Evolution of the Mughal Political Structure: Re-evaluating Contributions of Humayun

Dr. Gulrukh Khan 

The totalizing effect of the modern studies based on contemporary accounts has been to present  before the posterity the reign of Humayun as a period of complete political and military disasters.  This image of Humayun’s reign persists because the sources for the study of his reign so far have  not been critically analysed. Besides, it is also unfortunate that Humayun’s reign is always  compared with that Babur and Akbar and never individually; this had also coloured our estimate  of Humayun. The reign of Humayun was a period of transition in the establishment of Mughal  empire in South Asia, a phase where neither the central Asian military characteristic was  completely overhauled nor the administrative and political structure, which were later witnessed  under Akbar (r.1556-1605) had completely settled in. The real contribution of Humayun lies not  only in managing this crucial transitory phase, which was extremely turbulent and unsettling but  also in guiding the transitory phase towards an informed political and administrative structure  that benefitted his son and successor Akbar. This article, thus explores, the crucial transitory  phase (c: A.D. 1530 – 1555) and re-examines critical substantial steps of Humayun to lay the  foundations of the future Mughal Political Structure. 

Challenging ‘received’ understanding of Humayun’s period: Some reflections  

Much of the predicament with the son and successor of Babur, Humayun is due to the analysis of  his reign, both by the contemporary, as well as modern historians who seeks to examine the  latter’s reign, either from the perspective of a military leader Babur, or from the perspective of a  well-established ‘sovereign’, Akbar. Gulbadan Begum, for example, provides glaring insight into  the reign of his brother Humayun, but apparently, while writing during the reign of Akbar, she  had a model of a well-established monarchy to revert back for the reign of Humayun. Jouhar  Aftabchi, an ewe-bearer of Humayun, most often looked at the reign of Humayun from a model  of a military leader provided by Babur, and often laments on the latter’s catastrophic political  decisions. 

Numerous researches in the recent years, no doubt, have questioned the validity of the studies  conducted in isolation. However, such studies do affirm the need to recognize the importance of  the then socio-political circumstances of the time, which in any case necessitate and guide, as  well as shape the destiny of a ruling monarch and his empire in any given time and space. For  the reign of Humayun the above given analytical model assumes vital characteristics since it was  a transitory phase in the annals of Mughal history in South Asia. The resulting confusion and  political chaos so evident during the reign of Humayun, particularly military debacle at Chausa  are all well-known hallmarks of a transitory phase, and, thus, needs to be studied carefully in its  proper context.

During his brief rule of four years in Hindustan, Babur did try to give practicalities to his title of  Padishah, trying to juggle between the political paradigms of ‘legitimacy’ and ‘justice’, only to  find a bitter resentment among his nobles. To establish himself as an absolute ruler over a ruling  class, which was predominantly Turani was a daunting task before Babur. Babur was able to  achieve this position by conquering Hindustan. However, as the largest numbers of nobles were  still Turanis, the Timurid tradition of Kingship still remained dominant. In spite of Babur’s  nomination of Humayun as his successor, Mir Khalifa a senior noble of Babur opposed not only  Humayun’s nomination but also that of his other brothers, namely Kamran, Askari and Hindal¹ and conspired to enthrone Mahdi Khwaja the brother-in-law of Babur.² The precedence given to  this person over the sons of Babur indicated that a few among the ruling class still strongly  believed, that the empire belongs to the ruling family and not to the ruler. This completely  undermines the right of the emperor to nominate his successor. Babur had expressed his wish  long before his death, to retire and to handover the kingdom to Humayun.³ However, despite the  wish of Babur, Humayun’s accession was not easy. Initially death of Babur was concealed by  disguising another person, which had Humayun’s approval. Gulbadan Begam writes that on the  suggestion of Araish Khan, an amir of Hind another person was disguised as Babur and was  placed on the throne.⁴ This indicates that as there were chances of rebellion in the absence of  Humayun, so to safe guard the throne this step was taken. 

It seems that because of these pressures Humayun agreed to divide his empire between his  brothers. Although his ‘sovereign’ status was not challenged by his brothers but it created  different centres of powers. Kamran, who got the lion’s share in the division, became so  ambitious that he captured almost the whole of Punjab and Humayun had to concede to his  request to officially handover these territories.⁵ Humayun is also blamed for his soft- heartedness  due to which he could not keep a check on his blood-relations who were full of lust for power  and created one after another problem for him.⁶ Even the modern writers blame his patience in  case of his relations and nobles and the mildness of his punishments. Ali Anooshahr studied the  accounts of contemporary writers like Bayazid Bayat and Jauhar Aftabchi (who continuously  compared Humayun continuously with his brother Kamran and Afghan rival Sher Shah Suri).  She is of the opinion that had fallen short specifically in fulfilling gender roles appropriate to a  warrior king.⁷ Humayun’s response towards his brothers was seen as a sign of weakness and lack  of boldness rather than generosity and his love. But this action of Humayun on one hand  indicated that he enjoyed complete authority as a ruler to assign territories to his brothers and  nobles, and on the other, it also satisfied the ruling class because they realised that the emperor  had also considerations for Chinggisid / Timurid traditions. This might have sent signals across  the Turanis that they have now a Padishah to reckon with, and not a military general that was  dependent on the counsels of his lieutenants. 

Soon after ascending the throne, Humayun started taking keen interest in the affairs of the state  and as a first step decided to curb the activities of rebellious elements in his kingdom. During the  Gujarat campaign Humayun showed his competence as great military commander and like a  ‘sovereign’, subdued the country of Ahmadabad, while at the same time also dividing whole of  Gujarat to his men.⁸ The subjugation of Ahmadabad and its annexation signalled that the  concept of ‘sovereign’ was gradually evolving. The powerful position, as well as stature  occupied by Humayun did neutralize, at least to an extent, the defiant nobility, which now for  quiet sometime have been creating hindrances in the path towards attaining a ‘sovereign’ status  and position. The annexation of Gujarat was done against the advice and wishes of the Turani military leaders. Seldom previously Babur managed to act against the counsel of his military  commanders, despite proclaiming himself as Padishah. Here again Humayun strongly asserted  his position as an absolute sovereign taking decision independently which in his view was in the  best interest of the Empire. It was the necessary step taken by Humayun as the court of Gujarat  by this time had the notorious position of providing refuge for the trouble makers of the Mughal  dynasty.⁹ The parcelling of different territories of Gujarat among his men apparently was also an  attempt to carve out some sort of political system, which for some reasons could not be achieved  by Babur.¹⁰

After returning to Delhi, however, when he came to know of the aggressive designs of Sher  Khan, he again moved to swiftly to take action against him. Humayun at this juncture is said to  have remarked, “The insolence of these Afghans exceeds all bounds; let us go and take Chunar  from them”.¹¹ This is indicative of the fact that even after the Gujarat disaster, Humayun was  not only confident of his military leadership but also of his nobility. The step above could only  have been taken if the king is assured of his following and status, which for Humayun at this  time seemingly was not a problem. On this strong note of confidence, it was not difficult for  Humayun to conquer the fort of Chunar after which he conferred a number of promotions and  bestowed honorary dresses on all chiefs.¹² These measures were like a ‘sovereign’, would do  under these circumstances. It does not, thus appear that Humayun was under any sort of  pressure, and the newly carved Mughal dominion in South Asia, was progressing rapidly towards  giving practical shapes to the mere theoretical adoption of the title of Padishah by Babur. 

Humayun as a powerful king also conveyed a strong message to Sher Khan through his  ambassador asking him to send the umbrella, the throne, and the treasure of Bengal to him. He  further asked Sher Khan to surrender the insignia of royalty and in exchange was offered any  assignment of his choice.¹³ Moreover, by asking the umbrella and throne of Bengal, Humayun  was reiterating his status as the Padishah of Hindustan, and thus, justifying his claims to the  insignia of royalty of small principalities. Symbolically, Humayun also indirectly conveyed to  Sher Khan not to act as a Padishah. This strong message sent to Sher Khan further indicates  Humayun’s assertion of his authority as the ruler of Hindustan. On the other hand, Sher Khan  continued to make arrangement to counter attack the Mughal position all along the route from  Bengal to Jaunpur. Having come to know of these moves of Sher Khan the officials pressed  Humayun to take action. The first important task before Humayun was to make a settlement of  Bengal and to find a competent officer to look after affairs of Bengal. Humayun, after much  deliberation, reached at the conclusion of appointing Zahid Khan, who for long has been  expecting promotion, as the governor of Bengal. But he refused to accept it saying that the emperor could not find some place more pleasant than Bengal in which to do away with him.¹⁴  Thereafter, Jahangir Quli Beg with 5,000 horses was given the charge of Bengal and Humayun  started towards Delhi.¹⁵ However, Humayun, it appears was not prepared to let the matter pass,  as would have normally happened during the reign of Babur. Instead, Humayun showed extreme  fury on the incidence and ordered for Zahid Khan’s execution. The latter finding shelter and  ultimate intercession from the harem could not also change Humayun’s decision and was forced  to take refuge in Agra, where Mirza Hindal was present.¹⁶ According to the testimony of  Gulbadan Begum, this person was one among those who incited Hindal to rebel against  Humayun.¹⁷ 

The returning journey of Humayun was complete disaster. Sher Khan completely defeated him at  Chausa and the grand Mughal army perished. The Mughal Emperor himself was able to save his  life with great difficulty. Humayun reached Agra only with handful of his soldiers. On his  arrival, Kamran who was already in Agra met him with all sincerity and even offered to lead a  campaign against Sher Khan. But Humayun, restrained him by saying, “No Sher Khan, defeated me, and I will have revenge of him.”¹⁸ It is rather difficult to explain this particular act of  Humayun, but keeping in view such other actions it may be suggested that he wanted to raise the  position of the ‘sovereign’; as well as his awkwardness in taking help to establish himself. In  spite of his successive defeats at the hands of Sher Khan, Humayun’s position as sovereign ruler  of Hindustan remained intact. His brothers, especially Kamran and Askari, who on occasion  challenged his position, were never able to get enough support to dislodge him. However, these  defeats undermined his position as a sovereign of Hindustan and the nobility lost confidence in  him as competent military commanders. Differences also arose between Kamran and Humayun  and the former left Agra just before the battle of Kannauj with his entire army, leaving only a  thousand troopers despite Humayun’s pleadings. There was such a precision in the Mughal  camp at Agra that a large number of nobles sent their families along with Kamran. Sher Khan  after his victory at Chausa crowned himself as Padishah of Hindustan and swiftly moved  towards Agra to dislodge Humayun. In these adverse circumstances, Humayun fought a battle at  Kannauj but once again he was completely defeated. After this defeat the nobles completely lost  confidence in Humayun. 

Consolidating gains : Humayun & organization of administration  

During the first ten years of his reign, Humayun not only acted as independent and powerful  ruler but also was, to an extent, able to counter act the ‘blood and legitimacy’ principle, which  provided a sort of autonomy to the nobles, especially the male members of the ruling house.  From time to time, Humayun bestowed grants, titles, awards and positions to his chiefs.  Although these bestowments were not on a considerable level, yet they point towards the fact  that gradually the concept of Mughal kingship was evolving and the powers of a ‘sovereign’ was  widening. 

We may recall here the distribution of the territories of Gujarat by Humayun to his men, as well  as bestowment of dresses and gifts after the victory at Chunar.¹⁹ On one hand, this conferment  were aimed at encouraging Humayun’s chiefs for performing valiantly and loyally, and on the  other hand they also implied to the chiefs that there is a sovereign who rewards them for  performing loyally. It helped in strengthening Humayun’s position as a ‘sovereign’ among his  chiefs. In a similar stride, after the conquest of Gaur, the capital of Bengal, Humayun divided  the province among his officers.²⁰ Prior to this, there was hardly any attempt to organize the  administration, although the concept of a Padishah was gradually evolving. Moreover, the  appointment of Jahangir Quli as the governor of Bengal also points towards the fact that  Humayun was indeed taking measures to organize his administration. Two of his measures  during this period are recorded. One in which, he posed as the chief Muslim power and assessed  the relative strength of the other Muslim kings. It is also said that in Persia, he was taunted for  his pretensions.²¹ The other interesting manifestation was that unlike his father, he generally  distanced himself from the nobles and used to put a veil on his face when he appeared in public  and when he removed it, the nobles used to say, “Light has shown forth”.²² This expression led  some people to believe that Humayun claimed divinity.²³ The capture of Gaur further  strengthened his position, and during his stay at Gaur it is alleged that he even claimed divine  status. 

Around 1540, before the battle of Kannauj Humayun bestowed ranks and titles on all his  principal officers and after his loss also did not hesitate to promote the officers. Similarly,  Humayun promoted Bukshi Langha, a powerful zamindar with the title of Khan-i Jahan.²⁴ Even  he sent him banner and kettle drums, a horse and a head-to-foot dress, and in return asked for  boats and corn.²⁵ The bestowment of titles and ranks on the days of festivities, as observed by the  Kings of Persia, was also adopted by Humayun. On the occasion of Nauroz (Persian New Year),  Jalal Khan was granted the colours and kettle drums.²⁶ Kettle drums, usually the prerogative of a  king, were also given to the most trusted servants. Symbolically, it confirmed the status of a  ‘sovereign’ which had the rights to bestow these high favours on the nobles. Similarly, Nadim  Beg (the husband of future ambitious and favourite foster mother of Akbar, Maham Anga), on  the same day was given the King’s seal.²⁷ In the same fashion, other nobles were rewarded with  the titles. All these measures indicate towards his ability to exert his authority over his officers. 

Humayun also attempted pseudo innovations, mainly to further strengthen his position. Around  1533, he divided all his officials into three classes. The first, he called them Ahl-i Daulat, the  second Ahl-i Saadat, and the third Ahl-i Murad.²⁸ Khwand Amir also records another system of  categorization of these three departments of the nobility, including King. He believed that just as  the Sun was the centre of the material world, similarly the King, whose destiny was closely  associated with the great luminary, was the centre of the human world. The servants of the state  were divided into twelve classes, each class being indicated by an arrow of which he himself was  the centre.²⁹ Another important innovation of Bishat-i-Nishat (carpet of mirth). It was a round  carpet divided into circles of different colours corresponding to the orbits of the planets. Gold  colour circle was reserved for the emperor to represent himself as the ‘centre of power’, like Sun.  Each section of the people was made to sit in accordance with one of the seven planets  appropriate to it, in the circle to which it corresponds.³⁰ It is alleged that Humayun after the victory of Gujarat, through his method of divining arrows, a method used to predict future,  placed Shah Tahmasp on the second class of twelve arrows, while his own name on first class of  twelve arrows. This provided a ground to Shah Tahmasp to seek justification for this particular  act of Humayun, which at least symbolically lowered the position of a Persian Shah in  comparison to Mughal ‘sovereign’. To which Humayun replied as that time he considered the  extent of Persia as only the half of his kingdom of Hindustan, so he placed him on inferior  position.³¹ This also reflects towards justification of his deeds as a ‘sovereign’ in spite of his  status of emperor without empire and in the refuge in the lands of Shah Tahmasp. 

He divided the entire administration or administrative divisions into four departments,  corresponding to the four elements, viz., the atashi (fire), the hawai (air), the abi (water), and the  khaki (earth) and appointed a minister for each of the department.³² He also introduced wearing  of different dresses for different days of the week.³³ As Humayun once in the hour of victory  wore a red robe for three days to express his rage and ordered city of Mandu to be plundered.  On the fourth day, he changed his dress into green after listening to Ustad Manjhu, the  musician.³⁴ It is significant to note that it was Humayun who introduced weighing ceremony of  the sovereign on his birthday in 1534 A.D.³⁵ He was the one who introduced taslim and  kornish.³⁶ Kornish signifies that the person has placed his head into obedience for any services  that are required from him. These administrative innovations were besides various other  innovations that directly or in-directly aimed at strengthening his position.

A minute analysis of the above reforms of Humayun confirms that under the given political  circumstances they helped in elevating the position of king among various other ambitious  nobles who probably wanted to share the powers with the king. Thus, by 1540, Humayun  through his military conducts and other symbolic acts, did try to give shape and meaning, not  only to Mughal kingship, but also to Mughal administration. Mughal emperors to assert their  absolute ‘sovereign’ status used symbols, metaphors and ceremonial acts and Humayun was no  exception. Charles W. Nuckolls considers symbols, ceremonies and instruments as means used  for consolidation of one’s authority.³⁷ Despite the claims in the outdated modern text books that  Humayun was not an administrator, or for that matter, had little time or genius to organize his  administration is hardly supported by evidences. On the contrary, it appears that Humayun was  moving cleverly and cautiously in consolidating the powers of his nobles, as well as his  adversaries like Sher Khan. Thus, it is quite evident from the above review that Humayun during  his initial ten years of rule did his best to exert his power and status among his nobles, as well as among other local chiefs and Rajas. His efforts to brush aside the opinions of his nobles,  especially Turanis did in fact promote his cause of a ‘sovereign’ ruler.

The brawl for power and the clash of interests  

During 1530-1540, while Humayun was trying to give meaning to his appellation of a Padishah,  his efforts were continuously challenged by his ambitious and stubborn Turani chiefs. We may  recall here the example of nobility, which instigated Prince Askari after their counsel of handing  over Gujarat to Sultan Bahadur as its deputy was turned down by Humayun. We have it to the  testimony of Jouhar Aftabchi, that the counsellors were very displeased after their counsel was  turned down.³⁸ This is also corroborated by Nizamuddin Ahmad that Amir Hindu Beg incited  Mirza Askari to have the public prayer read and coin struck in his own name to which Mirza  have not agreed.³⁹ This is perhaps not the only evidence to prove that the nobles were  provocative enough to gain their ends but there are many other examples which show their  seditious nature on different occasion. When Mirza Askari arrived near Champener, Tardi Beg  who was posted there shut himself in the fort and sent message to the Emperor that Askari is  hostile and keen to take Agra and to become emperor.⁴⁰ About the same time, Muhammad  Zaman Mirza, taking stock of Emperor’s absence from the capital, rebelled.⁴¹ Muhammad  Zaman Mirza was the grandson of Sultan Husain of Herat, and married his cousin Masuma, a  stepsister of Humayun and showed himself as a capable general in Babur’s campaign.⁴² Thus, it  is not as if Humayun’s efforts were going unnoticed or unchallenged. It again goes to his credit  that despite the hostilities shown by his chiefs, as well as by other adversaries, Humayun was  gradually exerting his position. His pardoning of Muhammad Sultan and other chiefs could be  well understood in the light of above circumstances, where despite all odds Humayun was trying  to exert his position. Naturally, pardon was a king’s prerogative to win over the seditious section  of people. 

Despite the displeasure shown by the nobility towards the annexation of Champaner, Humayun  preferred to annex Gujarat and appointed Tardi Beg as its governor.⁴³ Hindal had already shown  signs of dissension, while Kamran could hardly be trusted. Mirza Askari in state of drunkenness  referred himself as Padishah and when objected by Ghazanfar (his foster brother), Mirza Askari  put him in prison. But he anyhow escaped to Sultan Bahadur and gave clue of the internal  condition of the Mughals who were keen to go back from Gujarat on the very first opportunity.⁴⁴  His nobles went a step further and tried to instigate Askari to march off with his division.  Moreover, Yadgar Nasir Mirza went to Champaner secretly to covet it but Terdi Beg refused to  comply with him and sent the information to Humayun.⁴⁵ Prince Askari, on whom the emperor  relied too, provided him respite from the nuisance of Sher Khan but asked for a price when he  should have done it as a duty.⁴⁶ On the other hand, Sher Khan remained defiant and proclaimed  himself as the Padishah.⁴⁷ The chiefs of Humayun were apathetic owing to their declining  status and position, manifested in their counsel being repeatedly turned down by the powerful  growing Emperor. Under these difficult circumstances and in the battle of nerves, Humayun  seemed to have lost some focus and made him more vulnerable to the counsels, rather than  independent actions. At every stage when Sher Khan was making inroads, Humayun was calling  upon his generals to form unanimous mode of action.⁴⁸ Apparently, this might appear to be a  strategically wrong move on the part of Humayun. It was probably owing to this that the  humiliating treaty of Bengal with Sher Khan was concluded.⁴⁹ 

In these dire circumstances Humayun’s nobles and his brothers started to quarrel with each other  for extremely trivial matters. Much of this quarrel was owing to ego and self-pride. Yadgar  Mirza and Askari, for example, physically intimidated each other, while after suffering  humiliating defeat from Sher Khan the army was returning to Agra. The overall condition of  Humayun, and the entire situation, as elucidated above, is most brilliantly summed up in the  words of Humayun himself. On hearing the fight between Yadgar Mirza and Askari on the issue  of chasing the robbers, Humayun remarked, 

They better have vented their spite on the robbers than on each other, 

what has happened cannot be recalled, but let us hear no more of it.⁵⁰

To add insult to the injury, an attempt to murder Humayun also took place.⁵¹ Kamran, taking  stock of the situation complained of his illness and returned to Lahore.⁵² Prince Hindal and  Yadgar Mirza quitted the army.⁵³ While Humayun was struggling to cope with Sher Khan and  the switching loyalties of his nobles, Shah Husain Sultan of Thatta revolted and also assumed the  title of Padishah.⁵⁴ 

All these circumstances–––defeat from Sher Khan, quarrel between the princes, desertion of  nobility–––– gave a tremendous blow to the confidence of still relatively in-experienced  emperor, Humayun. He started to lose control over the situation. The experienced campaigner  like Tardi Beg and Munim Khan could have been of some assistance here. However, they also  behaved indifferently. There are various incidences where these two senior campaigners, not  only fought with each other, but also did not leave any stone unturned to humiliate their emperor  Humayun. Tardi Beg, for example, refused to lend his horse to Humayun, and at another place  refused to lend his boat.⁵⁵ The cumulative effect of all these events, as also stated previously,  gave set back to the progress of the evolution of Mughal kingship, as well as administration. The  priorities now began to change drastically as Humayun, who earlier was acting independently  and taking bold initiatives, and also performing heroically on the battle front, was now struggling  to survive. The various administrative measures, which he initiated early in his reign, sunk in all  this sorry state of affairs. Humayun, forced to flee in every direction to find a place of solitude  could not even find one. He had hardly any money to pay to his army, which resulted in  decrease in its number on a regular basis. It should also be noted here that during this confusion  and strife when different sections were behaving rather indifferently towards the cause of the  Mughal success, the harem as institution also tried to exert its influence. These growing  insinuations of harem into politics had far reaching implications in the annals of Mughal history,  particularly in the evolution of the structure of Mughal polity. 

The wandering ‘Sovereign’: Persian insinuation on Mughal re-conquest of  status and territories 

The Mughal concept of ‘sovereignty’ and efforts of its emperor Humayun towards the  ‘evolution’ of some sort of political structure received serious setback after multitudes of  military debacles and political blunders, especially after the loss at Chausa. Stressed out by the  attitude of his kinsmen and brothers, as well as by the military losses, Humayun was forced out  of Hindustan and was rigorously pursued by the Afghans and his brothers. Humayun was even  refused to pass through Kabul by Kamran on the pretext that it was given by Babur to his  mother.⁵⁶ The second blow to him was that his name was also dropped from the khutba at  Qandahar by Hindal on insistence of Kamran.⁵⁷ Within a span of few years an apparently strong  military leader, Humayun began to show signs of feebleness, manifested not only in frequent  counsels being sought before making any important move, but also in contravention of his  decisions aimed at degeneration of his status as a ‘sovereign’. One might, for instance cite the  attitude of his lieutenant Tardi Beg during the days of wandering when the latter refused to  provide water to royal horses, or for that matter Rushan Kuka who demanded back his horse  from Hamida Banu, which he had earlier lent.⁵⁸ These two instances do highlight the true impact  of the loss of prestige, status, honour and position of ‘sovereign’ after the defeat from Afghans.  Further blow to his prestige when Mirza Askari was sent by Mirza Kamran to imprison  Humayun at Qandhar. In such circumstances, the desolate Padishah had to abandon his infant  son Akbar and was forced to move into Persian territories.

Humayun’s stay in Persia, courtesy to the hospitality of Shah, not only provided much needed  respite to Humayun, but also changed the course, trajectory, as well as complexion of Mughal  political structure. All the three historians, namely Jouhar Aftabchi, Bayazid Bayat and Gulbadan  Begum speaks in very clear terms that Humayun was accorded a very high status in Persia by  Shah Tahmasp right from the time when the former entered Herat. After the meeting with Shah,  where Humayun was shown high respects and was seated on the same cushion, many  qamarguha hunts were organized. Over-all Humayun’s stay in Persia, courtesy to the hospitality  of Shah, not only provided much needed respite to Humayun, but also changed the course,  trajectory, as well as complexion of Mughal political structure. 

Humayun’s fortune started to favour him once the Persian Shah accorded him high respect in his  dominions. Khwaja Jalauddin Obhi, a noble of Mirza Askari deserted his master and joined  Humayun earlier.⁵⁹ The fort of Bust, which was under the officers of Mirza Askari, was ordered  to be conquered, and from there Humayun proceeded towards Qandhar. There is every reason to  believe, as asserted by Gulbadan that on getting the news of the approaching Humayun, Mirza  Askari sent young Akbar to Mirza Kamran, who hurriedly tried harem insinuation for stopping  Humayun by sending Khanzada Begam, sister of Babur.⁶⁰ Qandhar was conquered from Mirza  Askari and as promised was handed over to the Persians first and very soon it came under control  of Humayun who started practicing his royal prerogatives and divided Qandhar among his  officers.⁶¹ Freed from the Persian obligation and tasting victory after a long time, it appears that  Humayun this time was adamant and cautious, as well as, practical in exercising the powers of a Padishah. Efforts were also made to gain some allies by writing to Mirza Sulaiman of  Badakshan, who was punished, in the absence of Humayun for being his ally by Kamran.⁶²  Suspecting contravention of his desire to see him, Humayun marched out against Badakshan and  won.⁶³ This was a hardly done before 1540, when he failed to take action and act strongly when  even his decrees were not obeyed. 

Secondly when Kabul was finally won by Humayun, the manner in which he handled his  officers, showed sternness in his decisions, fought valiantly in battles, all pointed towards his  renewed attempts to give practical meanings to the concept of ‘Padishah’, something he might  have taken lessons from the Persians. The distribution of Kabul and its dependencies as  assignments among his officers was a first major step taken by Humayun.⁶⁴ All the officers who  deserted Kamran to join Humayun were adequately promoted. 

He next also devised of plans of extending his dominions by marching out against Uzbegs in  Balkh. On his request, Mirza Sulaiman and Askari joined Humayun’s forces but Kamran failed  to turn up.⁶⁵ For a very strong reason Mirza Sulaiman wrote to Humayun against the plans of  Kamran and their argument was Kamran’s not showing up for the campaign in Balkh.⁶⁶ Despite  the disaster at Balkh, Humayun unfailingly strove hard and fought like a Padishah and more  importantly inspire confidence in his troops. But when Kamran was nabbed at Ghakkar, this  time he showed no brotherly affection and blinded Kamran. Our sources, especially Gulbadan  speaks that Humayun was reluctant to take a strong action, but was convinced hard by his  nobility.⁶⁷ She illustrates Humayun’s struggle between the family and the duties of the king.  Probably owing to this resolution of his officers, who stood by him in difficult times, Humayun  before the march for Hindustan gave orders for the blinding of Kamran. This also reveals his  commitment to the higher standards of justice which is also prerogative of a ‘sovereign’. 

To conclude, it is quite evident that Humayun after initially trying to give practical shapes to the  concept of ‘Padishah’ and in an effort to evolve a political structure suffered humiliating defeat  from the Afghans. His softness to take stern action against his own brother, especially Kamran  had immensely contributed in his days of wandering and humiliation from the Persian Shah. The  time he spent with Shah Tahmasp in Persia, however appeared to have shown the working of a  ‘sovereign’ and his sternness in his decisions and in his ability to turn his desires into decrees.  Thus, although with the help of the Persian army Humayun was able to conquer Qandhar, but  afterwards started to act independently and strongly. 

Humayun from the very beginning was keen to elevate the status of the emperor unlike his  father, and whenever he got the opportunity, he tried to do so as discussed. But the circumstances  such as treacherous nature of his own kinsmen, Mughal empire being in infancy at the time of his  succession and the rise of Sher Shah who was more potent rival in comparison to him acted as  hurdle in acting as ‘sovereign’. Humayun was the first of the Mughals to emphasize that the  king was the shadow of God on the earth. Kingship is a divine light and Humayun was the first  Mughal emperor to show his subjects his status in a ceremonial manner.⁶⁸ Khwandmir calls him  a personification of the spiritual and temporal sovereignty (Jamai Sultanati Haqiqi wa Majazi), and His Majesty the King, the Shadow of God (Hazrat-i Padshah Zill-i-Ilahi). Humayun also  assumed himself as Padshah-I Khilafat Panah (Sovereign Defender of the Caliphate), Padshah

i’A’ali (the Exalted Sovereign), Padsha-i Alam (the Sovereign of the World), etc.⁶⁹ Abul Fazl  used the word ‘Insan-i Kamil’, or the perfect man for Humayun too, who use to receive  institutions and inspiration from God.⁷⁰ And in a way, Humayun was forerunner of Akbar who  went a step ahead of his father and assumed the titles like Padshah-i Islam (King of Islam),  Imam-i 'Adil (the Just Imam), and Insan-i Kamil (the Perfect Man).⁷¹ The division of territories  as assignments, the treatise with different rulers. different rulers, and more importantly his.

Notes

 

1 Ahmad, Nizamuddin. Tabaqat-i Akbari. Translated by Brajendra Nath De. Delhi: Low Price Publication, 1992, p.42;  Also see S. K. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, London: Oxford University Press,1983. 

2 According to Nizamuddin Ahmad, Mahdi Khwaja was the son-in-law of Babur but Gulbadan Begum refers Mahdi  Khwaja as his brother-in-Law, which seems more correct. See Gulbadan.Begum Humayunnama. translated by  Annette S. Beveridge. London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1902, p.128. Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.19.  3 Begum, p.103. 

4 Ibid., p.109 mentions the incidence in the following words, “It is not well to keep the death secret, because when  such misfortunes befall kings in Hindustan, it is the custom of the bazar people to rob and steal; God forbid that the  Mughals not knowing, they should come and loot the houses and dwelling-places. It would be best to dress  someone in red and, and to set him on an elephant, and to let him proclaim that the emperor Babar had become a  dervish and has given his throne to the emperor Humayun.’ This, his Majesty ordered to be done.”

5 Mewat was conferred on Mirza Hindal; and the Punjab, Kabul and Qandahar to Mirza Kamran; and Sambhal was conferred on  Mirza Askari. See Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari., 2, p.45; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama.tr. by Henry Beveridge, 1, p.151 where Abul Fazl  mentions Alwar instead of Mewat and Badakhshan according to him was given to Mirza Sulaiman; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and  Times of Humayun, Calcutta: Orient Longman, 1955, p.42; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.28. 

6 Banerjee, Humayun Badshah,1, p.33. Satish Chandra, Medieval India: From Sultanate to the Mughal Empire (1526-1748),  part 2, New Delhi: Har Anand Publications, 1999

7 Anooshahr, Ali. “The King Who Would Be Man: The Gender Roles of the Warrior King in Early Mughal  History.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 18, no. 3, 2008, pp.327–40. 

8 Ahmadabad was bestowed on Mirza Askari and Patan on Yadgar Nasir Mirza. According to Nizam-ud-din,  Bahruch was given to Mir Hindu Beg and Baroda to Qasim Husain Sultan and Champener on Tardi Beg, but  according to Gulbadan, Bahruch was conferred on Qasim Husain Sultan. See, Begum, Humayunnama, pp.131-132 9Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.67. Alain Desoulières, “Mughal Diplomacy in Gujarat (1533- 1534) in Correia’s ‘Lendas Da India.’” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 22, no. 3, 1988, pp. 433–54.  10 Jouher Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, tr. by Major Charles Stewart,  Delhi: Idarah-i adabyiat-i-Delhi 1972, p.6. 

11 Ibid., p.9.

12 Ibid., p.10 ; Begum, Humayunnama, p.133.

13Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp.11-12 ; Begum,  Humayunnama, p.133; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.119; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.204-205. 14 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,1,  p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, pp. 125-126.

15 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, translated by Henry Beveridge. 3 vols. New Delhi: Saeed International, 1989. 1, p.341; Ishwari Prasad, The Life  and Times of Humayun, pp. 125-126.

16 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.31.  17 Begum, Humayunnama, p.134; Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari,2, p.66.

18 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.20. 

19 See Begum, Humayunnama, p.133. 

20 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.13.

21 Cited from R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, Central Book Depot, Allahabad, p.117.  22 Abdul Qadir Badaoni, Muntakhab-ut-Tawarikh, translated by W. H. Lowe, 2 vols., Karachi: Karimsons, 1976,  vol. 2, p.573. 

23 R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, p.117; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2, p.335. 24 Ibid., pp.28-29. 

25 Begum, Humayunnama, p.148. 

26 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.70.

27 Ibid.,70. 

28 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, pp.25-26.

29 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, pp.31-32; R.P Tripathi, Some Aspects of Muslim Administration, pp.116-117; Banerjee,  Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.336-337.

30 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.80-81; Abul Fazl, Akbarnama, 1, pp.649-650.

31 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.69; Sukumar Ray,  Humayun in Persia, p.28. 

32 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.35; Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 2, pp.336-337. 

33 Ibid., pp.51-53.

34 Banerjee, Humayun Badshah, 1, p.134 and 2, p.338; Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, p.76.  35 Khwandmir, Qanun-i Humayuni, p.74.

36 Banerjee, Humayun Badshah,2, p.342.

37Charles W. Nuckolls, “The Durbar Incident.” Modern Asian Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 1990, pp. 529–59

38Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, pp.6-7.

39 Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.60. 

40 Ibid., p.61. 

41 Ibid., p.65. 

42 S.R. Sharma, Mughal Empire in India, Agra: Educational Publishers, 1934, p.38. 

43 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.6.  44Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.59.

45 Ibid., p.7. 

46 Ibid., pp.14-15. 

47 Ibid., p.15. 

48 Ibid., pp.15-16. 

49 It was probably owing to these bad counsels that this treaty was concluded when Mughals had an edge. Chunar, ultimately was  given back to Sher Khan; See Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.17.  50 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.23. 

51 Ibid., p.24. 

52 Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.71. 

53 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.27. 

54 Ibid., p.29.

55 Ibid., p.33. 

56 Begum, Humayunnama, p.147. 

57 Ibid., pp.161-162.

58 Ahmad, Tabaqat-i Akbari, 2, p.86 

59 Dughlat, Tarikh-i Rashidi, p.739.

60Begum, Humayunnama, p.175; Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor  Humayun, p.78. 

61 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.80  62 Ibid., p.83. 

63 Ibid., p.84; Begum, Humayunnama, p. 180; 

64 Aftabchi, The Tezkereh al Vakiat or Private Memoirs of the Moghul Emperor Humayun, p.83.  65 Ibid., p.191. 

66 According to Gulbadan, Kamran proposed for marriage to Haram Begam, the wife of Mirza Sulaiman on which  the latter was rebuked by the Begam. Thus, Kamran became an enemy for Mirza Sulaiman and his son Mirza  Ibrahim. See Ibid., pp.193-194.

67 Begum, Humayunnama, pp.200-201.

68 Anna Malecka, “Solar Symbolism of the Mughal Thrones A Preliminary Note.” Arts Asiatiques, vol. 54, 1999, pp.  24–32. 

69 Khwandmir, Qanun-I Humayuni, ed. By M.Hidayat Husein, Calcutta, 1950,pp.12 &22  70 Abul Fazl, Akbarnama,1, p.115 & 120 

71These titles proclaimed by Akbar in the Mahzar of 1579. Also see Iqtidar Alam Khan “State in the Mughal India:  Re-Examining the Myths of a Counter-Vision.” Social Scientist 29, no. 1/2 (2001): 16–45, p.21; Also See Nurul  Hasan, The Mahzar of Akbar's Reign in the book Religion, State and Society in Medieval India Collected Works of S.  Nurul Hasan, Edited and with an Introduction by Satish Chandra, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005