AKBAR (1556-1605)

By S. Roy

Below are the main topics covered in this article

• Period of Tutelage 
• Early Conquests 
• Religious Policy 
• Conquests in North India 
• Foreign Policy 
• Conquests in the Deccan 
• Revolt of Salim 
• Death of Akbar—His Personality

I. PERIOD OF TUTELAGE 

The news of Humayun’s death was concealed by Bairam Khan1 in order to prepare for the unopposed succession of Akbar. A man resembling Humayun and dressed up like him made public appear¬ ance while the Turkish admiral Sldi ‘All Ra’is, who happened to be at Delhi, left for Lahorela and assured the people of Huma¬ yun’s recovery. On 14 February, 1556, Akbar ascended the throne at the age of thirteen years and a few months.15 The task before the young emperor and his veteran guardian was very difficult and complicated. His hold on the kingdom, only recently recover¬ ed, was very uncertain. The small army under Bairam Khan had but a precarious hold on certain districts in the Punjab; and both the army and the nobility were heterogeneous bodies of uncertain loyalty. Three Afghan princes of the Sur family still contested the sovereignty of Hindusthan. Himu, the Hindu general, who nominally acted on behalf of his Afghan master but aspired to sovereign power, further complicated the situation. The fairest parts of Hindusthan were devastated by a frightful famine and an epidemic plague.

 

Immediately after Akbar’s accession, Bairam Khan, who held the reins of government, had to arrest Shah Abu-T-Ma‘ali, a favou¬ rite noble of Humayun, who at first refused to attend the emperor’s court and misbehaved when he did attend it-2 Bairam wanted to execute him but, at the young sovereign’s intercession, the culprit was sent to Lahore in confinement. Bairam Khan then resumed his activity against Sikandar Sur and from Kalanaur proceeded with Akbar up to Dahmiri (modern Nurpur in Kangra district) where they remained for about three months in order to keep watch over the Sur 'pretender’. But the arch-enemy was neither Sikandar, who had become a spent force after Machiwara and Sirhind, nor Ibrahim Sur, whose ambition had been frustrated by Sikandar at Farah, nor even the musician king ‘Adi! Shah who was at Chunar, but his powerful lieutenant Hlmu. 

Himu must be regarded as a very remarkabl personality among the Hindus in medieval India. By his uncommon ability and commanding talent Hlmu had raised himself from an humble shop-keeper at Rewarl to the cabinet of ‘Adil Shah who made him his first minister and chief commander- It is said that he fought ‘two and twenty’ battles with his master’s opponents and was victo¬ rious in all of them. Nominally acting on behalf of ‘Adil Shah, HImu really aspired to carving out a Hindu kingdom on the ruins of Muslim power. The accession of young Akbar offered him the opportunity for striking at Delhi. With a huge body of cavalry and elephants, he marched from Gwalior to Agra whose governor Iskandar Khan, the Uzbeg, failed to defend it against the superior force of the invader and fled to Delhi. HImu took Agra and then advanced on Delhi. Tardl Beg Khan, the governor of Delhi, gave battle. The Mughuls began by routing Himu’s vanguard and right wing but HImu suddenly made such a violent charge on the Mughul centre that Tardl Beg who commanded it failed to resist and fled from the field of battle. This broke the morale of his army, the flight became general and Delhi fell into Himu’s hands. 

When the report of the fall of Delhi reached Akbar at Jullun dur, the majority of his nobles advised an immediate retreat to Kabul as the enemy’s force was far stronger. But the hero of Machlwara and Sirhind was not to abandon so easily the throne of Hindusthan; Bairam, rejecting all defeatist counsel, decided to give battle. Leaving Khizr Khvaja Khan at Jullundur to subdue Sikan dar Sur, Akbar and Bairam marched towards Delhi. At Sirhind, they were joined by the fugitive governors, Iskandar Khan, Tardl Beg Khan and ‘All Qull Khan, who had been forced to leave Sam bhal. Here Bairam Khan took the drastic step of executing Tardl Beg Khan for his failure at Delhi while Akbar was away on hunt¬ ing. Some modern historians follow Firishta in justifying it on the ground of State necessity and there can be no doubt that Bai¬ ram Khan’s bold step calmed all disaffection among the nobles and restored unity and discipline to the army which were so essential for the infant Mughul State at that critical juncture. A dispassion¬ ate study of the contemporary chronicles, however, reveals that the Shiah Bairam wanted to remove a powerful Sunni rival, and Tardl Beg Khan’s failure at Delhi, due to cowardice or negligence or indiscretion, offered him the opportunity when State necessity coincided with self-interest; and afterwards Bairam exacted from the emperor a reluctant approval of his action-3 

From Sirhind, Akbar and Bairam advanced towards Delhi to meet the enemy who was now master of Delhi and Agra. HImu at the height of his power gave up the mask, took the title of Raja Vikramaditya and made his Afghan soldiers call him HImu Shah. The defeat of his advance guard and the capture of his artillery by ‘All Quli Khan did not dishearten Himu who marched on with a huge cavalry of 50,000 Afghans and Rajputs and 1,500 elephants. On 5 November, 1556, the two armies met face to face on the historic battlefield of Panipat. The Mughul army, which was positively inferior in number, did not possess more than 25,000 horse. Himu began the battle with a vehement charge on the Mughul ranks which threw the wings into confusion. He then directed his attack with all his elephants against the centre com¬ manded by ‘All Quli Khan. In spite of their valiant efforts, the Mughuls under ‘All Quli Khan could not stand the onset of Himu. He was on the point of gaining victory when an arrow struck him in the eye and pierced his brain and he fell unconscious in the saddle. This turned the tide of the battle- Himu’s army lost its morale and dispersed. Two thousand were killed during retreat and all of Himu’s elephants fell into the hands of the Mughuls who obtained a complete and decisive victory. The battle sealed the fate of the Afghans and completed the work of Machiwara and Sirhind. The story of the Mughul empire now begins 

Himu was captured by Shah Quli Khan Mahram who brought him to the presence of Akbar at a short distance from the field of action. Bairam Khan begged him to slay Himu with his own hand in order to gain the reward of jihad (crusade against in¬ fidels) and the title of ghazi (hero combating infidels). Akbar ac¬ cordingly struck Himu with his sword and Bairam Khan followed him. The story of Akbar’s magnanimity and refusal to kill a fallen foe seems to be a later courtly invention.41 The humane and libe¬ ral emperor of Hindusthan who preached sulh-i-kull (universal toleration) was not born but made. 

After the victory of Panipat Akbar made his triumphant entry into Delhi. Bairam Khan appointed his servant Pir Muhammad Sherwanii to suppress Haji Khan, an officer of Sher Shah, who was acting independently in Alwar and to capture the family and pro¬ perty of Himu which were there. Haji Khan fled before the arrival of the Mughul army and Himu’s wife also escaped, but Pir Muham¬ mad captured his vast wealth and his octogenarian father whom he put to death on his refusal to accept Islam. 

Meanwhile Sikandar Sur had defeated Khizr Khvaja Khan at Chamiari (in Amritsar district), driven him back to Lahore and begun to collect taxes with Kalanaur as his headquarters- Bairam Khan promptly sent Iskandar Khan, the Uzbeg, now styled Khan ‘Alam, to assist Khizr Khvaja Khan and on 7 December, 1556, he and Akbar left Delhi to deal with the enemy. They proceeded on to Dahmlrl, but Sikandar retreated to the hill country of the Siwa liks and took refuge in the strong fortress of Mankot5 which Islam Shah had built at enormous cost as a bulwark against Gakkhar aggression. Bairam Khan besieged the fort but its natural advan¬ tages and store of provisions enabled Sikandar to resist the Mughuls for about six months. But Sikandar relied more on the Afghans in other parts of the country who, he expected, would create diver¬ sion. The defeat and death of ‘Adil in the battle near Chunar with Khizr Khan Sur of Bengal and the suppression of Rukn Khan LohanI and Jalal Khan Sur by ‘All Quit Khan, Khan Zaman, un¬ nerved Sikandar who surrendered the fort on 25 July, 1557, and left for Bihar and then for Bengal where he died two years later. 

Akbar marched to Lahore where he remained for four months. Bahadur Khan put down the Baluch disturbances in Multan and Bairam executed Takht Mai, raja of Mau (Pathankot), for his alliance with Sikandar. In December Akbar left for Delhi and on the way at Jullundur, Bairam Khan, then aged more than fifty, married his nineteen year old cousin Salima Begam.6 After cross¬ ing the Sutlej, Akbar learnt of the growing power of HajI Khan who had fled from Alwar to Ajmer, established his authority there and was marching on Hissar. Bairam Khan accordingly sent to Hissar reinforcement under Pir Muhammad Khan, whereupon HajI Khan escaped to Gujarat and the Mughuls took possession of Ajmer Akbar returned to Delhi on 14 April, 1558. 

Early in 1557 Qiya Khan Gung had been sent to capture the famous fort of Gwalior, ‘the pearl in the necklace of the castles of Hind’, which was held by Bahbal Khan, an officer of ‘Adil Shah. Qiya Khan laid siege to the fort but the garrison did not surrender even after a continued siege for months. In November, 1558, Bairam Khan sent from Agra reinforcement under Habib ‘All Khan which alarmed Bahbal Khan who surrendered the fort in January next year. The same year Khan Zaman annexed Jaunpur after an easy victory over Ibrahim Sur. After an effort of one year Habib ‘All Khan besieged the fort of Ranthambhor which Islam Shah’s officer Jajhar Khan had just sold to Rai Surjan, a servant of Rana Uday Singh of Chitor, but the siege had to be raised on account of the downfall of Bairam Khan. Similarly a grand expedition under Bahadur Khan, which Bairam sent for the conquest of Malwa and proceeded up to Siphi in Gwalior State, was recalled early in 1560. 

For four years (1556-1559) Bairam Khan had bravely piloted the ship of the Mughul State against enormous odds. But the reverse of the medal offers a less pleasing record. The scandalous conduct and misdeeds of ‘All Quit Khan, who had enticed a page of Humayun and disregarded the order of Akbar, required drastic, punishment. But Bairam Khan passed over his guilt while he put to death Musiahib Beg for lesser fault and approved of the execu¬ tion of Khvaja Jalal-ud-din Bujuq by Mun‘im Khan for personal and trifling cause. 

Pir Muhammad Khan had gradually raised himself by loyal services to the position of Bairam Khan’s right-hand man. He was also appointed tutor to the prince and won royal favour and confidence, so much so that he became almost as powerful as Bai¬ ram Khan himself. Bairam would brook no rival and availed of the earliest opportunity for dismissing the upstart. One day he even insulted his patron by refusing admission when he made a courtesy visit to his house during his illness- Pir Muhammad Khan was at first sent in confinement to Bayana and then allowed to go on pilgrimage to Mecca by way of Gujarat. Though Bairam Khan was amply justified in discharging this ungrateful servant, Akbar was displeased. 

After Pir Muhammad’s dismissal Bairam Khan appointed Shaikh Gadal, a Shiah of no eminence to the important position of Sadr-us-Sudur. This appointment raised a storm of indignation among the orthodox Muslims who, to quote Badauni, ‘flew into a rage at the advancement, honour and unseasonable exaltation of Shaikh Gadal.’ The unbecoming treatment which Bairam Khian, under Shaikh Gadai’s influence, meted to Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus when he visited Agra in April, 1559, highly displeased Akbar who revered the Shaikh (Muhammad Ghaus) and afterwards became his disciple-7 

The chronicles deal at great length with the circumstances that led to Bairam Khan’s downfall. In spite of their differences in minor details they reveal one fact: the root cause of the regent’s fall was the desire of the prince to be the king in fact as in name. As Akbar advanced in years to manhood he found that he was a mere puppet in the hands of his guardian who did not con¬ sult him in the gravest matters of public importance and did not allow him the least power in financial affairs, so much so that his personal expenses were sanctioned by Bairam with stringency. Akbar wanted to set himself free and this could be done only by the dismissal of his all-powerful guardian, for Bairam would not have tolerated subordination to one whose obedience he had so long enjoyed. This desire of the young emperor to drop the pilot was further strengthened by a series of incidents which highly dis¬ pleased him and completely alienated him from his valued guardian 

From the very beginning the precocious ward had begun to differ with his powerful guardian. As early as May, 1557, Bairam Khan suspected that Akbar had begun to dislike him; he misinter¬ preted the accidental running of two royal elephants near his tent as an attempt on his life and held Atga Khan responsible for the displeasure with which he was occasionally treated by his young sovereign. The execution of Tardi Beg Khan and Musahib Beg, the dismissal of Fir Muhammad Khan, the cold treatment of Shaikh Muhammad Ghaus and the two elephant incidents (1559-60) when Bairam put to death two drivers of the royal elephants—on the first occasion, because a drunken royal elephant had wounded one of Bairam’s elephants, and, on the second, another royal elephant had rushed towards the boat of the minister on the Yamuna where he had been airing—all these added to the displeasure and vexa¬ tion of the growing ward and made him all the more conscious of his real position. 

Bairam Khan was harsh in temper, overbearing in manner, arbitrary, dictatorial in method, highly ambitious and jealous of power, and would brook no rival. His administration, though effi¬ cient, was marked by high-handedness and nepotism. A Shiah, who had raised the Shiah Shaikh Gadai to the highest position in the State, he was disliked by the majority of the Muslims in Hindu sthan who were Sunnis, while he had incurred the jealous hosti¬ lity of not a few among the nobles by his exalted position, though he obtained it by his superior merit. 

The leaders of the opposition against the regent, however, formed a small faction whose personnel was drawn from the mem¬ bers of the harem and their relations or more properly Akbar’s foster-relations known as Atga-Khail: Maham Anaga, the chief nurse of the emperor who had risked her life when the prince was thrown open to the gun shots of Mirza Kamran at Kabul,7a her son Adham Khan, her relations Shihab-ud-din Ahmad Khan, governor of Delhi, and Mirza Sharaf-ud-dln Husain, and Jijli Anaga who had suckled the prince, her husband Shams-ud-din Atga Khan with his brothers and sons as well as Hamida Begam, the queen-mother. They were mainly inspired by jealousy and self-interest and avail¬ ed of the growing discontent against the regent and hoped to monopolize power should they be able to overthrow him. 

The dismissal of so powerful a man like Bairam Khan by the young emperor was not an easy task. A secret plot was made by Akbar and the opposition party so that Bairam Khan might be taken by surprise and would have no time to prepare for opposi¬ tion. The chronicles differ as to the comparative share of Akbar and the Maham Anaga junto in the plot for the dismissal of the great minister. It seems that the decision for dismissal was main¬ ly Akbar’s own and he himself took the initiative and in this action, which required great firmness and much address, he had to take the help of, and was absolutely helped by, the harem party which was hostile to the minister. The dismissal of Bairam Khan was achieved by a coup, decided on and to a great extent planned by Akbar, prepared by the harem cabal and worked by all who were hostile to the Khan Khanan. 

On 19 March, 1560, Akbar and the collaborators left Agra on the pretext of hunting, taking with them Abu-’l-Qasim, son of Mirza Kamran, whom Bairam might use as a pretender. As his mother was lying sick at Delhi, Akbar made this his motive to pro¬ ceed to that city. At Delhi the enemies of Bairam did their ut¬ most to hasten his dismissal. Shihab-ud-din Ahmad Khan made arrangements for the defence of the city, and officers from all directions were called to join the emperor. Atga Khan was the earliest to arrive and others followed. 

On receiving Akbar’s message from Delhi,7b Bairam Khan was surprised and immediately sent envoys to the emperor begging his pardon and assuring him of loyal service in future. But Akbar imprisoned his envoys and then refused him permission to inter¬ view. The die was now cast. The followers of Bairam advised him to march on Delhi and seize the emperor’s person but the great minister refused to disgrace his old age by rebellion after passing a lifetime in loyal service.8 Early in April he left Agra announcing that he was going on pilgrimage to Mecca. The harem party, however, got alarmed and induced Akbar to march against Bairam and send Mir ‘Abdul-Latif with a message that, as he had taken the reins of government in his own hands, Bairam should proceed to Mecca and that due provision would be made for his expenses there. On the way Pir Muhammad Khan joined the em¬ peror from Gujarat and he was sent with a large force towards Nagaur To pack Bairam as quickly as possible to Mecca.’ From Nagaur which he had reached by way of Alwar, Bairam went to Bikaner to avoid Raja Maldev of Marwar who was hostile to him; but the studied insult which his enemies had meted to him by appointing his dismissed servant gave him provocation. Against the explicit warning of Akbar he turned his direction towards the Punjab and ‘crossed the Rubicon’.9 

Bairam placed his family at Tabarhinda (modern Bhatinda), and proceeded towards Jullundur via Dipalpur and Tihara, 27 miles west of Ludhiana. Akbar now recalled Fir Muhammad Khan and appointed Atga Khan with a large force to deal with the rebel minister. Atga Khan defeated Bairam in a battle at Gunachaur in Jullundur district (August, 1560) and forced him to flee to the fortress of Tilwara in the Siwalik hills. Meanwhile Akbar in per¬ son had marched to Sirhind. Here Mun‘im Khan joined him from Kabul and was appointed to the office of vakil with the title of Khan Khanan which Bairam had so long held. The royal troops besieged the fortress of Tilwara, but after a short resistance Bairam offered to surrender on condition that he would be assured of safe conduct to the emperor. In October, 1560, at Hajipur (in Hoshiarpur district) he presented himself before Akbar who received him kindly and offered him the alternatives of service as his personal companion or as a jdgirdar of Kalpi and Chanderi and pilgrimage. Declining to serve where he had ruled, the great minister chose the second and left for Gujarat where at Patan he was assassinated on 31 January, 1561, by some Afghans led by one Mubarak Khan whose father had been killed at the battle of Machiwara in which Bairam was in command. There is no positive evidence in support of the suggestion of Count Von Noer that the enemies of Bairam who had worked for his downfall might have had a hand in it. Bairam’s family became stranded and it was not before September, some eight months after the tragic incident, that they reached the court. Bairam’s infant son Mirza ‘Abdur-Rahlm grew up in royal favour and gradually rose high in position till he became the Khan Khanan in 1584. 

The services of Bairam to the Mughul dynasty were great; his gifts and ability, undisputed. He was the real author of the Mughul restoration and without him Akbar could hardly have retained his throne. His exit from the stage of Mughul history marks the end of an epoch, the age of military conquest, the age of Babur. A new era with a new orientation commences in Indo-Islamic history, the age of Akbar. 

Some modern historians regard the dismissal of Bairam Khan as premature and state that for the next four years Akbar remain¬ ed under a ‘petticoat government of the worst kind.’ They exag¬ gerate the influence of Maham Anaga both in bringing about Bai¬ ram’s downfall as well as during the period immediately following. True, the harem party and Maham Anaga in particular secured important positions as the natural reward of the great services they had recently rendered, but it is inaccurate to say that Akbar became a victim of the harem cabal. It would be more accurate to say that the period immediately following the downfall of Bai ram Khan was marked by an attempt made by the harem party to dominate Akbar who, however, revealed his own personality and was able to assert himself without any serious difficulty and with¬ in a short time. Akbar used Maham Anaga for his own purpose and he overthrew her when she proved hostile to his policy and in¬ terests.10 The buffet which struck down the audacious Adham Khan did not make Akbar a man, as Count Von Noer states; it was the man who struck the buffet. 

Akbar now undertook the conquest of Malwa which had been interrupted by the events leading to Bairam Khan’s downfall. The choice of commanders was unfortunate and proves the unmistak¬ able influence of Maham Anaga and the harem party. The Mughul army led by Adham Khan, his foster-mother’s son, and Pir Muham¬ mad Khan invaded Malwa and marched unopposed to Sarangpur where at last the musician-king Baz Bahadur, a voluptuary par ex¬ cellence, gave battle but, deserted by his Afghan officers who were discontented, was easily defeated by the superior army of Akbar and put to flight (29 March, 1561). All his treasures, elephants and his harem fell into the hands of the victors but his beloved, the famous Rupamati, the romantic theme of artists and poets, took poison to evade the clutches of ‘her conqueror rude.’ The two com¬ manders, who, according to Badauni, considered human beings as 'leeks, cucumbers and radishes’, perpetrated acts of barbaric cruel¬ ty, massacring the prisoners and putting to death even their wives and children—not even sparing Sayyids and holy men with copies 

of the Qur’an in their hands, as Badauni expresses with righteous indignation. Adham Khan, puffed up with pride at his easy suc¬ cess, behaved as if he were independent. He sent to the emperor a report of his victory and only a few elephants, himself appropriat¬ ing the rest of the spoils. Akbar resented this insolence and per¬ sonally marched to Sarangpur to punish the delinquent who, being taken by surprise, surrendered to the emperor. Adham Khan was excused through the intercession of Maham Anaga who did not hesi¬ tate to kill two innocent girls of Bahadur’s harem as they were witnesses to her son’s scandalous conduct. Though not immediately, Adham Khan was recalled from Malwa and Akbar made over the command to Pir Muhammad who reduced Bijagarh with general massacre and then invaded Khandesh where Baz Bahadur had taken refuge. He captured the fort of Aslrgarh and proceeded as far as Burhanpur, massacring or enslaving the people and destroying towns and villages on the way, but was defeated by a coalition of three powers: Mubarak Khan of Khandesh, Baz Bahadur and Tufal Khan, the de facto ruler of Berar. As he was retreating towards Malwa he was drowned while crossing the Narmada, the just retribution for the sighs of the orphans, the weak and the captives, as BadaunI affirms. The confederate army pursued the Mughuls and drove them out of Malwa, and Bahadur recovered his kingdom. In 1562 a second army sent by Akbar under ‘Abdullah Khan, the Uzbeg, in¬ vaded Malwa and compelled Baz Bahadur to flee to Chitor. ‘Abdul¬ lah Khan took Mandu and restored Mughul authority in Malwa. Baz Bahadur remained a fugitive at various courts until November, 1570, when he surrendered to Akbar at Nagaur and joined his service. 

Early in 1561 Khan Zaman and his brother Bahadur Khan suppressed a formidable uprising of the Afghans under Sher Khan, son of ‘Adil Shah, who marched from Chunar with a big army but suffered total defeat near Jaunpur. Khan Zaman behaved like Adham Khan and appropriated the spoils. Akbar would not tolerate such a gross infringement of his prerogative and marched from Agra towards Jaunpur (July, 1561). Alarmed at this the brothers paid homage to Akbar at Kara and returned him all the spoils including the elephants. Akbar pardoned them and re-instated them in their position. The emperor then sent Asaf Khan to the important for¬ tress of Chunar which the Afghans surrendered without any re¬ sistance. 

In November, 1561, Atga Khan was appointed vakil or the prime minister. This appointment displeased Maham Anaga and Mun‘im Khan who had been holding the position since the discharge of Bairam Khan. The harem party was now broken into two groups: the Maham Anaga group and the party of Atga Khan. 

In the middle of January, 1562, Akbar made a pilgrimage to the tomb of the famous saint of Ajmer, Khvaja Mu‘!n-ud-d!!n Chishti. On the way Raja Bihar! Mai of Amber paid homage to the empe¬ ror and offered him the hand of his daughter. Akbar agreed and during his return journey the marriage was celebrated at Sambhar. Man Singh, the nephew and adopted son of Raja Bhagwan Das, the heir of Raja Bihar! Mai was taken into the royal service. The prin¬ cess afterwards became the mother of Emperor Jahangir. This pil¬ grimage to Ajmer, which henceforward Akbar made annually until 1579, is a landmark not only in Akbar’s but also in Indo-Muslim history. The Rajput alliance was not merely the stroke of a diplo¬ mat to win the support of militant Hinduism; it was the beginning of a new orientation of State-policy, the first expression of that doctrine of sulh-i-kull (universal toleration) which his great Per sian tutor Mir ‘Abdul-Latif Qazvlnl had infused into Akbar. He was not to be the head of a community but all people. No Muslim ruler before, not even Sher Shah, with all his benevolence, held this exalted conception of State and kingship so definitely and vividly. 

On his way from Ajmer, Akbar sent Mlrza Sharaf-ud-din Husain to take the fort of Merta, then held by Jai Mai for Rana Uday Singh of Mewar. The fort surrendered to the Mughuls after a siege of several months and a stubborn fight offered by Jai Mai’s commander Dev Das. 

The appointment of Atga Khan as vakil had provoked the dis¬ pleasure of the Maham Anaga group and the malcontents found in the unscrupulous Adham Khan, freshly embittered by his recall from Malwa, a pliable instrument for the fulfilment of their desires. On 16 May, 1562, the hot-headed youth, accompanied by a few ruffians, burst in upon Shams-ud-dm as he sat in the hall of audience and murdered him. Adham Khan then rushed to the inner apart¬ ment where he was caught by Akbar, just roused from sleep by the tumult, who only replied to the murderer’s explanation to pal¬ liate his crime by striking him down with a heavy blow of his fist. Adham was twice thrown from the terrace by royal order and put to death. Akbar himself broke this news to Maham Anaga who made the simple but dignified reply that he did well, and forty days later followed her son to the grave. In grateful remembrance of his foster!-mother who had once risked her life for his sake on the bat¬ tlement of Kabul and sheltered him from the cradle to the throne, Akbar raised a noble mausoleum at Delhi where mother and son lie interred. 

Akbar meted out magnanimous treatment to the conspirators. They were pardoned and both Shihab-ud-dm Ahmad and Munfim Khan, the ringleaders, were reinstated in their position. The Atga Khail or the Atga group who thirsted for vengeance were removed from court by employment in an expedition against the Gakkhars. As a result of this expedition Akbar’s protege Kamal Khan was given back the Gakkhar country lying between the upper courses of the Jhelum and the Indus which had been seized by his uncle Sultan Adam. 

The Adham Khan affair is not the beginning of Akbar’s asser¬ tion of his own individuality; it is the logical end of a policy which he had been following since 1557 when the great Bairam had be¬ gun to feel the weight of his personality. In 1560 he overthrew his all-powerful guardian who had maintained his throne; in 1562 he overthrew the Maham Anaga group who had assisted him to drop his pilot but abused the power he had bestowed on them. Two years later he revealed the same strength of character when he did not hesitate to order death sentence on his maternal uncle Khvaja Mu‘azzam for having murdered his wife. The Rajput al¬ liance and Akbar’s prohibition in 1562 of the practice of enslaving prisoners of war were expressions of that marked individuality of the young emperor. In 1563 Akbar abolished the tax on Hindu pilgrims to holy places and early next year he took the revolutionary step of abolishing the jizya or poll-tax on non-Muslims. Tt was an assertion of Akbar’s will and conscience against a tradition of all the Muslim conquerors of India, sanctioned by centuries of cus¬ tom, against all his advisers’ (Binyon). 

Already Akbar had begun to inquire about the view of his sub¬ jects by nocturnal visits among them in disguise and on one occa¬ sion in 1561 he was recognized. Next year he appointed a capable officer' of Islam Shah Sur, on whom was now conferred the title of Ttimad Khan, to remove the abuses that had crept into the adminis¬ tration of the reserved (khalisa) lands, and this was followed in 1564 by the appointment of Muzaffar ‘All Turbatl, who had served under Bairam Khan and gained experience in the local revenue adminis¬ tration of a pargana, as the Diwan or the finance minister of the empire. He had also curtailed the authority of the Sadr-us-Sudur when he appointed Muhammad Salih of Herat to that position (1562). He was replaced in 1565 by Shaikh ‘Abdun-NabI who, however, disappointed Akbar’s hope for reformation in the administration by lavish abuse of his power. He was dismissed in 1578 when the office was shorn of its ‘ancient dignity’ as Akbar substantially cur¬ tailed the powers of the Sadr. Ultimately in 1582 he effected further curtailment of the power and authority of the Sadr-us-Sudur by appointing six provincial Sadrs. 

II. EARLY CONQUESTS 

Akbar now seriously undertook the work of conquest. He was a self-confessed annexationist; in his ‘Happy Sayings’ his ideology is clearly expressed: ‘A monarch should be ever intent on conquest, otherwise his enemies rise in arms against him’. Without scruple and even without provocation he invaded kingdom after kingdom and annexed them to his expanding empire. The people whom he conquered were reconciled to his rule because they enjoyed the blessings of peace which Akbar extended to them. The policy of expansion had been initiated by his valued guardian under whom Ajmer, Gwalior and Jaunpur had been annexed and it was followed by Akbar when he sent the expedition for the conquest of Malwa (1562). But from 1564 onwards when he began his attack on Gond wana, Akbar systematically pursued a policy of expansion which did not end until the fall of Aslrgarh in 1601. In fairness to Akbar it has to be conceded that, though most of his wars were motivated by earth-hunger, yet all of them cannot be dismissed as purely annex¬ ationist in nature. Some of them were what Mommsen calls defen¬ sive-offensive: as for example, his conquest of Bengal and his wars in the North-West Frontier; and at least one of his conquests can be justified: the conquest of Gujarat which he undertook in response to an invitation from that quarter. 

Asaf Khan, the governor of Kara, was entrusted with the task of subduing the kingdom of Gondwana or Garha-Katanga now includ¬ ed in Madhya Pradesh, bounded, according to Abu-’l-Fazl, on the east by Ratanpur, a dependency of Jharkhand or Chota Nagpur, and on the west by Malwa, while Panna (the Bhath kingdom) lay north of it, and the Deccan, south. It was then ruled by Rani Durgavati, a princess of the famous Chandel dynasty of Mahoba, as regent for her son Bir Narayan. She was a capable and benevolent ruler, a good shot and a courageous leader; she possessed an army of 20,000 cavalry and 1,000 elephants and had defeated in battle Baz Bahadur and the Miyana Afghans. The advance of the Mughul army alarmed Durgavati’s soldiers, many of whom deserted. The rani, however, made a gallant stand at Narhi to the east of Garha11 against the Mughuls in spite of their overwhelming superiority in number. She was easily overpowered, received two wounds from arrows and stabbed herself to death to avoid disgrace. Two months later, Asaf Khan marched on the capital Chauragarh12 and defeated Bir Narla yan who, though wounded in the battle of Narhi, offered battle and was slain. Two women who escaped death at jauhar—one of them being Rani Durgavati’s sister, Kamalavati—were sent to Akbar’s harem. Asaf Khan obtained rich spoils in gold, coined and uncoined, and in figures of men and animals, jewels, pearls as well as 1,000 elephants and he followed the evil example of Adham Khan in appro¬ priating the major portion. 

Towards the end of 1564, Akbar laid the foundation of a town which he named Nagarchain (the city of repose) on the site of the village of Kakrali, seven miles to the south of Agra.13 It became his favourite resort where he received even ambassadors from abroad, but was deserted some years later when Fathpur Sikri became the capital of the empire. About this time Akbar began also the resto¬ ration of Agra by building a new fort of stone to replace the old crumbling brick fort. We are told by Abu-’l-Fazl that Akbar erected at Agra 'more than five hundred buildings of masonry after the beautiful designs of Bengal and Gujarat, which masterly sculptors and cunning artists of form have fashioned as architectural models’. Most of them were demolished by his grandson when he recon¬ structed the fort. 

Akbar’s work of conquest was now seriously interrupted by a formidable rebellion of the Uzbegs. The Uzbegs in Akbar’s service formed a party; in a sense they were the hereditary enemies of the Timurids as it was they who had driven Babur from Transoxiana.14 They had joined the Indian expeditions of the Timurids and entered their service but their loyalty to the dynasty was lukewarm and uncertain. Khan Zaman and his relations were proud of their line¬ age from the royal line of Shaiban.15 They resented Akbar’s prefer¬ ence to Persians who were appointed to high positions at court while they were placed far away in the eastern provinces requiring constant exertion. As bigoted Sunnis they were hostile to the Per¬ sians who were mostly Shiahs but it would not be quite proper to describe the Uzbeg rebellion as a protest of Sunni orthodoxy against Akbar’s liberal policy towards the Shiahs and the Hindus, as a modern author has suggested.16 It was the protest of a lawless aristocracy, accustomed to the laxity of Humayun’s days, against centralised government which Akbar was building, leavened by the racial factor and to a certain extent by personal ambition. The Uzbeg officers comported themselves like veritable satraps aspiring to independence. At one stage the rebels were in communication with Akbar’s half-brother MIrza Hakim, but there is no evidence of their complicity with ‘Abdullah Khan, the famous Uzbeg chief of Bukhara. The prominent Uzbeg officers were ‘All Qull Khan, Khan Zaman who was governor of Jaunpur and their leader, his brother Bahadur Khan, their uncle Ibrahim Khlan who held Surhur pur, north of Jaunpur, Iskandar Khan whose fief was Awadh and ‘Abdullah Khan who had succeeded Plr Muhammad Khan in the government of Malwa. 

Already in 1561 Khan Zaman had shown the complexion of his allegiance and again in 1564 after his surprising victory over the Afghans in full force under Fath Khan, who had invaded and occu¬ pied Bihar, he dismissed Akbar’s messengers who demanded assur¬ ance of his allegiance with an evasive reply. In Malwa ‘Abdullah Khan showed symptoms of revolt. In July, 1564, Akbar marched through Narwar to Mandu, overtook the fleeing rebels near the city and drove him into Gujarat. He sent an envoy to Chingiz Khan, ruler of Southern Gujarat, requesting extradition of his fugitive officer or at least his expulsion. Chingiz Khan sent a polite reply asking pardon for the refugee and promising his expulsion if he were not forgiven. At Mandu Akbar received in marriage the daughter of Mubarak Shah, ruler of Khandesh. He appointed Qara Bahadur Khan, a cousin of Haidar Mirza, the historian, to the govern¬ ment of Malwa and returned to Agra on 9 October. 

The evasive reply of Khan Zaman and the misconduct of ‘Abdullah Khan bred suspicion in Akbar’s mind about the Uzbegs in general. Early in 1565 Akbar sent Ashraf Khan to bring Iskandar Khan to court but Iskandar proceeded to Jaunpur, taking with him Ibrahim Khan from Surhurpur, and there under the leadership of Khan Zaman the Uzbegs decided on a systematic campaign against the emperor. Iskandar and Ibrahim marched on Kanauj and defeated the Mughul troops at Nimkhar in Sitapur district. Khan Zaman and Bahadur besieged Majnun Khan Qaqshal at Mlanikpur who, though reinforced by Asaf Khan from Chauragarh, was unable to maintain himself against the enemy. Akbar immediately sent Mun‘im Khan to his aid and on 24 May himself set out from Agra with a large force. He joined Mun‘im Khan at Kanauj and made a rapid march on Lakhnau and forced Iskandar to evacuate it. Alarmed at this, Khan Zaman raised the siege of Manikpur and fled eastwards. Ulti¬ mately the Uzbegs took their stand near Hajipur whence they nego¬ tiated with the Afghans of Rohtas and Sulaiman Kararam, sultan of Bengal, for help. Akbar marched to Jaunpur and replied by sending an emissary to Mukunda Dev, raja of CMssa, asking him to attack Sulaiman if the sultan would help the rebels, to which he agreed. But Akbar’s situation became complicated by the sudden defection of Asaf Khan on 16 September as he was called to account for the spoils of Gondwana. Khan Zaman now sent Iskandar and Bahadur into the territory north of the Gogra to divide the royal troops. Akbar despatched Mir Mu‘izz-ul-Mulk to Khairabad in Sitapur* district to arrest their aggression, while he himself proceeded to Allahabad. Finding Akbar equal to the situation, Khan Zaman sent a messenger to Mun‘im Khan asking pardon and a reconciliation was patched up on condition that Khan Zaman should send his mother and uncle to court and he should not cross the Gogra as long as the imperial army would remain in that neighbourhood. Meanwhile in spite of these negotiations Mir Muhzz-ul-Mulk and Raja Todar Mai who had joined him, forced on Bahadur and Iskandar a battle in Khairabad and suffered an ignominious defeat. Akbar, however, extended gene¬ ral amnesty to the Uzbegs and recalled as well as reproved his officers. 

On 24 January, 1566, Akbar left Jaunpur for Banaras, in¬ specting on the way the important stronghold of Chunar. No sooner had Akbar set out than ‘All Quli Khan violated the conditions of peace, crossed the Gogra, marched to Muhammadabad and sent a force to take Ghazipur and Jaunpur. Akbar turned back to chastise the faithless Uzbeg who, however, fled to the hills. But Bahadur had advanced on Jaunpur, captured Ashraf Khan and released his mother and then, plundering Banaras, retreated across the Ganga (Ganges). Akbar hastened to Jaunpur and declared it his head¬ quarters, determined to quell the rebellion root and branch. Khan Zaman was alarmed and again opened negotiation for submission and pardon. Akbar, weary of the long campaign, forgave the rebels and reinstated them in their positions. On 3 March, 1566, he left for Agra. 

The storm apparently subsided but it broke again early next year when the Uzbegs, who were in secret communication with the ruler of Kabul, encouraged him to invade India and Khan Zaman read the khutba in his name at Jaunpur. In a family conclave held at Surhurpur the Uzbeg leaders decided on a renewed cam¬ paign. Khan Zaman, taking advantage of Akbar’s absence in the Punjab where he had marched in November, 1566, to ward off Mirza Hakim’s invasion, invaded Kanauj and besieged the fort of Sher garh, near Kanauj, where the Mughul officer Mirza Yusuf Khan had taken refuge. Bahadur Khan attacked Asaf Khan and Majnun Khan at Manikpur while Iskandar and Ibrahim marched on Awadh. On 23 March, 1567, Akbar left Lahore for Agra and on 6 May marched from Agra on Shergarh. Khan Zaman escaped to Manik pur. Akbar despatched a force under Raja Todar Mai and Muzaffar Khan against Iskandar Khan in Awadh, while he himself marched towards Manikpur to deal with the main body of rebels. At Rae Bareli he learnt that Khan Zaman and Bahadur Khian had crossed the Ganga (Ganges) with a view to proceeding to KalpL17 On 7 June he marched on from that town, disregarding the murmuring reluctance of his troops weary of incessant campaigns, and on ar¬ rival at Manikpur ferry he despatched the main body of his troops under Raja Bhagwan Das and Khvaja Jahan to Kara while he, with some 1500 men, displayed extraordinary courage in crossing the swollen river. Meanwhile the Uzbegs had crossed the Ganga (Ganges) and on their way to Kara encamped in the neighbour¬ hood. On 9 June at dawn Akbar surprised the Uzbegs who could not suspect his arrival and had spent the whole night in a dissolute carousal. They marched off without offering battle, but Majnun Khian and Asaf Khian were despatched in advance to intercept them. In the battle that followed, the Uzbegs resisted for some time but were ultimately defeated.18 Khan Zaman was slain and Bahadur Khan was taken captive. Bahadur was executed and some ring¬ leaders were trampled to death and a reward of one gold mohur was paid for every Uzbeg’s head. Akbar then marched to Allaha¬ bad and on to Banaras which was sacked because it closed its gates against him. From Banaras he marched to Jaunpur and conferred the assignments of Khan Zaman and other Uzbeg chiefs on Mun‘im Khan. Meanwhile Todar Mai and Muhammad Quli Khan Barlas had besieged Iskandar in Awadh and driven him to the Afghans at Gorakhpur.19 The great Uzbeg rebellion, the gravest menace in the early years of Akbar’s reign, came to an end. On 18 July, 1567, Akbar returned to Agra. 

Hardly had the Uzbeg menace been surmounted when Akbar had to face another rebellion, though less formidable, organized by the Mirzas. They were Tlmurid princes, descended from ‘Umar Shaikh Mlrza, the second son of Timur while Akbar was descended from the third son Mlran Shah. The doyen of these Mirzas, Mu¬ hammad Sultan Mlrza who was a grandson (daughter’s son) of Sultan Husain Mlrza, the grand monarch of Khurasan, joined Babur’s service. In the reign of Humayun he with his sons Ulugh Mlrza and Shah Mlrza gave the emperor not a little trouble.20 Both these sons died before Akbar’s accession, so that the family now consisted of Muhammad Sultan Mlrza and his other sons, Ibrahim Husain Mlrza, Muhammad Husain Mlrza, Mas‘ud Husain Mlrza and ‘Aqil Husain Mlrza as well as two grandsons Ulugh Mlrza and Shah Mlrza, sons of the deceased Ulugh Mlrza. Rebellion against the Mughul emperor was their political creed; in Akbar’s reign they shifted the theatres of their activities from Sambhal and the neighbour¬ hood to Malwa and then to Gujarat. They were given assignments in the districts of Sambhal and A‘zampur. During the invasion of Mlrza Hakim, when Akbar, already exhausted with the task of sup¬ pressing the Uzbeg revolt, was away in the Punjab, the Mirzas, true to their tradition, raised the standard of revolt, and marched plun¬ dering through the country at the head of a hastily collected swarm of disaffected persons and partisans and even threatened Delhi whose gates were closed by Tatar Khan. Mun‘im Khan marched from Agra, captured Muhammad Sultan Mlrza whom he imprisoned at Bayana and compelled the other Mirzas to retire to Malwa. There their designs were favoured by independent Rajput chiefs and they were able to take some important towns and districts including Ujjain. After the final suppression of the Uzbeg revolt, Akbar left Agra on 31 August, 1567, for Dholpur and Gwalior and on reaching Gagraun on the Malwa frontier sent Shihab-ud-din Ahmad Khan to deal with the troublesome Mirzas. Shihab-ud-din marched on Uj¬ jain and the Mirzas fled to Mandu and from there they took refuge with Chingiz Khan who was then supreme in Gujarat. 

In September, 1567, Akbar undertook one of the most famous military operations of his life, the siege and capture of Chitor. To the ruler of Northern India the importance of Rajasthan was great: through it lay the route to Gujarat, the Narmada valley and the Deccan and without the possession of its strong fortresses he could not feel himself secure. The key to Rajasthan was Mewar whose capital Chitor was the £ sanctuary of Rajput freedom’. Akbar had come into contact with the Rajputs as allies; he was now to meet the Rajputs in arms. The solemn vow of the ranas of Mewar, that they would not sully their blood by matrimonial alliance with any Muslim ruler nor diminish the honour of the house of Bappia Rawal by acknowledging his sovereignty, wounded the imperial pride of Akbar* who found in the hospitality the riana had extended to Baz Bahadur and the assistance he had rendered to the rebel¬ lious Mi'rzas in Mjalwa his casus belli. The Rajput annals refer to an unsuccessful attempt before that of 1567 when Chitor was saved by ‘the masculine courage’ of its queen, but Muslim chronicles are absolutely silent on it. 

Legend and history are equally eloquent in praising the grand¬ eur and strength of the historic fortress of Chitor, the handiwork of both art and nature, which stands on a long narrow hill, lying almost exactly north and south and about 500 feet above the sur¬ rounding plain. Its length is about three miles and a quarter and its greatest breadth, half a mile.203 In the time of Akbar the city was on the hill within the fort. On 23 October, 1567, Akbar pitched his camp before Chitor.21 On the approach of the Mughul army rana Uday Singh, the unworthy son of a worthy father who had fought gloriously against the emperor’s grandfather, abandoned the capital and took refuge in the defiles of the Aravalll hills. But this did not facilitate the capture of the fortress in which there was a strong garrison commanded by Jai Mai of Bednor who had bravely resisted Sharaf-ud-dln Husain in Merta. A month elapsed before the fort was completely invested and the three batteries con¬ structed. Akbar made many unsuccessful attempts to take it by direct assault which caused heavy loss of 200 men a day and he decided to proceed by means of mines and sabdts (covered ways) which were completed at enormous cost, more than a hundred men being killed daily. On 17 December two mines were fired and, as one exploded, the Mughuls rushed into the breach when suddenly the second exploded and killed 200 of them, half of them being officers, while the garrison, which lost only 40, easily repaired the breach. Akbar realized that success required greater caution, plan¬ ning and perseverance and the siege was protracted. On the night of 22-23 February, 1568, a general attack was made on the fort from all sides and several breaches were made. In the early hours of 23 February, Akbar observed at the breach a man of com¬ manding presence, armed in mail, directing the restoration and de¬ fence of the works. He immediately fired at him with his favourite gun sangrdm and the Rajput fell shot through the forehead. Not until the next morning did Akbar come to know that he had brought down the ‘lion of Chitor’. The Rajputs immediately withdrew from the ramparts and the fire that broke out in several places within the fort during the night was rightly explained by Raja Bhagwan Das as the jauhar, ‘the last awful sacrifice which Rajput despair offers to honour and the gods.’ 

The mantle of Jai Mai now fell on the young and gallant Patta of Kailwa, but with his fall Chitor also fell. Early in the mor'n ing Akbar entered the fortress in triumph and ordered a general massacre ‘which ceased only for lack of victims’ in the afternoon, for each bazaar, each street and each house was a fortress and centre of resistance. Thirty thousand were slain; among them was the gallant Patta who fell after he had displayed ‘prodigies of valour.’ One thousand musketeers from Kalpi managed to escape, to the utter indignation of Akbar, by a stratagem, passing themselves off as Akbar’s troops. To expiate ‘the sin of the slaughter of Chitor’ Akbar honoured the memory of his vanquished adversaries by erect¬ ing the statues of Jai Mai and Patta mounted on elephants which he placed at the gate of Agra fort. 

Akbar1 made over the government of Mewiar to Asaf Khan, left Chitor on 28 February and after a pilgrimage to Ajmer re¬ turned to Agra on 13 April. An expedition sent to besiege the fortress of Ranthambhor was recalled in order to deal with the Mirzas who, forced to leave Gujarat on account of disagreement with Chingiz Khan, invaded Malwa and besieged Ujjain. The ad¬ vance of the Mughul troops under Ashraf Khan forced the Mirzas to retreat to Mandu and they were pursued across the Narmada, They then escaped again to Gujarat where the assassination of Chingiz Khan and the consequent confusion in the country opened to them fresh prospects for their ambitions. 

Akbar now took important steps to improve the administration (September, 1568). The Atga-KhaU (‘foster-father cohort’) held extensive fiefs in the Punjab and their leader Khian Kalan was governor of the province. Akbar broke up the confederacy by dis¬ persing them. The government of the Punjab was made over to Husain Qul’i Khian who was transferred from Nagaur. Khan Kalan was sent to Sambhal, his younger brother Qutb-ud-dln Muhammad Khan to Malwa, and Kanauj was assigned to another brother Sharif Khan. Mirza ‘Aziz Kuka, the son of Khjan Kalan, was allowed to retain his assignment of Dipalpur in the Punjab. These measures he adopted with a view to preventing the gathering of relations and prolonged service of officers at the same place. Shihab-ud-dm Ahmad Khan was called from Malwa and placed in charge of the reserved lands as Muzaffar Khan, the revenue minister, was over¬ worked. Shihab-ud-dm abolished the annual assessment of land revenue, which was expensive and led to corruption, and esta¬ blished group-assessment (Nasaq) of a village or a pargaud as a whole.22 

Towards the end of the year, Akbar was able to send an ex¬ pedition for the conquest of Ranthambhor, the great stronghold in Rajasthan, which had been invested as early as 1558 but the siege had to be raised on account of the imbroglio with Bairam Khan. On 8 February, 1569, Akbar pitched his tent before the fort which was held by Rai Surjan Hara, chief of Bundl, as a vassal of the rania, of Chitor. The fortress, which was remarkable for its height and strength, was also well-provisioned. Akbar opened the siege with sabtits (covered ways) and fifteen huge mortars were dragged to the hill Ran which commands the fortress. There is a discre¬ pancy between the version given in the Muslim chronicles and that in the Rajput annals. According to the former, Akbar’s mortars caused breaches in the walls of the fort and destruction of the houses within it. Rai Surjan took a lesson from the fate of Chitor, sent his two sons to* Akbar asking his pardon and surrendered the fort on 21 March, 1569. Abu-T-Fazl boasts that Akbar conquered the fort in a month whereas ‘Ala-ud-dm Khaljl had taken one year. According to the Rajput version, as the garrison did not show any sign of surrender Raja BhagWan Dias and Man Singh seduced Surjan to transfer his allegiance to the Mughul emperor and Man Singh, accompanied by Akbar in the guise of a mace-bearer, secured access to the fortress to discuss the matter. Akbar was, however, recog¬ nized and terms were negotiated in his presence and Surjan agreed to surrender the fort on conditions which were favourable to him: Surjan was to join Akbar’s service and be placed in charge of fifty two districts; the chiefs of Bund! were to be exempted from the duty of sending a bride to the royal harem and payment of the jizya; they should have the privilege of entering the hall of audience fully armed and were to be exempted from prostration (sijda); their temples should be respected; their horses should not be brand¬ ed; they should not be required to cross the Indus and should be placed under the command of a Hindu leader; and Bund! should re¬ main their permanent capital. In the present state of our know¬ ledge, it is not possible either to reject or to accept the Rajput ver¬ sion definitely. It does not, however, appear improbable as it was not unlike Akbar, who had no scruple to employ diplomacy where his sword was not enough. Rai Surj an was at first given a command in Gondwiana and then appointed governor of Banaras, including Chunar, with the rank of a commander of 2,000. Akbar made over the fort of Ranthambhor to Mihtar Khan and returned to Agra on 10 May, 1569, after making his annual pilgrimage to Ajmer. 

During his march on Ranthambhor, Akbar had ordered Majnun Khan Qaqshal to capture the fortress of Kalinjar, the stronghold which had cost the life of Sher Shah and was then held by Raja Ram Chand Baghela of Rewah who had already been reduced to obedience by Asaf Khan, the conqueror of Gondwiana and had de¬ monstrated it by surrendering his minstrel Tansen to the emperor. The fort was invested but the raja, taking lessons from the de¬ vastated battlements of Chitor and the fall of Ranthambhor, sur¬ rendered it without offering any serious resistance (August, 1569). Akbar granted him a jdglr near Allahabad and placed Majnun Khan Qaqshal in charge of the government of Kalinjar. 

After the fall of the strong Rajput fortresses, Jodhpur and Bikaner judged it expedient to make submission. In November, 1570, while the emperor was encamped at Nagaur, Chandra Sen, son of Raja Mai Dev of Jodhpur and Kalyan Mai, raja, of Bikaner, with his son Rai Singh paid homage to the emperor who received in marriage the niece of the raja of Jodhpur. Rawal Har Rai of Jaisalmer also entered into matrimonial alliance with the Mughul emperor by offering him the hand of his daughter. Partly by his sword, partly by the threat of his mailed fist as well as magnani¬ mous diplomacy, Akbar was able to establish his supremacy over the Rajputs who gradually reconciled themselves to Mughul rule and found in their conqueror a beneficent protector under whose banner they fought the battles of the empire from the glaciers of the Hindu Kush to the marshes of Bengal. The ruthless victor of Chitor succeeded in healing the wounds which his soaring ambi¬ tion had inflicted. Rajasthan was indeed Akbar’s testing ground for exhibition of his mastery in arms, diplomacy and statesmanship. 

In spite of these brilliant successes, Akbar had no peace of mind as he was still denied the blessing of a son, several children born to him having died in their infancy. He prayed fervently at the shrines of Ajmer and Delhi for an heir to his throne. He now approached the venerable Shaikh Salim ChishtI who lived at Sikri, 23 miles to the west of Agra, and was assured by him of the early fulfilment of his prayers. Early in 1569 the daughter of Raja Bihari Mai was found to be with child and she was sent to the Shaikh’s hermitage at Sikh! where, on 30 August, she gave birth to a son who was named Salim in honour of the saint. In the course of a few years the royal nursery was enriched by new arrivals in succession: in November, a daughter was born to him and on 7 June, 1570, Prince Murad saw the light. Two years after, on 10 September, 1572, was born a third son at Ajmer in the house of Shaikh Daniyal whom he named after the saint. Two daughters also were born after Daniyal. These three sons of Akbar all attained mature age. 

In pursuance of a vow, Akbar set out on foot on pilgrimage to Ajmer to offer thanks for the birth of Salim (20 January, 1570). From Ajmer he returned to Delhi where he inspected the splendid mausoleum of his father which had been recently built, thanks to the affectionate fidelity of a wife, Haji Begam. In September he set out again on pilgrimage to Ajmer where he repaired and en¬ larged the fortifications and began construction of buildings for him¬ self and his nobles. On 3 November he left for Nagaur22a where he stayed a few months and received the homage of the Rajput States of Jodhpur, Bikaner and Jaisalmer as well as that discrown¬ ed fugitive Baz Bahadur of Malwa. From Nagaur he arrived at Pak Pattan in the Punjab to visit the shrine of Shaikh Farid Shakar ganj (March, 1571). From there he returned to Ajmer by way of Hissar and on 9 August, 1571, arrived at Sikri which he now decided to make his capital as the auspicious place where his two sons Salim and Murad had been born. The resources of his ex¬ panding empire and the artistic genius of India and Persia were employed to convert the petty, quiet hamlet into the crowded proud metropolis which even in its lost glory was regarded by Fitch in 1585 as much greater than Elizabethan London. From the time when it was built until 1585 when it was abandoned, Sikri, which was named Fathpur after the conquest of Gujarat, remained the capital of Akbar’s empire. 

Akbar had become supreme in Northern India and he could now turn to extending his dominion to the sea in the west as well as in the east. The conquest of Malwa and the supremacy over Rajasthan opened the road to Gujarat whose anarchical condition invited foreign invasion. Muzaffar Shah III, the nominal king, was a mere puppet in the hands of ambitious and unscrupulous nobles who partitioned the kingdom among themselves and were often at war with one another. One of these, Ptimad Khan, who had already sought Akbar’s help and intervention in 1567 against his rival Chingiz Khan, invited him in 1572, hard-pressed by Sher Khan Fuladi whom Muzaffar Shah joined at Ahmadabad, to put an end to the anarchy in Gujarat by annexing it to the Mughul empire. But Akbar had more than one reason for his invasion of the kingdom. Gujarat had been in temporary Mughul occupation under Humayun and its recovery would be quite legitimate for his successor. The rebellious Mlrzas, who had returned to Gujarat after the assassination of Chingiz Khan, entered upon his inheritance by defeating his son and made themselves masters of the southern portion of the kingdom. It was high time for Akbar to suppress these incorrigible rebels and strike at their power before they should usurp the whole kingdom. Besides, Gujarat lay on the road to Mecca and Medina, and in the interest of the pilgrim traffic its security was essential. It intervened between the Portuguese ter¬ ritory and the Mughul empire and its weakness might as well offer an opportune soil for the aggression of the Portuguese who were already masters of the western coast of India and the Arabian Sea. With its fertile soil, flourishing ports and extensive foreign trade, the rich kingdom of Gujarat could not but attract the ambitious sovereign, who could secure through its ports a window for his land-locked empire. 

On 2 July, 1572, Akbar set out from Fathpur Sikrl for Ajmer from where he sent Khan Kalan with 10,000 horse as an advance guard and himself followed by leisurely marches. Through Nagaur and Merta he marched to Sirohl where he made a charge on the Rajputs as one of them had made a murderous attack on Khan Kalan, and in the fight that ensued 150 of them were slain. He then left for Patan, after sending Raja Man Singh towards Idar in pursuit of the sons of Sher Khan Fuladi. On 7 November Akbar reached Patan where he received the homage of the people. He then marched on towards Ahmadabad and on the way at Jotana, two stages from Patan, he received the fugitive Muzaffar Shah who had left Sher Khan Fulladl as the latter had, on the approach of Akbar, raised the siege of Ahmadabad and fled to Sauriashtra. Shortly after, Ptimad Khan and other noblemen came to pay him homage. On 20 November, Akbar reached the capital of Gujarat and he made over the government of the country to the north-west of the river Mahi to Khan A‘zam and of the southern portion, where the turbulent Mlrzas had established themselves, to Ptimad Khan. 

On 8 December Akbar left Ahmadabad for the wealthy port of Cambay where he had the first sight of the sea and came into contact with the merchants of Portugal, Turkey, Syria, Persia and Transoxiana. Akbar then turned his direction towards the Mirzas: Ibrahim Husain who held Baroda; Muhammad Husain, Surat; and Shah Mirza, Champaner. On reaching Baroda Akbar despatched an army under Shlahbaz Khan towards Champaner and a large force under Sayyid Mahmud Khan Barha towards Surat. He rapidly marched towards the Mahi to intercept Ibrahim Husain who was moving towards the north and contacted the enemy who was at Sarnal on the opposite bank. At heavy risk and with a following of 200 men only, he crossed the river at night and as he entered the town Ibrahim Husain, who had 1,000 troopers, left it by another gate. Akbar made an intrepid pursuit of the enemy and the battle that ensued was fought ‘man to man, hand to hand’ and ‘more re¬ sembled a tourney than a battle.’ At one stage Akbar’s life was in imminent danger when he was directly attacked by two of the enemy’s troopers. Ibrahim Husain Mirza was ultimately defeated and escaped under cover of darkness. 

Akbar next undertook the investment of Surat. Ibrahim Hu¬ sain’s wife, with her young son Muzaffar Husain, escaped to the Deccan and the commandant of the fort surrendered it after a re¬ sistance of one month and a half on 26 February, 1573. Akbar again came into contact with the Portuguese, who had come in res¬ ponse to an invitation of the Mirzas but, finding them a spent force, paid a friendly visit to the emperor. 

Meanwhile Muhammad Husain Mirza and Shah Mirza, in com¬ bination with Sher Khan FuladI, laid siege to Patan. Khan A‘zam, joined by the fief-holders of Malwa and Chanderl, marched to the relief of Sayyid Ahmad Barha, the Mughul commandant, and forced the rebels to raise the siege and inflicted on them a major defeat on 22 January, 1573. Sher Khan fled to Junagarh and the Mirzas, to the Deccan. 

On 2 April Akbar returned to Ahmadlabad. He made over the government of the whole of Gujarat to Khan A‘zam and that of Malwa to Muzaffar Khan Turbati and proceeded towards his capital. On the way at Sirohi he received the report of the death of that arch-rebel Ibrahim Husain, who after leaving Gujarat had been creating trouble in the Punjab and was defeated by the Mughul gov¬ ernor Husain Qull Khan. Husain Qull was then engaged in the siege of Nagarkot but he had hastened to oppose Ibrahim after making a favourable peace with its raja, Bidai Chand, on condition of acknowledgement of Akbar’s sovereignty. On 3 June Akbar re¬ turned to Fathpur Sikril and found the head of Ibrahim Husain.22b His brother Mas‘ud, with his eyes sown up, was brought as a cap¬ tive to the emperor who however pardoned him. 

Hardly three months had elapsed before Gujarat was again aflame and Mughul authority was challenged by a confederacy of rebels. Muhammad Husain Mlrza, who had returned from the Deccan soon after Akbar’s departure, invaded Surat and captured Broach and Cambay. Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk and the sons of Sher Khlan FuladI, in conjunction with the raja of Idar, took Ahmadnagar. The rebels jointly advanced on Ahmadabad and besieged Khan A‘zam. On receipt of this disconcerting news Akbar left Fathpur SikrI on 23 August with an army of 3,000 and, marching by way cf Ajmer and Merta with lightning speed, reached the vicinity of Ahmadabad on 2 September, thus covering a distance of about 500 miles in eleven days which caravans took two months to complete, The enemy was taken by absolute surprise and Muhammad Husain was reluctant to believe the report of the arrival of Akbar whom his scouts had left at Fathpur SikrI just two weeks back. The amazed Mlrza sent Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk with a force of 5,000 horse to prevent Khan A‘zam from sallying out of Ahmadabad and himself drew out his forces for battle. The battle remained long undecided but ultimately Akbar gained a complete victory over the enemy who had 15,000 men. Muhammad Husain was wounded and captured and shortly after put to death. The Mughuls, who were resting after the victory and expecting Khan A‘zam, were surprised by the sudden arrival of a new foe, Ikhtiyar-ul-Mulk, who hastened to the Mlrza’s aid. Akbar, in spite of great consternation in his army, attacked the enemy, routed his vanguard and forced him to retreat. Ikhtiyar ul-Mulk lost battle as well as life. A minaret was made of 1,000 

heads of the slain. In the evening the Mughuls had a second sur¬ prise when a fresh army was observed proceeding towards them: it however proved to be the force of Khan A‘zam who now joined the emperor. Akbar then made his triumphant entry into Gujarat’s capital and turned his direction to the final settlement of Gujarat affairs. An army was sent to Broach and Champaner in pursuit of Shah Mlrza who now disappears from history. Raja Todar Mai was appointed to restore order in the financial administration of the province by revising the revenue settlement. Akbar returned to Fathpur SikrI on 5 October, 1573, after an absence of only 43 days. The second campaign of Gujarat is the most amazing military achievement of Akbar’s life. 

With the expansion of his kingdom Akbar realized the necessity for its consolidation. The year 1573 saw the inauguration of far reaching reforms in the administration of the empire by the intro¬ duction of the branding system (dagh), the conversion of the assignments (jagirs) into reserved lands (khalisa)23 and fixing the rank (mansab) and gradation of pay of the officers of the State. First introduced by ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji and revised by Sher Shah, the branding of horses in every officer’s due contingent was aimed at stopping the fraud of false musters when baggage ponies hired or borrowed would be produced, an evil from which the Mughul army suffered even in its most palmy days; and the system continued till the breakdown of the Mughul government in the middle of the eighteenth century. The institution of the mansab system led to the establishment of a well-regulated bureaucracy which with cer¬ tain modifications remained the basis of Mughul administration. All officers were placed in ranks ranging from the commander of 10 up to 5,000 horsemen with the exception of princes and a few nobles who were given commands of 7,000. The other measure of Akbar, the conversion of the assignments into reserved lands, was of a revolutionary nature. Akbar wanted to bring the whole of his king¬ dom under his direct administration and pay all his officers in cash with a view to removing the evils arising from the assignment system. In the absence of a correct valuation of the empire, the assignment system proved defective in its working: the two valua¬ tions made early in his reign were ‘corruptly falsified’; over-valua¬ tion of the assignments led to discontent in State service. The whole empire was divided into circles, each estimated to yield a crore of dam (Rs. 250,000). The experiment lasted for five years and in 1579/80 a new and precise valuation of the empire was made and the assignment system was revived. Akbar’s policy of absolute cen¬ tralization received a check. 

The Surs, who held Bengal at Akbar’s accession, maintained friendly relations with him, but in 1564 Taj Khan Kararam, an officer of Sher Shah, overthrew them. Under his brother Sulaiman (1565-72) there was a revival of the Bengal sultanate and his autho¬ rity extended from Cooch Behar to Purl and from the Son to the Brahmaputra. Sulaiman was shrewd enough to acknowledge Akbar’s sovereignty by reading the khutba in his name. After Sulaiman’s death in 1572 his elder son Bayazid succeeded him but after a few months he was put to death by the Afghan nobles who raised Sulai¬ man’s younger son Daud to the throne. 

Inheriting his father’s vast treasures and grand army, Daud defied Akbar’s authority by reading the khutba in his own name, invading Mughul territory and destroying the fort of Zamaniya in Ghazipur district. On instruction from Akbar, then in Gujarat, Mun‘im Khan marched on Patna, but Daud’s Minister Ludi Khan bought him off with gifts and delusive assurances of loyalty. Akbar disapproved Mun‘im’s conduct and sent further reinforcement. 

Mun‘im Khan now besieged Patna where Daud, after murdering Ludi Khan, had shut himself up. As the aged Khan Khanan experi¬ enced difficulties, Akbar set out on 20 June, 1574, from Agra by boat while the army marched by land and on 4 August arrived at Patna with a large flotilla carrying elephants and guns. 

Akbar quickly perceived that the strength of Patna lay on Hajipur on the north bank of the Ganga (Ganges) from where it drew its supplies. On 7 August he took it after a few hours’ assault. In the fall of Hajipur, Patna read its doom. That very night Baud fled and Patna also fell into the hands of the Mughuls. Akbar pursued the fugitive Afghans upto Daryapur233 and then returned with much booty in treasures and 265 elephants. He proceeded to¬ wards Delhi and sent Mun‘im Khan with 20,000 men to conduct the campaign. Surajgarh, Monghyr, Bhagalpur and Colgong (Kahalgam) fell in quick succession and Mun‘im Khan marched triumphantly through the fortified pass of Teliyagarhl into Daud’s capital Tanda (25 September). 

Daud fled to Orissa and Mughul authority was easily established in Ghoraghat (Dinajpur-Bogra), Satgaon (Hooghly) and Burdwan. The Mughul soldiers, weary of incessant campaigns, were reluctant to proceed further but Todar Mai persuaded them to march on and their reluctant commandant in Tanda, now in senile decay, to join them and make a decisive end of the war. Daud, encouraged by the dissensions and apathy in the Mughul camp, was also proceeding to meet the invaders. They met at Tukaroi, nine miles south-east of Dantan, in Midnapur district. Daud began the battle (3 March, 1575) with a vigorous offensive: a furious elephantry charge. The Mughul van was dispersed, Khan ‘Alam was killed, the centre was broken and Mun‘im Khan was wounded. Todar Mai, who alone held the Mughul left wing, rallied the shaken divisions and made a successful charge on the Afghan vanguard. He then dispersed the Afghan right wing and the left wing also was ultimately defeated. Daud could not maintain his position and fled to Cuttack. The Afghans suffered a complete rout. On 12 April Daud made his submission to Munhm Khan at Cuttack and delivered his nephew as a hostage at the Mughul court, and he was given a considerable portion of Orissa in fief. The victory of Tukaroi, however, led to the de jure annexation of Bengal to the Mughul empire, though the effective establishment of Mughul authority was still far off. 

Mun‘im Khan hurried to the north to recover Ghoraghat which had been occupied by the Afghans during his absence. He trans¬ ferred his capital from marshy Tanda to pestilential Gaur where the Mughuls died in hundreds until Mun‘im Khan returned to Tarida just to die (23 October, 1575). In utter indiscipline, born of terror, the Mughul officers and troops evacuated Bengal and retreated to Bhagalpur. Baud issued from his retreat, took Bhadrakh and Jales war and recovered the whole of Bengal. Akbar sent Khan Jahan, governor of the Punjab, with Todar Mai as his lieutenant, to deal with the situation. The Bengal officers were, with great tact, per¬ suaded by Todar Mai to rally under the Shiah governor. Junaid Kararanl, Baud’s cousin, had raised his head in South-East Bihar, and ‘Isa Khan was supreme in Bengal. It was with difficulty that Muzaffar Khan, governor of Bihar, held Hajipur. Khan Jahan, how¬ ever, advanced and captured Teliyagarhi from Baud’s commandant. Baud was forced to retire into the fortress of Rajmahal. Here Khan Jahan, reinforced by the army of Bihar, gave battle on 12 July, 1576. After a stubborn and long-wavering fight, the Afghans were completely routed and their leaders slain. Baud’s veteran general Kala Pahar fled wounded and Baud himself was taken prisoner and executed. His head was received by Akbar one stage from Fathpur S'ikri as he was proceeding to Bengal to deal with the situation personally. The battle of Rajmahal overthrew Baud and the Kara rani dynasty but it did not result in the effective Mughul conquest of Bengal. Mughul authority was established in towns but the coun¬ try at large remained at the mercy of the dispossessed Afghans and local Hindu chiefs. Bengal remained under Akbar rather as a ter¬ ritory under military occupation than an integral part of the empire with settled administration. 

Before the fall of Baud at Rajmahal, Akbar had to face his indomitable foe in Rajasthan. Chandra Sen, son of Raja Mai Bev of Jodhpur, had taken up arms in March, 1574 and not until 1576, two years later, could the Mughuls bring about the capitulation of Siwana, the fulcrum of his resistance. But it was Rana Pratap Singh of Mewar, the chivalrous grandson of Rana Sangram Singh, who voiced the discontent of sullen Rajasthan. ‘Race feeling taught him to hate the foreigners, ancestral pride to despise them and high mar¬ tial spirit, his grandsire’s legacy, to resist them.’ Succeeding his father in 1572, he disciplined his troops in the art of guerilla warfare and was master of Udaipur, his new Chitor, Kumbhalgarh (Kumal garh) and Gogunda. Akbar needed no casus belli: to the emperor liberty is license, as Bryce has well expressed. In April, 1576, he sent from Ajmer Raja Man Singh and Ghiyas-ud-din ‘All, known as Asaf Khan, against the Rana. They marched through Mandalgarh towards Gogunda, but were opposed by Rana Pratap at Haldighat. Here, near the pass, the memorable battle was fought on 21 June. 

We have a graphic account of the battle from the historian Badauni who was present in the field. 

Pratap Singh advanced with a force of three thousand horse which he arranged in two divisions. One of these, under Hakim Khan Sur, charged the Mughul vanguard and dispersed it and put the Rajputs in the Mughul left wing under Rai Lon Karan to flight. Badauni who could not distinguish the friendly from the enemy Rajputs shot arrows indiscriminately for, as Asaf Khan remarked, ‘on whichever side they may be killed, it will be a gain to Islam. 

The second Rajput division, led by the Rana himself, charged Qaz'I Khan at the entrance of the pass and threw his foi^ce into confusion. The battle raged from early morning till midday, but the desperate valour of the Rajputs was ultimately unavailing against a superior force ‘with a numerous field artillery and a dromedary corps mount¬ ing swivels.’23b Pratap lost the battle with a considerable loss. Gogunda fell into the Mughul hands. 

Akbar regretted the escape of the Rana and even suspected loyal Man Singh of connivance. He was, however, able to establish effec¬ tive Mughul authority in the southern part of Rajasthan. Sirohi was occupied, the principality of Idar was reduced to obedience and Akbar received the submission of several minor chiefs: the rulers of Banswara and Dungarpur, the latter offering the emperor the hand of his daughter. In 1577 the chief of Bund! was subdued and next year Madhukar, the Bundela chief of Orchha, who had been defying the imperial authority, surrendered and acknowledged Akbar’s sovereignty. 

Akbar was determined to overthrow the Rana of Mewar. In October, 1578, a considerable force under Shahbaz Khan was des¬ patched against Pratap Singh. The Mughuls seized Kelwi'ara, defeat¬ ed the Rajput garrison at Kumbhalgarh and captured Gogunda and Udaipur. The Rana retired to the remote fastness of Chavand and from that base began to recover his territories. Kumbhalgarh was recovered and the chiefs of Banswara and Dungarpur acknowledged the Rana’s sovereignty. Shahbaz Khan made a renewed attempt at suppressing the Rana who retired to the hills, but the Mughuls re¬ turned unsuccessful. Six years later another expedition was sent by Akbar under Zafar Beg and Jagannatha, the Kachhwahlah, which met with the same fate. Akbar’s preoccupation in the Punjab, the troubles in the north-west frontier and the bogey of Uzbeg invasion prevented the emperor from undertaking active campaign against an enemy who harassed and exhausted the invaders by guerilla tactics. Before his death in 1597 the Rana had recovered all hisAKBAE 

territory except Ajmer, Chitor and Mandalgarh. In 1600 Akbar made another attempt against Mewar when the expedition led by Prince Salim and Raja Man Singh defeated Pratap’s successor, Amar Singh, and devastated the country; but the expedition came to an abrupt end due to the recall of Man Singh whose services were ur¬ gently required in Bengal. 

In 1577 Gujarat became the scene of a revolt led by Mihr 'AH, an ambitious servant of Ibrahim Husain Mirza, who set up his youth¬ ful son Mirza Muzaffar Husain as the puppet king of the country. The rebels took Baroda and the governor Vazir Khan was unable to resist them. Todar Mai drove the rebels to Cambay and defeated them at Dholka and the Mirza retired to Junagarh. But as soon as the Rlaja left, Muzaffar Husain returned, defeated Wazir Khan at Sarnal and besieged him at Ahmadabad. But Mihr ‘Ali was killed by a stray bullet and so the Mirza raised the siege and withdrew. He fell into the hands of Raja ‘Ali Khan of Khandesh who ultimately surren¬ dered him to Akbar’s envoy. Akbar replaced the weak and ineffi¬ cient Vazir Khan by Shihab-ud-dm Ahmad Khan in the government of Gujarat. 

The same year Akbar undertook an important reform: the re¬ organization of the mints. The various provincial mints were placed under the management of high officials and the famous artist and calligrapher ‘Abdus-Samad was appointed Master of the Mint to ex¬ ercise general supervision over the department. 

III. RELIGIOUS POLICY 

By the year 1578 Akbar’s religious belief had ceased to be a mere personal affair. No aspect of Akbar’s character and history has been the subject of so much interest and controversy as his faith and religi¬ ous policy. The influence of heredity upon the development of Akbar’s religious ideas should not be unduly exaggerated: there was wide difference between the indifferentism of his early Central Asian an¬ cestors, the unorthodoxy of his grandfather, the superstitious mysti¬ cism of his father and the rational eclecticism and dreamy mysti¬ cism of the great Akbar. A mystic as well as a rationalist, Akbar was sincerely religious and an earnest seeker after truth. From early youth he was fond of the society of faqlrs and yogis. From 1562 for long eighteen years he made annual pilgrimage to the shrine of Shaikh Mu‘iin-ud-din Chishti at Ajmer. He had early come into contact with Sufi literature and thoughts: Hafiz and Rumi were read to him and he maintained this contact in advanced years. 

Behind the conqueror and the diplomat there lay a melancholy soul, suffering from ‘internal bitterness’ and ‘lack of spiritual provi¬ sion’, yearning for truth. The Jesuit Fathers found him melancholic. In his ‘Happy Sayings’ Akbar tells us how one night his heart was weary of the burden of life, when suddenly between sleeping and wak¬ ing a strange vision appeared to him and his spirit was somewhat comforted. Such visions came to him from time to time. According to Abu-’l-Fazl, as early as 1557, when Akbar was barely fifteen, during the siege of Mankot he had experienced religious ecstasy when sud¬ denly he broke away from the camp into a distance where he spent many hours in solitary meditation.230 Seventeen years later as he would often listen to Mir Sharif reading books on spiritual lore, tears would roll down his eyes. Badauni tells us that he passed whole nights in praise of God and ‘would sit many a morning alone in prayer and meditation on a large flat stone in a lonely spot’. In his eager search for truth, Akbar imbibed a passionate love for philosophical discus¬ sions and only the pressure of duties forced him to abstain from them and ‘return from the errancy into the infinite’. In the liberal Shaikh Mubarak and his two sons, particularly Abu-’l-Fazl, ‘the king’s Jonathan’, as the Jesuits call him, Akbar found his true spiritual companions. Abu-’l-Fazl, who according to Badauni ‘set the world in flames’, was a true eclectic whose heart was equally drawn towards the sages of Cathay, the ascetics of Mount Lebanon, the Lamas of Tibet, the padres of Portugal, the mubids (Zoroastrian theologians) of Persia and the secrets of the Zend Avesta. 

All these led to the foundation in 1575 of the ‘Ibddat-Khdna (House of Worship) at Fathpur Sikri where religious discussions were held every Friday evening. It was confined to Muslims and was divided into four sections, occupied by four classes of members: the nobles of the court, Shaikhs or ascetics, Sayyids or descendants of the Prophet, and the ‘Ulamd or jurists. The violent intolerance of the orthodox party led by Shaikh ‘Abdun-Nabi and Makhdum-ul Mulk and bitter differences between the Sunnis and Shiahs disgust¬ ed the emperor and alienated him from orthodox Islam. Of course he showed his interest in pilgrimage by arranging Gulbadan Begam’s journey to Mecca (1575) and next year he himself intended to pro¬ ceed on pilgrimage. But Akbar was passing through a mental crisis, and ‘the internal bitterness’, which is referred to in one of his ‘Happy Sayings’ as having been experienced in his twentieth year, he was in all probability experiencing in the twentieth year of his reign. In January, 1578, he expressed his abhorrence of meat diet23d and in April at Bhera, on the bank of the Jhelum, occurred the famous hunting incident: when after ten days’ preparation birds and beasts within a circumference of fifty miles had been encircled for 'monstrous slaughter’, Akbar all on a sudden broke the hunt and set free all animals: 'not the feather of a finch was to be touched/ 'A strong frenzy’ seized him and he distributed alms and gold to faqirs. A garden was laid and a structure raised to commemorate the hallow¬ ed spot where, sitting under a tree, he had experienced the call. 

In October, 1578, discussions in the 'Ibddat-Khana were revived with renewed vigour and the House of Worship had become a Parlia¬ ment of religions where the Sufi, the philosopher, the orator, the jurist, the Sunni and the Shiah, the Brahman and the atheist (Chdrvdka), the Jain and the Buddhist, the Christian and the Jew, the Sabaean and the Zoroastrian and others met and debated under the presidency of the Mughul Caesar. The bitter differences among the ‘Ulamd in these debates, which revealed their shallow pride as well as the narrowness of orthodox Islam, further weakened his faith in it and he decided to take all religious matters in Islam into his own hands. The series of brilliant military successes had given him mas¬ tery over a considerable portion of Northern India and he had al¬ ready adopted measures for its consolidation by the establishment of a centralized government. The time had arrived when the king as the secular head of the State should be the head in spiritual mat¬ ters as well. The exalted conception of sovereignty that he held neces¬ sitated it, and the Tlmurid tradition pointed to it. On Friday, 26 June, 1579, emulating the Caliphs and his illustrious ancestor Timur, Akbar mounted the pulpit of the mosque at Fathpur Sikri and recited the khutba composed by Faizi in verse which ended with the words: Allahu Akbar. Some modern authors believe with BadaunI that Akbar made ambiguous use of these words to mean both God is great as well as Akbar is God. But Akbar was no Mansur-al-Hallaj for whom he had little respect. Like several Muslim rulers before him, Akbar claimed that he was the agent of God, KhallfatuT-lah; he never laid claim to divinity.23e 

On 2 September, 1579, Akbar took the final step when he be¬ came the Imam and the Mujtahid of the age by the famous Mahzar (Declaration) which he obtained from the ‘Ulama. It determined the rank of just king as higher than that of mujtahid (highest autho¬ rity on law) and declared that Akbar as the just ruler (sultdn-i- ‘ddil) could decide between mujtahids, if they differed in opinion on any religious question, by accepting any of the conflicting views and that his decision was final and binding. Also it empowered him to issue new orders which the people must obey, provided they were in conformity with the Qur’an and were for the benefit of the people. This document was drafted by Shaikh Mubarak and signed reluctantly, according to Badauni, by five others, the principal ‘Ulamd and prominent theologians of Hindusthan. It made Akbar, who was the temporal head of the State, the Supreme Head of the Church or more properly the Islamic faith in India as well. The mahzar was really cthe funeral oration of the ‘Ulama’ as it over¬ threw the nimbus of their legal and spiritual power. It was the natural corollary to Akbar’s ideal of royal absolutism. It led to the virtual assumption by Akbar of the title of the Caliph and is closely connected with the ‘pulpit incident.’ Some of his coins also bear the title of exalted Caliph and we are told by ‘Arif Qan dahari that in all the mosques of the Mughul empire the khutba mentioned him as Amir-ul-mumimn. The decree had its signifi¬ cance in the outer Islamic world as well. It was a vindication of Akbar’s sovereign authority and a challenge to the Sultan-Caliph of Turkey, the juridical head of Islam in whose name the khutba was recited at Mecca and Medina. It was a reply to the Safavi Shahs of Persia as well, who posed as the perpetual patrons of the Mughul dynasty because both Akbar’s father and grandfather had sought and obtained Persian help on condition of accepting the Shiah faith. Akbar’s authority was now superior to that of the muj tahids, the highest ecclesiastical and juridical authorities of the Shiahs.24 The decree, however, did not at all involve Akbar’s re¬ pudiation of Islam: it was as a Muslim king that Akbar could de¬ cide between the conflicting views of the mujtahids. Neither was Akbar invested with infallibility. The scope of the decree was limited: the king should accept one of the conflicting views and any new order he might issue must be in conformity with the Qur’an and for the benefit of the people. 

There can be no doubt that the declaration displeased the ‘Ulamd and orthodox Muslims. Soon after, Akbar made his last pilgrimage to Ajmer and he showed extraordinary reverence to a stone brought from Mecca, carrying an impression of the Prophet’s foot. Akbar, however, had definitely become estranged from ortho¬ dox Islam. The creed of his birth could no longer satisfy his en¬ quiring spirit; and contact as well as acquaintance with diverse creeds made him a confirmed eclectic. The influence of the Hindu wives of his household had been strengthened by the Brahmans, particularly Debi and Purushottam, who participated in the debates of the ‘Ibddat-Khana and instructed the emperor in the secrets of Hinduism. Akbar was converted to belief in transmi¬ gration. He gave private interviews to several Hindu yogis from whom he made enquiries about the secrets and spiritual questions regarding Hinduism. 

Zoroastrianism found its able exponent at the ‘Ibadat-Khana in its theologian Dastur Mahyiarji Rana whom Akbar had met in Gujarat in 1573 and who arrived at the court in 1578. His in¬ fluence was so great that it was believed Akbar had become a con¬ vert. A sacred fire was established in the palace. In 1580 Akbar began to prostrate himself publicly before the fire and the sun. In this the emperor was influenced also by Birbal, who gave em¬ phasis to sun-worship, and by the Hindu ladies of his harem who performed homa. Persian festivals were revived and the solar Ildhl era, with Persian names for months and days, was adopted in 1584. 

In response to Akbar’s invitation the first Jesuit mission from Goa arrived on 28 February, 1580, at Fathpur Slkri,25 and was received with gracious respect. It consisted of Father Rudolf Aquaviva, an Italian, Antony Monserrate, a Spaniard, and Francis Henriquez, a Persian convert who acted as the interpreter. Akbar showed profound reverence for a copy of the Bible which the Fathers presented and made respectful salutation to a picture of the Madonna. He appointed Abu-’l-Fazl to translate the Gospel and Monserrate to give Murad ‘a few lessons in Christianity.’ The em¬ peror built for them a chapel in the palace and held prolonged dis¬ cussions with them on Christianity. The Fathers took part in the discussions at the ‘Ibadat-Khana where they used very strong words about Islam and its Prophet, so much so that Akbar had to give them mild warning. Akbar was highly impressed by Christianity, though he was not convinced of the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Virgin birth of the Son and the Incarnation. The Fathers hoped that they had discovered the Second Constantine in the Mughul Caesar, for in their zeal and bigotry they could not properly understand him and failed to notice the varied appeals to which he equally responded. 

Akbar invited and in 1582 received a Jain delegation as well which consisted of HiJravijaya Suri, Bhanuchandra Upadhyaya and Vijayasena Suri. Jainism, with its doctrine of non-violence, made a profound impression on him and influenced his personal life. He curtailed his food and drink and ultimately abstained from flesh diet altogether for nine months in the year. He renounced hunting which was his favourite pastime, restricted the practice of fishing and released prisoners and caged birds. Slaughter of animals was prohibited on certain days and ultimately in 1587 for about half the days in the year. 

Already Akbar had become acquainted with Sikhism and came into contact with its Gurus, Amar Das (died 1574) and Ram Das (died 1581). He found in the Granth only love and devotion to God.26  

These studies and discussions on religions of various hues con¬ firmed the growing eclecticism of the emperor who, as Badauni points out, found truth in all religions and realized that it was not the monopoly of Islam.27 The idea gained ground among the people that ‘Akbar was the Sdhib-i-Zaman who would remove all differences of opinion among the seventy-two sects of Islam and the Hindus.’ The turbulence of schisms grieved him and he sought the way for its subsidence. He had so long strayed in the maze of jarring creeds and he would now find out the path. The zero hour had arrived in Akbar’s spiritual evolution and early in 1582 he promulgated the Din-i-Ilahi. It is difficult to define the Divine Faith, for its author did not define it. It was neither inspired by Revelation nor based on any well-defined philosophy or theology. It was deism modified by Hindu and predominant Zoroastrian in¬ fluence, a religion without priests and books, ‘an ethical rationalism leading to the ideal of mystic union of the soul with the divine,’ in which respect it was based on the Sufi idea of absorp¬ tion of the soul in the Divine Being. It enjoined such ethical and social reforms as recommending alms-giving and sparing of animal life, permitting remarriage of widows, prohibiting child-marriage and marriage among close relations as well as forced sati, recom¬ mending monogamy, enforcing chastity and controlling gambling and drinking by restricting the sale of drink. The Dm-i-Ilahi was definitely an attempt at religious syncretism, as much a child of Akbar’s spiritual development as a product of the age, following as it does the movement of Kablr and Nanak. The syncretism was not quite happy because, though Akbar was ‘a rare jeweller and seeker after truth,’ his knowledge could neither be systematic nor thorough, acquired as it was through ears. He sought for light in the variegated and jarring creeds of man, but could not find it. 

Though Akbar asserted what Gibbon calls ‘a necessary fiction’ that he was God’s vicegerent and, if we are to believe Badauni, demanded from his followers ‘readiness to sacrifice property and life, honour and religion’, he was no zealot and regarded religion as a matter of private conscience. As the bigoted chronicler him¬ self affirms: ‘His Majesty was convinced that confidence in him as a leader was a matter of time and good counsel, and did not re¬ quire the sword.’ Unlike the ‘Abbasid Caliph Ma’mun, Akbar did not become intolerant in the name of toleration to push the child of his own fancy; he forced it on none and he did not persecute orthodox belief in a fever of authoritarian rationalism. The charge of persecution of Islam laid at his door by the bigoted annalist of Badaun and the equally bigoted Jesuit Fathers is quite natural. 

The fundamental of Akbar’s religion, sulh-i-kull (universal tolera¬ tion), was equally obnoxious to Sunni orthodoxy and Jesuit Catholicism. The Fathers were anxious to prove that Akbar was about to embrace Christianity by describing him as an enemy and persecutor of Islam. Most of the charges made by BadaunI do not stand the test of scientific criticism. From the Muslim chronicles as well as Jesuit accounts we find that throughout the reign of Akbar and even after the promulgation of the Din-i-Ilaht, Muslims could pray, observe fasts and festivals, give the name of Ahmad and Muhammad to their children and go on pilgrimage to Mecca, though BadaunI would have us believe to the contrary. In Islam politics and religion fuse, and the question naturally arises how far the destruction of mosques or their conversion into stables in certain places278 was a campaign against disintegration or an attack on Islam. The Bengal rebellion of 1580 which began with the slogan of Islam in danger suggests the former. It is certain that Akbar must have received the greatest opposition to his religious beliefs from the orthodox Muslims for ‘in religious societies tolera¬ tion is no virtue, it is the despised offspring of lukewarmness or in¬ difference’. This affected to a certain extent the emperor’s feeling towards them. In fact, Akbar, with his principle of universal toleration, was far in advance of his age. As the historian Free¬ man says: ‘In his age he stood alone, not only in Islam, but in the whole world; Catholic and Protestant Christendom might both have gone and sat at his feet’.27b No wonder that the Dm-i-Ildht could ob¬ tain hardly twenty-five converts of note and died with its author. 

The ‘ethical rationalism’ of Akbar, which was to have united all, pleased none; it was many centuries too soon. It appealed neither to the Hindus nor to the Muslims. Hinduism moved on in the old track while reactionary Islam, championed by Shaikh Ahmad, became triumphant with Shah Jahan. It would, however, be rash to describe the Din-i-IldhI as ‘a monument of Akbar’s folly’, because it was not a ‘monument of his wisdom’. It was a failure; none-the-less it was sublime. 

Some modern writers270 maintain that the Din-i-Ildht was not a new faith but a reformation of Islam. The Divine Faith ignored both the Prophet and the Qur’an. Its ceremonial law and theolo¬ gical doctrines were considerably different from those of Islam. As an eminent authority has remarked: ‘The religion of Akbar is not to be looked upon as a reform but a denial of Islam—a break with its traditions more decided than that which manifests itself in the doctrines of Isma‘il’.28 In one of his ‘Happy Sayings’ Akbar con¬ fesses that he is no longer a Muslim. He ignored revelation and rejected the Islamic doctrines of Resurrection and Judgment. He believed in the doctrine of transmigration of souls and in the wor¬ ship of the sun which Islam does not admit. But in his letter to the Sharlfs of Mecca, written not long before 1582, and in his two letters written in 1586 to ‘Abdullah Khan, ruler of Bukhara, Akbar maintains that he is not only a good Muslim but a champion of Islam: he was not prepared to risk his empire for the sake of his personal religion. There was a tradition also that Akbar died a Muslim as Sir Thomas Roe states. The Jesuit writers record the truth when they say: ‘Among the people there are various opi¬ nions regarding the emperor; some holding him to be a Christian, others a heathen, others a Muhammadan. The more intelligent however consider him to be neither Christian nor heathen nor Muhammadan, and hold this to be the truest’.281 Akbar went very far with Hinduism and Jainism as well as with Zoroastrianism and Christianity but everywhere he ‘stopped upon the threshold’. In reality Akbar was born a Muslim but died, as he had lived, an eclectic. 

IV. CONQUESTS IN NORTH INDIA 

As if to doubt the efficacy of the consolidation of his authority, Akbar had to face the alarming force of disintegration from three quarters: Bengal, Kabul and Gujarat rose almost simultaneously to arms. The Bengal revolt came first and it was the most serious of the three. It was primarily and in reality a struggle between the crown which was asserting its power and the nobility whose autho¬ rity was curtailed, a challenge of aristocratic force against centra¬ lized government. But the Bengal rebellion assumed a cloak in which it appeared as a conflict between orthodox Islam and Akbar’s heterodoxy. To Monserrate it was ‘a war chiefly undertaken against the religion of Christ’, while other Jesuit writers ascribe it to Akbar’s devotion to Christianity.2813 The rebellion obtained support from the Afghan chieftains of Bengal who regarded Mughul occu¬ pation as nothing but usurpation. There is truth in the contention of R. D. Banerji that “what Abul Fazl terms ‘the rebellion of Bengal officers’ was really another Afghan war during the reign of Akbar.”28c The rebellion did not remain confined to Bengal; it spread like infection to Bihar, Orissa, Ghazipur, Banaras, Allahabad, Awadh and Katehr (Rohilkhand). 

Muzaffar Khan Turbatl, the governor of Bengal, with a view to building the administration of the province and guarding the interests of the State, revoked unauthorized alienation of land and enforced the branding of horses to stop the prevalent fraud of false musters. He decreased the pay of the troops in Bengal by 50 per cent and in Bihar by 30 per cent. All these measures were adopted on instruction from the centre and they were well-moti¬ vated as well as necessary, but they were carried out by the Mughul governor and his lieutenants without tact and moderation and with undue severity.28'1 The result was a mutiny of the Mughul officers which first began in Bihar and then spread to Bengal. The Bengal officers left Tanda and on 28 January, 1580, openly raised the standard of revolt. The rebels planned, with a view to giving some legality to their agitation, to raise Mirza Hakim to the throne and considered the pretender of Kabul, a worthless drunkard, the champion of orthodox Islam ! Resumption of suyilrghdl lands (grants made by way of charity) was regarded as an encroach¬ ment on Islam, and the newly-appointed qazl of Jaunpur, Mulla Muhammad Yazdi, issued a decree enjoining on all Muslims to rise in revolt against the crowned infidel of Fathpur Sikri who had assumed the title of Imam. Thus the rebellion of the malcontent party of Bihar and Bengal assumed the garb of a struggle between Islam in danger and heresy in triumph. 

The rebellion was led by the Qaqshals, one of the proudest of the Turkish tribes. The Bengal mutineers crossed the Ganga at Rajmahal and joined with the Bihar rebel force at Teliyagarhi where they defeated the imperialist army sent by Muzaffar. The rebels besieged Muzaffar in Tanda, captured him and put him to death. The khutba was recited in the name of Muhammad Hakim, and Baba Khan Qaqshal was appointed viceroy of Bengal. Bengal and Bihar were lost to the empire. 

Muhibb ‘All Khan of Rohtas relieved Tirhut from the rebel Bahadur Badakhshi. Todar Mai met the rebels at Monghyr. At first they besieged him, but on arrival of fresh reinforcement under Khan A‘zam raised the siege and took to flight. An imperialist force re¬ covered Bihar from M‘asum Khan Kabuli who had to evacuate Gaya as well on the approach of Todar Mai. Order was thus restored in Bihar by the end of 1580, but jealousy between the two imperial commanders, Khan A‘zam and Shahbaz Khan, delayed the recovery of Bengal. Qutlu Khan Lohani, a lieutenant of Daud, defeated several Mughul officers and set up an independent principality in Orissa. The rebel leader of Bengal, Bahadur Kheshgi, was soon kill¬ ed in an engagement and this was followed by other losses: the death of Baba Khan Qaqshal from cancer and the poisoning of Sharaf-ud-dm Husain by his rival M‘asum Khan Kabuli. M‘asum Khan Farankhudi, who had recently deserted the royal cause and opened a second front for the rebels from Jaunpur as his base, was badly defeated by Shahbaz Khan in Awadh (January, 1581), while Allahabad, where the infection had spread, was recovered from the rebels under Niyabat Khan and the rebellion in Katehr was sup¬ pressed by ‘Ain-ul-Mulk who defeated the leader ‘Arab Bahadur. 

Their third front was broken when on 10 August the im¬ perialist troops made their triumphant entry into Kabul and drove the pretender to the hills. 

In April, 1582, Khan A‘zam was sent as the governor of Bengal. Taking advantage of his absence, the Bengal rebels entered Bihar and took Hajlpur. On his return from court Khan A‘zam finally expelled them from Bihar, recovered Teliyagarhl (March, 1583) and pursued them to the Kati Gang near Rajmahal. Dissensions, how¬ ever, broke out among the rebels, particularly between M‘asum Khan Kabuli and the Qaqshal clan, but operations were delayed by the recall of Khan A’zam, and it wTas not until several months later, on 26 November, 1583, that his successor Shahbaz Khan could de¬ feat M‘asum Kabuli and drive him to East Bengal. Shahbaz Khan even pursued him to ‘Isa Khan’s territory of Vikrampur (Dacca dis¬ trict) and demanded of ‘Isa Khan his surrender, but that wily chief simply detained him for several months by delusive promises of expulsion or surrender, defeated him in a battle on 30 Septem¬ ber, 1584, and forced him to retreat to Tanda. In 1585 Akbar' sent strong reinforcement with a view to suppressing ‘Isa Khan but mutual jealousies of the imperial commanders hampered the work of pacification. The Afghans moved out from Orissa and Dastam Qaqshal besieged Ghoragbat. With the return of Shahbaz Khan to Bengal in January, 1586, the tide turned. He won over most of the Afghans by diplomacy and thus isolated ‘Isa Khan who was obliged to make peace. M‘asum Kabuli sent his son to the em¬ peror’s court and proceeded to Mecca, and the last flame of the Bengal revolt was put out (1587). The de jure authority of Akbar over all Bengal was acknowledged. 

Until the death of Muhammad Hakim in 1585 Kabul was the plague-spot of Akbar’s empire. On Humayun’s death the territory of Kabul, including Ghazni, became the appanage of his younger son Mirza Muhammad Hakim, but the government was really in the hands of his guardian Mun‘im Khan. Sulaiman Mirza of Badakhshan, on hearing of Humayun’s death, made an attempt to seize Kabul. Mun‘im Khan asked for help and when Sulaiman Mirza learnt that Akbar’s troops had crossed the Indus, he opened negotiations for peace and retired on condition that his name should be recited in the khutba and that the other side of the Baran should belong to Badakhshan. 

For the next four years peace reigned in Kabul but trouble began in 1560 when Mun‘im Khan was recalled to Akbar’s court on the occasion of Bairam Khan’s rebellion. ‘Intrigue followed in¬ trigue, and crime succeeded crime.’ Mun‘im Khan, who was re¬ appointed to the government of Kabul, hastened with an army to¬ wards that country but on the way at Jalalabad he was defeated by the prince’s mother Mah Chuchak Begam and retreated to court in disgrace. Mah Chuchak Begam then herself assumed the govern¬ ment. 

The situation in Kabul became far worse with the arrival of that ‘stormy petrel’, Shah Abu-T-Ma‘all, who, after his failure to create strife in Hindusthan by setting up Mirza Hakim as a pre¬ tender to the Delhi throne, sought shelter with Mah Chuchak Begam and obtained an influential position in the government. But his ambition overleaped itself; he gathered round him the mal¬ contents of Kabul and slew the queen-mother. Muhammad Hakim secretly asked help of Sulaiman Mirza who marched towards Kabul, defeated and seized Abu-T-Maiaii on the bank of the Ghurband river and delivered him to Muhammad Hakim who had him hanged on 13 May, 1564. 

Hakim now became a puppet in the hands of Sulaiman Mirza who assumed all power and fortified his position by giving Hakim his daughter in marriage. The nepotism and highhandedness of Sulaiman raised a storm of protest and led to the expulsion of all Badakhshanis. Mirza Sulaiman thereupon marched on towards Kabul with a large army. Hakim escaped to Peshawar and, pur¬ sued there by Sulaiman, came to the Indus and appealed to Akbar for help. Akbar sent the officers of the Punjab under its governor Khan Kalan who marched on to Jalalabad, took it from Sulai man’s officer and forced Sulaiman to beat an inglorious retreat to Badakhshan. Mirza Hakim was restored to power by imperial aid but he compelled Khan Kalan to leave Kabul. Encouraged by the return of the imperial officers, Sulaiman made another attempt on Kabul and besieged the fort. Hakim escaped to the Indus and, taking advantage of the revolt of the Uzbegs in Hindusthan with whom he was in secret communication, he crossed the river and, passing through Bhera with plunder and rapine, appeared before Lahore. Akbar himself set out from Agra on 16 November, 1566. Ten days later he reached Delhi and as he advanced he learnt near the Sutlej that the invader had already retreated. Meanwhile Mirza Sulaiman had continued the siege of Kabul but Hakim’s officer M‘asum Khan put the Badakhshanis to great straits. Sulaiman there fore made peace with M‘asum Khan and the prince of Kabul re¬ turned to his capital. 

Hakim in reality began to rule Kabul as an independent prince. In 1578 Akbar sent a mission to his half-brother with a view to per¬ suading him to acknowledge his sovereignty, but Hakim did not res¬ pond. On the contrary he opened the western front for the rebels of Bihar and Bengal two years later. The Bengal rebels were in collusion with him and read the khutba in his name. Hakim re¬ ceived invitation to invade India from some officers of Akbar’s court as well, who wanted to raise him to the Mughul throne. It was suspected that Shah Mansur, the revenue minister, was the leader of this treacherous conspiracy. Akbar accordingly suspend¬ ed him from office and dispersed his colleagues, but he was after¬ wards pardoned and reinstated. Two reconnoitring expeditions of Mlrza Hakim into the Punjab led by Nur-ud-dln and Shadman fail¬ ed in December, 1580, and the prince then personally invaded the Punjab. Passing through Rohtas which rejected proposal of sur¬ render, Hakim appeared before Lahore on 6 February, 1581. The valiant and ever loyal commander Man Singh strongly defended it against the invader. Hakim, who had counted on an uprising in his favour, was not joined by anybody and, when he heard of the advance of Akbar, beat a hasty retreat. 

Early in February, Akbar had set out from Fathpur Slkrl with a considerable force against the invader. Shah Mansur, who had been pardoned and reinstated, accompanied the emperor. At Son pat near Delhi he was met by Malik Sant who had been formerly in the service of Mlrza Hakim. This revived Akbar’s suspicion against Mansur; fresh evidence of his complicity and treasonable cor¬ respondence with Mlrza Hakim was brought. Mansur was accord¬ ingly hanged at Kot Kachhw.aha near Shahlabad in Karnal district. Recent writers on Akbar, relying too much on the version of Father Monserrate, regard Shah Mansur guilty of treason, but it is difficult to reject the version of Nizam-ud-din and BadaunI who state that the letters, on the basis of which Mansur was executed, were forged, while from Abu-’l-Fazl we learn that Akbar regarded as forgeries the previous letters, which were found by Man Singh in Shadmfen’s baggage, proving Mansur’s treasonable complicity with Mlrza Hakim. According to Mzam-ud-dm and BadaunI all the letters were forged by Mansur’s enemies. Shah Mansur’s policy of economy and rigour made him unpopular and the nobles, who were too glad to see his downfall, must have prejudiced Akbar against him. The emperor afterwards regretted the ‘judicial murder’ which he had unconsciously committed.29 

Near Sirhind Akbar learnt of the retreat of Mirza Hakim but he marched on. On reaching the Indus by way of Kalanaur and Rohtas, he began the construction of the fortress of Attock. From here he sent an army under Rajla Man Singh, though under the nominal command of Prince Murad, towards Kabul. On 12 July he himself crossed the Indus and set out for Peshawar. Mirza Hakim was severely defeated by Prince Murad in Khurd Kabul near Kabul, and fled to Ghurband. On 10 August, 1581, Akbar made his triumphant entry into the historic city of Kabul. He left it after a week, after having pardoned and reinstated his rebellious half brother to the government.293 On 1 December, the emperor re¬ turned to his capital. 

Kabul continued to be a source of anxiety to Akbar particu¬ larly because of the Uzbeg supremacy in Central Asia. The menace became imminent when civil war between Mirza Sulaiman and Shah Rukh led to the Uzbeg annexation of Badakhshan in 1584. The death of Mirza Hakim in July 1585 relieved Akbar of a critical situa¬ tion, and Kabul was formally annexed to the Mughul empire. 

A serious revolt in Gujarat followed the rebellion in Bengal and Mirza Hakim’s invasion. In the pages of the Mughul historians it was merely the rising of a pretender; in reality it was the feeble protest of Gujarat for its loss of independence. On a similar oc¬ casion the people of Gujarat had stood behind Bahadur when he recovered his territory from the Mughuls under Humayun. King Muzaffar III, who had been kept in Mughul custody since his cap¬ ture in 1572, had in 1578 eluded the vigilance of the imperial ser¬ vants and fled to Saurashtra. In 1583 when 1‘timad Khlan had just arrived in Gujarat as its new viceroy, Muzaffar raised a formidable rebellion against the Mughul authority, joined by Gujarat officers groaning under the burden caused by the enforcement of the brand¬ ing regulations by the retiring viceroy Shihab-ud-din Ahmad Khan. Ptimad Khan, finding the situation grave, sought the help of his retiring predecessor, but before he could settle terms with the re¬ luctant Shihab-ud-din, Muzaffar had captured Ahmadabad where the people made common cause with him (September, 1583). Muzaffar granted titles and jagirs to his followers and was joined by Sher Khan Fuladi. Qutb-ud-din Muhammad Khan, governor of Broach and Baroda, marched against the invader from Broach but was de¬ feated at Baroda by Muzaffar who forced Qutb-ud-din to surrender on promise of safe conduct but violated it by putting him to death. Muzaffar then marched to Broach and took it, and the wealth as well as property of Qutb-ud-dln fell into his hands. People began to gather round him and he was able to raise an army of 30,000 men. 

Akbar accordingly sent Mirza Khan, son of Bairam Khan, to Gujarat. In January, 1584, he defeated the ‘pretender’ seriously at Sarkhej and made his triumphant entry into Ahmadabad. The report of this victory reached Akbar while he was returning to the capital from Allahabad which he had just founded. He conferred on the young Mirza Khan, then twenty-eight years old, the title of Khan Khanan. Mirza Khan then pursued Muzaffar to Cambay and drove him first to Baroda and then to Nandod where he inflicted a severe defeat on him and forced him to take to flight (March, 1584). But, for about ten years the ex-king offered stubborn resistance, hoping to recover his throne. He was hotly pursued until in 1593, ‘hounded like a wild beast’, he was captured. Khan A‘zam, then viceroy of Gujarat, took Junlagarh where he had taken refuge and Muzaffar fled to Cutch. But Khan A‘zam pursued him there and forced the chief of Cutch to reveal Muzaffar’s hiding place. Muzaffar was captured but on the way, a day after his capture, he committed suicide to save his honour. Thus ended the last effort of reviving the old kingdom of Gujarat. 

At the end of 1585 Akbar was comparatively free to undertake seriously the conquest of Kashmir. The Mughul emperors had al* ways an eye on Kashmir with its cool climate, running streams and charming gardens. Babur had sent a small unsuccessful expe¬ dition against the country and Mirza Haidar, who had advised Huma yun to occupy it as a point d’appui for the recovery of Hindusthan, established himself and ruled in Kashmir for ten years (1541-1551). As early as 1559 GhaZi Khan who was the de facto ruler of Kashmir, anxious to establish friendly relations with Akbar, sent his envoy Nusrat Chakk who waited upon the emperor and his guardian. But Bairam Khan replied by despatching an expedition next year under Mirza Qara Bahadur which was seriously defeated near Rajaorl by the infantry of Ghazi Khan. 

After the inglorious end of his first attempt Akbar postponed the conquest of Kashmir for a more opportune moment, but he did not fail to maintain regular contact with her rulers. In 1568 we find Akbar’s ambassadors Mirza Muqim and Ya‘qub at the court of Husain Shah who treated them with all honours and had to tolerate the arrogance of Mirza Muqim who, by virtue of his position as the Mughul envoy, interfered in the domestic affairs of the country. Husain Shah, with a view to pleasing Akbar, sent with the envoys his daughter to the Mughul emperor who however rejected her. 

In 1578 Akbar sent Mulla ‘IshqIS and Q/&zl Sadr-ud-din to ‘All Shah, successor of Husain Shah, at whose court they remained until they were sent back to the imperial court. The khutba was read and coins were struck in Kashmir in Akbar’s name and ‘All Shah sent along with the imperial ambassadors his own envoy Muhammad Qasim with rich presents and the daughter of his nephew for Prince Salim. 

In January, 1580, Yusuf Shah, ‘All Shah’s son, on being over¬ thrown by his cousin Lohar Chakk, sought shelter with Akbar. A few months later Akbar ordered Raja Man Singh and Mirza Yusuf Khan to assist Yusuf in recovering his kingdom. Meanwhile the report of imperial intervention alarmed the Kashmir nobles who in¬ formed Yusuf that they would restore him to his throne if he would abandon Mughul assistance. Accordingly he left Sialkot for Kashmir and was joined by his supporters at Baramgalla. At Sopur Yusuf defeated Lohar Chakk on 8 November, 1580, and recovered his kingdom without Mughul assistance. Akbar was outwitted and de¬ prived of any immediate pretext for intervention in Kashmir. 

At the end of 1581 after his successful Kabul campaign Akbar sent from Jalalabad Mirza Tahir and Salih ‘Aqil as envoys to Kashmir. Yusuf Shah received them with spectacular respect and sent them back with his third son Haidar Khan to wait on Akbar. Haidar remained at court for one year. Three years later Yusuf Shah sent on Akbar’s demand his eldest son Ya‘qub who arrived at court on 10 February, 1585. Ya‘qub however became suspicious of Akbar’s designs and fled to Kashmir. In October Akbar sent from Kalanaur Hakim ‘All and Baha-ud-din to summon Yusuf to court or at least to send Ya‘qub. In December while Akbar was encamped at Hasan Abdal, the envoys returned: Yusuf did neither come nor send his son. Accordingly on 31 December, 1585, an army under Mirza Shah Rukh and Raja Bhagwan Das with 5,000 horse was despatched to Kashmir. 

The imperial force immediately marched by the Pakhli route and reached the Buliyan Pass, some fifty miles west of Baramula, but they found the road closed by Yusuf who had already reached there. Severe cold, scarcity of provisions, difficult communications as well as rain and snow exceedingly harassed the Mughuls who decided oin peace. Yusuf also agreed and saw Raja Bhagwan Das on 24 February, 1586, and offered his submission to the emperor. But his son Ya‘qub, joined by his nobles, offered resistance. The Kashmiris were however defeated by Madhu Singh, son of Raja Bhagwan Das, at the Kuarmat Pass and were forced to offer the following terms: coins were to be struck and the khutba recited in Akbar’s name and ‘the mint, the saffron, the silk and the game should be imperial/ The report of the Yusufzai disaster broke the morale of the Mughul leaders who readily accepted them and Yusuf Shah was taken by Raja Bhagwan Das to Akbar at Attock on 7 April, 1586. Akbar disapproved of the treaty, imprisoned Yusuf and made him over to Raja Todar Mai, though the Kashmir sultan had been assured of safe conduct by Bhagwan Das. The treacherous imprisonment of Yusuf is a dark blot on the character of the chi¬ valrous Akbar. 

Ya‘qub continued to challenge the imperial authority and Akbar accordingly sent another expedition under Qasim Khan on 8 July, 1586. The Mughul army passed by the defile of Bhimbar and then marched through RajaorL Neither the nobles nor the people gave solid support to Ya‘qub who retired to Kishtwar. Qasim Khan easily defeated a Kashmiri force and entered Srinagar on 15 October, 1586, and the khutba was recited in Akbar’s name. Kashmir was now formally annexed to the Mughul empire. Ya‘qub continued to resist for the next three years. In 1586 he made two unsuccessful attempts on Srinagar and next year his third attempt was foiled by Mirza Yusuf Khan, governor of Kashmir. In 1589 while Akbar was returning from Kashmir, Ya‘qub surrendered to him at Sopur on 7 August and the last spark of Kashmir independence was put out. 

The death of Mirza Hakim and the annexation of Kabul were immediately followed by troubles in the North-Western frontier. Like his predecessors Akbar had to face the ever-lasting frontier problem. The tribes inhabiting what was until recently known as the North-West Frontier province were absolutely independent. As Kabul ceased to be the centre of disturbances, Akbar turned his attention towards making the frontier secure by suppressing the Raushanais and the various Afghan tribes of Swat and Bajaur. The Raushanais were the followers of Bayazid who set aside the autho¬ rity of Qur’an and founded a new creed. His doctrine, which was extreme pantheism, shows a curious mixture of lofty ethics and crude barbarity. Bayazid obtained many followers among the Af¬ ghan tribes of Tirah. After his death in 1585 his youngest son Jalal-ud-din became the leader of the Raushanais. In 1581 while Akbar was returning from Kabul, he saw the emperor and was kindly received but he escaped and created troubles (‘raised the standard of revolt’ in the words of Mughul historians) in the country west of the Indus. The Raushanais infested the routes between Kabul and the Punjab and the Khyber route was so effectually blocked by them that ‘Abdullah Khan, Uzbeg’s envoy to Akbar, could not pass through it. Akbar accordingly appointed Man Singh to the government of Kabul with directions to suppress the Afghan tribes leavened with a new spirit. 

On 22 August, 1585, Akbar himself left Fathpur Slkrl for the Punjab with a view to keeping watch over the frontier as well as to conducting campaigns for the conquest of Kashmir. On 31 De¬ cember Akbar sent from Attock, simultaneously with the Kashmir expedition, Zain Khan at the head of a considerable force to Swat and Bajaur. Zain Khan pushed on to Bajaur while another force despatched by the emperor entered and devastated the Samah, the country of the Mandars, lying between Peshawar and the Swat river. Zain Khan chastised the Yusufzais of Bajaur and advanced to Chak-darah on the Swat river where he erected a fortress. As his troops were much depressed by continued marching, Zain Khan asked for reinforcements. Akbar directed Raja Birbal, who had already been despatched to Bajaur through the Samah, and Hakim Abu-’l-Fath to join Zain Khan in Swat. No sooner had the rein¬ forcement arrived than disagreement began between the generals. Zain Khan was in favour of holding and strengthening Chak-darah and making it a base for further operations against the Afghan tribes. But the raja and the Hakim contended that their task was not to occupy the country but to harry it and so they should return to the royal camp at Attock. They also opposed Zain Khan’s sug¬ gestion to return by the Malakhand Pass, the road they had come by, and decided to withdraw by the difficult route through the Kara kar and Malandarai Passes. The Mughuls were subjected to much opposition and harassment by the Yusufzais and Mandars during their retreat through the Karakar Pass but the opposition became virulent when they reached the Malandarai Pass further south. The furious attack of the Yusufzais broke the morale and discipline of the Mughul force and the retreat became a disastrous rout. Eight thousand men, about half of the army, perished, including Raja Bir¬ bal. Zain Khan, after a stubborn rear-guard fight in which he suf¬ fered defeat, managed to escape, and with Hakim Abu-’l-Fath led ‘the shattered remnant of the army’ into the royal camp at Attock (24 February, 1586). Akbar was so overwhelmed with grief at the death of Raja Birbal that he took no food for two days and nights. It should however be noted that Akbar himself was primarily res¬ ponsible for the disaster in appointing a wit and a physician to such a difficult command. 

Akbar however sent Todar Mai with a large army to retrieve the disaster. Todar Mai erected strong forts in the Yusufzai terri tory and devastated it. Raja Man Singh had inflicted several de¬ feats on the Raushanais on his way to Kabul but towards the end of 1586, led by Jalal-ud-dm, they formed a confederacy with the Yusufzais, the Mohmands, the Khalils and other tribes, invested Peshawar and completely closed the Khyber route. Man Singh de¬ feated Jalal-ud-dm near ‘All Masjid in the Khyber Pass and he fled towards Bangash. But throughout the year 1587 the Afghan tribes were active under Jalal-ud-dm who was joined by the Afridis and the Orakzais as well. 

The transfer of Man Singh to Bihar late in 1587 and the ap¬ pointment of Zain Khan as warden of the Western Marches marked the beginning of a more vigorous policy. Akbar was determined to uproot ‘the thornbrake of the Tarikis’ and despatched several batches of troops from different centres in order to capture Jalal ud-dm. In 1588 Zain Khan led strenuous campaigns into Swat and Bajaur. He entered Bajaur by an unknown route, surprised Jalal ud-dm who made a narrow escape, erected forts at different places and after desultory fighting for eight months forced the Afghans to submit. He then entered Swat by a secret route, surprised the Afghans as they were celebrating the Qurban-i-‘id (31 October, 1588) and strengthened his position by erecting forts at Chak-darah, Malakhand and other places. Meanwhile Sadiq Khan, who had been despatched to Tirah, won over the Afridis and the Orakzais who undertook to preserve peace in the Khyber. Jalal-ud-dm fled to Turan as he had lost all influence over the Afghans. Altogether Zain Khan’s campaigns of 1588 maintained peace in the frontier for the next three years and in October, 1589, Akbar could make a peace¬ ful journey from Attock to Kabul. 

Early in 1592 the frontier trouble revived when Jalal-ud-dm returned from Turan, stirred up strife in Tirah and won back the Afridis and the Orakzais. The failure of Qasim Khan to chastise them encouraged the Raushanais and the Yusufzais to raise their heads again and they were joined by the hitherto friendly Gagiyana and Muhammadzai tribes, who invaded Peshawar. Zain Khan sur¬ prised and dispersed them and drove the Yusufzais and the Rau¬ shanais from Bajaur, where they had escaped, to Kafiristan. Next year he marched into the Kafir country, inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Afghans in which 400 were killed and 7,000 taken pri¬ soners, took the fort of Ganshal and received the submission of their leaders. 

The campaigns of 1592-93 ensured peace for just three years. In May, 1596, there was recrudescence of the Raushanais who made the Khyber route unsafe. Qullj Khan’s failure to suppress them led to the reappointment of Zain Khan to Kabul early next year. The frontier troubles continued even after the death of Jalal-ud-dln in 1600. As late as 1602 Takhta Beg had to suppress a ‘rebellion’ of the Afridls, Pani, Orakzai and Surl tribes in Tirah under Ahdad who became the leader of the Raushanais after Jalal-ud-dln’s death. In reality, the Afghan tribes remained unconquered and the great campaigns of Man Singh and Zain Khan could not uproot ‘the thorn brake of the Tariikls’, though they subdued them for a time. The Mughul sword could neither crush the martial instincts of the Af¬ ghans nor solve the problem of their over-population. 

Akbar’s policy was to build up a scientific frontier for the Mughul empire. This required the maintenance of imperial control over Kabul and Qandahar, the two gateways to Hindusthan as well as over the tribes inhabiting the north-west frontier region. Kabul was annexed to the Mughul empire after Mlrza Hakim’s death in 1585, but the frontier problem became grave and menacing on ac¬ count of the ascendancy of ‘Abdullah Khan Uzbeg of Bukhara who occupied Badakhshan in 1584 and incited the frontier tribes to rise against Akbar. The series of vigorous campaigns against these tribes, the annexation of Baluchistan and the acquisition of Qanda* hlar in 1595 enabled Akbar to keep the frontier altogether secure against foreign aggression from Persia and particularly from the Uzbegs of Central Asia. 

After the conquest of Kashmir, Akbar naturally turned towards the conquest of Sind in the west and Orissa in the east, the two kingdoms in Hindusthan which still remained independent. The con¬ quest of Sind and Baluchistan was imperative as a base of opera¬ tions for the recovery of Qandahlar which was in Persian hands. As early as 1574 the fortress of Bhakkar had been surrendered to the Mughuls. Towards the end of 1586 Sadiq Khan, governor of Multan, besieged Sehwan but Jani Beg, ruler of Sind, offered sub¬ mission by sending tribute to Akbar at Lahore. Jaril Beg however renounced his allegiance and asserted independence. In 1590 Khan Khanan ‘Abdur-RahJJm was appointed to the government of Mul¬ tan with direction to conquer Sind. The Khan Khanan invaded the country and besieged Sehwan. Jam Beg had meanwhile ad¬ vanced against the Mughuls with a big army, war-boats and a park of artillery and he fortified the Pass of Nasarpur. The Khan Kha¬ nan accordingly raised the siege and marched by land and water to meet the enemy. In October, 1591, he inflicted a severe defeat on Jam Beg and then returned to complete the siege of Sehwan. As JanS Beg advanced to help the hard-pressed garrison, he was opposed and defeated by the Khan Khanan on the way. But he con¬ tinued to resist from a new stronghold some forty miles away. The Khan Khanan attacked him there and forced him to make peace by surrendering Tatta and Sehwan and agreeing to pay homage to Akbar at court. In 1593 he came to the Mughul court at Lahore, He was kindly received and was appointed governor of Multan and afterwards of Sind. He accepted the Divine Faith of the emperor. 

In the east the great pro-consul of Bihar, after settling the pro¬ vince, led the campaign in April, 1590, for the conquest of Orissa and reached Jahanabad (modern Arambagh in Hughli district) by way of Bhagalpur and Burdwan. Qutlu Khan LohanI, the Afghan ruler of North Orissa, despatched a large force to Raipur in the Bankura district. The Afghans surprised and badly defeated the Mughul ad¬ vance-guard under Man Singh’s son, the inexperienced Jagat Singh. But the sudden death of Qutlu Khan shortly after disheartened the Afghans. His minister Khvaja Tsa raised his young son Nasir Khan to the throne and he made peace with the Mughuls on condition that the khutba was to be recited and coins were to be struck in Akbar’s name and Purl, including the temple of Jagannath, was to be made reserved lands under the emperor. On 15 August the boy-king paid homage to Man Singh. 

But after the death of the regent the treaty of 1590 was repu¬ diated by the Afghans who captured the temple of Jagannath and took Puri. In November, 1591, Man Singh marched again by land and river and was joined by Sa‘id Khan, governor of Bengal. At Benapur, one day’s march from Jaleswar, a severe and contested battle was fought on 18 April, 1592.30 The Mughuls ultimately gained the victory and Man Singh made his triumphant entry into Jaleswar where the khutba was recited and coins stamped in Ak bar’s name. The Afghans retreated southwards and continued to resist. Though Sa‘id Khan left him, Man Singh marched into Orissa, took Cuttack, secured the surrender of the fort of Aul by Qutlu Khan’s officer and received the submission of the Tila raja at Kal kalghatl But Ramchandra Dev, the raja of Khurdha, the greatest of the Orissa chiefs, still held at Sarangarh. Man Singh raided the Khurdha territory and compelled Ramchandra to submit. A Mughul force despatched by him recovered Jaleswar which had meanwhile been captured by the Afghans. Sarangarh capitulated in June but it was not until January, 1593, and after the despatch of an expedition under Jagat Singh that Ramchandra Dev per¬ sonally waited on Man Singh. The conquest of Orissa was now completed but, as in Bengal, what the Mughuls could establish was military occupation rather than effective rule. 

Meanwhile Kashmir had become the scene of serious disturbances. During his first visit to that province in 1589 Akbar had made necessary arrangements for its administration. The revenue admi¬ nistration of the province was the root of the trouble: the high assessment of Akbar caused grave discontent. The malcontents elected as their leader Yadgar, the cousin of the governor Mirza Yusuf Khan, who asserted independent authority and coined money in his own name. In July, 1592, Akbar left Lahore for Kashmir and halted at Bhimbar where he received the head of Yadgar who had been captured and executed. On 14 October he entered Srinagar. On the resignation of Mirza Yusuf Khan due to difficulties in re¬ venue administration, the entire province was converted into re¬ served lands (Khcittsa). About five years later, in 1597, Akbar made his third and last visit to Kashmir. 

In 1595 Akbar’s conquest of the northern portion of the Indian sub-continent (excluding Assam) was completed by the annexa¬ tion of Baluchistan. In December, 1594, Mir M‘asum, the historian, led the campaign. The zamtnddrs of Gandava offered their sub¬ mission and in February, 1595, the Mughuls besieged the fort of Sibi, held by the Parni Afghans and shortly after forced the garrison to surrender the fort. The country up to the border of Qandahar, Cutch and Makran came into the possession of the Mughuls. Two months later occurred the bloodless conquest of Qandahar. 

V. FOREIGN POLICY 

Qandahar was the Alsace of medieval Asia, the bone of conten¬ tion between India and Iran in the sixteenth and seventeenth cen¬ turies. The Safavi monarchs regarded Qandahar as an appanage of Khurasan and considered Mughul occupation as nothing but usurpa¬ tion. At Akbar’s accession it was governed by Bairam Khan’s agent Shah Muhammad Qilatl. In 1558 a large Persian force led by Sultan Husain Mirza invaded Qandahar and took possession of it. For the next thirty-six years it was to remain in Persian hands. On account of his preoccupation in India and the troubles in Kabul and the frontier, Akbar could not make any attempt at the recovery of Qandahar. By the year 1590 he had become the paramount so¬ vereign of Northern India, Kabul had been annexed to his empire and the Raushanais had been subdued for the time being. The Uzbegs had become supreme in Khurasan and were threatening the Safavi kingdom. It was the time to strike a blow and recover Qandahar. Akbar apprehended as well the capture of Qandahar by the Uzbegs in which case Kabul and the Punjab would be insecure. Accordingly in 1590 he sent an army under ‘Abdur-Rahlm to recover Qandahar, but the Khan Khanan turned to the conquest of Sind, probably as a prelude to the conquest of Qandahar. This postponed the Qandahar expedition and circumstances made any expedition unnecessary. Muzaffar Husain Mir^a, who held the government of Qandahar, feared the prospect of an Uzbeg invasion and might also have learnt of Akbar’s plan to recover Qandahar. Shah ‘Abbas was then in no position to send him reinforcements. Muzaffar Husain, therefore, refusing the offer of help by ‘Abdullah Khan who had sent him an envoy, surrendered the fort on 18 April, 1595, to Akbar’s officer Shah Beg Khan and left for the Miughul court. ‘A populous country came into possession without a battle’, as Abu-’l Fazl states. In July Zamln Dawar and Garmsir were also taken by Shahi Beg Khan, but they were recovered by the Persians in 1603. 

In spite of Qandahar, round which the Mughul-Safavl diplomacy centred, there was almost regular diplomatic intercourse between Agra and Qazvin or Isfahan. Under Akbar the Mughul-Safavi re¬ lationship, which had been that of client and patron, entered upon a new phase. Akbar’s toleration of the Shiahs and the Sunnis alike toned down the religious animosity of the Safavl monarchs who were zealous champions of Shiahism, while the building up and consolida¬ tion of the great Mughul empire under him raised the prestige of the dynasty abroad, and both Shah ‘Abbas and ‘Abdullah Khan Uzbeg sought his alliance against each other. 

Early in the reign Bairam Khan had sent Shah GhazI Sultian as envoy to Shah Tahmasp. He saw the necessity of establishing cor¬ dial relationship with the Safavl court, especially now when the boy king was beset with a crop of difficulties in Hindusthan and required the Shah’s moral support. Shah Tahmasp received the envoy with honour and in 1562 sent his cousin Sayyid Beg on embassy to Akbar with a letter offering condolences for the death of Humayun and congratulations on his accession and emphasizing the necessity of cementing the bond of friendship between the two kingdoms. In 1564 Akbar received another envoy from Shah Tahmasp who came with a letter and rarities of Iran. Early in November, 1572, during his march from Sirohi to Piatan, Akbar received Yar ‘All Beg, envoy from Sultan Muhammad Khudabanda, Shah Tahmasp’s eldest son and governor of Khurasan, who probably sought the support of Akbar in the coming war of succession in Persia. The death of Shah Tah¬ masp in 1576 was the signal for the outbreak of civil war and anarchy, followed by a succession of weak rulers, during which diplomatic intercourse between the Mughul empire and Persia was stopped. But under Shah ‘Abbas (1587-1629) a closer contact was established between Agra and Isfahan. Shah Tahmasp would look on Akbar as the son of Humayun who had sought shelter at his court and during his lifetime Akbar’s supre¬ macy over Hindusthan had not been fully established. Shah ‘Abbas found Akbar the paramount sovereign of almost all Hindusthan and naturally sought his alliance, hard-pressed as he was in the west by the Ottoman Turks and in the east by the Uzbegs under their power¬ ful king ‘Abdullah Khan who overran and captured Khurasan. In 1591 Shah ‘Abbas sent his envoy Yadgar Sultan Rumlu who arrived at the Mughul court on 16 May with choice presents and a suppli¬ catory letter to Akbar, asking for his military help and at least his moral support. Akbar could not agree to send an auxiliary force for the recovery of Khurasan from the Uzbegs, as some of his nobles suggested, though he would have thereby cleared his father’s as well as grandfather’s debt to the Safavi dynasty. For he did not consi¬ der it politic to go against the powerful Uzbeg king with whom he was in alliance and whose hostility would mean grave menace to the frontier of the Mughul empire. Yadgar Sultan remained at Ak¬ bar’s court for three years and a half. On 2 December, 1594, Akbar gave him leave and sent with him Zlya-ul-mulk Qazvlnl and Abu Nasir Khvafi as envoys to the Shah with curiosities of Hindusthan and a letter full of instructions and written in a most patronising spirit which reminds one of the letters that Shah Tahmasp had addressed to the Emperor H'umayun. Akbar’s envoys were given a splendid reception at Qazvln by Shah ‘Abbas. They remained in Persia for a few years until 1597-8 when they obtained leave and the Shah sent Mlnuchihr Beg with a letter and choice presents to the Mughul court. The capture of Qandahar by the Mughuls in 1595 did not sever diplomatic connection. The envoy arrived at the Mughul court in November, 1598. In his letter the Shah referred to his activities against the Uzbegs in which he expected Akbar’s good wishes and support. Next year Shah ‘Abbas sent from Herat Mlrza ‘All Beg on embassy to Akbar with a letter informing him of his victory in Khurasan after the death of ‘Abdullah Khan. ‘All Beg arrived at court on 11 March, 1599, and both he and Mmuchihr Beg re¬ mained at court until 4 April, 1601, when they obtained leave. Akbar sent with them his own envoy Ma'sum Khan Bhakkari and they arrived in Persia in 1602. Ma‘sum Khan remained at the Safavi court for more than a year and returned in 1604. 

As a kingdom contiguous to Kabul, Badakhshan was of im¬ portance to the Mughul empire under Akbar as a buffer State be¬ tween it and the Uzbeg kingdom rapidly increasing under ‘Abdullah Khan. Mlrza Sulaiman of Badakhshan, who had been recognized by Babur in 1530, gave a lot of trouble to his grandson by his re peated attempts on Kabul, but the growing power of the Uzbegs compelled him and his grandson to seek the alliance of Akbar and take shelter at his court. In 1561 he sent an envoy to Akbar ask¬ ing for his help against the Uzbegs who had killed his son Mirza Ibrahim. In 1575 Sulaiman, expelled by his rebellious grandson Mirza Shah Rukh, sought Akbar’s protection. Akbar treated him kindly and offered him the government of Bengal which he refused as he expected the emperor would help him recover his kingdom. In disappointment Sulaiman left for Mecca next year. Mirza Shah Rukh sent to Akbar two envoys who arrived at his court on 9 July, 1577, and next year Akbar gave them leave and sent with them his own envoys to Badakhshan. Badakhshan ceased to be a buffer State when, in 1584, it was annexed by the Uzbegs and Mirza Shiah Rukh sought refuge at Akbar’s court. ‘Abdullah Khan objected to Akbar’s giving him protection and this caused not a little anxiety to the Uzbeg king. In 1587 Mirza Sulaiman, who had gone to Bada¬ khshan a second time, was forced to leave for India and sought shelter at the Mughul court. 

No other factor moulded Akbar’s trans-Indian policy so much as the growing power of the Uzbegs in Transoxiana. It affected his activities in India as well to a considerable extent. It was the bogey of an Uzbeg invasion which was mainly responsible for Akbar’s long stay in the Punjab from 1585. It encouraged the frontier tribes to raise their heads against the authority of Akbar; in fact, they were subsidized by ‘Abdullah Khan who twice received at his court Jalal-ud-din, the leader of the Raushanais. To a certain extent it served as a brake on the progress of Mughul arms in the Deccan inasmuch as it prevented Akbar’s leading the campaign personally even when mutual jealousies of commanders brought about a dead¬ lock there. The bitter hostility between Shah ‘Abbas and ‘Abdullah Khan strengthened the position of Akbar who was approached by both for help. ‘Abdullah Khan always sought to gain the support of Akbar and Akbar was equally anxious to be on friendly terms with ‘Abdullah; the two feared each other and therefore the grand¬ son of Babur and the scion of Shaibani Khan remained allies. 

In 1572 ‘Abdullah Khan sent his first envoy, HajI Altamash, with presents and a letter to Akbar. The object was to gain the support of Akbar against other princes of Turan. This first em¬ bassy was rather coldly received by the emperor who dismissed the envoy afterwards without sending his own to ‘Abdullah. Accord¬ ing to Abu-’l-Fazl, Akbar disliked the maintenance of diplomatic relations with ‘Abdullah as he intended to conquer his ancestral territory in Central Asia. Possibly Akbar, who was then too much engaged in his own affairs in Hindusthan, did not want to incur the suspicion of Shah Tahmasp. 

Five years later in 1577 arrived the second embassy from Bukhara. It was the period of civil war, anarchy, and weak succes¬ sion in Persia after' Shah Tahmasp’s death and ‘Abdullah suggested an invasion of that country. Akbar sent his envoy Mlrza Fuladi with a reply to ‘Abdullah stating that he could not agree with him in re¬ garding ‘difference in law and religion’ as casus belli and go against the Safavis with whom he was in alliance. Here was a great oppor¬ tunity for Akbar to recover Qandahar, but Akbar wanted to keep the balance and prevent the Uzbegs from growing too powerful: a feeble Persia would be a menace to the Mughul empire. 

In 1585 after the annexation of Balkh and Badakhshan by ‘Abdullah and the absorption of Kabul into the Mughul empire, the territories of ‘Abdullah and Akbar became contiguous and the situation became more critical. The Uzbeg king, alarmed by Akbar’s campaigns in the frontier and his continued stay on the bank of the Indus as well as Mlrza Shah Rukh’s presence in India, sent Mir Quraish who arrived at the Mughul court on 11 March, 1586. Akbar’s support or at least his neutrality was badly needed by ‘Ab¬ dullah in his campaign against Khurasan. On 2 September Akbar gave Mir Quraish leave and despatched Hakim Humam with a letter to the Uzbeg court. Ultimately an agreement was reached between the two. It seems Akbar approved ‘Abdullah’s invasion of Khura¬ san and ‘Abdullah promised not to support or subsidize the Afghan tribes of the frontier.303 

About three years later Hakim Humam returned in 1589 with a letter from ‘Abdullah in which he thanked Akbar for his moral support in his recent conquest of Khurasan; and he sent his envoy Ahmad ‘All Ataliq who however died in India. On 4 January, 1591, Mamavl Husain arrived at the Mughul court on embassy from Bukhara. He too died in India and ‘Abdullah Khan became anxi¬ ous at the unusual delay in the return of his envoys. On 14 June, 1596, Akbar sent his ambassadors Khvaja Ashraf N’aqshbandl and Shaikh Husain of Lakhnau with a letter to ‘Abdullah in which he regretted the death of ‘Abdullah’s two envoys and assured him of his friendship and informed him that he did not help Shah ‘Abbas, who had sent his envoy Yadgar Sultan asking for his help, on ac¬ count of his consideration for ‘Abdullah and that for the same rea¬ son he did not support the rebellion in Badakhshan and grant Shah Rukh any fief in Kabul or Kashmir. ‘Abdullah Khan received Akbar’s envoys with respect and on 30 July, 1597, sent them back with his own envoy Mir Quraish. Akbar’s envoys returned to court on 29 April, 1598, but Mir Quraish returned home from the way on learning of the death of his master. With the death of ‘Abdullah Khan in February, 1598, Akbar was relieved of the Uzbeg menace, for he had nothing to fear from his son ‘Abdul-Mumin. The nobles advised Akbar to invade ‘Abdullah’s territory but he did not agree. Akbar had never any serious intention of conquering Badakhshan and Transoxiana, the home of his ancestors. He followed an Indian policy and thoroughly abandoned the Central Asian outlook of his grandfather and even of his father. 

Diplomatic intercourse between Turkey and India could not be regular on account of the geographical situation of the two coun¬ tries. The Turkish admiral SidI ‘All Ra’is was present at Delhi at the time of Humayun’s tragic end and Akbar’s accession. SlcLi ‘Ali was no accredited envoy, but Bairam Khan availed of the op¬ portunity of despatching a letter in the name of Akbar in 1556-57 to Sulaiman the Magnificent through the admiral. In the letter Akbar addresses the sultan as the ‘Caliph on earth sent by God’ and states that, though there had been no diplomatic connection between the sultan of Turkey and the Mughul emperor, there had always been the desire to maintain such relations and that is why he is despatch¬ ing this letter to the sultan ‘to bind the chains of union and love’ through the admiral, though he had no commission from his master, and he hopes that the sultan will also respond to his wishes and maintain communication with the Mughul court. It does not ap¬ pear that the sultan of Turkey responded, for he had no interest in any alliance with the Mughul emperor. Akbar also, as he established his supremacy over India and as the Turkish power declined after the death of Sulaiman (1566), did not regard Turkish support as of importance. On the contrary, he viewed with jealousy that the khutba was recited in Mecca and Medina in the name of the sultan of Turkey and threw a challenge to him when in 1579 he assumed the titles of Imdm and Khalifa- Akbar expressed his desire to Rudolf Aquaviva to form an alliance with the king of Portugal against the sultan30b and he asked ‘Abdullah Khan of Bukhara to enter into a coalition against the Ottoman Turks while he promised Shah ‘Abbas help against them (1586).30c In reality Akbar considered the Sultan Caliph of Turkey as his great rival.30d 

Of the European powers Akbar had diplomatic relations with the Portuguese who had already established their authority on the western coast of India with Goa as their capital. In 1572 during his visit to Cambay he met some Portuguese merchants who came to pay their respects. Next year during his siege of Surat he came into contact with the Portuguese who had come as the ally of the garrison but cleverly posed themselves as friends and sent their envoy Antonio Cabral to Akbar who, however, received them kindly. According to the Portuguese version Akbar had also sent his envoy to the Portuguese viceroy and a treaty, satisfactory to both parties, was concluded. Akbar wanted to be on friendly terms with the Portuguese who controlled the pilgrim traffic to Mecca by their domination of the Arabian Sea which had virtually become the Portuguese lake. In 1578 the Portuguese viceroy of Goa sent the same Antonio Cabral as ambassador to the Mughul emperor and Akbar’s discussion with him on religious mat¬ ters led ultimately to the despatch of the first Jesuit mis¬ sion to his court in 1580. Akbar sent his envoy HajI ‘Abdullah and the Portuguese Government responded by the despatch of this mission which has already been referred to. The mission terminat¬ ed in February, 1583, when Father Rudolf left the Mughul court. Seven years later Akbar despatched a letter to the viceroy of Goa through the Greek sub-deacon Leo Grimon, asking for a second mis¬ sion to his court. It was well received at Lahore in 1591 but the Fathers realized the impossibility of converting Akbar in spite of his professed sympathy for Christianity, and shortly afterwards it came to an abrupt conclusion. In 1594 Akbar invited a third mission from the viceroy of Goa who sent it, in spite of the reluctance of the pro¬ vincial authority to risk a third attempt, on account of the possibi¬ lity of good results of a political character. The mission consisting of Father Jerome Xavier, a grand-nephew of St. Francis, Father Emmanuel Pinheiro and Brother Benedict de Goes arrived at Lahore on 5 May, 1595, and, with varying personnel, remained at the Mughul court till Akbar’s death in 1605. Akbar showed the same reverence for the Christian faith and permitted the Fathers to preach the Gospel and even convert people. But he was least inclined to em¬ brace Christianity and gave more attention to political and military affairs than to religious discussions. Though this caused not a little disappointment to the Fathers, the viceroy of Goa received in 1598 instruction from the king of Spain to maintain the mission at the Mughul court. Akbar also tried to utilize the services of Xavier and Benedict de Goes to obtain during the siege of Asirgarh guns and munitions from the Portuguese at Chaul which of course they refused as it was un-Christian and as they were in alliance with the ruler of Khandesh. From the Deccan Akbar also despatched in March, 1600, an embassy to Goa purely with a view to gaining poli¬ tical alliance. The Portuguese alliance with the sultans of the Dec can caused grave concern to the emperor and he wanted to check their influence by the establishment of Mughul authority in the Deccan. At one time he even thought of securing the help of the Deccan sultanates against them. In reality Akbar considered the Portuguese as his most powerful enemy in India as he states in his letter to ‘Abdullah Khan30e but he considered it politic to maintain friendly relations with them. 

Akbar had no proper diplomatic relations with England, though some Englishmen visited his court. Elizabethan England had al¬ ready begun to take interest in Indian trade and in 1585 a party of three Englishmen, John Newbery, a London merchant and mem¬ ber of the Levant Company, Ralph Fitch, another London merchant, and William Leedes, a jeweller, arrived at Fathpur Slkrl. Newbery carried with him a letter from Queen Elizabeth, written in February, 1583, in which she addresses Akbar as ‘the most invincible and most mighty Prince, King of Cambaie’ and recommends to him Newbery and his companions favourable reception, friendly treatment and suitable privileges.31 The object of their visit was commercial. They were England’s pioneers in India. Of them Fitch has left a valuable account of his travels and to him Agra and Fathpur Slkrl appeared much larger and more populous than Elizabethan London. Leedes was taken into the royal service at Fathpur Slkrl. In 1603 another Englishman, John Mildenhall, also a merchant, arrived at Agra with a letter from Queen Elizabeth. He presented Akbar twenty-nine horses and some jewels and asked of him friendship with Queen Elizabeth, permission for the newly founded East India Company to trade in his kingdom and his neutrality in the event of English and Portuguese ships fighting on his coasts. But the Portuguese Fathers at the Mughul court prejudiced the mind of Akbar against the English whom they described as ‘a complete nation of thieves.’ Ultimately, according to his own version, Mildenhall was able to exact from Akbar a favourable treaty but there is no doubt that he could not gain any concession from the emperor. The negotia¬ tions opened by Newbery and Mildenhall, however, led ultimately to the despatch of a duly accredited embassy to Jahangir. 

VI. CONQUESTS IN THE DECCAN 

Akbar had his eye on the Deccan long before he sent regular expeditions for the expansion of the Mughul empire into the South which ultimately proved to be the fata morgana under his great grandson, leading to his own ruin and the ruin of his empire. Akbar’s ambition for supremacy over the whole Indian sub-continent de¬ manded it; the policy of the previous Muslim rulers like ‘Ala-ud-dln Khalji pointed to it; and the Portuguese influence at the courts of the Deccan sultanates made it imperative on the emperor who needed no casus belli. Akbar had always reckoned the Portuguese as a power, controlling important parts of India’s seaboard and growing as a menace to the Mughul empire, and he considered it essential to counteract their influence at the cabinets of the Deccan sultanates. Chronic jealousy and frequent wars between these States offered Akbar the favourable ground for the fulfilment of his imperial am¬ bition. Of the five offshoots of the BahmanI empire, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda concerned Akbar. Berar had been annexed by Ahmadnagar in 1574 and Bldar was too insignificant to attract attention. Besides, there was the kingdom of Khandesh which was the outpost of Mughul invasion into the South. 

As early as 1564 Akbar had sent from Mandu an envoy to Mu¬ barak Shah II of Khandesh, demanding the hand of his daughter. Mubarak sent his daughter and agreed to surrender Bijagarh and Hindiya and recognize Akbar’s sovereignty by reciting his name in the khutba. During his campaign in Gujarat in 1573 Akbar des¬ patched envoys to the courts of Khandesh and Ahmadnagar and four years later, in 1577, the emperor received letters and an envoy from the Nizam Shahl court in response to an embassy which he had sent. About this time, in February, 1577, Akbar despatched an expedition under Shihab-ud-dln Ahmad Khan against the new ruler of Khan¬ desh, Raja ‘All Khan, who reversed the policy of his predecessors, Mubarak II (1535-66) and Muhammad II (1566-76) by assuming the title of Shah and refusing to pay tribute. The expedition, how¬ ever, was withdrawn shortly after as Raja ‘All Khan paid tribute. 

It was not until 1585 that Akbar secured some pretext for in¬ terference into the Deccan affairs. The dictatorial rule of Salabat Khan, the minister of Murtaza Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar, dis¬ gusted the nobles, some of whom fled to Akbar’s court and sought his help. In 1585 Akbar ordered Khan 'Azam, governor of Malwa, to invade Berar but it was not until the next year that he could ac¬ tually carry out the royal order. He invaded Berar, sacked its capital, Ellichpur, but had to retreat to Nandurbar after fighting an indecisive battle at Chandur313 on account of the combined opposi¬ tion of the troops of Raja ‘All Khan and the Nizam Shah. He bank¬ ed on the help of the Khan Khanan, governor of Gujarat, which he failed to secure, and the expedition came to a barren end. 

The Deccan enjoyed a respite for about three years after which circumstances in Ahmadnagar invited Akbar’s aggression. On 14 June, 1588, Murtaza Nizam Shah I was murdered by his son Husain who succeeded him but was himself deposed and murdered on 1 April, 1589, by the nobles who raised to the throne Isma'il, the son of Burhan-ud-dln, the younger brother of Murtaza Nizam Shah, now a refugee at Akbar’s court. This aroused the ambition of Burhan-ud-din to secure the throne of Ahmadnagar and offered Akbar the pretext for interference into its affairs. Akbar sent him to Malwa with instructions to Khan A‘zam and Raja ‘AH Khan of Khandesh to help him secure the Ahmadnagar throne. Burhan, how¬ ever, refused Mughul assistance to avoid inconvenient and humi¬ liating obligations and invaded Berar with his own troops, but he was defeated and retreated to Khandesh. His second attempt, in which Raja ‘All Khan substantially helped him and secured for him the help of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shiah II, proved successful. Isma‘Il was taken captive after the victory of Burhan and Raja ‘All at the battle of Rohankhed.32 Burhan deposed him and sat on the throne of Ahmadnagar as Burhan Nizam Shah II (May, 1591). Burhan, whom Akbar regarded as his protege, far from proving his obedient vassal, asserted his independence. 

Akbar was outwitted and so, in August, 1591, he sent ambassa¬ dors to the courts of Khandesh, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda. In 1593 Faizi and the other envoys returned from the Deccan. None of the sultans agreed to acknowledge Akbar’s sovereignty, though Raja ‘All Khan sent his daughter for marriage with Prince Salim and the sultans of Bijapur and Golconda were good enough to pre¬ sent rich gifts to the emperor. Burhan did not even accord Akbar’s envoy Faizi an honourable treatment. It was high time that Akbar should send an expedition and he appointed the Khan Khanan and Sultan Murad to this command, assisted by Mirza Shah Rukh and Shahbaz Khan. Dissensions between the imperial leaders, however, delayed operation. Murad wanted the officers of Malwa to join him in Gujarat, his province, and march from there to the Deccan, while the Khan Khanan wanted to proceed from Malwa, where he was then stationed, and refused to act as a mere follower of the prince. 

Meanwhile the course of events in Ahmadnagar offered Akbar the casas belli which he had long sought for. On the death of Burhan Nizam Shah II in April, 1595, his elder son Ibrahim succeed¬ ed him but a few months after he was slain in a battle. Ibrahim’s infant son Bahadur was imprisoned by Miyan Manjhu and the Dec canis; they raised to the throne a youth named Ahmad who was represented as the son of Muhammad Khudabanda, sixth son of Bur¬ han Nizam Shah I (1509-1553). But Chand Sultan, daughter of Husain Ni^am Shah I and widow of ‘All ‘Adil Shah I of Bijapur, championed the cause of the lawful heir, Bahadur. The African nobles, who supported another candidate, besieged Miyan Manjhu in Ahmad¬ nagar who sought the help of Sultan Murad, governor of Gujariat. 

The prince, who had been preparing for a campaign in the Deccan, marched without delay and at Chandur,33 some sixty miles from Ahmadnagar, where he was joined by the Khan Khanan, Raja ‘All Khan also joined the imperial force, though rather reluctantly, because his real sympathies were with the Deccan kingdom. The Mughul army arrived before Ahmadnagar on 26 December, 1595, and, instead of coming as allies, they came as invaders, as Firishta justly comments, and besieged the city. 

Miyan Manjhu, who regretted the appeal he had made to the Mughuls, retired from Ahmadnagar, and Chand Sultan took the helm of affairs in her own hand. The jealousy and dissension be¬ tween the Mughul commanders, the heroic defence of the fort by the ‘noble queen’ and the encouragement the garrison received from Raja ‘All Khan, who sent secret messages to them, made the pro¬ gress of the siege slow. In response to the call of Chand Sultan, the nobles rallied round her. Ikhlas Khan marched from Daula tabad with 10,000 horse but in the vicinity of Paithan on the Goda¬ vari the Mughuls defeated him. Abhang Khan marched from the southern frontier with 7,000 horse but was badly defeated by the Khan Khanan’s troops with heavy loss. In the doom of Ahmad¬ nagar the sultans of Bijapur and Golconda read their own and they sent a big army which was advancing from the Bijapur frontier. The Mughuls, therefore, had recourse to digging mines with a view to destroying the defences but treachery helped the garrison who, being informed in time, destroyed the mines by countermining. Meanwhile the confederate army of Bijapur and Golconda was ap¬ proaching the city and scarcity of provisions prevailed in the Mu¬ ghul camp. Sultan Murad accordingly offered terms of peace to Chand Sultan: the Mughuls would raise the siege of Ahmadnagar provided Berar was ceded to them. Reluctantly Chand Sultan agreed and peace was concluded on 23 March, 1596.34 The Mu¬ ghuls raised the siege of Ahmadnagar and retired to Berar and the first act in the drama of Akbar’s Deccan campaign ended. 

The peace thus concluded proved a mere truce. There were causes of complaint on both sides, but the terms of peace were ac¬ tually violated, against Chand Sultan’s advice, by the rulers of Ahmadnagar who, encouraged by the approach of the Bijapur and Golconda army, whose help they had sought, made an attempt to expel the Mughul troops from Berar. The Khan Khanan moved with an army of 15,000 horse against the Deccanis, and at Ashti near Sonpet a hardly-contested battle took place on 8 and 9 February, 1597. The battle began late in the afternoon. Suhail Khan, the commander of the Bijapur troops, made an artillery attack with such vehemence that the two wings of the Mughul army were defeated and put to flight and Raja ‘All Khan of Khlandesh, who commanded the Mughul left, was slain with his officers and 500 of his men. The Khan Khanan and Shah Rukh Mirza who commanded the centre ably stood their ground, pushed back the troops of Ahmadnagar and captured the Bijapur artillery. Next morning the Khan Khanan with 7,000 men, who had assembled at night, inflicted a severe defeat upon the Bijapur troops who, with Suhail Khan wounded, fled. 

The victory of the Khan Khanan was not however followed by any remarkable progress of the Mughul arms in the Deccan, particularly because of the dissension between the two commanders which led to the recall of the hero of Ashti to court. In 1598 the Mughuls gained some minor successes; they took Gawil, Narnala, Kherla and other forts in Berar. Next year Akbar sent to the Deccan Abu-’l-Fazl who arrived at Burhanpur in May but failed to persuade Bahadur, son and successor of Raja ‘All Khan of Khandesh, to join the imperial army. On 12 May, 1599, Prince Muriad died of deli¬ rium tremens and his younger brother Prince Daniyal was ap¬ pointed to the Deccan command, but his movement was so leisurely that he did not reach Burhanpur until 1 January, 1600. Taking advantage of this situation, the Ahmadnagar troops besieged the Mughul commandant at the fort of Bir. 

Akbar, who was now freed from the bogey of Uzbeg invasion because of the death of ‘Abdullah Khan in February, 1598, left Agra on 29 September, 1599, with 80,000 horse and despatched the Khan Khanan to join Daniyal in the Deccan. Dissension in Ahmadnagar favoured the Mughul cause. Chand Sultan was opposed by Abhang Khan and she opened negotiations with Abu-’l-Fazl by which she agreed to surrender Ahmadnagar if the Mughuls would remove Abhang Khan. Abhang replied by despatching an army which invaded Berar and advanced as far as Ellichpur, but was ultimately defeated by the Mughuls. 

The arrival of Prince Daniyal at Burhanpur in January, 1600, added fresh complication to the intricate situation. Bahadur re¬ fused to wait on him and shut himself up in the fort of Aslrgarh and the enraged prince summoned the officers of Berar to reply to Bahadur’s insolence. Akbar, who was now in Maiwa on his way to the Deccan, sent orders to the prince to march towards Ahmad¬ nagar and he himself hastened towards Burhanpur to deal with the defiant Bahadur. On 8 April Akbar appeared before Burhanpur and the very next day he despatched Khan A‘zam to besiege the fort of Aslrgarh. 

Daniyal and the Khan Khanan accordingly marched towards Ahmadnagar. Abhang Khan proceeded to oppose them but ulti¬ mately retreated to Junnar. On 21 April the Mughuls besieged the fort without opposition. Chand Sultan, who advised peace with the Mughuls by surrender of the fort, was put to death by a riotous faction which was opposed to her policy. With her fall the star of Ahmadnagar sank. The defences of the fort were destroy¬ ed by mines and the Mughuls stormed it on 28 August. The fall of Ahmadnagar alarmed Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II of Bijapur who sent an envoy to Akbar to conciliate him and agreed to give his daughter in marriage to Prince Daniyal. 

Bahadur, who had enough provisions in the fort of Asirgarh to stand a siege, opened negotiations with Akbar just to gain time so that the Mughuls would be compelled to raise the siege on account of scarcity of provisions, but Akbar saw through the design and demanded unconditional surrender. On 21 June a Mughul force captured the Sapan hill from which the enemy harassed the besie¬ gers and a second overture for peace was also rejected in Septem¬ ber. But the progress of the siege was remarkably slow and Abu- ’1-Fazl was sent to infuse fresh vigour into the besiegers. The garrison was, however, reduced to great straits on account of the congestion of men, animals and stores and a pestilence broke out which took a huge toll of lives. This miserable plight of the be¬ sieged enabled the Mughuls to capture on 9 December the fort of Maligarh, situated to the north-west of the main fort and on the lower slopes of the hill. These circumstances compelled Bahadur to agree to Akbar’s proposal to meet him at his camp for negotia¬ tion on condition that Khandesh would be restored to him and the members of the royal family would be released. On 21 December Bahadur came to Akbar’s camp. He had left instruction to the garrison not to surrender and consequently he refused to surrender the fort. Akbar had tried to secure the help of Portuguese artil¬ lery through the Jesuits but failed. He therefore detained Baha¬ dur and coerced him to write to the garrison for delivering the keys of the fort. Yaqut, the Abyssinian commandant of the fort, loyal to Bahadur’s instruction, disregarded his master’s letter from Akbar’s camp delivered to him by his son Muqarrab Khan, and, on the refusal of every other member of the royal family to sit on the throne for its defence, committed suicide. The garrison, large¬ ly bribed by Akbar’s officers, lost morale and surrendered the fort to the Mughuls on 6 January, 1601.35 In the siege of Asirgarh Akbar stands guilty of an act of treachery; he was not treache rous by nature but when expediency demanded it, he did not hesi¬ tate to use it as a weapon.36 

Akbar made over the government of Khandesh to Daniyal and ultimately Khandesh, Berar and the annexed portion of Ahmad nagar were combined as the viceroyalty of the Deccan under the prince. A large portion of Ahmadnagar remained independent under Murtaza Nizam Shah II, the son of Shah ‘All, third son of Burhan I, as the nominal ruler but with Malik ‘Ambar as the real power with whom the Mughuls made peace after minor engage¬ ments. 

VII. REVOLT OF SALIM 

Akbar intended to deal with the kingdom of Bijapur, Golconda and Bidar but he had to leave the Deccan in April for the North where Salim was in active mutiny. On 23 August, 1601, the em¬ peror reached Agra. His profligate son, who had disliked his be¬ stowing favour on Daniyal, became impatient of the delay in secur¬ ing the throne. As early as 159136a he had displayed shameless eagerness to grasp sovereign power and nine years later, taking ad¬ vantage of Akbar’s preoccupation in the Deccan, attempted a coup de main. Salim’s revolt was not a protest of orthodox Islam against the heterodoxy of Akbar and Abu-’l-Fazl. Salim did not champion the cause of Islamic orthodoxy, as Count Von Noer states. When Akbar set out for the Deccan, the prince had been left in charge of the capital and entrusted with the task of suppres¬ sing the Rana of Mewar in collaboration with Raja Man Singh. But he neither seriously carried out his father’s instructions nor listen¬ ed to his brother-in-law who advised him to accompany him to Bengal where he was transferred to deal with the rebellion of the Afghans. He first made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Agra and the Punjab and then crossing the Yamuna on 23 July, 1600, made for Allahabad, evading an interview with his grandmother who hastened after him to dissuade him from his purpose. On arrival at Allahabad he took possession of the treasures of Bihar amount¬ ing to 30 lakhs of Rupees and seized the territory from KalpI to Hajlpur where he appointed his own officers. He sent an evasive reply to his father’s letter from the Deccan. On his return to the capital Akbar opened negotiations with his rebel son but Salim advanced towards Agra at the head of 30,000 horse and reached Etawa. Akbar despatched a letter of remonstrance and threat ordering the prince to return to Allahabad and then offered him the government of Bengal and Orissa. Salim disregarded the offer but returned to Allahabad (May, 1602) where he set up as an indepen dent monarch. He sent his envoy to Agra to negotiate peace with his father who could hardly agree to his extravagant demands. Besides he struck coins in his own name and had the audacity to send specimens to confirm his sovereign powers. This fresh provo¬ cation moved Akbar to action which paternal affection as well as policy had so long prevented. He recalled from the Deccan his valued counsellor Abu-’l-Fazl who deeply resented the prince’s foolish and shameless conduct and assured his sovereign that he would bring the ‘king of Allahabad’ bound to court and immediate¬ ly left for the capital. Salim, who was jealous of the power and influence of the great minister, regarded him as his personal enemy and saw his impending doom. He apprehended that Abu-’l-Fazl’s influence might cause Akbar to adopt a sterner attitude and even to take the extreme step of disinheriting him. He was determin¬ ed to destroy Abu-’l-Fazl and commissioned Bir Singh, the rebel Bundela chieftain of Orchha, for this purpose. On 19 August 1602, the loyal bandit intercepted Abu-’l-Fazl between Sarai Bir and Antri37 and with 500 horsemen fell upon the great minister, overpowered his insufficient escort and after severing the head from his body, sent it to Salim at Allahabad. It is strange to re¬ late that this cultured prince received it with barbaric delight and treated the savage murder of the greatest savant of Muslim India with supreme contempt. Stranger still, even in his autobiography, which must have been written later and in calmer moments, he refers to the incident—tragic beyond measure—with almost brutal cynicism. 

Akbar became furious and heart-broken. He had lost Raja Birbal, the brilliant wit and poet, in 1586 due to his own mis¬ take and in 1589 he had been deprived of two of his valued ser¬ vants: Todar Mai, the great financier and Raja Bhagwan Das, the valiant commander. In 1593 his faithful counsellor Shaikh Muba¬ rak died and two lyears later he lost his valued Poet Laureate Faizi; but the loss of Abu-’l-Fazl, his devoted counsellor and con¬ stant friend, overpowered him with grief and rage. For three clays he abstained himself from appearing in public and he cried like a helpless child. The emperor ordered that the culprit should be hunted down and his head brought to court. Bir Singh was hotly pursued and almost captured in the fortress of Erachh38 but he managed to escape. This heightened the indignation of Akbar who deputed Asad Beg to investigate into the matter and Asad Beg re¬ ported great negligence on the part of the officers concerned. 

Salima Sultan Begam, the gifted widow of Bairam Khan and Akbar’s cousin and wife, now offered her good offices to reconcile Salim to his father. She went to Allahabad and, succeeding in her mission, returned with the prince who was received by his grand¬ mother one stage from Agra and led into his father’s presence. Salim presented 12,000 gold mohurs and 770 elephants to Akbar who forgave his profligate son deserving capital punishment, re¬ ceived him kindly by a warm embrace and even designated him heir apparent. In October, 1603, Salim was deputed to lead an ex¬ pedition against the Rana of Mewar but he expressed his reluctance and was permitted to return to Allahabad. At Allahabad Salim gave himself up to opium and wine and committed the worst bar¬ barities; he had the news-writer who reported his misdeeds flayed alive in his presence and one of his associates was castrated and another beaten to death. The other son of the emperor, Daniyal, who had just married a daughter of the ‘Adil Shah of Bijapur, drank himself to death at Burhanpur in April, 1604.39 Akbar him¬ self set out for Allahabad to punish his recalcitrant son, but he had to return to Agra due to the serious illness of his mother who died on 10 September. Akbar deeply mourned her loss and discon¬ tinued his movement against Salim who, by the persuasion of Mir Sadr Jahan as well as due to the necessity for remaining at court to counteract the intrigues of Khusrav’s partisans, agreed to sub¬ mit and on 16 November arrived at court with rich presents for his father. Akbar welcomed him at the public audience but after¬ wards reproached him for his misconduct and imprisoned him in a room for ten days during which he was deprived of opium and wine. Thus ends the rebellion of Salim whom Akbar could pro¬ bably never forgive in all sincerity as the blood of Abu-’l-Fazl flowed between the grieved father and the unrepentant son. 

Meanwhile at court there was a strong party led by Khan Aczam and Raja Man Singh who favoured the succession of Salim’s son Khusrav and induced Akbar to set aside the claim of his father. Khusrav was Khan A‘zam’s son-in-law and Raja Man Singh’s nephew. Besides, Salim’s misconduct had created an unfavourable opinion of him as heir to the throne. 

VIII. DEATH OF AKBAR — HIS PERSONALITY 

On 3 October, 1605, Akbar fell ill with dysentery and the efforts of his best physician Hakim ‘All failed to cure him. Khan A‘zam and Raja Man Singh now became alert and conspired to seize Salim when he would next visit his dying father, but the prince was informed in time and was able to return safely from the court. The right of primogeniture had become customary in the TImurid family and the two leaders were outvoted in a conference of the nobles, the majority of whom decided in favour of Salim. The Sayyids of Barha supported his cause and the Rajputs of Raja Ram Das, the Kachhwaha, guarded the treasury in his interest. 

On 21 October, when at last Salim visited his dying father, he could not speak; he made a sign asking his son to place the im¬ perial turban on his head and gird himself with Humayun’s sword. At midnight on 25-26 October the great monarch passed away, and next morning his body was borne in state to the garden of Bihishtabad (Sikandra), some six miles from Agra, where he had commenced to build his own mausoleum. 

“Happy the writer who shall tell the history of Catherine II”, exclaimed Voltaire. A similar remark might be made with greater justice in regard to Akbar who is ‘one of the hinges of history’ and was great in an age of great rulers: Elizabeth of England, Henry IV of France, Sulaiman the Magnificent of Turkey and Shah ‘Abbas the Great of Persia were his contemporaries. We have contem¬ porary portraits of the emperor: one from the pen of the Jesuit Father Monserrate and one from that of his son Jahangir and several from the brush of his court painters. Akbar was a man of medium height with broad shoulders, dark sparkling eyes, open forehead, long arms and wheat-coloured complexion. He was strongly built, neither thin nor stout. His eyebrows were narrow, eyelids heavy. His nose was of middle size and his nostrils were wide. Below his left nose was a mole of the size of a pea. His head drooped slightly over his right shoulder. His voice was loud, his conversation witty and animated. Normally he was dignified: when he laughed, he was distorted; in his wrath he was majestic. Altogether he was kingly and was easily recognized as the king in any assemblage of men. 

The titanic and complex personality of the great Mughul is not easy to portray. Akbar was by nature humane and gentle, though occasionally he could be violent and cruel as when he ordered the general massacre of the vanquished garrison of Chitor and put a luckless lamp-lighter to death for the crime of having fallen asleep close to the royal couch. Chivalrous and just to all men, funda¬ mentally sincere and straightforward, charitable and generous to a fallen foe, he could be perfidious and unscrupulous when expedi¬ ency demanded it, as we find him in his treatment of Yusuf Shah of Kashmir and Bahadur Shiah of Khandesh. Genial and sociable, possessed of a magnetic personality and winning manners, he had ‘super-abundant capacity for sympathy’ and genius for gaining the love and affection of his people and the respect and admiration of his enemy. Moderate in his diet, he took but one full meal a day. 

A temperate drinker, he was fond of fruit; he disliked and ultimately abstained from flesh food. Possessed of radiant energy, he was essentially a man of action. Equally efficient in riding, polo and swordsmanship, he was an unerring shot and had practical knowledge of the mechanical arts. A true Timurid in his daunt¬ less personal courage, he would expose himself in battles and sieges and would not hesitate to risk his life by attacking a mighty tiger or by hand-to-hand challenge of the enemy as in the battle of Sar nal. He possessed the essential qualities of a general: capacity for strategy and practical knowledge of war to a remarkable degree as well as swiftness of military movements that was perfectly Ale¬ xandrine. His mastery of speed and surprise was revealed in his wonderful blitzkrieg in Gujarat. The siege of Chitor revealed him as an exact marksman. The Kabul campaign showed his mastery of detail and that of Bengal, where he defeated the Afghans dur¬ ing the full rains, proved his contempt of time-honoured custom. His Central Asian policy, by which he maintained the balance by playing off ‘Abdullah Khan of Bukhara against Shah ‘Abbas of Persia, befriending both but helping neither, is well worthy of the Roi Soleil and testifies to his mastery in diplomacy. A man of soaring and boundless ambition, he was a self-confessed annexation¬ ist, an antithesis of the great Asoka whom he resembles in so many respects. He was an indefatigable worker at the trade of a king and would only sleep for three hours at night. His mind was as active as his body. Sincerely religious and God-fearing, he was a rationalist and a dreamer, a mystic and a seeker after truth: he covered under his inexhaustible energy a soul melancholy. Of his two inscriptions on the walls of the portico of the Buland Dar wdza, one records the date of his proud conquest of Kh&ndesh and the Deccan and the other reminds all of the transitoriness of world¬ ly things. He had an infectious enthusiasm for religious and philo¬ sophical discussions. He could neither read nor write, but he was not ignorant as BadaunI would have us believe. Monserrate, who was impressed by his splendid versatility, testifies that in spite of his illiteracy, he was yet most learned (doctissimus eruditissi musque).40 He was a man of many interests and varied tastes. He had books read to him on poetry, history, philosophy and theo¬ logy and he had a prodigious memory. He took interest in music and to him the art of painting was a means to the realization of the greatness and glory of God. He not only laid the real founda¬ tion of the Mughul empire and conferred on the subjects of his far-flung dominion the blessings of Pax Muglauliana, but he was also the founder of Mughul polity and he made his capital the veri¬ table Mecca of culture and civilization rivalling, if not surpassing, in grandeur Herat of Sultan Husain MirzJa Baiqara, the grande monarque of Central Asia. Architecture and gardening, calli¬ graphy and painting, music and the minor arts, history and poetry, theology and philosophy, all were represented at his sumptuous court. He laid the foundation of the Mughul school of painting and the Mughul style of architecture. Persian as well as Hindi litera¬ ture had a glorious revival under his generous patronage. Kausari, the court poet of Shah ‘Abbas the Great, even regrets that the centre of Persian literature had shifted from Persia to Hindusthan. Even Sanskritic studies did receive his positive encouragement.40"1 

Indeed Akbar took an important part in the evolution of Mughul civilization by the happy fusion and harmonious blending of Per¬ sian and Indian cultures; he himself was the very symbol of that synthesis. 

Yet it has to be confessed that Akbar’s knowledge, acquired through ears, could neither be methodical nor co-ordinated. He was a man of original ideas and bold conceptions. His administrative and military reforms reveal his constructive ability and organiza¬ tional power. In his social reforms—the abolition of forced sati,41 encouragement of widow remarriage and prohibition of child mar¬ riage—he anticipated the ideas of modern times. He believed in the divinity of kingship in regarding royalty as a ‘light emanating from God’ and by his character and work he raised the prestige of monarchy. He was a statesman par excellence with a masculine intellect, profound knowledge of human nature, judgment of pro¬ blems and a vision of things afar: he could hear the beating of drums coming from a distant mart. He was the first Muslim ruler, Sher Shah excepted, who accepted the responsibilities of govern¬ ment with the welfare of the governed as its objective. He gave a new orientation to Indo-Islamic history. Few monarchs have come nearer to the ideal of a father of his people. As the apostle of sulh-i-kull (universal toleration) he stands unique. In his boy¬ hood there were the fires of Smithfield in England, his contem¬ porary was Philip II of Spain and he was followed a century later by the monarch of the Dragonnades. While the Duke of Alva by the stroke of his pen was massacring millions of people for their resistance to the authority of Rome, Abu-’l-Fazl was enunciating that ‘persecution defeats its own purpose.’ Like the Buland Dar waza that he built at Fathpur Sikri, Akbar towers far above his contemporary sovereigns and, with all his vices, he remains not only as one of the grandest monarchs known to history but ‘one of the few royal figures that approach the stature of great men.’ 

1. Badauni, Tr. by Ranking, Vol. I, p. 2. 

la. Vambery, The Travels and Adventures of the Turkish Admiral Ali Rai‘s, pp. 56-58. 

lb. Hodivala, Historical Studies in Mughal Numismatics, pp. 265-66; ‘Arif Qan daharl, Tarikh-i-Akbari, pp. 40-41. 

2. There is a picture by the famous artist Khvaja ‘Abdus-Samad illustrating the incident, at the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Reproduced in Percy Brown, Indian Painting under the Mughals, p. 55. 

3. Indian Historical Quarterly, June 1952, pp. 147-156. 

4. This conclusion is not based on the statements of later chroniclers like Ahmad Yadgar and Van den Broecke as Vincent Smith has done in J.R.A.S., 1916, pp. 527-34, but on the evidence of two really contemporary authorities: Bayazld Biyat and ‘Arif Qandaharl, supplemented by other chroniclers. For a full discussion see Dacca University Studies, November 1935, pp. 67-101. 

5. Town in Kashmir State 32° 38’, 75° 24’; Thornton, Gazetteer of India, London, 1886. 

6. Her mother was a daughter of Babur. See the article on Salima Begam in J.A.S.B., 1906, and A.S. Beveridge, Humayun-ndma, pp. 276-78. 7. The conflicting accounts in the chronicles make it difficult to say whether he was a saint or a charlatan. 

7a. Tab. Akbari, Eng. Transl. II, p. 112; Tarikh-i-Alfi, I. O.Ms., ff. 423-4. 7b. Vide Tab. Akbari. Eng. Transl. II., p. 238. The message runs thus; ‘As I have come to such distance without consulting you, my attendants have be¬ come uneasy (lit. fallen into suspicion). It is best and proper if you will soothe them so that they may serve with composure of mind.’ 8. Vincent Smith is wrong in his statement that Bairam Khan died as a young man of thirty-six or thirty-seven, Akbar the Great Mogul, p. 46, n. 2. See Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 1949, pp. 191-195. 9. Two chronicles assert that Bairam Khan proceeded to the Punjab with a view to going to Mecca by way of Qandahar and Mashhad, holy for the Shiahs, the road to Gujarat being controlled by Mai Dev, raja of Jodhpur, who was hostile to Bairam, Maedan-i~akhbdr-i-Ahmadi. f. 183 b and Khdfi Khan, Vol. I, pp. 146-47. 

10. See Journal of Indian History, Vol. I, 1921, pp. 327-44. Also Ma‘dan-i-akhbd/r-i Ahmadi, f. 177 a and Zubdat-ut-Tawdrikh, I O.Ms., f. 103 b. 

11. In Jubbulpur district. 23° 10' N., 79° 57' E. 

12. In Narsinghpur district. 22° 46' N., 78° 59' E. 

13. See Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1904, ‘A Forgotten City.’ 14. Vide Chapter II. 

15. For the Shaibamds see Lane-Poole, The Mohammadan Dynasties, pp. 270-72. 16. Cambridge Shorter History of India, p. 346. 

17. Firishta suggests that they wanted to retire to Malwa with a view to joining the rebellious MIrzas or forming an alliance with the sultans of the Deccan, Briggs, Vol. II, p. 227; Text, Vol. II, p. 256. 

18. The site of the battle named by Abu-’l-Fazl as ‘Sakrawal’ and Nizam-ud-dm and Badauni as ‘Mankarwal’ cannot be properly identified. 

19. He remained there until March 1572, when through the intercession of Mun‘im Khan he obtained pardon and was granted Lakhnau as his fief where he died shortly after. ‘Abdullah Khan who had escaped from Gujarat and joined Khan Zaman in Jaunpur had already died. 

20. See Chapter III. 

20a. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Provincial Series, Rajputana, p. 132. 21. Major Price and Beveridge (Akbar-ndma, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 464) and following them Vincent Smith also gave the incorrect date, 20 October. 

22. Akbar~ndma, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 333; Moreland, Agrarian System of Mos¬ lem India, p. 85. 

22a. Haig reads Nagaur as Bagor as he considers that Akbar should not have pro¬ ceeded in a north-westerly direction from Ajmer when his objective lay to the south-west. But besides the MSS. of the Akbar-nama, Nizam-ud-dln, BadaunI, Firishta and ‘Abdul-BaqI state that Akbar left Ajmer for Nagaur. 

22b. Tab. Akbarls Eng. Trans. II, p. 403. 

23. Moreland has rightly objected to the translation of khalisa as 'crown lands’, Agrarian System of Moslem India, p. 29, n. 1. 

23a. A town in Patna district. 

23b. Tod. Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, Ed. by Crooke, I, p. 394. 23c. Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans. II, p. 93. 

23d. Ibid, III, p. 332. 

23e. Aln-i-Akbari, Trans. by Jarrett, III, p. 394; Badduni, Trans. by Lowe, II, p. 213; Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., Ill, p. 397. 

24. See J.R.A.S., 1924, pp. 591-608, where Buckler emphasizes the importance of the 'declaration’ in relation to the outer Islamic world. There is no reason to believe, as Buckler does, that the early Mughul emperors acknowledged the sovereignty of the Safavl Shahs or that the latter asserted the right of over¬ lordship over the former. On this point see Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp. 156-58, and S.Ray, Humdyun in Persia, pp. 58-60. See also Hollister, The Shi‘a of India, pp. 133-34, London, 1953. 

25. The date as given by Luis de Guzman is here accepted. See Maclagan, The Jesuits and the Great Mogul, p. 42. 

26. Macauliffe, The Sikh Religion, Vol. II, pp. 97, 105-9. 

27. Lowe, Muntakhab-ut-Tawarlkh, Vol. II, pp. 263-64. 

27a. Ibid., p. 308; Maclagan, The Jesuits and the Great Mogul, p. 62. 27b. Freeman, History and Conquests of the Saracens, pp. 199-200. 27c. Von Noer, Haveil, Yusuf Ali and following them M. L. Roy Chowdhury; Sri 

Ram Sharma and A. L. Srivastava rather do not consider it a religion. 28. Goldziher, Mohammed and Islam, p. 330. 

28a. Maclagan, The Jesuits and the Great Mogul, p. 34. The Jesuit sources are Peruschi, du Jarric and Informatione. 

28b. Maclagan, op. cit., p. 34; Monserrate, Commentarius (Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, iii, 1914), fol. 42a. 

28c. R. D. Banerji, History of Orissa, Vol. II, p. 3. 

28d. See Akbar-nama, Eng. Ill, p. 431. ‘[Akbar].. .had ordered for the encourage¬ ment of the army that the pay of the soldiers should be increased by 100 per cent, in Bengal and 50 per cent, in Bihar. The Khwaja [Shah Mansur]... did not understand the situation and took upon himself the responsibility of issuing an order to the effect that in Bengal the increase should be 50 per cent and in Bihar, 20 per cent. Muzaffar was bound by the order and made out the accounts from the beginning of the year, and so instituted heavy demands’. As pointed out by Beveridge in Akbar-nama, III, footnote, p. 431, Mansur re¬ duced the pay and apparently Muzaffar made the reduction take effect from the beginning of the year and so demanded repayment of the excess. Therefore it comes to this that ‘Muzaffar decreased the pay of the troops in Bengal by 50 per cent, and in Bihar by 30 per cent’. The pay was already increased and Muzaffar reduced it and demanded repayment. Shah Mansur was responsible for this measure, but in Bengal Muzaffar executed it. For tactlessness and severity, see J. N. Sarkar—History of Bengal, II, published by Dacca University, p. 196; Badduni, Eng. Trans., II, pp. 288-89. 

29. Cf. J.A.S.B., 1915, pp. 201-04; Tab. Akbari, Eng. Trans., II; pp. 545-7, 553-4; Badduni, Trans, by Lowe, II, pp. 298-303; Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., Ill, pp. 501-505. Mcuasir-ul-Umara, Vol. I, pp. 656-7. 

29a. Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., III., pp. 541-2; Badduni, Eng. Trans, by Lowe, II, p. 303; Tab. Akbari, Eng. Trans., II, p. 551. 

30. History of Bengal, Vol. II, p. 209, has 10 April, 1592 which seems incorrect. The battle took place on 31 Farwardm or 6 Rajab, 1000 A.H., which yields 

18 April, 1592. The error has been probably due to calculation based on Beveridge’s conversion of 5 Jumada II, 1000, into 11 March, 1592 at p. 927, A.N., iii.; it should be 19 march. 

30a.‘Abdur Rahim, Mughal Relations with Central Asia, Islamic Culture, Janu¬ ary 1937, pp. 81-90; R.C. Verma, Foreign Policy of the Great Mughals, pp. 58-59. 

30b. Hoyland and Banerjee, Commentaries of Fr. Monserrate, p. 172. 30c. Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., Ill, p. 758. 

30d. For rivalry and jealousy over the Caliphate issue, Cf. Arnold, The Caliphate. 30e. Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., Ill, pp. 757-8. 

31. The letter is reproduced in J. C. Locke, The First Englishmen in India, Lon¬ don, 1930, pp. 31-32. It is the earliest communication between the Govern¬ ments of the two countries. 

31a. In Ellichpur district. 

32. 20° 37' N. and 76° 11' E. 

33. 20° 19' N. and 74° 15' E. 

34. Burhan-i-Madsir, Eng. Trans, in Indian Antiquary, November 1923, p. 345. 35. The above date is given by Abu-’l-Fazl who himself was present at the gate of the fort. According to the inscription on the front wall of the Jami‘ Mas jid in the fort, the date was 26 January, 1601. 36. The siege of Aslrgarh has been a controversial point in Akbar’s history. The Jesuit version of the incident is at variance with that of the Muslim chronicles. After careful examination Payne has come to the definite con¬ clusion that the ‘Jesuit references to the Deccan campaigns are vague and inac¬ curate.’ The exhaustive researches of Payne have conclusively overthrown V. A. Smith’s charge against Abu-1-Fazl that he was guilty of deliberate perversion of the truth. According to Du Jarric, Muqarrab Khan, the com¬ mandant’s son, was killed by Akbar when he reported his father’s refusal to surrender the fort, while according to the Muslim chronicles he com¬ mitted suicide to avoid the critical situation. For a detailed discussion see Payne, Akbar and the Jesuits, pp. 248-258; Akbar-nama, Eng. Trans., Vol. Ill, pp. 1168-69; Indian Antiquary, 1918, pp. 180-83; and V. A. Smith, Akbar, pp. 272-86 and 297-300. V. A. Smith unjustly accused Abu-’l-Fazl without consulting the Akbar-nama; Abu-’l-Fazl, indeed, does not conceal the fact of Akbar’s treachery and his recourse to bribery. 

36a. Badauni, Lowe, II, p. 390. 

37. Sara! Bir is about 12 miles from Narwar while Antrl is about 6 miles away from it, Blochmann, Ain-i-Akbari, Vol. I, XLVIII. Abu-’l-Fazl’s tomb is at Antrl. 

38. On the Betwa in JhansI district. 

39. Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, Rogers and Beveridge, Vol. I, pp. 34-35, and V. A. Smith, Akbar, pp. 331-32. The supplement to the Akbar-nama gives the date as March, 1605. 

40. Mongolicae Legationis Commentarius by Father Anthony Monserrate, S. J., edited by Rev. H. Hosten, S. J., in Memoirs of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, iii, No. 9, Calcutta, 1914, p. 643. 

40ai. J. B. Chaudhuri, Muslim patronage to Sanskrit learning, pp. 86-88. 41. Akbar saved the widow of Jai Mai, a cousin of Raja Bhagwan Das, from sati forced on her by her son whom he punished by imprisonment.