Dr. Gulrukh Khan
The
totalizing effect of the modern studies based on contemporary accounts has been
to present before the posterity the
reign of Humayun as a period of complete political and military disasters. This image of Humayun’s reign persists because
the sources for the study of his reign so far have not been critically analysed. Besides, it is
also unfortunate that Humayun’s reign is always
compared with that Babur and Akbar
and never individually; this had also coloured our estimate of Humayun. The reign of Humayun was a period
of transition in the establishment of Mughal
empire in South Asia, a phase where neither the central Asian military
characteristic was completely overhauled
nor the administrative and political structure, which were later witnessed under Akbar (r.1556-1605) had completely
settled in. The real contribution of Humayun lies not only in managing this crucial transitory
phase, which was extremely turbulent and unsettling but also in guiding the transitory phase towards
an informed political and administrative structure that benefitted his son and successor Akbar.
This article, thus explores, the crucial transitory phase (c: A.D. 1530 – 1555) and re-examines critical
substantial steps of Humayun to lay the
foundations of the future Mughal Political Structure.
Challenging ‘received’ understanding of Humayun’s period: Some reflections
Much of the predicament with the son and successor of Babur,
Humayun is due to the analysis of his
reign, both by the contemporary, as well as modern historians who seeks to
examine the latter’s reign, either
from the perspective of a military leader Babur, or from the perspective of
a well-established ‘sovereign’, Akbar. Gulbadan Begum, for example, provides glaring insight
into the reign of his brother Humayun,
but apparently, while writing during the reign of Akbar, she had a model of a well-established monarchy to
revert back for the reign of Humayun. Jouhar
Aftabchi, an ewe-bearer of Humayun, most often looked at the reign of
Humayun from a model of a military leader
provided by Babur, and often laments on the latter’s catastrophic
political decisions.
Numerous researches in the recent years, no doubt, have questioned the validity of the studies conducted in isolation. However, such studies do affirm the need to recognize the importance of the then socio-political circumstances of the time, which in any case necessitate and guide, as well as shape the destiny of a ruling monarch and his empire in any given time and space. For the reign of Humayun the above given analytical model assumes vital characteristics since it was a transitory phase in the annals of Mughal history in South Asia. The resulting confusion and political chaos so evident during the reign of Humayun, particularly military debacle at Chausa are all well-known hallmarks of a transitory phase, and, thus, needs to be studied carefully in its proper context.
During
his brief rule of four years in Hindustan, Babur did try to give practicalities
to his title of Padishah, trying to juggle between the political paradigms of ‘legitimacy’
and ‘justice’, only to find a bitter resentment among his
nobles. To establish himself as an absolute ruler over a ruling class, which was predominantly Turani was a daunting task before Babur.
Babur was able to achieve this position
by conquering Hindustan. However, as the largest numbers of nobles were still Turanis,
the Timurid tradition of Kingship still remained dominant. In spite of Babur’s nomination of Humayun as his successor, Mir Khalifa a senior
noble of Babur opposed not only Humayun’s nomination but
also that of his other brothers, namely Kamran, Askari and Hindal1 and conspired to enthrone Mahdi
Khwaja the brother-in-law of Babur.2 The precedence given to this person over the sons of Babur indicated
that a few among the ruling class still strongly believed, that the empire belongs to the
ruling family and not to the ruler. This completely undermines the right of the emperor to
nominate his successor. Babur had expressed his wish long before his death, to retire and to
handover the kingdom to Humayun.3 However, despite the wish of Babur, Humayun’s accession was not easy.
Initially death of Babur was concealed by
disguising another person, which had Humayun’s approval. Gulbadan Begam writes that on the suggestion of Araish Khan, an amir of Hind another person was
disguised as Babur and was placed on the
throne.4 This indicates that as there were chances of rebellion in
the absence of Humayun, so to safe guard
the throne this step was taken.
It
seems that because of these pressures Humayun agreed to divide his empire
between his brothers. Although his ‘sovereign’ status was not challenged by his
brothers but it created different centres of
powers. Kamran, who got the lion’s share in the division, became so ambitious that he captured almost the whole of Punjab and
Humayun had to concede to his request to
officially handover these territories.5 Humayun is also blamed for
his soft- heartedness due to which he
could not keep a check on his blood-relations who were full of lust for
power and created one after another
problem for him.6 Even the modern writers blame his patience in case of his relations and nobles and the
mildness of his punishments. Ali Anooshahr studied the accounts of contemporary writers like Bayazid
Bayat and Jauhar Aftabchi (who continuously
compared Humayun continuously with his brother Kamran and Afghan rival
Sher Shah Suri). She is of the opinion
that had fallen short specifically in fulfilling gender roles appropriate to
a warrior king.7 Humayun’s response
towards his brothers was seen as a sign of weakness and lack
of boldness rather than generosity and his love. But this action of
Humayun on one hand indicated that he
enjoyed complete authority as a ruler to assign territories to his brothers
and nobles, and on the other, it also
satisfied the ruling class because they realised that the emperor had also considerations for Chinggisid / Timurid traditions. This might have sent signals across the Turanis
that they have now a Padishah to
reckon with, and not a military general that was dependent on the counsels of his
lieutenants.
Soon
after ascending the throne, Humayun started taking keen interest in the affairs
of the state and as a first step decided
to curb the activities of rebellious elements in his kingdom. During the Gujarat campaign Humayun showed his
competence as great military commander and like a ‘sovereign’, subdued the country of Ahmadabad,
while at the same time also dividing whole of
Gujarat to his men.8 The
subjugation of Ahmadabad and its annexation signalled that the concept of ‘sovereign’ was gradually evolving.
The powerful position, as well as stature
occupied by Humayun did neutralize,
at least to an extent, the defiant nobility, which now for quiet sometime have been creating hindrances
in the path towards attaining a ‘sovereign’ status and position. The annexation of
Gujarat was done against the advice and wishes of the Turani military leaders. Seldom previously Babur managed to act
against the counsel of his military
commanders, despite proclaiming himself as Padishah. Here again Humayun strongly asserted his position as an absolute sovereign taking
decision independently which in his view was in the best interest of the Empire. It was the
necessary step taken by Humayun as the court of Gujarat by this time had the notorious position of
providing refuge for the trouble makers of the Mughal dynasty.9 The parcelling of
different territories of Gujarat among his men apparently was also an attempt to carve out some sort of political
system, which for some reasons could not be achieved by Babur.10
After
returning to Delhi, however, when he came to know of the aggressive designs of
Sher Khan, he again moved to swiftly to
take action against him. Humayun at this juncture is said to have remarked, “The insolence of these Afghans exceeds all bounds; let
us go and take Chunar from them”.11 This is indicative of the fact that
even after the Gujarat disaster, Humayun was
not only confident of his military leadership but also of his nobility.
The step above could only have been
taken if the king is assured of his following and status, which for Humayun at
this time seemingly was not a problem.
On this strong note of confidence, it was not difficult for Humayun to conquer the fort of Chunar after
which he conferred a number of promotions and
bestowed honorary dresses on all chiefs.12 These measures were like
a ‘sovereign’, would do under these circumstances. It does
not, thus appear that Humayun was under any sort of pressure, and the newly carved Mughal
dominion in South Asia, was progressing rapidly towards giving practical shapes to the mere
theoretical adoption of the title of Padishah
by Babur.
Humayun
as a powerful king also conveyed a strong message to Sher Khan through his ambassador asking him to send the umbrella,
the throne, and the treasure of Bengal to him. He further asked Sher Khan to surrender the
insignia of royalty and in exchange was offered any assignment of his choice.13 Moreover,
by asking the umbrella and throne of Bengal, Humayun was reiterating his status as the Padishah of Hindustan, and thus,
justifying his claims to the insignia of
royalty of small principalities. Symbolically, Humayun also indirectly conveyed
to Sher Khan not to act as a Padishah. This strong message sent to
Sher Khan further indicates Humayun’s assertion of
his authority as the ruler of Hindustan. On the other hand, Sher Khan continued to make arrangement to counter attack the Mughal
position all along the route from Bengal
to Jaunpur. Having come to know of these moves of Sher Khan the officials pressed Humayun to take action. The first important
task before Humayun was to make a settlement of
Bengal and to find a competent officer to look after affairs of Bengal.
Humayun, after much deliberation,
reached at the conclusion of appointing Zahid Khan, who for long has been expecting promotion, as the governor of
Bengal. But he refused to accept it saying that the emperor could not find some
place more pleasant than Bengal in which to do away with him.14 Thereafter, Jahangir Quli Beg with 5,000 horses
was given the charge of Bengal and Humayun
started towards Delhi.15 However, Humayun, it appears was not
prepared to let the matter pass, as
would have normally happened during the reign of Babur. Instead, Humayun showed
extreme fury on the incidence and ordered for Zahid
Khan’s execution. The latter finding shelter and ultimate intercession from the harem could not also change Humayun’s decision and was forced to take refuge in Agra, where Mirza Hindal was present.16
According to the testimony of Gulbadan
Begum, this person was one among those who incited Hindal to rebel against Humayun.17
The
returning journey of Humayun was complete disaster. Sher Khan completely
defeated him at Chausa and the grand
Mughal army perished. The Mughal Emperor himself was able to save his life with great difficulty. Humayun reached
Agra only with handful of his soldiers. On his
arrival, Kamran who was already in Agra met him with all sincerity and
even offered to lead a campaign against Sher
Khan. But Humayun, restrained him by saying, “No Sher Khan, defeated me, and I
will have revenge of him.”18
It is rather difficult to explain this particular act of Humayun, but keeping in view such other
actions it may be suggested that he wanted to raise the position of the ‘sovereign’; as well as his
awkwardness in taking help to establish himself. In spite of his successive
defeats at the hands of Sher Khan, Humayun’s position as sovereign ruler of Hindustan remained intact. His brothers, especially
Kamran and Askari, who on occasion
challenged his position, were never able to get enough support to
dislodge him. However, these defeats
undermined his position as a sovereign of Hindustan and the nobility lost
confidence in him as competent military
commanders. Differences also arose between Kamran and Humayun and the former left Agra just before the
battle of Kannauj with his entire army, leaving only a thousand troopers despite Humayun’s pleadings.
There was such a
precision in the Mughal camp at Agra
that a large number of nobles sent their families along with Kamran. Sher
Khan after his victory at Chausa crowned
himself as Padishah of Hindustan and
swiftly moved towards Agra to dislodge
Humayun. In these adverse circumstances, Humayun fought a battle at Kannauj but once again he was completely
defeated. After this defeat the nobles completely lost confidence in Humayun.
Consolidating gains : Humayun & organization of administration
During the first ten years of his
reign, Humayun not only acted as independent and powerful ruler but also was, to an extent, able to
counter act the ‘blood and legitimacy’ principle, which provided a sort of autonomy to the nobles, especially the
male members of the ruling house. From
time to time, Humayun bestowed grants, titles, awards and positions to his
chiefs. Although these bestowments were
not on a considerable level, yet they point towards the fact that gradually the concept of Mughal kingship
was evolving and the powers of a ‘sovereign’ was widening.
We
may recall here the distribution of the territories of Gujarat by Humayun to
his men, as well as bestowment of
dresses and gifts after the victory at Chunar.19 On one hand, this
conferment were aimed at encouraging
Humayun’s chiefs for
performing valiantly and loyally, and on the
other hand they also implied to the
chiefs that there is a sovereign who rewards them for performing loyally. It helped in strengthening
Humayun’s position as a ‘sovereign’ among his
chiefs. In a similar stride, after
the conquest of Gaur, the capital of Bengal, Humayun divided the province among his officers.20
Prior to this, there was hardly any attempt to organize the administration, although the concept of a Padishah was gradually evolving.
Moreover, the appointment of Jahangir
Quli as the governor of Bengal also points towards the fact that Humayun was indeed taking measures to
organize his administration. Two of his measures during this period are recorded. One in
which, he posed as the chief Muslim power and assessed the relative strength of the other Muslim
kings. It is also said that in Persia, he was taunted for his pretensions.21 The other
interesting manifestation was that unlike his father, he generally distanced himself from the nobles and used to
put a veil on his face when he appeared in public and when he removed it, the nobles used to say,
“Light has shown forth”.22
This expression led some people to
believe that Humayun claimed divinity.23 The capture of Gaur
further strengthened his position, and
during his stay at Gaur it is alleged that he even claimed divine status.
Around
1540, before the battle of Kannauj Humayun bestowed ranks and titles on all
his principal officers and after his
loss also did not hesitate to promote the officers. Similarly, Humayun promoted Bukshi Langha, a powerful zamindar with the title of Khan-i Jahan.24 Even he sent him banner and kettle drums, a horse
and a head-to-foot dress, and in return asked for boats and corn.25 The bestowment
of titles and ranks on the days of festivities, as observed by the Kings of Persia, was also adopted by Humayun.
On the occasion of Nauroz (Persian
New Year), Jalal Khan was granted the
colours and kettle drums.26 Kettle drums, usually the prerogative of
a king, were also given to the most
trusted servants. Symbolically, it confirmed the status of a ‘sovereign’ which had the rights to bestow these
high favours on the nobles. Similarly, Nadim
Beg (the husband of future ambitious
and favourite foster mother of Akbar, Maham Anga), on the same day was given the King’s seal.27 In the same fashion, other nobles
were rewarded with the titles. All these
measures indicate towards his ability to exert his authority over his
officers.
Humayun
also attempted pseudo innovations,
mainly to further strengthen his position. Around 1533, he divided all his officials into three
classes. The first, he called them Ahl-i
Daulat, the second Ahl-i Saadat, and the third Ahl-i Murad.28 Khwand Amir
also records another system of
categorization of these three departments of the nobility, including
King. He believed that just as the Sun
was the centre of the material world, similarly the King, whose destiny was
closely associated with the great
luminary, was the centre of the human world. The servants of the state were divided into twelve classes, each class
being indicated by an arrow of which he himself was the centre.29 Another important
innovation of Bishat-i-Nishat (carpet
of mirth). It was a round carpet divided
into circles of different colours corresponding to the orbits of the planets.
Gold colour circle was reserved for the emperor to
represent himself as the ‘centre of power’, like Sun. Each section of the people was made to sit in accordance
with one of the seven planets
appropriate to it, in the circle to which it corresponds.30 It
is alleged that Humayun after the victory of Gujarat, through his method of
divining arrows, a method used to predict future, placed Shah Tahmasp on the second class of
twelve arrows, while his own name on first class of twelve arrows. This provided a ground to Shah
Tahmasp to seek justification for this particular act of Humayun, which at least symbolically
lowered the position of a Persian Shah in
comparison to Mughal
‘sovereign’. To which
Humayun replied as that time he considered the
extent of Persia as only the half of his kingdom of Hindustan, so he
placed him on inferior position.31
This also reflects towards justification of his deeds as a ‘sovereign’ in spite of
his status of emperor without empire and in the refuge in the
lands of Shah Tahmasp.
He
divided the entire administration or administrative divisions into four
departments, corresponding to the four
elements, viz., the atashi (fire),
the hawai (air), the abi (water), and the khaki (earth)
and appointed a minister for each of the department.32 He also
introduced wearing of different dresses
for different days of the week.33 As Humayun once in the hour of
victory wore a red robe for three days
to express his rage and ordered city of Mandu to be plundered. On the fourth day, he changed his dress into
green after listening to Ustad Manjhu, the
musician.34 It is significant to note that it was Humayun who
introduced weighing ceremony of the
sovereign on his birthday in 1534 A.D.35 He was the one who
introduced taslim and kornish.36
Kornish signifies that the person has placed his head into obedience for any
services that are required from him.
These administrative innovations were besides various other innovations that directly or in-directly
aimed at strengthening his position.
A
minute analysis of the above reforms of Humayun confirms that under the given
political circumstances they helped in
elevating the position of king among various other ambitious nobles who probably wanted to share the
powers with the king. Thus, by 1540, Humayun
through his military conducts and other symbolic acts, did try to give
shape and meaning, not only to Mughal
kingship, but also to Mughal administration. Mughal emperors to assert
their absolute ‘sovereign’ status used symbols,
metaphors and ceremonial acts and Humayun was no exception. Charles W. Nuckolls considers symbols, ceremonies
and instruments as means used for
consolidation of
one’s authority.37 Despite the claims in the outdated
modern text books that Humayun was not
an administrator, or for that matter, had little time or genius to organize
his administration is hardly supported
by evidences. On the contrary, it appears that Humayun was moving cleverly and cautiously in
consolidating the powers of his nobles, as well as his adversaries like Sher Khan. Thus, it is quite
evident from the above review that Humayun during his initial ten years of rule did his best to
exert his power and status among his nobles, as well as among other local
chiefs and Rajas. His efforts to
brush aside the opinions of his nobles,
especially Turanis did in fact promote his
cause of a ‘sovereign’ ruler.
The brawl for power and the clash of
interests
During
1530-1540, while Humayun was trying to give meaning to his appellation of a Padishah, his efforts were continuously challenged by
his ambitious and stubborn Turani chiefs.
We may recall here the example of
nobility, which instigated Prince Askari after their counsel of handing over Gujarat to Sultan Bahadur as its deputy
was turned down by Humayun. We have it to the
testimony of Jouhar Aftabchi, that the counsellors were very displeased
after their counsel was turned down.38
This is also corroborated by Nizamuddin Ahmad that Amir Hindu Beg incited Mirza Askari to have the public prayer read
and coin struck in his own name to which Mirza
have not agreed.39 This is perhaps not the only evidence to
prove that the nobles were provocative
enough to gain their ends but there are many other examples which show
their seditious nature on different
occasion. When Mirza Askari arrived near Champener, Tardi Beg who was posted there shut himself in the fort
and sent message to the Emperor that Askari is
hostile and keen to take Agra and to become emperor.40 About
the same time, Muhammad Zaman Mirza, taking
stock of Emperor’s absence from the capital, rebelled.41 Muhammad Zaman Mirza was the grandson of Sultan Husain
of Herat, and married his cousin Masuma, a
stepsister
of Humayun and showed himself as a capable general in Babur’s campaign.42 Thus, it is not as if Humayun’s efforts were going
unnoticed or unchallenged. It again goes to his credit that despite the hostilities shown by his chiefs, as well as
by other adversaries, Humayun was
gradually exerting his position. His pardoning of Muhammad Sultan and
other chiefs could be well understood in
the light of above circumstances, where despite all odds Humayun was
trying to exert his position. Naturally,
pardon was a king’s prerogative
to win over the seditious section of people.
Despite
the displeasure shown by the nobility towards the annexation of Champaner,
Humayun preferred to annex Gujarat and
appointed Tardi Beg as its governor.43 Hindal had already shown signs of dissension, while Kamran could
hardly be trusted. Mirza Askari in state of drunkenness referred himself as Padishah and when
objected by Ghazanfar (his foster brother), Mirza Askari put him in prison. But he anyhow escaped to
Sultan Bahadur and gave clue of the internal
condition of the Mughals who were keen to go back from Gujarat on the
very first opportunity.44 His
nobles went a step further and tried to instigate Askari to march off with his
division. Moreover, Yadgar Nasir Mirza
went to Champaner secretly to covet it but Terdi Beg refused to comply with him and sent the information to
Humayun.45 Prince Askari, on whom the emperor relied too, provided him respite from the
nuisance of Sher Khan but asked for a price when he should have done it as a duty.46 On
the other hand, Sher Khan remained defiant and proclaimed himself as the Padishah.47 The chiefs of Humayun were apathetic owing
to their declining status and position,
manifested in their counsel being repeatedly turned down by the powerful growing Emperor. Under these difficult
circumstances and in the battle of nerves, Humayun seemed to have lost some focus and made him
more vulnerable to the counsels, rather than
independent actions. At every stage when Sher Khan was making inroads,
Humayun was calling upon his generals to
form unanimous mode of action.48 Apparently, this might appear to be
a strategically wrong move on the part
of Humayun. It was probably owing to this that the humiliating treaty of Bengal with Sher Khan
was concluded.49
In these dire circumstances Humayun’s nobles and his brothers
started to quarrel with each other for extremely trivial matters. Much
of this quarrel was owing to ego and self-pride. Yadgar Mirza and Askari, for example, physically
intimidated each other, while after suffering
humiliating defeat from Sher Khan the army was returning to Agra. The
overall condition of Humayun, and the
entire situation, as elucidated above, is most brilliantly summed up in
the words of Humayun himself. On hearing
the fight between Yadgar Mirza and Askari on the issue of chasing the robbers, Humayun
remarked,
They better have vented their spite on the robbers than on each other,
what has happened cannot be recalled, but let us hear no more of it.50
To
add insult to the injury, an attempt to murder Humayun also took place.51
Kamran, taking stock of the situation
complained of his illness and returned to Lahore.52 Prince Hindal
and Yadgar Mirza quitted the army.53
While Humayun was struggling to cope with Sher Khan and the switching loyalties of his nobles, Shah
Husain Sultan of Thatta revolted and also assumed the title of Padishah.54
All
these circumstances–––defeat
from Sher Khan, quarrel between the princes, desertion of nobility–––– gave a tremendous blow to the confidence of still relatively
in-experienced emperor, Humayun. He
started to lose control over the situation. The experienced campaigner like Tardi Beg and Munim Khan could have been
of some assistance here. However, they also
behaved indifferently. There are various incidences where these two
senior campaigners, not only fought with
each other, but also did not leave any stone unturned to humiliate their
emperor Humayun. Tardi Beg, for example,
refused to lend his horse to Humayun, and at another place refused to lend his boat.55 The
cumulative effect of all these events, as also stated previously, gave set back to the progress of the evolution
of Mughal kingship, as well as administration. The priorities now began to change drastically as
Humayun, who earlier was acting independently
and taking bold initiatives, and also performing heroically on the
battle front, was now struggling to survive.
The various administrative measures, which he initiated early in his reign,
sunk in all this sorry state of affairs.
Humayun, forced to flee in every direction to find a place of solitude could not even find one. He had hardly any
money to pay to his army, which resulted in
decrease in its number on a regular basis. It should also be noted here
that during this confusion and strife
when different sections were behaving rather indifferently towards the cause of
the Mughal success, the harem as institution also tried to exert
its influence. These growing
insinuations of harem into
politics had far reaching implications in the annals of Mughal history, particularly in the evolution of the
structure of Mughal polity.
The wandering
‘Sovereign’: Persian insinuation on Mughal re-conquest of status and territories
The Mughal concept of ‘sovereignty’ and efforts of its emperor
Humayun towards the ‘evolution’ of some
sort of political structure received serious setback after multitudes of
military debacles and political blunders, especially after the loss at
Chausa. Stressed out by the attitude of
his kinsmen and brothers, as well as by the military losses, Humayun was forced
out of Hindustan and was rigorously
pursued by the Afghans and his brothers. Humayun was even refused to pass through Kabul by Kamran on
the pretext that it was given by Babur to his
mother.56 The second blow to him was that his name was also
dropped from the khutba at Qandahar by Hindal on insistence of Kamran.57
Within a span of few years an apparently strong
military leader, Humayun began to show signs of feebleness, manifested
not only in frequent counsels being
sought before making any important move, but also in contravention of his decisions aimed at degeneration of his status as
a ‘sovereign’. One might, for instance cite the
attitude of his lieutenant Tardi Beg
during the days of wandering when the latter refused to provide water to royal horses, or for that
matter Rushan Kuka who demanded back his horse
from Hamida Banu, which he had earlier lent.58 These two
instances do highlight the true impact of the loss of prestige,
status, honour and position of ‘sovereign’ after the defeat from Afghans.
Further blow to his prestige when Mirza Askari was sent by Mirza Kamran
to imprison Humayun at Qandhar. In such
circumstances, the desolate Padishah had
to abandon his infant son Akbar and was
forced to move into Persian territories.
Humayun’s stay in Persia, courtesy to the hospitality of Shah, not
only provided much needed respite to Humayun, but also changed
the course, trajectory, as well as complexion of Mughal political structure. All the three
historians, namely Jouhar Aftabchi, Bayazid Bayat and Gulbadan Begum speaks in very clear terms that Humayun
was accorded a very high status in Persia by
Shah Tahmasp right from the time when the former entered Herat. After
the meeting with Shah, where Humayun was
shown high respects and was seated on the same cushion, many qamarguha
hunts were organized. Over-all Humayun’s stay in Persia, courtesy to the hospitality of Shah, not only provided much needed
respite to Humayun, but also changed the course, trajectory, as well as complexion of Mughal
political structure.
Humayun’s fortune started to favour him once the Persian Shah
accorded him high respect
in his dominions. Khwaja Jalauddin Obhi,
a noble of Mirza Askari deserted his master and joined Humayun earlier.59 The fort of
Bust, which was under the officers of Mirza Askari, was ordered to be conquered, and from there Humayun
proceeded towards Qandhar. There is every reason to believe, as asserted by Gulbadan that on
getting the news of the approaching Humayun, Mirza Askari sent young Akbar to Mirza Kamran, who
hurriedly tried harem insinuation for stopping
Humayun by sending Khanzada Begam, sister of Babur.60 Qandhar
was conquered from Mirza Askari and as
promised was handed over to the Persians first and very soon it came under
control of Humayun who started
practicing his royal prerogatives and divided Qandhar among his officers.61 Freed from the Persian
obligation and tasting victory after a long time, it appears that Humayun this time was adamant and cautious,
as well as, practical in exercising the powers of a Padishah. Efforts were also
made to gain some allies by writing to Mirza Sulaiman of Badakshan, who was punished, in the absence
of Humayun for being his ally by Kamran.62 Suspecting contravention of his desire to see
him, Humayun marched out against Badakshan and
won.63 This was a hardly done before 1540, when he failed to
take action and act strongly when even
his decrees were not obeyed.
Secondly
when Kabul was finally won by Humayun, the manner in which he handled his officers, showed sternness in his decisions,
fought valiantly in battles, all pointed towards his renewed attempts to give practical meanings
to the concept of ‘Padishah’, something he might have taken lessons from the Persians. The
distribution of Kabul and its dependencies as
assignments among his officers was a first major step taken by Humayun.64
All the officers who deserted Kamran to
join Humayun were adequately promoted.
He
next also devised of plans of extending his dominions by marching out against
Uzbegs in Balkh. On his request, Mirza Sulaiman and Askari
joined Humayun’s forces but Kamran failed
to turn up.65 For a very
strong reason Mirza Sulaiman wrote to Humayun against the plans of Kamran and their argument was Kamran’s not showing up for
the campaign in Balkh.66
Despite the disaster at Balkh, Humayun
unfailingly strove hard and fought like a Padishah
and more importantly inspire
confidence in his troops. But when Kamran was nabbed at Ghakkar, this time he showed no brotherly affection and
blinded Kamran. Our sources, especially Gulbadan speaks that Humayun was reluctant to take a
strong action, but was convinced hard by his
nobility.67 She illustrates Humayun’s struggle between the family and the
duties of the king. Probably owing to this resolution of
his officers, who stood by him in difficult times, Humayun before the march for Hindustan gave orders
for the blinding of Kamran. This also reveals his commitment to the higher standards of justice
which is also prerogative of a ‘sovereign’.
To
conclude, it is quite evident that Humayun after initially trying to give
practical shapes to the concept of ‘Padishah’ and in an effort to evolve a political structure suffered
humiliating defeat from the Afghans. His
softness to take stern action against his own brother, especially Kamran had immensely contributed in his days of
wandering and humiliation from the Persian Shah. The time he spent with Shah Tahmasp in Persia,
however appeared to have shown the working of a
‘sovereign’ and his
sternness in his decisions and in his ability to turn his desires into
decrees. Thus, although with the help of the Persian army Humayun was
able to conquer Qandhar, but afterwards
started to act independently and strongly.
Humayun
from the very beginning was keen to elevate the status of the emperor unlike
his father, and whenever he got the
opportunity, he tried to do so as discussed. But the circumstances such as treacherous nature of his own
kinsmen, Mughal empire being in infancy at the time of his succession and the rise of Sher Shah who was
more potent rival in comparison to him acted as
hurdle in acting as
‘sovereign’. Humayun was
the first of the Mughals to emphasize that the
king was the shadow of God on the earth. Kingship is a divine light and
Humayun was the first Mughal emperor to
show his subjects his status in a ceremonial manner.68 Khwandmir
calls him a personification of the
spiritual and temporal sovereignty (Jamai
Sultanati Haqiqi wa Majazi), and His Majesty the King, the Shadow of God (Hazrat-i Padshah Zill-i-Ilahi). Humayun
also assumed himself as Padshah-I Khilafat Panah (Sovereign
Defender of the Caliphate), Padshah
i’A’ali (the Exalted Sovereign), Padsha-i Alam (the Sovereign of the
World), etc.69 Abul Fazl used the word ‘Insan-i Kamil’, or the perfect man for Humayun
too, who use to receive institutions and
inspiration from God.70 And in a way, Humayun was forerunner of
Akbar who went a step ahead of his
father and assumed the titles like Padshah-i
Islam (King of Islam), Imam-i 'Adil (the Just Imam), and Insan-i Kamil (the Perfect Man).71
The division of territories as
assignments, the treatise with different rulers. different rulers, and more
importantly his.
Notes
1
Ahmad, Nizamuddin. Tabaqat-i Akbari. Translated by Brajendra Nath De. Delhi:
Low Price Publication, 1992, p.42; Also
see S. K. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, London: Oxford University Press,1983.
2
According to Nizamuddin Ahmad, Mahdi Khwaja was the son-in-law of Babur but
Gulbadan Begum refers Mahdi Khwaja as
his brother-in-Law, which seems more correct. See Gulbadan.Begum Humayunnama.
translated by Annette S. Beveridge.
London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1902, p.128. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1,
p.19. 3 Begum, p.103.
4
Ibid., p.109 mentions the incidence in the following words, “It is not well to
keep the death secret, because when such
misfortunes befall kings in Hindustan, it is the custom of the bazar people to
rob and steal; God forbid that the
Mughals not knowing, they should come and loot the houses and
dwelling-places. It would be best to dress
someone in red and, and to set him on an elephant, and to let him
proclaim that the emperor Babar had become a
dervish and has given his throne to the emperor Humayun.’ This, his
Majesty ordered to be done.”
5
Mewat was conferred on Mirza Hindal; and the Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar to
Mirza Kamran; and Sambhal was conferred on
Mirza Askari. See Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari., 2, p.45; Abul Fazl,
Akbarnama.tr. by Henry Beveridge, 1, p.151 where Abul Fazl mentions Alwar instead of Mewat and
Badakhshan according to him was given to Mirza Sulaiman; Ishwari Prasad, The
Life and Times of Humayun, Calcutta:
Orient Longman, 1955, p.42; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.28.
6
Banerjee, Humayun Badshah,1, p.33. Satish Chandra, Medieval India: From
Sultanate to the Mughal Empire (1526-1748),
part 2, New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1999
7
Anooshahr, Ali. “The King Who Would Be Man: The Gender Roles of the Warrior
King in Early Mughal History.” Journal
of the Royal Asiatic Society 18, no. 3, 2008, pp.327–40.
8
Ahmadabad was bestowed on Mirza Askari and Patan on Yadgar Nasir Mirza.
According to Nizam-ud-din, Bahruch was
given to Mir Hindu Beg and Baroda to Qasim Husain Sultan and Champener on Tardi
Beg, but according to Gulbadan, Bahruch
was conferred on Qasim Husain Sultan. See, Begum, Humayunnama, pp.131-132
9Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.67. Alain Desoulières,
“Mughal Diplomacy in Gujarat (1533- 1534) in Correia’s ‘Lendas Da India.’”
Modern Asian Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1988, pp. 433–54. 10 Jouher Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or
Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, tr. by Major Charles Stewart, Delhi: Idarah-i adabyiat-i-Delhi 1972,
p.6.
11
Ibid., p.9.
12
Ibid., p.10 ; Begum, Humayunnama, p.133.
13Aftabchi,
The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun,
pp.11-12 ; Begum, Humayunnama, p.133;
Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.119; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah,
2, pp.204-205. 14 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the
Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,1, p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of
Humayun, pp. 125-126.
15
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.31; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, translated by Henry Beveridge. 3 vols. New
Delhi: Saeed International, 1989. 1, p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, pp. 125-126.
16
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.31. 17 Begum, Humayunnama,
p.134; Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari,2, p.66.
18
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.20.
19
See Begum, Humayunnama, p.133.
20
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.13.
21
Cited from R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Central Book
Depot, Allahabad, p.117. 22 Abdul Qadir
Badaoni, Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, translated by W. H. Lowe, 2 vols., Karachi:
Karimsons, 1976, vol. 2, p.573.
23
R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.117; Banerjee, Humayun
Badshah, 2, p.335. 24 Ibid., pp.28-29.
25
Begum, Humayunnama, p.148.
26
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.70.
27
Ibid.,70.
28
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, pp.25-26.
29
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, pp.31-32; R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim
Administration, pp.116-117; Banerjee,
Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.336-337.
30
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.80-81; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, 1, pp.649-650.
31
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.69; Sukumar Ray, Humayun in
Persia, p.28.
32
Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.35; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2,
pp.336-337.
33
Ibid., pp.51-53.
34
Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.134 and 2, p.338; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and
Times of Humayun, p.76. 35 Khwandmir,
Qanun-i Humayuni, p.74.
36
Banerjee, Humayun Badshah,2, p.342.
37Charles
W. Nuckolls, “The Durbar Incident.” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1990,
pp. 529–59
38Aftabchi,
The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun,
pp.6-7.
39
Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.60.
40
Ibid., p.61.
41
Ibid., p.65.
42
S.R. Sharma, Mughal Empire in India, Agra: Educational Publishers, 1934,
p.38.
43
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.6. 44Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari,
2, p.59.
45
Ibid., p.7.
46
Ibid., pp.14-15.
47
Ibid., p.15.
48
Ibid., pp.15-16.
49
It was probably owing to these bad counsels that this treaty was concluded when
Mughals had an edge. Chunar, ultimately was
given back to Sher Khan; See Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private
Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.17.
50 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul
Emperor Humayun, p.23.
51
Ibid., p.24.
52
Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.71.
53
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.27.
54
Ibid., p.29.
55
Ibid., p.33.
56
Begum, Humayunnama, p.147.
57
Ibid., pp.161-162.
58
Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.86
59
Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.739.
60Begum,
Humayunnama, p.175; Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the
Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.78.
61
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.80 62 Ibid., p.83.
63
Ibid., p.84; Begum, Humayunnama, p. 180;
64
Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor
Humayun, p.83. 65 Ibid., p.191.
66
According to Gulbadan, Kamran proposed for marriage to Haram Begam, the wife of
Mirza Sulaiman on which the latter was
rebuked by the Begam. Thus, Kamran became an enemy for Mirza Sulaiman and his
son Mirza Ibrahim. See Ibid.,
pp.193-194.
67
Begum, Humayunnama, pp.200-201.
68
Anna Malecka, “Solar Symbolism of the Mughal Thrones A Preliminary Note.” Arts
Asiatiques, vol. 54, 1999, pp.
24–32.
69
Khwandmir, Qanun-I Humayuni, ed. By M.Hidayat Husein, Calcutta, 1950,pp.12
&22 70 Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,1, p.115
& 120
71These
titles proclaimed by Akbar in the Mahzar of 1579. Also see Iqtidar Alam Khan
“State in the Mughal India: Re-Examining
the Myths of a Counter-Vision.” Social Scientist 29, no. 1/2 (2001): 16–45,
p.21; Also See Nurul Hasan, The Mahzar
of Akbar's Reign in the book Religion, State and Society in Medieval India
Collected Works of S. Nurul Hasan, Edited
and with an Introduction by Satish Chandra, New Delhi: Oxford University Press,
2005