Balaji Baji Rao: Peshwa, Maratha Empire. Panipat's fall, rise, legacy. Explore his rule & history.
Bālāji Rão Peshwa's Grand Design
Bālāji, or Nānā Saheb, as he was called, was the third great Peshwa of the Maratha State during Shahū's reign. He succeeded Bāji Rão I on June 25, 1740. He was only nineteen at the time but had been associated with his father and uncle in the work of administration and warfare. He was appointed by Shahū to the Peshwa's post on account of the qualities he possessed. The Peshwaship at that time was not a hereditary office, and the Raja had full authority and freedom to choose a suitable person based on his merits Despite some opposition and adverse influences like those of Raghūji Bhosle and others, Balaji was chosen as the fittest person to occupy the Peshwa's responsible office. He administered the affairs of the Maratha State and its expanding empire from 1740 to 1761.
His 21-year regime is packed with events of momentous importance in Indian history. It saw the end of one epoch—the Mughal empire of India—and the beginning of another—the Maratha empire in India.
Balaji's reign saw the zenith of the expansion of the Maratha State in India and the success of Maratha arms in its various parts. But it also witnessed the appearance of four new powers in the political contest for supremacy in India: the Afghans, the Sikhs, the French, and the English
The Mughal Empire had grown weak and corrupt. The rising power and aggression of the Marathas, Nadir Shah's invasion, loot, and massacre, the incompetence and voluptuousness of the emperors, the selfishness of the Vazirs or chief ministers and great nobles, and their personal jealousies, rivalries, and dissensions, had all shaken it to its foundations. It had practically disintegrated. The Subahdars and Nawabs had usurped the emperor's powers, had risen in rebellion against his authority, and had consolidated their own powers with the help of independent feudal armies and mercenary arms, both in the north and in the south. Such were the Nawabs of the Deccan and Karnatak, the Nawabs of Awadh and Allahabad, and the Nawabs of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. Similar usurpations were made by smaller officers and nobles in the country.
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| An image of Balaji Baji Rao |
Balaji had to consolidate these conquests and regularize the rights acquired during Baji Rao's period, and also to expand the Maratha state and its influence in other parts of India. His grand design, like his father's, was to bring the whole of India under Maratha influence and paramountcy, either by conquest and annexation or by levying chauth and sardeshmukhi. He was, however, not served well by his ministers and generals. They quarreled among themselves, took opposite sides, and fought against one another for personal gains and prestige. Senior Maratha ministers and generals were jealous of the young Peshwa's power.
Balaji's first task lay in making good the territorial gains and claims of chauth acquired during his father's regime. He also had to meet the legacy of debt of about Rs. 14 lakhs left by his father—incurred during the campaigns in the north. He had to wage constant war for these purposes. He also had to fight against opponents at home and eliminate them. Then, his policy of fresh advancement and aggression in the north and south required fresh arms and resources. It was a Herculean task that he undertook.
Defects in the Design
Balaji's Peshwaship can be divided into two periods: one from 1740 to 1749 and the other from 1749 to 1761. During the first period, the Peshwa was somewhat restrained by the Raja, who tried to control the direction and policy of Maratha affairs and movements Though he never took an active part in military campaigns, he would not allow his Peshwa to change the main principles of his policy. He divided the work and various spheres of Maratha activities in the north and the south and allotted them to different ministers, generals, and nobles, so as to avoid or minimize conflict among them. His aim was to bring all of India under Maratha influence or paramountcy, while maintaining the Mughal empire in name. He wanted the power of Maratha arms to reach beyond Attock, but in alliance with, or as an agent of, the Mughal empire. It was to be a Mughal-Maratha alliance for the governance of India as a whole.
This could be done either by accepting governorships of provinces from the emperor and administering them directly, or by accepting annual tributes in the form of chauth and sardeshmukhi, leaving the administration of provinces in the hands of the emperor's nominees, but protecting them from foreign invasions.
The weakness of Maratha politics lay in this policy of Shahu, which he pursued for 42 years of his reign. It could not result in any outright conquests and annexations of territories. Therefore, Maratha politics had no stability, and Maratha warfare had no finality. It became merely a process of flow and fluctuation.
At home, Shāhū would not allow the suppression of old ministers and sardārs even when they acted as traitors or rebelled against the State, entered into conspiracies with the enemies of the State, or opposed the policies and plans of the Chief Minister in various theaters of war. Moreover, Shāhū was against the amalgamation of Kolhapur and Satara States even after his death. He had not his grandfather Shivājī's vision of the unity of the Maratha State and the centralization of its power and administration. Balajī had to work with this background and to carry out his own plans of building up a great Maratha State and empire.
During the second period, Balaji became free from the control of the new Maratha King. Ram Raja, the successor of Shahu, was a posthumous son of Tara Bai's son, Shivaji II, and had been brought up secretly in humble circumstances. He lacked the ability and training of a ruler and fell prey to the intrigues of his grandmother Tara Bai. He was ultimately confined to his palace at Satara and lost all control over the political affairs of the Maratha State.
Besides the political difficulties inherent in the feudal organization of the Maratha State, Balaji had to face great financial difficulties. The Maratha State had insufficient resources to finance its growing responsibilities and military expenses. Its armies of expansion and military advance depended on the tributes and contributions of the defeated princes who remained in possession of their power and territorial administration.
There were two main centers of Maratha political activities: one in the north and the other in the south. Eastern (in the north) and Western (in the south) theaters were of minor importance.
The achievements in the north were primarily due to the Peshwa and his new generals. Sindias, Holkars, Pawārs, and Jadhavs were the most prominent among them. As regards the south, west, and east, the old Maratha ministers like the Prati-nidhi, and sardārs like Bhosles, Dabhadés, and Angrias had vested interests, influence, and power, and these spheres were marked as their field of operations. The Peshuva could not fully direct and control the politics there nor would Shāhū allow him to do so. Still it was the Peshwa, Bājī Rão and Bālājī Rão, who checked the Nizāms and the Sidīs and some rebellious sardārs and jagīrdārs, Dābhādes, Gaik-wārs, and Angrias, in their conspiracies and aggressions against the Marathā State. Thus the Marathās lacked a common will and policy, one unified control and direction in military affairs and political administration. Hence a centrally directed and controlled Marathā State could not be built up.
During Bālājī's regime, the first year in northern politics culminated in the recognition of Maratha claims and conquests in Malwa by the grant of a farman of that province by the emperor in 1741. Gujarat was already conquered by Dābhādes, Gaikwārs, and Peshwās. The Marathas had begun to interfere in the affairs of Bundelkhand, Rajputana, and other parts of Hindustan as far as Delhi during Bājī Rão's period. Bālājī's period saw the extension of their activities further north beyond Delhi into the Punjab as far as Attock, and east into the Doāb, Awadh, Allahābād, Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa. The Peshwa and his generals worked in the north, and Raghūji Bhosle in the east Their policies and activities proved at first at cross-purposes, but later on Shāhū fixed their separate spheres of activity. Still, the weakness of the Maratha power lay in the fact that it was not one unified power. It became an aggregate of powers with conflicting aims, policies, and interests. They even conspired and fought against one another, and Balaji was unable to centralize the power of the Maratha State in one hand and thus direct all affairs according to a common policy and a common plan.
The main problems that Balaji had to face in internal politics were: (1) the constant opposition of some old ministers and sardars; (2) the succession issue and Tara Bai's machinations; (3) financial difficulties and debts; and (4) administrative arrangements of old and new conquests.
In external politics, his aims were: (1) to advance and establish Maratha paramountcy over the whole of India; (2) to control the Delhi emperor and to administer imperial provinces in his name or to secure the grant of annual chauth from them; (3) to liberate the Deccan province from the Nizām; (4) to establish supremacy over Karnāśak rulers; (5) to bring Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa under Maratha influence and to secure chauth from them; and (6) to deliver the sacred places of the Hindus in the North from Muslim control. As the chief minister of the Maratha central and supreme power, did Balaji succeed in solving these problems and achieving these aims? He seemed to make progress, but his achievements.
were often nullified by the new powers and alliances that arose in Indian politics, and by the internal dissensions and cross purposes of Maratha ministers and sardars. The rise of British power in Bengal in 1757 and the failure of Maratha arms at Panipat in 1761 proved a great set-back to whatever Balaji had achieved.
Balaji was not an active soldier like his father. He, however, proved to be a diplomat and a leader of no mean quality. He possessed greater vision and vigor than his associates. But as he had neither dominant and decisive military qualities nor foresight nor sound financial resources to support his undertakings and enterprises, his achievements did not prove lasting. He could not meet his debts, and the ever-increasing military expenses as his wars and conquests did not lead to lasting results and settlements He had to meet the same problems and dangers again and again, and thus the energy and resources of the State were exhausted. No doubt, he kept the core and the central part of the Maratha State (Swarajya) independent and properly administered, and its frontiers advancing and increasing. But this was not enough. The newly acquired provinces had to be consolidated and properly administered from the center, and this he was not able to do. His energies were spent undertaking constant external warfare and settling internal dissensions.
The system of chauth and sardeshmukhi or tribute had elements of political dominance and disturbance but not of political permanence and governance. Two powers, one in actual possession of territories, and the other only demanding regular chauth and sardeshmukhi or tribute, one unwilling to pay or pay only under duress, and the other constantly forcing it to pay, could not create a stable polity or politics in the anarchic conditions of that period It was a period of great anarchy. There were wars of succession and usurpations in all parts and provinces of India. Maratha help was sought by the defeated and discontented parties. North of Malwa, the Marathas appeared more interested in interfering and helping to gain control and money. Thus, they interfered in the making and unmaking of the rulers of Rajputana, Bundelkhand, the Doab, Awadh, Allahabad, Bihar, Bengal, and Orissa in the north. In the Deccan and Karnatak provinces in the south, however, they showed concern in acquiring territory.
But Maratha successes were not decisive as their policy was half-hearted. They did not establish their own regular administration nor succeed in regularly realizing their claims to chauth and sardeshmukhi or to large jagirs. Their invasion and occupation of Those parts did not result in any political permanence or financial assurance.
Northern Campaigns and Politics: First Phase (1740-1749)
The Marathas alone thought in terms of India as a whole and as one. They followed two policies in the north: one of conquest and annexation preceded by a demand for chauth as in Gujarat and Malwa, and the other of merely imposing chauth on territories they invaded and conquered. The second policy proved ineffective in developing their permanent influence and political power in those territories. It merely resulted in a 'fight and carry' system, not in a 'conquest and stay' system. Hence, Maratha progress in the north beyond Malwa did not result in achieving the permanent expansion of Maratha power. It left the administration in the hands of old rulers who were neither loyal nor completely destroyed.
The Marathas had partitioned the Mughal empire into separate spheres of influence and military activities among their military captains or sardars. Northern India was primarily the field of the Peshwa and his generals, Sindias, Holkars, and Pawars.
Balaji organized four expeditions to the north between 1740 and 1748, in which he was personally present. The first was in Rajputana (1740–41), which had become a center of succession wars and civil wars. There were disputes for the thrones of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota, and Bundi, and the help of the Marathas was sought by one side or the other. Imperial authority was completely destroyed in Rajputana after 1740. Hence, the Marathas, as the strongest power, came in by invitation.
The Maratha chiefs helped one side or the other by taking huge subsidies or tributes. If they were not paid, they helped those who paid more. Thus, the Maratha interference did not help to stabilize the politics of Rajput States. There was no final settlement. There were conflicting policies among the Maratha sardars themselves, and therefore there was no unity of action. These sardars sometimes helped opposite sides. The Peshwa was not able to check this completely. Thus, politics in Rajputana remained in perpetual turmoil, and its economic life was ruined by constant warfare and the pecuniary demands of the Marathas.
The Peshwa's main objective was money, the realization of chauth, and the tribute demanded for help given. In the first expedition, he entered Rajputana via Bhilsa and met Sawai Jay Singh at Dholpur and tried to settle Maratha-Mughul relations through him. He received 15 lakhs from the emperor, and was promised a farman for chauth and sardeshmukhi of Malwa. This he got on 7 September 1741. The Peshwa had demanded chauth over all the imperial provinces.
In the second expedition (1741 to 1743), he passed through Bundelkhand and entered the provinces of Bihar and Bengal. These were considered by Raghūji Bhosle of Nagpur as his field of military activities. These subāhs had been captured by 'Alī Vardī Khān by an act of usurpation and by defying imperial authority in 1740. The Peshwa wanted to establish the Maratha claims of chauth and sardeshmukhi over these provinces in his name. Raghūji Bhosle claimed the provinces as lying within his sphere of influence This conflict between the Peshwa and Raghūji led to Ali Vardi Khan seeking help from the Peshwa against Raghūji. The emperor granted the chauth of these provinces to Shahū on the condition that they be protected from any interference. From Berar to Bengal, Raghūji had made Eastern India his sphere of military activities. He carried on several expeditions there from June 1741 and reduced the authority of the Nawab in Orissa and western Bengal. Ali Vardi Khan sought the help of the Peshwa as the protector of the imperial provinces, having promised to cede the chauth to him. The Peshwa wanted to check Raghūji's rising power and to establish full claim to the chauth of these provinces. While his objective was money and supremacy, that of Raghūji was the acquisition of tribute, territory, and political power for himself.
Balaji proceeded towards Bengal on December 8, 1742, entered Bihar in February 1743, met Ali Vardi Khan on March 8, 1743, and expelled Raghuuji's forces from the province. Raghuuji appealed to Shahu. Shahu divided the spheres of the Peshwa and Raghuuji on August 31, 1743. Four subahs of Malwa, Agra, Ajmer, and Allahabad, and the estates of Tikari and Bhojpur in the subah of Bihar were assigned to the Peshwa, and Raghuuji was given the subahs of Bengal, Orissa, Awadh, and parts of Bihar. They were ordered not to interfere in each other's spheres In 1745, the emperor promised to pay a chauth to Shahū—25 lakhs for Bengal and 10 lakhs for Bihar. The conflict over shares in the amount between the Peshwa and Raghūji, however, remained. But the Peshwa did not interfere in Raghūji's sphere. There were about six invasions of Bengal by Raghūji. The fortune of arms was not constant in favor of one or the other. The Marathas, however, gained Orissa. Finally, in 1751, a treaty was made between Ali Vardi Khan and Raghūji, which settled their relations. The surplus revenue of Orissa was to be paid to Raghūji, and 12 lakhs of rupees were to be paid annually to him as the chauth of Bengal and Bihar. On these terms, the Marathas agreed not to enter Bihar and Bengal again. Later, the Bhosles of Nagpur annexed Orissa to their kingdom of Berar and established their full sovereignty over it. 5
On his return from Bengal, the Peshwa defeated the Rajas of Bundelkhand, who had refused to accept Maratha supremacy and demands of chauth and tribute. He settled the affairs there by appointing Naro Shankar as the commander-in-charge. After the defeat of the Bundelā Rajas, Govind Pant Bundela was established at Saugor to realize the Maratha dues.
Balaji's third campaign took place again in 1744–45 to settle affairs in Rajasthan and Bundelkhand. The politics there were in eternal flux. In this expedition, Bhilsa was captured by Ranoji Sindia on March 11, 1745, from the Nawab of Bhopal. Hostilities, however, continued in both areas until 1747.
The fourth expedition was undertaken in 1747. Balaji went to the north on December 6, 1747. One of Balaji's objectives was to help the emperor against Ahmad Shah Abdalī, who invaded India in 1747. The other was to settle the affairs in Rajasthan and realize Maratha claims. Abdalī was defeated by the emperor's forces on March 3, 1748; the Peshwa was not required to proceed further. He met Madho Singh of Jaipur in April 1748, at Newai, south of Jaipur, and after some arrangements, returned. But he was not able to settle the affairs finally.
The results of these expeditions were meager and not decisive enough to establish the Maratha paramountcy anywhere in northern India. The Marathas had to fight constantly to realize their chauth and the promised tributes. The Rajput princes, who had welcomed the Marathas to fight against the Mughuls and settle their internal disputes, now became hostile to them. Maratha sardars supported opposite sides and constantly increased their heavy pecuniary demands and did not settle any matter finally.
A case in point is the mean treatment meted out to Ishwari Singh, Raja of Jaipur, in 1751. Sawai Jay Singh, the father of Ishwari Singh, was a friend of the Marathas, had facilitated their entry into Malwa, and had persuaded the emperor to agree to their demands. May be, he had his personal ambitions to be a leader of Rajasthan chiefs and to have a dominant position in the Mughal Court. Balaji Vishwanath and Baji Rao, the first two Peshwas, had befriended him and acted as his allies. But all this goodwill evaporated after Sawai Jay Singh's death in 1743. His two sons, Ish-Ishwari Singh and Madho Singh began to contest for the chieftaincy of the state. Madho Singh, though junior, staked his claim to the throne on the ground of his birth of an Udaipur princess. Ishwari Singh promised his brother an appanage of 24 lakhs of rupees, but Madho Singh wanted a half share in the kingdom. Ishwari Singh, with the help of his Maratha allies—Sindia and Holkar—nipped in the bud in an attempt to seize Jaipur territory by force in 1745; but then Mahārānā Jagat Singh of Udaipur, with whom Madho Singh was residing, held out promises of a large subsidy to the Marathas in case Madho Singh's cause was upheld. The Peshwa, instead of evolving just principles for succession, now started pleading the cause of Madho Singh, because his uncle, the Rana of Udaipur, promised a large subsidy. To Sindia, who entered a protest against the proceedings, he wrote a mollifying letter. In March 1747, at the Battle of Rajmahal, Ishwari Singh routed his opponent. Madho Singh and his uncle, the Maharana of Udaipur, would not accept the defeat gracefully. They bribed Holkar heavily and sent their envoys to Poona to exact from Ishwari Singh the fulfillment of his earlier promise, offering Shahu a tribute of a few lakhs of rupees. The Peshwa suggested to Malhar Rao Holkar and Sindia's Diwan Ramchandra Baba to persuade Ishwari Singh to cede the promised territory to his younger brother instead of letting this fratricidal struggle continue. 10
When the demand for half the territory of his kingdom for Madho Singh was placed before Ishwari Singh, he declined to accede to it. He angrily replied that there was a unique and hereditary friendship between the Peshwa and himself. Balaji Rao Peshwa knew well how close his father was to him and what services he rendered to Balaji Rao. Up until now, he (Ishwari Singh) was acting according to the Peshwa's advice. But the question was one of inheritance of ancestral property. They were rajas and must follow their hereditary usage. This dispute was in respect of the territory of the kingdom. How could he give it away? "I had previously given to Madho Singh what your chiefs (Holkar and Sindia) had asked me to grant by way of service to the State. How can I part with more without fighting? How can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger son? The Peshwa and his chiefs want more territory to be given to Madho Singh than before, but it cannot be done. The chiefs have changed sides for reasons well known to themselves." 11
But Ishwari Singh was humbled next year. He fled from the battlefield when he sent against the Abdali in March 1748. When the The entire Maratha army converged on his kingdom two months later, and he was in no position to refuse the Peshwa's demands. 12 But Ishwari Singh was not a willing partner to the contract and tried to wriggle out of it. Holkar marched against him with a force in August 1748 and exacted fulfillment of the terms. 13 Ishwari Singh agreed to give five parganas to his brother and restore Bundi to Ummed Singh. On 9 August, he met Holkar and his captains and swore mutual friendship and promised tribute.
At the end of 1750, the Marathas once more visited Jaipur to exact payment of the promised tribute. The land had been impoverished by constant warfare and marches and countermarches of rival armies. The Jaipur treasury was empty. The Raja did not know how to meet the Maratha demands "In utter desperation he ordered his servant to bring a live cobra and some arsenic needed to prepare a medicine. At midnight he swallowed the poison and caused the cobra to bite him. When the Maratha army approached the city, they were surprised to be greeted by a silent city. Soon the news of the horrible tragedy spread and Vakils came from Jaipur to negotiate a settlement. The Maratha protege, Madho Singh, reached the city within a fortnight, but instead of fulfilling the financial agreements, attempted to destroy his allies by treacherous attacks."14 The Jaipur invasion ended in a fiasco and permanently lost to the Marathas the goodwill and friendship of the Rajputs. They came to be hated in Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur and lost their prestige and influence among them.15 Their heavy demands for money alienated all. On January 10, 1751, they were massacred at Jaipur by the Rajputs on account of their rising hatred of the Marathas. 16
IV. Southern Campaigns and Politics: The First Phase (1740-49)
Balaji had three main objectives in the south: (1) to liberate the Maratha part of the Deccan from Mughal rule; therefore, the Nizam's power had to be liquidated or brought under control; (2) to bring the outlying Deccan and Karnak provinces under control; and (3) to crush rebellious polygators and nawabs.
Balaji had no free field in the south as in the north. Shahu was not prepared to destroy the Mughal power in the south. He only wanted his rights to chauth and sardeshmukhi recognized and realized. If the Nizam paid them regularly, then there was no question of war with him. As against this, the Nizam wanted to free himself from these obligations to the Marathas. He tried to weaken the Marathas by fomenting quarrels and conspiracies among their sardars and rival claimants. He had his own army and was supported by a number of local Maratha sardars hostile to Raja Shahu; these Sardārs held jagīrs and estates in the Maratha part of the Mughal Deccan. The Nizām also had an eye on the Karnāțak which now consisted of a number of independent polygars and nawābs.
Then there were a number of old sardars who were interested in controlling and conducting the politics and warfare in the south, and who were opposed to the Peshwa's dominant role in it or control of it. Consequently, the Maratha policy towards the Nizam was not fixed, but was vacillating, though the latter was completely opposed to the Maratha expansion in the south. Some of these ministers and sardars sided with the Nizam against the Peshwa. Consequently, the Nizam's power could not be liquidated, though he was defeated several times. Internal rivalries of Maratha politics, and dangers and diversions in northern India politics saved the Mughul Deccan from being finally conquered and annexed. All the Maratha warfare and successes proved of no avail in the end.
In 1741, Nizām-ul-Mulk was supported by the Peshwa in his fight against his own son, Nasir Jang, who wanted to usurp the subāhdarship of the Mughul Deccan. He defeated Nasir Jang and established himself again as the subāhdar of the Mughul Deccan. In 1743, he invaded Karnāśak and wrested it from Maratha hands. After this, until his death, he did not fight the Maratha forces in any theater of war,
Karnāţak expeditions of the Peshwa were necessitated by the aggression of Muslim rulers on Hindu kingdoms of the south. The help of the Marathas was also sought in quarrels over succession among local Muslim rulers in Karnāţak. In 1740, Shahū entrusted the task of defeating Muslim rulers to Raghūji Bhosle. He defeated Dost 'Ali, the Nawab of Arcot, in the Battle of Damalcheri on May 20, 1740. Trichinopoly was taken on March 26, 1741, and Chanda Sahib, his son-in-law, was captured and imprisoned. Thus Maratha supremacy was established over Karnāţak. 19
Nizām-ul-Mulk, however, could not tolerate this. He also laid claims to Karnāţak as part of the Mughal empire While Balaji and Raghuji were engaged in the Bengal campaign of 1742–43, Nizam-ul-Mulk invaded Karnatak in January 1743 with a large force and brought it under his control. He thus completely undid the work of Raghuji. Shah entrusted the task of opposing the Nizam to Babuji Naik and Fateh Singh Bhosle, who were defeated on February 15, 1745. On December 5, 1746, the Peshwa sent Sadashiv Rao, his nephew, to settle affairs there. Nizam-ul-Mulk, however, kept quiet until his death in 1748. Sadashiv Rao's campaign was successful. He conquered several places in Karnāțak and collected tribute from them. He returned on 13 April 1747. But Balaji could not get a grip on Karnāțak until Shahū's death. Shahū did not want to displease even those who proved incompetent and treacherous, like Babuji Naik. Balaji's progress was hampered in the south, owing to the conflicting interests of Shahū's sardars.
Shahu died on December 15, 1749. Balaji was desirous of uniting Kolhapur and Satara states, thus creating one Maratha state. He had therefore secretly agreed to support Shambhuji's (king of Kolhapur) succession to Satara. But Shahu was against the union. He appointed Ram Raja, Tara Bai's grandson, as his successor. Tara Bai proved that he was not a pretender. Thus, a war of succession was avoided in the Maratha kingdom, but unfortunately, Kolhapur and Satara remained separate states. Ram Raja being weak and incompetent and a puppet in Tara Bai's hands, the power of the state gradually fell into the hands of the Peshwa.
Shahu's disposition was not active and military. He did not want to disturb the existing conditions and vested interests. His vision was limited. He was not able to coordinate and control the work of his ministers and sardars, nor could he coerce them into submission when necessary. He was never interested in creating a strong, unitary, and centralized administration in his Swaraj, much less in his new conquests. He would not allow the Peshwa to change the old order and bring in the new by way of reforms.
Balaji became free from Shah's control at the end of 1749 and from succession affairs in 1751. The new ruler, Ram Raja, was a mere nonentity. He was confined to his palace and was not allowed to take any active part in state affairs, first by Tara Bai and then by Balaji.
Balaji's legacy was, however, not a happy one. There was no conception of a centralized and integrated state. The Maratha State was merely a loose collection of feudal entities. It was only in the Swaraj territory that there was some centralized and unified administration. The outlying parts of the State were administered by the military sardars to whom they were assigned as military grants (Saranjams).
In the second period of Balaji's regime, his aims and problems remained the same. He, however, being more free to direct his policy, wanted to bring to a conclusion many of the old festering problems both in the north and in the south. The new dangers which Developed during this period were the conquests made by Ahmad Shah Abdālī in the Punjab, and the military interference of the French and the English in the politics of both north and south.
In order to free himself from domestic troubles, the Peshwa arrived at a settlement at Sangola in October 1750 with Ram Raja. It defined the claims and spheres of various ministers and sardars. On November 24, 1750, Ram Raja was put in confinement by his grandmother Tara Bai. He thus ceased to be an active or directive factor in the politics of the Maratha State.
Southern Campaigns and Politics: Second Phase (1749–1761)
In 1748, Nasir Jang succeeded Nizam-ul-Mulk, but was challenged by his nephew, Muzaffar Jang Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Saheb sought the help of the Marathas. But they immediately received the help of French forces and defeated Nasir Jang and the Nawab of Arcot. Then Chanda Saheb became the Nawab of Arcot, and Muzaffar Jang assumed the title of the Nizam. Nasir Jang sought the help of the Peshura. He defeated his opponents but was killed on 5 December 1750 in the battle between him and the opposing forces led by Bussy. Thus Muzaffar Jang became the Nizam, but he, too, was killed in a melee in 1751. Then Salabat Jang was installed as the Nizam by Bussy. In 1751 Salabat Jang and the Peshwa entered into an agreement. But the agreements proved short-lived; In November 1751, Ramdas, the Diwan of Salabat Jang, on the advice and aid of Bussy, invaded the Maratha territory. In the Battle of Ghodnadi, a number of skirmishes took place. Ramdas was not successful and concluded a treaty at Shingwa.25
Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, who was at Delhi, came to the Deccan in October 1752, with a mandate from the emperor to take over the subahdarship of the Mughul Deccan, but before he could succeed, he was poisoned by one of the wives of Nizam-ul-Mulk, mother of Nizam 'Ali, at a banquet on October 16, 1752. The Peshwa and his sardars had little support for Ghazi-ud-din's claim Then Salā-bat Jang made peace with the Peshwa at Bhalki in November 1752. It was agreed that both parties were to jointly conduct the invasion of Karnataka. 26 There was no warfare between the Nizam and the Marathas until 1756. But in 1757 again incidents occurred and there was the campaign of Sindkhed from August 17, 1757 to January 2, 1758. It was undertaken to realize the 25 lakh jāgīr promised by the Nizam to the Peshwa. A peace was made at Sakharkharda, and the Peshwa was again promised the jāgīr. 27 But the terms of the treaty were not carried out. The Nizam's strength which lay in the French arms, was weakened by Bussy's departure in 1758. He then took the help of the British.
In 1759, Balaji decided to crush the Nizam finally. The campaign of Udgir took place from October 1759 to February 1760. The Nizam's forces were completely defeated. The Marathas captured four famous places: Burhanpur with fort Asirgarh, Daulatabad, Ahmadnagar, and Bijapur. Final victory was gained on February 3, 1760. Sadashiv Rao Bhau conducted the campaign and led Maratha forces to victory. The Nizam proposed peace. Sixty lakhs worth of Jagir territory, Asirgarh and Daulatabad forts, Bijapur, and Burhanpur were ceded. Ahmadnagar had already been seized. But the Battle of Panipat and disasters in the north prevented the Peshwa from taking full advantage of the victory.
Karnak Campaign
From 1753 to 1760, the Peshwa conducted several campaigns in Karnāśak to establish Maratha supremacy and to secure a regular flow of money through tribute. In 1753, his forces entered Seringapatam (Srirangapattan). In 1754, they went to Bagalkot, Savanur, and Harihar; in 1755 to Bidnur; in 1756 to Savanur; and in 1757 to Srirangapattan. In the next three years, the Peshwa sent his sardars. A lot of tribute and some territory was acquired. But matters were not finally settled.
Tulājī Angria and the Peshwa
It is to the eternal discredit of Balaji that he destroyed the naval power of Tulāji Angria with the help of the British. Without creating a new strong naval arm of the Maratha State, which was an absolute necessity against European powers in the western seas, he destroyed the old one. He did not fully realize the political danger coming from the sea powers of the west like the Portuguese, the French, and the English
Tulājī Angria did not keep on good terms with the Peshwā and was often arrogant and disloyal. His opposition and disloyalty became a thorn in Balaji's eyes. He therefore sought the help of the British in the domestic affairs of the Maratha State. It was the greatest mistake committed. Tulājī had defied western powers on the seas and checked their ambition and aggression all these years. Balaji did not fully weigh this fact. The British were very glad of this golden opportunity to crush the Maratha naval power completely. Balaji was blind to this. Thus, one of the greatest achievements of the Marathas and a century-old unique creation of Maratha naval genius was destroyed by the Peshwa with the help of a foreign enemy. It was a suicidal act born of a short-sighted policy.
Tulājī Angria, who had succeeded Sambhājī Angria in 1743, proved strong and daring enough not to allow the Europeans to establish their naval supremacy on the western coast until 1755. But the Peshwa and the British entered into a treaty of aggression against Tulājī on March 19, 1755. Tulājī was defeated by the combined forces, and Suvarnadurg was captured on April 4, 1755, and Vijayadurg on February 13, 1756. Vijayadurg was taken possession of by the English against the Peshwa's desire It was a great success for the British, whose navy could now control the entire western coast. The Peshwa took Underi from the Sidis in 1759. But the English would not help the Peshwa in destroying the power and fort of Sidis. What a contrast between the English and the Peshwa!
Northern Campaigns and Politics: Second Phase (1749-1761)
The years 1748 and 1749 are very important in the political history of India, both in the north and in the south. Indian politics then was primarily personal, not institutional. The deaths of Emperor Muhammad Shah on April 14, 1748, of Nizam-ul-Mulk on May 21, 1748, and of Shahu on December 15, 1749, removed men of old traditions and great influence Similarly, the Anglo-French Wars and their successful interference in Indian politics, and Ahmad Shah Abdālī's invasions and temporary conquests created new dangers and introduced new forces in Indian politics. The old world of the Mughul supremacy practically ended, and a new world of usurping nawābs and nizams, ministers and generals arose. We do not find one power like that of the Mughul emperor dominating over India, but a number of usurping powers—ministers and governors—holding that power separately and using it against the unity and safety of the empire itself in their own dynastic and narrow feudal interests. This age may be called the age of Vazīrs and Peshwās or prime ministers, both in the north and in the south, or of subāhdars (governors) and sardars. The Mughal emperor of the north and the Maratha king of the south had become puppets or nonentities in the country's politics. They had no character, ability, or strength and proved mere ghosts of their famous predecessors and ancestors, sitting on their thrones as mere puppets.
The Delhi emperors had asked for Maratha help against foreign invaders like Nadir Shah in 1739 and against Ahmad Shah abdali In 1747, Bāji Rão had started but could not reach in time to fight against Nadir Shāh. Bālājī reached Jaipur in 1747, but Abdali was defeated before he could reach Delhi. Maratha help was also sought by the Vazirs of the emperor against their rivals from the time of Bājī Rão. During Bālājī's time, a Maratha contingent was placed in Delhi according to an agreement of 175233 to serve the Delhi emperor and his Vazir. Thus, Maratha influence in Delhi politics increased. Later, their help was also sought in the Afghan quarrels in the Doab and in the quarrels in the Punjab against Afghan aggression from beyond the Indian borders.
The Peshwa had his sardars Sindia, Holkar, and Pawar, and other officers, administrators, and representatives, permanently stationed in important parts of northern India. Ranoji Sindia, the founder of the Sindia house, died in 1745. His sons Jayappa and Dattaji were good soldiers and continued their father's work in the north as military generals of the Peshwa. Malhar Rao Holkar lived during Balaji's regime and carried out Marathā military activities in the north, especially in Malwa, Rajputana, Bundelkhand, the Doab, and Delhi areas. Other sardars and officers were engaged in minor and restricted theaters of war.
Balaji did not personally go to the north after he returned from Jaipur in 1748. His sardars and representatives carried out military and diplomatic activities on his behalf to secure his financial and territorial gains and to advance his political interests and supremacy in the north. Balaji kept himself in touch with northern politics through correspondence. He had envoys to various courts. His envoys were entrusted with the diplomatic work at Delhi as were the envoys of the Peshwan.
During the second period of Balaji's regime, four great campaigns were organized in the north: two under the command of Raghunath Rao, the third one under Dattaji Sindia, and the last one under Sadashiv Rao Bhau. Delhi emperors and Vazirs had asked for Maratha support in their internal quarrels and against foreign invasions. Ahmad Shah Abdullah invaded India several times. Though he was defeated in 1748, he was successful in later campaigns, being invited by discontented governors and nobles of the Punjab and the Doab. The emperor, being weak, had to cede some districts in the Punjab to Abdullah in his second campaign.
The Peshwa's chief aim in undertaking these expeditions was to realize the vast sums of money promised by north Indian rulers and governors. The first expedition to the north under Raghunath Rao took office during 1753–55. He was the commander of the Maratha forces and was assisted by Sindia and Holkar. This campaign lasted until October 1755. The Marathas arrived in Rajputana in October 1753. They were promised tribute by Kota, Bundi, Jaipur, and other states. They fought with the Jats from January 16 to May 22, 1754, but failed. After that, they marched towards Delhi. They helped Ghazi-ud-din Imad-ul-Mulk in putting a new emperor on the throne and in making him the Vazir. Raghunath Rao moved around Delhi and its surroundings; Then he entered the Doab and, after making some contributions from the Rohillas and others, he returned to Poona on 10 August 1755. Malhar Rao Holkar had accompanied Raghunath Rao in this campaign. The subsidy of 40 lakhs promised to the Marathas by the Vazir could not be realized. Only a small amount was paid. The Marathas were therefore given 22 villages in Saharanpur and a few others from the emperor's estate.34
The Punjab Politics and Campaigns in the Second Period
The Punjab politics were at the time in a confused state. Claimants and usurpers were quarrelling for its governorship. The Sikhs had risen in rebellion. In this state of affairs, Ahmad Shah Abdalī invaded the Punjab and stayed there from December 1747 to March 1748. Shah Nawaz Khan, who had usurped the governorship of the Punjab, sought his help against the emperor. An engagement between the Afghans and the Mughuls took place on January 11, 1748, and Lahore was captured by the Afghans. Then the Afghans took Sirhind, but they were defeated by the imperialists on March 11, 1748.
Their second invasion occurred in December 1749. The subah-dar of Lahore granted Abdalī the revenues of four Mahāls, and he retired.
The third invasion took place in December 1751, in order to realize the promised annual revenues of the four mahāls, which were not sent. Muin-ul-Mulk, the governor, had to surrender to Abdalī at Lahore on March 5, 1752. Thus, the Punjab was lost to the empire, and subāhs of Lahore and Multan were added to the Durrani empire by a treaty confirmed by the emperor on April 13, 1752. Abdalī then conquered Kashmir.
After the third invasion of Abdalī, the Vazir Safdar Jang and Khoja Javid Khan, a favorite and confidant of the court, persuaded the emperor to enter into an agreement with the Marathas in May 1752, for the duty of defending the empire against its external and internal foes, 36 Antāji Mänkeshwar was placed in charge of the Marathā military force at Delhi for this duty. In return, the Marathās were to obtain the chauth of the North-Western provinces usurped and occupied by the Afghans. But that chauth could only be secured by actual conquest. The Marathās were also given the subahs of Ajmer and Agra which were in the hands of Rajputs and Jats. This created antagonism between them and the Marathās.
After the murder of Javid Khan on August 27, 1752, by Vazir Safdar Jang, Imad-ul-Mulk, Ghazi-ud-din Khan's son, with the help of the Marathas, drove away Safdar Jang in 1753 to Awadh, and in June 1754 he deposed the emperor Ahmad Shah. Raghunath Rao, Malhar Rao Holkar, and Najib Rohilla assisted him to become Vazir in place of Intizam-ud-Daulah, the son of the old Vazir Qamar-ud-din.
The fourth invasion of Abdullah took place in November 1756. Punjab politics and life were in chaos and confusion. The Sikhs had risen everywhere. The Marathas were interfering in the politics of Delhi and harassing the governors and the government for money At this time, Ahmad Shah Abdālī was invited to invade India by Mugh-lani Begam, the widow of the late subāhdar Muin-ul-Mulk, Najib-ud-Daulah, and the emperor 'Alamgir II, all of whom promised him full support. 38 On this occasion there was no opposition to him until he reached Delhi. Delhi was systematically looted and ravaged. Sacred places like Mathura and Vrindavan suffered the same fate. There were massacres and rapes. A cholera epidemic in his army, however, made him return. While on his way back, Ahmad Shah again sacked Delhi, annexed Sirhind, and laden with immense booty, left Delhi on 2 April 1757. He gave the office of the Vazir to Imad-ul-Mulk and that of Mir Bakhshi to Najib-ud-Daulah, making the latter his own plenipotentiary and the real master of the Mughul government. 39
The defect of Maratha politics in the north lay in the constant change of policies and allies. This created suspicion and distrust in the minds of all, against them. They thus alienated the sympathy of Rajputs, the Jats, the Awadh Nawabs, and the Rohillas. They had no real and constant allies left to achieve their political objectives in the north. 40
The fourth invasion of Abdālī broke the back of the Delhi power and also swept off Maratha influence there. After Abdālī's departure, the Marathas again came and established their supremacy in Delhi and ousted Najib-ud-Daulah. They entered into a new treaty in June 1757, with Imad-ul-Mulk. Instead of one-fourth they were promised one-half share of all the revenues that they might gather from the Mughal dominions. 41 This meant that the Marathas must use force on all sides to obtain their dues. Their main object, however, was the establishment of their supremacy in the Punjab province. After May 1757, the condition of the Punjab politics was that Abdalī's son, Timur Shah, was the viceroy at Lahore and Jahan Khan,his general and guardian. There were two other parties who claimed the governorship of Lahore: one, the Mughul party led by Mughlani Begam, the widow of Muin-ul-Mulk, the old governor, who died in 1753, and the other, the party of Sikhs who had risen as a people against Mughul rule. Adina Beg Khan, one of the officers, was carrying on guerrilla warfare with the help of the Sikhs for power. The Sikhs had made stable rule of the Afghans in the Punjab impossible by defeating their generals. Adina Beg Khan invited the Marathas to help him. The Maratha plan was to prevent Abdalī from crossing the Indus. They, therefore, undertook the campaign in the Punjab with the consent of the Vazir Imad-ul-Mulk in March 1758. Raghunath Rao and Malhar Rao led this campaign.
This was the second expedition Raghunath Rohide carried out during 1757–58. Large Maratha armies began to move and stay in the north for this purpose. Raghunath first invaded Rajputana and then moved on to Delhi. He attacked Delhi on August 11, 1757, and took it. Najib Khan Rohide made peace with the Marathas on September 9, 1757. Thus, Raghunath established Maratha supremacy over the Delhi area. But Najib-ud-Daulah continued his secret alliance with the Abdalīs and invited him to drive away the Marathas from the north.
The first Maratha invasion of the Punjab took place in 1758 under the leadership of Raghunath. He was assisted by Malhar Rao Holkar. It was Adina Beg who had requested Raghunath, when at Delhi, to extend the Maratha dominions as far as the Indus. The invasion began in February 1758.
The Maratha troops were about 50,000. Manaji Paygude, the able Maratha captain, led the Marathas to Lahore on April 20, 1758. Timur Shah and Jahan Khan retreated beyond China. Then Raghunath and Malhar Rao returned by the end of May 1758, at the call of the Peshwa. The entire administration of the Punjab was left in the hands of Adina Beg, who promised to pay 75 lakhs a year to the Marathas.
The danger to the Maratha power lies in not staying in the Punjab in sufficient strength and consolidating their conquests. That was the weakness of the whole of their northern and Deccan policy and politics. A small force could not meet all eventualities. However, on their return, Raghunath sent Vithal Shivdeo, and Malhar Rao sent Tukoji Holkar to the Punjab.
Raghunath, in his letter to the Peshwa from Lahore on May 4, 1758, describes the Maratha achievements in the Punjab as follows:
"We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kashmir, and other subahs on this side of Attock under our rule for the most part... Ahmad Khan Abduli's son, Timur Sultan, and Jahan Khan, have been pursued by our troops, and their forces completely routed. Both of them have now reached Peshawar with a few broken troops...we have decided to establish our rule up to Kandahar." 43
Adinā Beg died in October 1758. After his death, a great scramble for power began in the Punjab. Tukoji, on behalf of Holkar, marched beyond the Jhelum and the Indus in pursuit of the Afghans in October 1758 and thus carried Maratha arms and standards beyond Attock to Peshawar. Sabājī Sindia, who had been sent by Dattāji, followed suit and joined him there. They continued there for four months until they returned to Lahore in March 1759, after new Afghan pressure.
But the anarchy in the Punjab and the consequent injury to Maratha interests compelled the Peshwa to send a fresh, strong force to the province under the able leadership of Dattāji Sindia. He arrived near the Sutlej in the first week of April 1759. Here he was met by Adina Beg's son, who paid part of the tribute. Dattāji then sent Sabāji Sindia with an army to take over Lahore and its governorship directly into his own hands. Sabāji Sindia was obeyed as governor as Dattāji was there to help him with his large force. In August 1759, Sabāji drove back the invasion of Jahan Khan coming from Peshawar. The Afghan general retreated across the Indus. His son died, and many of his troops were killed and wounded.
But Jahan Khan again crossed the Indus in October 1759 with a strong Afghan force and marched towards Lahore. At this time, Dattāji was engaged in the siege of Shukartāl. Sabājī was not strong enough to oppose Jahan Khan; he therefore retreated from Lahore and thus deserted the Punjab.
Dattāji and Jankoji, who had left as far as the Sutlej in April 1759, did not stay there long enough to organize the Punjab conquests. They returned, depending on Sabājī and his forces to hold the Punjab. The Peshwa asked them to return to Delhi as he was in great need of money to pay his heavy debts. He wanted Dattaji to undertake a new campaign to Bengal to get money.
The Marathas were in the Punjab from April 1758 to October 1759. They acted as representatives of the emperor and collected the revenue with the help of local Mughal officers. The Marathas had about 15,000 troops there to oppose Abdullah's fifth invasion.
The entire province of Punjab was occupied by the Afghans without a blow. Maratha detachments, which were dispersed throughout the province, lost heavily. Abdālī established his government at Lahore in October 1759, entered Sirhind on November 27, 1759, and annexed the Punjab. This was his fifth invasion of India. It was undertaken to remove the Maratha danger once and for all. Najib-ud-Daulah, his Indian ally, invited and helped him in this task.
Rajputana Politics and Campaigns in the Second Period
By 1751, the claimants whom the Marathas had supported in Jaipur, Jodhpur, and Bundi had succeeded to their principalities. But the huge sums that were promised to the Marathas had not been paid, and not even a part of them could be realized except by force. In 1751 and 1752, the Marathas were helping Safdar Jang of Awadh against the Afghans of the Doab. In 1752, Malhar Rao Holkar was supporting Ghazi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizam-ul-Mulk, to secure the viceroyalty of the Mughal Deccan.
From 1753, the Marathas again took an active part in Rajputana politics. Sindia and Holkar were the chief Maratha sardars who were entrusted with preserving Maratha interests there Jayappa Sindia was not successful at first at Ajmer, but invaded Marwar again on 23 June 1754. At this time Raghunath Rao came from the south along with Malhar Rao Holkar. He gained some contributions, but his main objective was to go to Delhi to help Imad-ul-Mulk. He arrived there on 1 June 1754. Jayappa Sindia completely defeated Bijay Singh of Marwar on 15 September near Merta. Though Jayappa had early successes in Marwar in 1755 also, his uncooperative conduct and exorbitant demands ruined the cause of the Marathas in Rajputana. On 25 July 1755, he was murdered by a Rathor envoy in a heated discussion during negotiations for peace. Therefore, the warfare continued furiously, and with the help of Dattaji Sindia and other sardars, the Marathas were successful. Jaipur and Jodhpur made peace with the Marathas in February 1756. Ajmer The fort and district were ceded to the Marathas. An indemnity of 50 lakhs was promised. Ram Singh, whom the Marathas supported, got half the territory of Marwar.
In 1757, the Peshwa ordered Malhar Rao and Raghunath Rao to realize the promised tribute. They had first intended to march to Delhi against Abdullah, but were not well equipped for it. They had neither sufficient money, nor proper fighting forces and materials, and were not successful in realizing the total amount of contributions despite threats of force. Jaipur under Madho Singh resisted their exorbitant demands and began to conspire with the Afghans against them. Raghunath Rao could obtain only 11 lakhs from Jaipur, but he was not able to continue hostilities for more money. Nobody offered him any loan, and looting could not maintain an army for long During this time, while he was engaged in minor conflicts, Abdālī's fourth expedition took place. The Shāh sacked and ravaged not only Delhi, but also the holy places of Mathura and Vrindavan, and Raghūnāth Rão was unable to do anything to check him. Raghūnāth returned to the south in June 1758. From July 1758, Jankōji Sindia, son of Jayappa, was trying to realize tribute from those Rajput states which had agreed to pay, and to use force against those states which were forming anti-Maratha coalitions and alliances.
In July 1759, Malhar Rao Holkar was sent to Jaipur to force him to pay the annual tribute, which had not been paid for long. Madho Singh had become pro-Abdalī. The Peshwa wanted money badly, but Holkar, in spite of his military superiority, was not successful in his objectives. He had, moreover, suddenly to abandon Rajputana in December 1759, at the request of Dattaji Sindia to come to his help. Madho Singh delayed Malhar Rao's departure until Abdalī had reached Sirhind on November 27, 1759. Malhar Rao left for Delhi on January 2, 1760. Rajputana affairs thus remained unsettled during 1760.
Delhi Politics and Campaigns
The Peshwa had appointed Dattaji in 1758 to replace Malhar Rao, who was dilatory in diplomacy and warfare in northern India. Dattaji's Sindia campaigns in the north took place during 1759–60. He adopted a stronger policy towards Delhi than that of Malhar Rao Holkar. His policy was anti-Najib as Malhar's was pro-Najib. He was commissioned to realize all the tributes promised from various imperial provinces. Raghunath Rao's expeditions had not been fruitful. Dattaji threatened the Vazir, Imad-ul-Mulk, and, after a After a few skirmishes near Delhi on 29 January 1759, there was an agreement about the money to be paid by the Vazir. Dattāji then marched towards the Punjab on 1 February 1759 and brought it back under control. He returned to Delhi in May 1759, as he wanted to lead an expedition to Bengal as suggested by the Peshwa. He entered into an agreement with Najib-ud-Daulah to help him build a bridge across the Ganga. Dattāji entered the upper Doab and met Najib. But Najib did not like to accompany the Marathas on their Bengal expedition. Being suspicious of their intentions, he defeated their plan by false promises and dilatory tactics. Then monsoon came and the bridge could not be built. Najib had invited Abdālī and was organizing a secret alliance of the Mughul nobles and Afghan and Rajput rulers in order to drive away the Marathas from the north. Dattāji, therefore, decided to crush him. But Najib had already taken an unassailable position at Shukartal on the bank of the Ganga, where he entrenched himself. At this place Dattājī wasted four months but failed to dislodge the Rohilla chief.4
Sabājī Sindia, the Maratha governor of Lahore, abandoned the Punjab and reached Dattājī's camp on 8 November 1759. Najib would not agree to pay an indemnity of 25 lakhs, and the war went on; but Dattājī's position at Shukartāl became untenable On 23 November, a small remnant of Maratha troops from the Punjab defeated by Abdālī reached Dattājī's camp. Dattājī raised the siege, as he had to meet the new Afghan danger. The Afghan army met Dattājī's forces near Thaneswar on 24 December 1759. Dattāji, being checked, fell back towards Delhi. A battle took place at Barari or Burādi Ghat on 10 January 1760, in which Dattājī was killed, and the Maratha army retreated. 45 Jankōji Sindia fled, and Malhar Rao Holkar, who was called for help, joined him on 15 January 1760. Both kept hovering around Delhi, and Malhar Rao was defeated at Sikandarbad in March 1760. 46 Abdālī did not return to his country after this, but remained in the Doab at the request of Najib to meet the new Maratha menace coming from the Deccan to avenge the disaster at Buradi Ghat.
Sadashiv Rao's expedition to the north took place in 1760. The Peshwa learned on January 27, 1760, of Abdalī's invasion, of the Maratha retreat from the Punjab, and of Dattaji being forced to raise the siege of Shukartal. Then the shocking news came on February 15, 1760, of the death of Dattaji and the destruction of the army under him. Sadashiv Rao Bhau, the victor of Udgir, was appointed to lead the expedition to retrieve the Maratha fortunes in the north. 47 He was, however, not free to decide matters on his own responsibility, as Vishwas Rao, the son of Balaji Rao, was made the nominal commander-in-chief. Bhau reached the Chambal on 8 June 1760. Malhar Rao Holkar joined him there. Shuja-ud-Daulah, the Nawab of Awadh, joined Abdullah's side at the persuasion of Najib Khan. Bhau invited all chiefs in the north to join in driving out foreigners, but there was no response from any quarter. Rajput princes were either hostile or neutral. Only Suraj Mal Jat helped the Marathas by providing them with supplies. All the Muslim rulers of the north combined against the Marathas. That the Hindu rulers did not join or support Bhau was a fact that weakened the Maratha financial resources and military strength. There were differences about the plan of campaign among the Maratha chiefs themselves. On May 16, 1760, Hafiz Rahmat came from Abdalī, met Malhar Rao Holkar and Suraj Mal, and proposed peace. But there was no agreement as the Maratha terms were exorbitant.
Another attempt at peace was made after the capture of Delhi by Bhau. Shuja-ud-Daulah proposed to bring about peace between Abdalī and the Peshwa. The conditions proposed were that Shah 'Alam should be acknowledged as emperor and his eldest son Jawan Bakht as his heir, that Shuja should be appointed as Vazir, and that Abdalī should then return to his own country and the Marathas to theirs. But the opposition of Imad-ul-Mulk and Suraj Mal to this proposal defeated the new peace movement
The Marathas thought in terms of India as a whole. They had invited all the rulers to join them against Afghan foreigners. Bhau aimed at fixing India's boundary at Attock. Peshawar and beyond was to be left to the Afghans. The Marathas were to administer imperial provinces in the name of the Mughal emperor.49
Sadashiv Rao Bhau captured Delhi on August 2, 1760. He was helped by Malhar Rao, Jankoji, and Balwant Rao Mehendale. But Suraj Mal, who was on the Maratha side, left the Maratha cause because peace proposals unacceptable to him were being entertained. His departure was a great loss, as no ally was left to the Marathas in the north. Suraj Mal suspected Maratha intentions against his own possessions. The Marathas now had to rely solely on their own resources and leadership. No peace was possible as the Peshwa would not agree to cede the Punjab to Abdalī or recognize Najib Khan's possessions in the Doab, though Bhau was prepared to entertain these proposals.
The capture of Delhi restored the prestige of Maratha arms, which had been lost after the fall of Dattaji. At this point, Abdali He showed his readiness for an honorable peace between the Rohillas and the Marathas and then would have liked to return to his country. But Bhau's success at Delhi overcame his sense of reality. He exaggerated the differences and anxieties felt in Abdalī's camp. Najib and Shuja continued peace talks with Bhau during August and September 1760. They did not succeed as the Peshwa's demands were exorbitant.
After the conquest of Delhi, Bhau was drawn further north and his difficulties increased as regards food supplies. There was starvation among his soldiers. No money or loan was available. His financial resources were exhausted and dried up as there was no local tribute available. Bankers had already disappeared.
The Battle of Panipat (January 14, 1761)
Bhau captured Kunjpura on October 17, 1760. This was necessary to cut off Abdalī's communications and capture his provisions there. But Bhau neglected to keep his own line of communication intact and watch the fords of the Jamuna to prevent Abdalī's crossing. While at Kunjpura, news reached him that Abdalī had crossed the Jamuna near Baghpat and was striding across his path to the south. He then began his march towards Delhi and reached Panipat on October 29, 1760. Abdalī, in the meantime, had crossed the Jamuna, arrived at Sonepat on October 20, 1760, and reached Panipat on November 1, 1760. Bhau's communications with Delhi and the Deccan were consequently cut off.
During March to October 1760, Abdalī destroyed the Maratha power in the Punjab, captured Delhi, killed Dattaji Sindia, and drove out Malhar Rao and other Marathas from the Upper Doab. He also compelled Suraj Mal to promise tribute. He would have gone back to his country had not Najib-ud-Daulah insisted on his stay in order to destroy the Peshwa's army coming from the south. So he remained in India after April 1760 to settle issues with the Marathas.
Shuja-ud-Daulah of Awadh was won over by Najib Khan on 18 July 1760. Abdalī's difficulties of food and fodder during his encampment in the Doab were met by both Najib and Shuja
Abdali's forces consisted of roughly 40,000 horse and 40,000 foot. His own army consisted of 30,000 cavalry, 10,000 infantry, and 2,000 camel swivels. The rest of the troops—10,000 horse and 30,000 foot—belonged to his Indian allies. Sadashiv Rão's army roughly consisted of 55,000 horse and 15,000 foot. This included 9,000 disciplined sepoys under Ibrahim Khan Gardi. Abdali's forces were superior both in number and quality. There were quite a large number of irregulars accompanying both sides. The odds were against the Marathas, and Abdali's generalship was superior. His cavalry was the finest in Asia, and his artillery was very mobile. Sadashiv Rao had a famished army, and his horses were poor and starved. His artillery was not equal to Abdali's. Abdali's organization and discipline of the army were far superior to that of Sadashiv Rao Bhau. The Afghan's was a compact centralized organization. As against this, the Maratha organization was feudal and individualistic. The Maratha army was not well-knit in spirit and movement, and its discipline was loose and lax.
Both armies entrenched themselves at Panipat. Skirmishes and minor battles began on November 1, 1760. The first regular battle was fought on December 7, 1760, when the Rohillas suddenly penetrated into the Maratha trenches. They were defeated, but Balwant Rão Mehendale, an important sardar, fell. He was the chief counselor of Sadashiv Rão and an able military leader.
The Afghan cavalry patrols were able to dominate the surroundings of the Maratha camp. They cut off Maratha communications, correspondence, and food supplies. This weakened Bhau's military strength because he lost connection with his base. His horses and soldiers were starving, and his ammunition was being exhausted. The treasure coming from the south was stopped and cut off. His condition in Panipat thus deteriorated. Govind Ballal Bundela failed to send help and supplies He was killed in a raid in the Upper Doab on December 17, 1760. A Maratha raid in Awadh also failed in January 1761. The treasure sent to Bhau by Govind Pant was also cut off near Panipat on January 6, 1761. Thus, Bhau's condition became worse and full of despair. His army was beleaguered and starved, and his food resources were exhausted. Under these conditions, Bhau proposed peace at any price, but Abdalī rejected it on the advice of Qazi Idris, who preached Jehad against the Marathas.
Therefore, on January 13, 1761, the starving Maratha army decided to fight and marched to battle the next day (on January 14). The rival armies had encamped close to each other for three months,
The Afghans had received fresh reinforcements from home, and their discipline and morale were excellent. Abdālī's army worked under him as one force, and his artillery was more efficient and mobile. The Afghan soldiers were well-armed and well-clad, and their military tactics were superior to those of the Marathas.
*With the Marathas cut off from their base, the Panipat campaign developed into a huge siege operation. Bhau's superiority lay in his heavy artillery and trained battalions, with which he surrounded himself in his entrenched camp at Panipat. Having retired within the defenses of this fortress, Bhau expected Abdāli to attempt to take the place by assault. Abdāli's response was different. Instead of hurling his men against the Maratha cannon, he chose to starve out the beleaguered garrison. Bhau's hope lay in holding out indefinitely and annoying the besiegers by frequent sorties and by calling his supporters outside to attack the Afghans. None of the measures he could pursue successfully, as he was in a friendly country without outside supporters. The sorties made by the Marathas succeeded partially, but by themselves they could not decide the issue. Bhau's primary mistake was to allow himself to be besieged in a foreign land. This view of the event explains why Abdāli delayed the attack for such a long time and forced the Marathas to abandon their defenses and come out in the open. When the besieging party is unable to carry a place by assault, it seeks to reduce the defense by starvation. The explanation given by some writers that Abdāli feared to close with the Marathas and was doubtful of the ultimate issue until the last moment misses the real issue.
Bhau did not receive any additional reinforcements from the south. He made a great mistake in not adequately guarding the fords at the Jamuna and maintaining his connection with the south. In this battle of Panipat, the Marathas were routed and completely defeated. It was a great disaster for them. Vishwas Rao and Sadashiv Rao Bhau were killed. Most of the officers fell. A large part of the forces were massacred and annihilated. The remnants were pursuad and slaughtered. A large amount of booty was captured by the victors. The total loss of the Marathas is estimated at 50,000 horses, 2,00,000 cattle, thousands of camels, hundreds of elephants, and a large amount of cash and jewelry.52
The Marathas lost heavily in men, money, military power, and political prestige by this defeat at Panipat, and lost the empire of India. It proved a great setback to their political ambitions, and they had to reestablish their position in the north.
Ahmad Shah Abdullah left India in March 1761. He gained very little except booty and prestige, and was prepared to make peace with the Marathas in April 1761. But the attempt proved a failure.
Morally, the defeat of Panipat was a disaster for the Marathas. They lost their support and prestige in the north; their help was no longer sought in quarrels by local potentates and rulers Shortly after hearing the outcome of the Battle of Panipat, Balaji Rao Peshwa died on 23 June 1761. It came as a great shock to him, as his entire life's work lay in ruins. His mistake lay in not keeping open a line of constant communication with Sadashiv Rao Bhau, in not properly estimating the needs of his army, in not constantly watching the position of Bhau's forces, and in not maintaining a constant flow of reinforcements and supplies to his army. He was not near the field of battle where the fate of his empire was being decided.
Sadashiv Rao Bhau's ideal was India for the Indians. 53 The country up to Attock or the Indus was to be governed by Indians themselves, not by Turks, Persians, or Afghans. He failed because his captains did not understand his strategy and tactics of warfare. Representing the Peshwa, he wanted to defend the Mughal empire from internal and external enemies since 1752. He received authority from the emperors and Vazirs for this purpose throughout India.
But Maratha habits and character and their own equipment in men, money, resources, and knowledge were not adequate for such a huge task in the face of foreign military powers and internal selfish and aggrandising rulers and officers.
NOTES
1. Selections from Peshwa Daftar, Vol. XV, pp. 97-98, hereafter referred to as S.P.D.; Purandare Daftar, I, 149, Rajwade, VI, 151; also Sardesai, New History, II, pp. 202-3.
2, Ibid, also Rajwade, II, 95; Malcolm, Memoir of Central India, I, 1880 edn., pp. 75-77
3, For Maratha conquests of Bengal, see S.P.D., XX, 24-28, 29, 48-49; Aitihāsik Patravywahār, 35-36; Rajwade, M.I.S., III, 184, 217, 535, VI, 169-71; Vad, Peshwa Diaries, Balaji Bāji Rão, Vol. II, pp. 242-43; Siyar-ul-Mutakherin (Eng. Translation), II, pp. 117-130 and Maharashtra Purana, ed. by Edward C. Dimock andP. C. Gupta (1961).
4. Aitihāsik Patravyawahar, 35-36.
5. See note No. 3; also Sarkar, Jadunath, Fall of the Mughal Empire, I, p. 166.
6. Sardesai, New History of the Marathas, Vol. II, p. 230; S.P.D. XXVII, 7; Bharat Varsha, I.
7. Sardesai, op. cit., p. 232; Rajwade, VI, 166-67; S.P.D. XXI, 7.
8. SPD. II, 9 and Sardesai, op. cit., pp. 237-40; Rajwade, VI, 190-1, 581.
9. Aitihāsik Patravyawahar (1933), 68.
10. S.P.D. XXVII, 18, 19, 26
11. S.P.D. II, 11, XXVII, 18, 19, 26, 38.
12. S.P.D. XXVII, 30
13. Rajwade, M.I.S. VI, 190-91, 581.
14. S.P.D. II, 31.
15. Maratha History Seminar (Kolhapur, 1971), Dr. Raghubir Sinh's paper.
16. S.P.D. II, 31 and XXVII, 64-65.
17. Hingne Daftar, I, 20 and Brahmendra Swami Charitra, 20; also see Yusüf Husain, The First Nizam (1963), p. 208.
18. Yusüf Husain, op. cit., pp. 212-14
19. S.P.D. XX, 21-22, Rajwade, M.I.S. VI, 149. Purandare Diary in Rajwade, M.I.S. VI gives details of this episode; Aitihasik Patravyawahar, 26.
20. Yusuf Husain, op. cit.
21. S.P.D. XXV, 10-72, XXVI, 13, 16, 20-29, XXVIII, 34-35, 52-53; K.S.P.Y., 45, 48, 52-54.
22. S.P.D. XXV, 29, 46-72, Purandare Daftar, I, 59, Aitihasik Patravyawahar, 73-78
23. Itihasa Sangraha, Peshwa Daftarantil Mahiti, pp. 321-51, Grant Duff, op. cit., I, p. 448.
24. Dhakta Ramaraja Charitra, p. 11; S.P.D. VI, 119, 124, 127, 139, 141, 147.
25. Rajwade, M.I.S. VI, pp. 71-73, 110, 232, M.I.S. III, 390, 400, Purandare Daftar, I, 372. Itihasa Sangraha, Ait. Sankirna Sahitya, 145-53
26. S.P.D. XXV, 144-49, XXVI, 202, Rajwade, M.I.S. III, 415, K SPY. 114.
27. S.P.D. XXV, 179-84 and Rajwade, M.I.S. I, 73-119.
28. S.P.D. I, and Rajwade, M.I.S. I, 166.
29. S.P.D. XXVIII, 140, 182-83, 185, Rajwade, M.I.S. III, 472-73, 479-81.
30. Secret & Political Deptt. Diary, Vol. I, pp. 1-35.
31. Ibid, p. 14
32. Ibid, Vol. II, pp. 34-36.
33. Rajwade, M.I.S. I, No. 1.
34. Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar (1959 ed.), pp. 2-8, K.S.P.Y. 122-31, S.P.D. II, 36, 39, 42, C.X.I, 58, XXVII, 79-83.
35. S.P.D. II, 9, K.S.P.Y. 65, Jadunath Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. I, pp. 215-32.
36. Rajwade, M.I.S. I, No. 1, VI, 82.
37. S.P.D. XXI, 60, XXVII, 90
38. Nur-ud-din 146; for the emperor's invitation to Abdali, see Francklin's Shah Aulum, pp. 4–5.
39. Ahmad Shah Abdali in Delhi, 1757: the most detailed and authentic sources are the Delhi Chronicle, an anonymous Persian MS., described by Jadunath Sarkar in the Proceedings of the Ind. Hist. Records Commission, Vol. II (1921), and Tarikh-i-'Alamgiri Sani in Elliot and Dowson's History, Vol. VIII; also S.P.D. CHII, 95–111; Hingne Daftar, Vol. I, 193.
40. S.P.D. XXI, 117.
41. S.P.D. II, 84.
42. S.P.D. XXVII, 218
43. Parasnis, Itihasa Sangraha, Aitihasik Sphuta Lekha, IV, 11.
44. Rajwade, M.I.S. Vol. I, 138-46, Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar (1959 ed.), pp. 47-53.
45. S.P.D. II, 114, Rajwade, M.I.S. I, 165.
46. S.P.D. II, 121; XXI, 187-88.
47. Rajwade, M.I.S. I, 168, 204, Shejwalkar, T. S. Panipat, p. 37.
48. Rajwade, Ibid., 174, Purandare Daftar, I, 287
49. Rajwade, Ibid, 179–80, 226.
50. S.P.D. II, 130–31.
51. Sarkar, Fall of the Mughal Empire, Vol. II, 285–89; Rajwade, Vol. I, 168–69. • Editor's addition.
52. Kashiraj, Battle of Panipat (1926 ed.), pp. 40–45; A. Macdonald, Memoir of Nana Farnavis (1851), (1927 ed.), p. 17. Macdonald says, "...of the fighting men only one-fourth are supposed to have escaped, and of the followers about an equal proportion; so that nearly two hundred thousand Marathas perished in the campaign."
53. Shejwalkar, T. S., Panipat 1761, p. 123
54. Bhau's death is corroborated by letters of Nana Phadnis, published in Sangli by Letters Publication (1965) Panipatcha Sangram in Nana's words, pp. 1-10