-continent. 

Mughal attitude towards the Ottoman Khilafat. 

There was a tremendous respect for the Ottoman Khilafat. Letters written to the Emperor  especially during the reign of Humayun to ‘Suleiman the Magnificent’ bears testimony to this  fact: 

‘Gifts of sincere wishes to your exalted majesty the possessor of the dignity of Khilafat,  the pole of the sky of greatness and fortune, the consolidator of the foundations of Islam.  Your name is engraved on the seal of greatness and in your time the Khilafat has been  carried to perfection .May your Khilafat be perpetuated. God be praised that the gates of  victory are opened by the eyes of His inspiration and His dispensation the seat of the  Sultanate and the throne of the Khilafat of the realms of Hind and Sind is once again  graced by a monarch (Humayun) whose magnificence is equal to that of Sultan Suleiman  the magnificent.’5



The Ottoman grand vizier Mustafa Pasha was greeted most respectfully by the grand  Mughal Vizier accompanied with pomp and splendour. The Turkish ambassador Arsalan  Agha was given a pompous and distinguished reception by Mir Zafar of Mughal India when  he visited Emperor Shah Jehan in Kashmir. However Mughal attitude towards the Ottomans  varied from emperor to emperor. It was a phase of mostly cordiality with occasional outbursts  of spasmodic hostility. 

Babur the first Mughal was steeped in Turkish culture. He spoke and wrote beautiful  Turkish (Chagtai). His famous Baburnama is well known universally. The Emperor also  admired and utilized Ottoman military tactics and methods. Yet he remained indifferent  towards the Ottomans the reason being his dislike of Ottoman- Uzbek friendship that he  considered damaging to his aims and interests in Central Asia. Babur’s successor Humayun  exhibited great respect for the Ottoman Sultan as the only sovereign in the world worthy to  bear the title of Padshah and displayed a genuine desire to establish contacts with the  Ottomans on a permanent basis. 

Akbar who followed Humayun not only reversed this policy but even demonstrated  outright hostility towards the Ottomans. It has been suggested that Akbar’s policy was based  on real politik6 according to Pakistani Scholar Riazul Islam.7 He goes on to say Akbar  revealed a lack of political pragmatism and diplomatic acumen as far as the Ottomans were  concerned. Historians say Akbar missed a great opportunity of a joint Mughal-Ottoman  operation against the Portuguese whom he wanted to encounter. It could have curtailed if not  ended the Portuguese behaviour towards the Indian commerce and Haj traffic. 

Jehangir’s policy was based on high diplomacy and friendship with the Ottomans 

despite depending on Safavid Persia. He took care not even to offend the Uzbeks. Shah Jehan  in early reign revived the policy of his father of a Mughal-Ottoman-Uzbek alliance. However Shah Jehan’s military intervention in Central Asia left him isolated in the world of Islam. The  Ottoman initiative in 1649 as usual restored suspended diplomatic relations. At the time of  Shah Jehan’s deposition in 1658 Mughal Ottoman relations had improved considerably. 

At the time of Aurangzeb the Empire was beset with internal problems and further  conquests. Aurangzeb attempted to send an embassy to Istanbul but did not enthusiastically  make overtures of friendship. But the Ottomans magnanimously broke the diplomatic  deadlock by taking the initiative of continuing the friendship. In 1689 Sultan Suleiman II  (1687-1691) sent Ahmed Aqa as his envoy to Aurangzeb’s court.8

Muhammad Shah was the last Mughal Emperor to acknowledge the Ottoman  Khilafat. However it was during Shah Alam’s reign (1759-1806) that several Indian Muslim  potentates acknowledged the Ottoman Sultan as the leader of the Faithful. The Bibi of  Arrakal (‘Arrakal’ was the name of a small province in the South of India that was in control  of some fragmented families of the last vestiges of the Mughal Empire. ‘Bibi’ is a highly  respectful term used in the Urdu language for a lady of high rank and honour) addressed the  Sultan as Khalifa and sought his help against the ‘high handedness’ of the English East India  Company. 

Tipu Sultan of Mysore (Mysore is another large province in the south of India which  still remains today) also paid homage to the Ottoman Khalifa. He was the first Indian Muslim  to receive a letter from the Ottoman Khalifa. There is evidence that after the demise of Shah  Alam II the khutba (Friday prayer sermon) was read in India in the name of the Ottoman  Khalifa.9 The deposition of Bahadur Shah II in 1857 proved to be a turning point in India’s  relations with the Ottoman Khilafat. Henceforth Indian Muslims looked towards the Ottoman  Sultan for sympathy and help. The Deoband School founded in 1857 also promoted pro Ottoman sentiment among the Muslims of India. According to the author the programme of  the Deoband was to educate the students in strict observance of the Sunni orthodoxy of the  Hanafi school, and the seeking of closer relations with the Turkish Sultan-Caliph. 

Even though the Mughal Empire phased out, the Muslims of South Asia looked up to  the Ottoman Caliph as their protector so much so that when the British ventured out to  remove the Khilafat there was almost a revolution in India by the Muslims who warned the  British that if the Khilafat was abolished they would revolt against British rule in India. This  is one of the most powerful chapters of Indian history before partition of the country and is  known as the Khilafat Movement and must be dealt at length regarding the subject of  Turkey’s relations with South Asia’s Muslims.

 

Part Two: The effect of the First World War on Ottoman-Muslim Indian Relations 

When the British declared war on Turkey in November 1914 there was a huge Indo-Muslim  sympathy for Turkey. A state of war was brought about to the regret of Britain’s rulers of  India. Despite the assurances by the British that the Muslim holy places in Arabia and  Mesopotamia and the port of Jidda would remain immune from attack and that Hajj pilgrims  will not be interfered with, the Indo-Muslims however remained suspicious. Nevertheless the  Ulema did offer their fatwa or oath of loyalty to the British. But then the Arab revolt, the  Mesopotamian campaign, the fall of Jerusalem and the Balfour declaration affected many  articulate Muslims like the Ali Brothers. Abdul Bari began to feel that the British claims  about the non-religious character of the war were tenuous if not a total sham. The British|  Prime Minister Mr Lloyd George added to the suspicion by dubbing Allenby’s conquest of  Jerusalem as the ‘last and most triumphant of all Crusades.’ This did not seem to be a very  reassuring rhetoric at that time. 

Then on January 5 1918 Lloyd George spoke in parliament to reassure the Muslim  subjects of the Empire once again. ‘The Ottoman empire would not be deprived of  Constantinople, nor of the rich and renowned lands of Asia Minor and Thrace which are pre dominantly Turkish in race.’ But ‘the Arabs were entitled to a recognition of their own  separation of the national conditions!’

This was another blow to the Indo-Muslim opinion but not as terrible as the one  delivered after the war when the peace conference started. They were talking of carving up  the Ottoman Empire and threatened to take away Constantinople from the Turks. The Ali  Brothers in north India who led the Khilafat and the independence movement against the  British watched these changes from isolation and anger. They organised a protest against the  British decisions on Turkey. The Ali brothers who spearheaded this movement were  occasionally called upon to read the khutba. One such reading brought objections from the  British government who were then in control of India, because in the reading they had asked  God to grant victory and succour to the Caliph of Turkey and ‘destruction to the infidels.’ But  there was little the government could do. ‘You can’t blame me,’ said Shaukat the younger  brother, ‘if the Caliph of Islam happens to be the Sultan of Turkey.’10

Islam was the Indian Muslim’s sense of identity and near common denominator. Their  pro-Turkish sentiment was based upon the feelings of Islamic community solidarity and the  fact that the Turkish ruler was acknowledged as Caliph the symbolic head of the community. 

Most electrifying for most of the Muslims of India was news of the Arab revolt  against Turkey. The Council of the Muslim League passed a resolution condemning the  Sharif of Mecca and his followers as enemies of Islam, and the knowledge that the British  government must be involved was greeted with consternation and anger. So this kind of  solidarity of Indo-Muslims had always existed with the Turkish people according to the  archives of political history. 

The Mughals were successful in establishing themselves as the source of political 

legitimacy within India until the establishment of the East India Company depriving them  from their original authority. Various Indian Muslim princes still continued to recognise the  last Mughal Emperor even though they became independent of him. The Mughal Emperor’s  name was read in the khutba in the mosques on Fridays and coinage was minted in his name.  Other Indian Muslim princes seeking to establish hegemony in their own regions turned  towards the Ottoman Sultan Caliph as a source of legitimacy. The Khilafat as a symbol of  Muslim Unity and the supremacy of the Sharia had a special significance in the history of  Muslim rule in India. The Caliph was important especially in times of political confusion and  stood as a source of legitimacy based on the Sharia. 

When the British finally extinguished Mughal rule after 1857 they eliminated a whole  structure of religious-political authority. The Ottoman Sultan was one remaining authority as  a Sunni potentate and hence the only possible candidate for Caliph. He was the symbol not  only of the survival of the rule of Islamic law but also of past Islamic glory. In the late  nineteenth century for a variety of reasons a new and widespread acknowledgement of the  Ottoman Sultan as Caliph developed in India. Imams began to read the Sultan’s name in the  khutba on Friday in some Indian mosques. Each time the Ottomans were involved in a war – the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78, or the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 Muslims in India  channelled fund drives for Turkish relief. Such actions did not imply political allegiance to  the Turkish ruler but they were testimony to a sympathy for Turkey which could be exploited  in the interests of Muslim solidarity whether within in India or without. The plight of the  Khilafat seemed to reflect the fate of Islamic rule in India. And by the extension, the  threatened position of the Muslim elite in the rapidly changing political conditions of the  times. The precarious state of the institution of the Khilafat was concerning and created  anxiety as this was the symbol of the supremacy of Islamic law. This also caused serious  concern among local Indian Muslim elite. The Khilafat Movement emerged from such  groups. 

A quarter century later a group with the same ideology would demand a separate  Muslim state from Hindu majority India. This eventually came into being in 1947 when India  was partitioned forming the state of Pakistan that literally meant ‘land of the pure’. However  in spite of the partition owing to ideological differences and cultural and geographical  impediments nearly 45 per cent of the Muslims remained back in India. This is another  powerful chapter in the history of the sub-continent and needs to be dealt separately at greater length. 

What is fascinating is that this historical relationship between the Ottoman Turks and  the Muslims of the sub-continent still exists till today, this time as Turkey-Pakistan friendship  owing to the birth of Pakistan 65 years ago created by an elite group of Indian Muslims who  feared ‘Hindu’ nationalist hegemony. The Ottoman Empire did not phase out completely. It  survived till it gave way to the secular Turkish Republic in 1923. At the lowest ebb of their  history the Ottoman Turks lost an empire but never their freedom. How different it is from  the legacy of the Mughals!

Notes

1 In my soon to be published article Ashraf Razi ‘Turkey-Pakistan Political Relations: Some Observations’ available in The Eurasia Studies Society Journal, 2013, I will explore the relationship between the modern  countries of Turkey and Pakistan, the heirs to the Ottoman and Mughal Dynasties respectively. 2 Richard C. Foltz, Mughal India and Central Asia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

3Stephen Frederick Dale, ‘The Legacy of the Timurids’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain  and Ireland, Vol. 8, Issue. 1, April 1998, pp. 43-58. 

4 See Naimur Rahman Farooqi, A Study of Political and Diplomatic Relations between Mughal India and the  Ottoman Empire,1556-1748, Volume 1, USA: University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1986.

5 Ibid. 

6 Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of the Political and Diplomatic Relations between the Mughal  Empire and Iran, Tehran, 1970, p.82. 

7 Ibid.

8 Niccolao Manucci, II p. 433 in Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations, p. 95. See also ‘Uzuncarcillin Osmani  Tarihi,III part II’, p.268 in Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations, p. 95. 

9 S.S. Nadvi, ‘Khilafat aur Hindusthan’, p.175, in Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian Relations, p. 211.

10 Gail Minault, The Khilafat Movement, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982, p. 55.

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