Priyanka
Kumar
B.A.
History (Hons.), IIIrd Year
Tutorial Group – Thursday, 11:25 (Group IV A)
Q.
Examine the development of relations with the Rajput chieftains under
Aurangzeb.
Ans.
Aurangzeb, regarded as the last of the Great Mughals, ruled from 1658-1707.
During his reign, the Mughal Empire reached its territorial climax. However, it
also began to show signs of decline and disruption. Aurangzeb’s policy towards
the Rajputs has been clouded by immense controversy. The Mughal alliance with
the Rajput chieftains, a key factor in the expansion and consolidation of the
Mughal Empire under Akbar, is said to have been breached under Aurangzeb,
leading to the weakening and subsequent disintegration of the empire. However,
as has been shown in recent works, this is a simplistic approach and needs to
be further examined.
It
has traditionally been understood that the Mughal attitude towards the Rajput
chieftains was governed by the personal religious outlook of the individual
rulers. Thus, it has been argued that the religious orthodoxy of Aurangzeb and
his desire to establish a truly Muslim state was the reason of his breach with
the Rajputs, just as Akbar’s religious liberalism was the motive force of his
Rajput policy. But Mughal-Rajput relations should instead be seen in the deeper
political, economic and geo-strategic context.
The
Rajputana region, flanking the Gangetic Valley, is characterized by a rocky
terrain, inhospitable climate and infertile land. Yet it was always considered
important by the Mughals for strategic and political reasons. The region formed
a crucial link between the Gangetic Valley and the rich and flourishing sea
ports on the west coast of India on one hand, and with the prosperous tract of
Malwa in Central India on the other, which was important for trade and also
access to both Gujarat and the Deccan region.
Akbar,
who ruled from 1556-1605, was the first Mughal to recognize the importance of
alliance with the Rajputs. He initiated policies to conciliate the Rajput
chieftains and integrate them into the Mughal state through the mansabdari
system. Accordingly, the Rajputs were given a personal rank (zat) and asked to
maintain a specified number of troops (sawar) that could be placed in the
service of the Emperor. In lieu of salary, the Mughals frequently granted the
mansabdar a territorial grant (jagir), which in the case of the Rajputs was
generally their watan (home territory). Akbar also sought to guarantee the
allegiance of the Rajput rulers through matrimonial alliances with them. At the
same time, by acknowledging the authority of the rajas in the internal affairs
of their kingdoms and their positions as heads of the clans, he was able to
turn their hostility into support.
For
all practical purposes, thus, the states were independent. However, the Mughals
had one important right – over matters of succession. On the death of a raja,
the territory was, in theory, supposed to devolve to not his heir, but the
Mughal Emperor, who then had the right to choose the successor. In practice,
however, the state was generally returned to the nominated heir. A sanad was
presented to the new ruler, and tika marked on his forehead by the Emperor’s
delegate, legitimizing his ascent to the throne (gaddi). Frequently a Rajput
raja would avoid a succession dispute among his sons by having his heir designate
formally recognized by the Mughal Emperor.
Over
time, a symbiotic relationship developed. The rajas gained an opportunity to
increase personal power by imperial appointment. In return, they acknowledged
the suzerainty of the Emperor and provided large military forces and leadership
to the Mughals in their campaigns. Thus the Rajputs acquired an important
position in the Mughal Empire. This policy of religious toleration and
cooperation continued under Jahangir and Shah Jahan.
Aurangzeb, however, is said to have reversed the policy followed by his predecessors and alienated the Rajputs, in turn, leading to rebellion by the two major Rajput states – the Rathors of Marwar (Jodhpur) and the Sisodias of Mewar (Chitor). There has been a lot of debate about the factors which led to this breach between Aurangzeb and the Rajputs. Jadunath Sarkar, one of the first scholars to work on this, attributed it to Aurangzeb's narrow religious policy and his attempts to establish Islamic orthodoxy. He based himself on Persian sources like the Padishahnamah, the Muntakhab-ul-Lubab b Khafi Khan, manuscript newsletters of the Imperial Court (akhbarat-i-darbar-i-muala), letters of Aurangzeb; official records, biographical dictionaries etc., and accounts of European travelers like Bernier and Manucci In the recent writings, however, efforts have been made to assess Aurangzeb's policies in the context of social, economic and administrative problems that he faced during his rule. Although he was certainly more orthodox in his personal thinking than his predecessors, his actions were always guided by political expediency. A close examination of the development of Mughal-Rajput relations under Aurangzeb is thus required.
If
we begin with the War of Succession, it has been assumed that it was a war
between the liberal-minded Dara and an orthodox Aurangzeb, and so the Rajputs
sided with Dara. However, evidence shows that the Rajputs, like other ethnic
groups in the nobility, were internally divided on the issue. Athar Ali has
shown the number of Hindus on the side of Aurangzeb were 28, opposed to 32 on
the side of Dara. Jaswant Singh of Marwar, sent by Shah Jahan, was defeated by
Aurangzeb at the Battle of Dharmat (1658). Some Rajput clans, like the Hadas,
fought for Dara. Aurangzeb also went out of his way to conciliate and win over
leading Rajput rajas. Qanungo has shown how Raja Jai Singh of Amber became a
secret supporter of Aurangzeb and played a key role in the overthrow of Dara.
Aurangzeb also established cordial relations with Rana Raj Singh of Mewar. He
issued several nishans (princely order) to the Rana, agreeing to assign to him
four parganas (Pur, Mandal, Badnor etc.), which had been sequestered by Shah
Jahan in 1654 as a punishment for the breach of the treaty of 1615, in return
for the services of a Rajput contingent. He also assured him of religious
toleration. After the battle of Dharmat, Kanwar Sardar Singh joined Aurangzeb
and was present in the battle against Shuja. Thus, Dara failed to win over the
important Rajput rajas to his side.
After
accession to the throne in 1658, Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajputs passed
through a number of phases which need to be analyzed separately.
In
the early phase, from 1658 to 1667, Aurangzeb’s relations with the Rajput rajas
were cordial. In fact, during the period the Rajputs were treated as partners
in the kingdom, and in some respects, their position actually improved from
what it had been under Shah Jahan. The percentage of non-Indian Muslims
employed in the mansabdari system remained almost constant from Akbar to
Aurangzeb. Rana Jai Singh was a close advisor to Aurangzeb, so much so that a
contemporary historian, Ishwardas, calls him “the key to the brain” of
Aurangzeb. In 1665, he was appointed viceroy of the Deccan, a charge normally
given to princes of blood or nobles of the highest rank and confidence. At his
instance, Aurangzeb also pardoned Jaswant Singh, in spite of his support for
Dara and his role at the battles of Dharmat and Khajwah; and he was posted as
Governor of Gujarat even without appearing at the court for formal leave as was
the custom. There had been no Rajput officer throughout the reign of Shah Jahan
holding the rank of 7000. Now both Jai Singh and Jaswant Singh were promoted to
a rank of 7000. Rana Raj Singh’s mansab was also raised to 6000/6000 (1000
du-aspa sih-aspa), the sequestered parganas restored and his overlordship over
Dungarpur, Banswara, Devaliya etc. recognized, as had been promised before the
war.
Likewise,
good relations were maintained with the other important states of Bikaner,
Bundi and Kota. Although Rao Karan of Bikaner had abandoned Aurangzeb in the
Deccan after hearing of the illness of Shah Jahan and had gone home, he was
pardoned. Rao Chhatrasal of Bundi, and Mukund Singh of Kota had laid down their
lives fighting against Aurangzeb, but there was no attempt to interfere in the
succession there, or to show displeasure in any way.
However,
it is true that such tokens of honour as the putting of tika on the forehead of
the Rajput rajas by the Emperor himself or the chief wazir were withdrawn.
Matrimonial alliances also came to an end during Aurangzeb's reign. However,
this had started during the time of Shah Jahan itself. The ban on tika can be
attributed to the financial crisis faced by the state in this period, a big gap
between the jama and the haasil. Matrimonial alliances had been used by Akbar
to strengthen the relationship with the Rajputs. This had already been achieved
by the time of Shah Jahan and Aurangzeb, and can thus explain the absence of
marriages between the Rajputs and the Mughals.
Between
1666 and 1679, relations between Aurangzeb and the Rajputs seem gradually to
have become cool. In 1660, Rana Raj Singh was asked to explain why he had
invaded Kishangarh and married the young Raja's sister, Charumati, “without
Imperial permission”. Raj Singh replied that permission was not asked for since
Rajputs had always married Rajputs and this had not been forbidden. Moreover,
his ancestors had married among the Pawars of Ajmer. He also pointed out that
he had not engaged in any hostilities with the Imperial forces. The explanation
of the Rana was accepted, but Aurangzeb showed his displeasure by restoring
Ghayaspur (Devaliya) and Banswara to Hari Singh, who had been ousted by the
Rana and had been at the Imperial court since 1659. Subsequently, the younger
sister of Charumati was married to Prince Muazzam.
Aurangzeb
also faced a series of domestic challenges in this period. There were the Jat
and the Satnami uprisings, continued conflict with the Afghans, the Assamese
and the Marathas, and a growing financial crisis reflected in a gap between
income and expenditure. One response of Aurangzeb was to re-emphasize Islam as
a major bond of unity by instituting a series of orthodox measures, and coming
closer to the ulama. Yet the Rajputs continued to receive important positions.
They sided with the Mughals in trying to crush the Jat uprising as well as the
peasant-based Satnami uprising. Rajput forces were also despatched to deal with
the two frontiers, the north-east and the north-west. Jaswant Singh was given
charge of north-west. Raja Ram Singh, who had been restored to the mansab of
5000 following the death of Jai Singh in 1667, was sent to the north-east.
However, unlike Mir Jumla earlier, he was not given the charge of the subah of
Bengal so that its resources could be used for the campaign.
The
surprising part was that they were virtually made to languish there for long
periods. It does not, of course, follow that the presence of these premier
Rajput rajas at the court would have influenced Aurangzeb's policies. But their
virtual banishment to distant places does support the suggestion of the
contemporary observer, Mamuri, that before his departure for the Deccan, i.e.
during this period, Aurangzeb had been exercising restraint in promoting the
Rajputs.
It
also seems that the percentage of Rajput nobles to the total number of nobles
dropped, as did their aggregate ranks. Information about the mansab promotions
and reductions is given in the official chronicle, Alamgirnamah of Mirza
Muhammad Kasim. It shows that, on the whole, the old proportion of appointment
of the Rajputs was not being maintained. It also seems that while during the
first 6 years of the decade, the Rajputs were granted relatively higher ranks,
during the last 4 years, their position declined appreciably. The sawar ranks
held by them were reduced in absolute terms. All this suggests a growing
reservation on the part of Aurangzeb towards the Rajputs. However, this could
be as Aurangzeb faced a problem of lack of suitable lands (paibaqi) available
for assignment of jagirs. After the failure of his campaigns to extend Mughal
territory, he may have decided to limit the number of jagirs that the Rajputs
could hold outside their homelands. Subsequently he allotted to other groups of
the Mughal nobility the revenue grants and promotions that might have gone to
the Rajputs.
The
real break in relations comes in the latter half of Aurangzeb’s reign. This
period witnessed the major rebellion by the states of Marwar and Mewar in 1679.
The causes for this breach between Aurangzeb and Mewar and Marwar have
generally been sought in the religious and political policies pursued by
Aurangzeb. However, the complexity in the actions of the Emperor should be
noted. For instance, although there are instances of temple destruction, grants
were also given to temples in Mathura and for the maintenance of several
Brahmins and maths.
The
re-imposition of jaziya by Aurangzeb in 1679 is generally regarded as marking
the culmination of the spirit of religious bigotry, which led to the alienation
of the Rajputs. The timing of the re-imposition has led some historians to
consider the measure as the impetus for a final call of arms by the Rajput race
against the bigotry of the Hindu Emperor. However, there is no evidence to show
that it had any effect on the relations of the Rajputs with the Emperor.
Relations between Raj Singh of Mewar remained cordial even after the enactment
of jaziya. In fact, his son Jai Singh was a guest at the imperial court till
April 1679. At the time the prince returned to Mewar carrying with him several
presents from Aurangzeb to the Rana, there is no suggestion of animosity
between Mewar and the Mughals. Later that month Aurangzeb issued a farman to
the Rana assuring him of his continued support and friendship Furthermore,
there is no record of Raj Singh protesting against the reinstitution of jaziya.
As G. N. Sharma notes, “Had there been any such protest, the local annalists
who have given minute details of other events would not have left this
unnoticed”. Tradition says that the Rana sent a letter of protest to the Emperor.
But its authorship is under question – while James Tod and K. S. Das ascribe it
to Raj Singh, J. N. Sarkar asserts that the style and content of the letter
suggest that Shivaji had written it. Thus, to ascribe the war between Raj Singh
and Aurangzeb to the re-imposition of jaziya by the latter is entirely
incorrect.
Also,
to say that the measure was intended to force a conversion of the Hindus is a
misrepresentation of the facts. People who served in the Mughal army were
exempt from it, as were priests and religious heads. Instead, the policy seems
to have been reintroduced due to serious political and economic considerations.
Having ascended the throne as a ‘champion of Islam’, Muslim theologians made it
seem binding on him to impose the tax. Also, one of his initial acts after
succession had been to abolish nearly 80 oppressive taxes. This meant an
enormous decrease in the imperial income. This coupled with heavy expenditure
entailed in quelling disturbances and waging wars, added o the financial crisis
and may have driven the Emperor to re-impose the tax.
Satish
Chandra points out that while Aurangzeb’s policies are extremely important, the
developments inside Rajputana, including the inter-state relations in the area
and the policies and ambitions of the individual rulers, in shaping
Mughal-Rajput relations should also be taken cognizance of. Keeping this in
mind, one can understand the rebellion of Marwar, and later Mewar, against the
Mughals in 1679.
The
crisis began when Jaswant Singh died in November 1678, with no surviving heir.
This raised the problem of who was to succeed to the gaddi. There were no
definite principles regulating succession in Marwar. Earlier, in 1638, Maharaja
Gaj Singh had set aside the elder son, Amar Singh, and nominated Jaswant Singh.
The nomination was accepted by Shah Jahan, although Jaswant Singh was only a
minor, whereas Amar Singh had performed useful service in the Deccan. So, when
news reached Aurangzeb at Agra, he converted the state of Marwar into khalisa.
According
to Jadunath Sarkar, there were many reasons why Aurangzeb “annexed” Jodhpur.
Firstly, he felt that as one of the leading Hindu states, Marwar could emerge
as the centre of Hindu opposition to his policy of temple destruction and the
imposition of jaziya. V. S. Bhargava agrees, suggesting that Aurangzeb wanted
to deprive the Hindus of a possible strong-head in their resistance to his
policy of religious persecution. Also, he wanted to take vengeance for the role
played by Jaswant Singh in the War of Succession, when he had sided first with
Dara. The Ajitodayas and Ajit Vilas of the second quarter of the 18th century
assert that Aurangzeb had never forgiven Jaswant Singh for his disloyalty
during the war against Shuja. Moreover, being strategically located on route to
the Deccan, he wanted it to be in the hands of someone more loyal than Jaswant
Singh had been. Further, Aurangzeb’s policy of forcible conversion of Hindus
“required that Jodhpur should sink into a quiescent dependency or a regular
province of the Empire.”
Jadunath's
conclusions have been contested by a number of historians, especially in the
light of the two contemporary sources which have recently been discovered - the
Persian Waqai Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambhor and the Rajasthani Jodhpur
Hukumat-ri-Bahi. The former is the secret report of a news-writer posted at
Ranthambhor and Ajmer during the Rathor rebellion and who then accompanied the
Imperial army in the Rajput war. The latter deals with the Jodhpur state under
Jaswant Singh, and gives a detailed account of the developments in the
Maharaja’s camp from the time of his death till the arrival of Durga Das and
the Ranis at the court at Delhi, and their subsequent flight to Jodhpur.
Firstly,
it has been argued that if Aurangzeb did actually want to punish Jaswant Singh,
why would he have waited for so long? Moreover, Aurangzeb had actually pardoned
him and appointed him as subahdar of Gujarat. Later he was sent to Jamrud as
thanadar. There is also no reason to
suppose that the taking of Jodhpur into khalisa signified its
"annexation" to the Empire. Apart from the fact that the state
already formed a part of the Mughal Empire, there were many precedents of a
state being occupied pending the settlement of a disputed succession. For
instance, in 1669 when Rai Singh had usurped the gaddi of Nawanagar from his
nephew, Satarsal (Chhatrasal), the state was occupied, the name of the capital
being changed to Islamnagar, and officials appointed to administer the state.
After some time however, the state was restored to Tamachi, the son of Rai
Singh. Similarly, in Jaisalmer, in 1650, on the death of Rawal Manohardas, who
had died heirless, the queens and the Bhatis nominated Ram Chandra, a
descendant of Rawal Maldeo's second son, Bhawani Singh. However, Shah Jahan
conferred the kingdom on Sabal Singh, a descendant of Rawal Maldeo's eighth
son, Khetsi.
Apart
from the disputed succession, the growing lawlessness in Marwar could have been
a contributory factor for Aurangzeb’s decision. Evidence of this is provided in
the Waqai Sarkar Ajmer wa Ranthambor also. The Mertias had risen up rendered
the roads to Ahmedabad unsafe, while the zamindars in Ranthambhor and in the
neighborhood of Ajmer had withheld the land revenue from the jagirs. Some of
the parganas, such as Phalodi and Pokharan, which had been allotted in jagir to
the Maharaja, were claimed by the neighbouring states, and they prepared to use
force to enforce their claims.
The
jagir of a chieftain was sometimes also converted to khalisa if he owed the
state a large sum of money. This is true in the case of Jaswant Singh also. 40
lakhs of rupees taken on loan by the Maharaja when he was the Governor of
Gujarat had not been repaid. There is no evidence that Jaswant Singh settled
his account with the imperial treasury by the time of his death in 1678.
Thus
we see that Aurangzeb did not break any Mughal precedent in his order to
convert Marwar into khalisa land. However this move was resisted by the queens
of Jaswant Singh, especially the chief queen Rani Hadi, who pleaded that it was
against custom that his descendants should be dispossessed. She wrote a letter
to Aurangzeb, asking her to allow her to retain Jodhpur and convert the rest to
khalisa land. Two of the Ranis of Jaswant Singh were pregnant and so Rani Hadi
apparently wanted to delay a decision by Aurangzeb. Her claim was backed by a
strong body of Rathors, and by Rana Raj Singh of Mewar, who deputed an army of
5000 horses under one of his leading men, Sanwal Das, to help Rani Hadi. In order
to overawe Rani Hadi and her supporters, and to enforce his orders, Aurangzeb
left Delhi for Ajmer. The supporters of Rani Hadi were in no position to
withstand the Imperial forces, and they entered Jodhpur.
The
situation became complicated as two claims to the gaddi were put forward - by
Indra Singh, who was the grandson of Jaswant Singh's elder brother, Amar Singh;
and by Anup Singh, who was the son of a daughter of Amar Singh. Indra Singh
argued that a great injustice had been done when the claims of Amar Singh were
passed over. He pleaded that this ancient wrong should now be put right. He
also offered to pay 20 lakhs of rupees as peshkash. Anup Singh offered to pay a
peshkash of 25 lakhs and also offered to realize 20 lakhs for the Imperial treasury
from Jaswant Singh's estate.
Meanwhile,
two posthumous sons of the Raja were born. Their claims were now supported,
among others, by Rao Anup Singh, the ruler of Bikaner, and by Khan-i-Jahan, the
Imperial Bakshi. Finally Aurangzeb invested Indra Singh as ruler of Marwar for
a peshkash of 36 lakhs. This was in keeping with the Mughal traditions, which
gave the Emperor rights over succession matters. But it started a dispute
within the Rathors. Earlier, desperately seeking to delay a decision in favour
of Indra Singh, Rani Hadi had secretly made an astounding offer - that the
Rathors would themselves destroy all the temples in Marwar if the tika was
given to a son of Jaswant Singh. This was rejected by Aurangzeb As a last
resort, Rani Hadi urged that rather than Jodhpur being conferred upon Indra
Singh, it should remain in khalisa. If Aurangzeb was being guided by religious
orthodoxy and had desired to annex Marwar in order to further his objective of
the forcible conversion of Hindus, as has been suggested by J. N. Sarkar, he
should have accepted Rani Hadi's offer and kept Marwar in khalisa.
On
15 April, the two minor sons of Jaswant Singh reached Delhi along with their
mothers and Durga Das, Jaswant Singh’ senior officer. They again pressed the
claims of Ajit Singh, the elder son, with great vehemence. Aurangzeb proposed
that the infant be brought up in the Imperial Palace and promised to restore
the kingdom to him when he would attain the age of discretion. Erroneously
supposing that the intention of the Emperor was to bring up the boy as a
Muslim, the Ranis left Delhi with him in disguise. But Aurangzeb had only
doubted the legitimacy of the child and wanted him brought to Delhi so that it
may be inquired into. The fact that the child who had been left behind by the
Rajputs, and whom Aurangzeb pretended to regard as genuine, was converted to
Islam is not a proof of the evil intention of Aurangzeb for it was a well-known
convention that if a raja's son changed his religion, willingly or unwillingly,
he lost all claim to his hereditary principality. For instance, after defeating
Jujhar Singh Bundela, Shah Jahan had conferred the gaddi on his cousin, Devi
Singh, and had either killed the sons of Jujhar Singh or converted them to
Islam in order that they may forfeit their right to the gaddi for all time.
The
arrival of Ajit Singh and Durga Das in Jodhpur marked the beginning of the
Rathor uprising. They openly attacked the Mughals officials. So the Mughals now
retaliated by using force against them. Aurangzeb also removed Indra Singh from
the gaddi on the ground that “he was too incompetent to rule the country and
put down the disturbances”. Towards the end of September, Aurangzeb himself
reached Ajmer. After that, temporarily, resistance in Marwar was and Jodhpur
was occupied. Even Rani Hadi submitted after some time. Durga Das now turned to
Mewar for help and along with Ajit Singh, escaped to the Mewar territories,
where he was welcomed by the Rana, and given the jagir of Kelwa for his
maintenance. If the Rathors had not received active help and encouragement from
Rana Raj Singh from the outset, it is likely that their resistance to Aurangzeb
would have collapsed.
The
interest taken by the Rana in the Marwar dispute cannot be explained merely on
the basis of support to the principle of legitimacy, for he had extended
support to Rani Hadi at a time before the two posthumous sons of Jaswant Singh
had been born, and the claim of Indra Singh was the strongest from the point of
view of legitimacy. Nor can it be explained on the ground of an implied threat
to the Hindu religion for there is no evidence of any protest on the part of
the Rana against Aurangzeb's policy regarding temples and his re-imposition of
the jaziya. Nor, contrary to general belief, was the mother of Ajit Singh a
relation of the Rana. Thus the Rana had no personal interest in the succession
of Ajit Singh.
Several
reasons have been identified as to why Mewar joined the rebellion with the
Rathors. It is possible that the Rana
was moved by the generous impulse of helping his sister-in-law, Rani Hadi. He
may also have hoped to gain some territorial advantage. Further, Aurangzeb had
drawn Raj Singh into an alliance with him during the War of Succession. Though
he made a number of concessions to the Rana, he could hardly honour the vague
promise held out by him of restoring the Rana to the position and honour
enjoyed by Rana Sangram Singh. Raj Singh, therefore, gradually drifted away
from Aurangzeb. Also, Mewar had, before the coming of the Mughals, been the
most prominent state in Rajputana. And although they had submitted to the
Mughals in 1615, they wanted to restore their lost prestige and possessions.
Moreover, while all other petty Rajput states had earlier been their
feudatories, now, through alliances with the Mughals, states such as Bikaner
and Amber had forged ahead On the other hand, Mewar itself had been subjected
to humiliating restrictions regarding Chittor, and the Mughals had granted
independent status to some of the states on the southern border of Mewar, such
as Banswara, Durgapur, Pratapgarh, Devaliya, etc. To add to this, a number of
Mewar parganas had been sequestered by Shah Jahan in 1654 for a breach of the
agreement regarding Chittor. Thus, the Ranas of Mewar chafed at the
restrictions placed on them by the Mughals and may have hoped to use the
situation to demonstrate the importance of Mewar in Rajput affairs, and thus
re-establish, to some extent, its position as the premier state of Rajasthan.
Initially
the Rana had viewed the succession struggle in Marwar with indifference, since
rivalry and antagonism had always characterized the relations between the two
leading states. However, as an increasing number of Mughal forces came to be
stationed in the Rathor state, the proximity of Mewar to Jodhpur and the
formidable military strength of the Mughals in the vicinity could have created
an uneasiness in his mind. The Emperor’s decision to personally direct the
operations against Marwar from Ajmer created further apprehension in the
Sisodian state. This may also have contributed in Raj Singh’s decision to
protect the young Ajit from the Mughals.
As
a result, the war now extended to Mewar as well. With this, Marwar became a
secondary factor in the war, though sporadic Rathor resistance continued. In
early 1680, Aurangzeb left the suppression campaign in the hands of Prince Azam
and his two brothers, Muazzam and Akbar. For nearly a year the Mughals had only
mixed success in dealing with the harassing activities of the Rajputs in each
kingdom. This situation changed after Raj Singh’s death in September 1680. His
death removed the chief bond of unity between the Sishodias and the Rathors.
The new Rana Jai Singh was lukewarm to Ajit Singh's cause.
Throughout
this period a continuing series of secret Rajput emissaries entreated Prince
Akbar to rebel against his father and seize the throne with Rajput support.
Finally, on January 1 1681, Akbar crowned himself emperor. However, he was
defeated by Aurangzeb and escaped to Maharashtra. Akbar’s flight suddenly
converted what had been merely an awkward rebellion by the Rathors to a
full-blown imperial crisis. These developments suggest that Aurangzeb's Rajput
policy had caused widespread concern, not only among the Rajputs but in a
section of the Mughal nobility as well. This treaty signaled the end of the
Rajput rebellion against Aurangzeb.
The
war lasted till 1681. By now both parties desired peace – the Rajputs because
they had tired of war, and the Emperor because matters had taken a serious turn
in the south and required his urgent presence there. As a result, the Treaty of
Rajsamudra was signed, according to which Jai Singh was acknowledged as the
Rana of Mewar and given a mansab of 5000. In return, he ceded certain tracts (3
parganas) of his territory to the Mughal Empire, i.e., Pur, Mandal and Badnor,
but this territory was returned 3 years later. The demand for jaziya was also
dropped. The fortress of Chittor was not to be repaired. He also had to supply
a contingent of 1000 Rajputs for service in the Deccan. The Mughals would withdraw
their forces from Mewar. The treaty of proved to be the basis of a lasting
peace between the Sisodian Rajputs and the Mughals. Jai Singh was honoured and
his younger brother Bhim Singh was posted at Ajmer as a mansabdar in the
imperial service. These cordial relations continued under Jai Singh’s successor
Rana Amar Singh, who ruled from 1698-1707.
In
Marwar, however, during the period 1681-1707, the war continued to be waged
intermittently and with varying degrees of intensity. After the failure of Akbar’s
rebellion, most of the Rathors had deserted Durga Das and returned to Marwar.
They now decided to accept imperial rule and attempted to obtain positions in
the Mughal administration of the state. After the Treaty, Durga Das and his
followers were completely isolated. They tried to gain the support of the
Maratha leader, Shambhuji, who was also at war with Aurangzeb. But although
Shambhuji granted them asylum and provided for their maintenance, his initial
reaction to the rebels was cool. The Emperor left for Deccan on 8 September
1681, and his presence in the south prevented Shambhuji from giving the rebel
prince any substantive support.
The
effect of the breach with Marwar and Mewar on the Mughal Empire should not be
overestimated. The scale of the Mughal military operations in the area after
the treaty with the Rana in 1681 was too small to effect the Mughal operations
elsewhere, or to constitute a serious drain. We may, however, agree with
Jadunath Sarkar that “the loss caused to Aurangzeb by his Rajput policy cannot
be measured solely by the men and money he poured on that desert soil”.
Inability to settle the issues concerning these states affected the prestige of
the empire and increased the area of lawlessness. Above all, it created doubts
about the political sagacity of Aurangzeb as well as his bonafides in his
dealings with non-Muslims. This helped to swell the tide of political
disaffection and religious discord in the country, and was also reflected in
the efforts of various royal princes to intrigue with the Rajput rajas, and to
form their own groups and factions.
Aurangzeb's
breach with Marwar and Mewar does not signify his breach with the Rajputs as
such. The rebellion had only involved the Rathors and Sisodias. The other clans
had not only remained aloof, but had also served under the Mughals. The Waqai
Sarkar Ajmer gives frequent reports of Rajput officers joining the Mughal army
with their contingents.
The
rebellion, thus, did not initiate any great decline in the fortunes of the
Rajput nobility. Though in the period 1679-1707, we find only 73 Rajput
officers out of a total 575 – mere 12.6% compared to the proportionate number
of Rajputs in 1658-78, which was 14.6% - this may be held out to mark a
decline. It should, however, be kept in mind that this was a general decline
suffered by the non-Deccani elements. If we take the non-Deccani nobles alone,
then the number of Rajputs amounted to 16.6% of the total in 1658-78, while in
1679-1707, the Rajputs numbered 17.6%. The rulers of Amber, Bikaner, Bundi and
Kota continued to serve in the Mughal armies even after 1679. Raja Anup Singh
of Bikaner and his son, Kesari Singh, as well as Rao Bhao of Bundi and his son
and successor, Anirudha Kishore Singh, served in the Deccan and also against
the Jats. Almost every Rajput state had its contingent fighting in the Deccan
alongside Aurangzeb’s army. Thus we cannot say that there was a special
discrimination against Rajputs after 1678 and they still formed an influential
group within the imperial nobility.
Scholars
like J. N. Sarkar and S. R. Sharma have presented the Rajput rebellion as a
Hindu-Muslim confrontation. However this is not consistent with the facts of
the revolt. Aurangzeb’s appointment of Indra Singh and the Rajput support for
Prince Akbar seem to belie the idea of a Hindu-Muslim conflict. It may also be
argued that with the gradual consolidation of the Mughal Empire in the north,
and the shift of emphasis to the conquest of the Deccan and the compulsion of
accommodating the local ruling elements, specifically the Marathas into the
nobility, alliance with the Rajputs had lost its urgency. Instead, it was the
Rajput rajas now that needed the alliance more than the Mughals in order to
maintain their internal positions and to augment their limited resources by
grant of jagirs outside Rajasthan in addition to their watan. A careful study
of the rebellion thus makes it clear that the rebellion was neither a general
uprising by the people of Marwar against Mughal authority nor a concerted effort
by the Rathor clan to resist Mughal imperialism; it was merely an internal feud
between competing factions of the Rathor clan for control of the offices and
revenues of Marwar.
Although
more recent historians have recognized the complexities of Mughal-Rajput
relations in the reign of Aurangzeb, the tendency to reduce the Rajput
rebellion to a Hindu-Muslim confrontation remains. However this distorts the
motives of both the rebels and Aurangzeb. The war was not a communal
confrontation, as it has been made out to be in the 20th century, but a
struggle between a traditional, parochial political system and an expansionist
empire. Moreover, they were intra-clan wars, in which the Mughals were forced
to interfere. Thus overall, it cannot be said that Aurangzeb reversed Akbar’s
policy. The relations should just be seen in the specific context of the
problems that he faced in his period, be it political, institutional or
financial.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Jadunath Sarkar – History Of Aurangzib,
Volumes III & IV
2. S. M. Jaffar – The Mughal Empire From
Babar To Aurangzeb
3. Zahiruddin Faruki – Aurangzeb And His
Times
4. Visheshwar Sarup Bhargava – Marwar And
The Mughal Emperors (A.D. 1526-1748)
5. G. N. Sharma – Mewar And The Mughal
Emperors (1526-1707 A.D.)
6. J. F. Richards – The Mughal Empire (From
The New Cambridge History Of India Series)
7. Satish Chandra – Medieval India: From
Sultanat To The Mughals, Part Two: Mughal Empire (1526-1748 A.D.)
8. Satish Chandra – Mughal Religious
Policies, The Rajputs And The Deccan
9. Robert C. Hallissey – The Rajput
Rebellion Against Aurangzeb: A Study Of The Mughal Empire In The
Seventeenth-Century India
10. M. Athar Ali - The Mughal Nobility Under
Aurangzeb
11. Muzaffar Alam and Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.)
– The Mughal State, 1526-1750
a. Some Notes On Rājput Loyalties During
The Mughal Period – Norman P. Ziegler
12. ARTICLES :-
a. The Religious Issue In The War Of
Successions (1658-1659) – Muhammad Athar Ali
b. A Re-Examination Of The Factors Leading
To The Breach Between Aurangzib And Rana Raj Singh – Satish Chandra