Alauddin Khalji's Market Reforms: A Comprehensive Exploration

 Alaudin Khilji Market Reforms

Adarsh Saini

The reign of Alauddin Khalji was marked by a period of expansion, conquests and annexation as well as the brave counter to the Mongols. In addition to the military achievements of Alauddin, his reign was also well known for the agrarian and market reforms which were introduced by the Sultan. They highlighted the need of the state for additional revenue which could have been possible only through state intervention.

Contrary to the opinions of some scholars like Moreland, information about Alauddin’s reforms would have been available had Barani’s work not been present. A number of contemporary historians have propounded their view points about this particular issue. Amir Khusrau had written his Khaza’inu-l Futuh in 1311 or soon after; Ibn Battuta’s Rihla was written during the period he was in Delhi (1335-1342); Isami devoted a section of his book-Futuh-us Salatin- to this particular topic in 1350 and even the Chisti mystic Nasiruddin Mahmud had spoken on this topic twice at some length in his conversations recorded in 1354-55. However, most of these accounts only provided a factual information about these reforms without giving an indepth analysis of the same; most of the time even the information was neglected or incomplete. It was Barani’s ‘Tarikh-I Firuz-Shahi written in 1357, which provides a full account of the market reforms which took place during the reign of Alauddin Khalji along with his own opinions on the same.

These reforms had come up as a possible solution to a critical financial problem. This was caused by the constant stream of invasions of the Mongol army for which Alauddin Khalji had to undertake a vast amount of expenditure. Fortified walls had to be thrown around Delhi, the damaged forts had to be rebuilt and strengthened and a number of new walls were also created. All these fortified settlements had to be stocked with grains and a large standing army had to be maintained at all times, with well-trained, equipped soldiers and good horses. These troopers had to be paid a regular annual salary as well. Khalji believed that if such an army was paid in cash on a regular basis than the royal treasury would be empty within a few years.

He worked out a system by which a fully equipped soldier maintaining one horse would be paid 234 tankas and a soldier maintaining two horses was to be paid 78 tankas extra. But such low payments could be put into effect only if the troops were still able to get all the articles and animals they were required to maintain and also such goods and services as were necessary for the maintenance or subsistence of their families, slaves and servants. Thus, Alauddin attempted the mechanism of pushing down prices of these goods without hurting his military ambitions.

However, some scholars have objected to this on the grounds that Alauddin had regulated and reduced the prices of all commodities, even those which had no importance for the military. However, other scholars have countered this by stating that the chief objective was not to merely cheapen the military stores and horses, but also reduce the salaries of the cavalrymen and other troopers. However, to ensure that these people were able to enjoy other goods as well for the basic subsistence pattern it was necessary to reduce the prices of all goods, whether directly required by the troopers or not.

Some scholars on the basis of Nasiruddin Mahmud’s writings believe that Alauddin’s market reforms were aimed at the general welfare of the people. Alauddin, apparently, wanted to do something beneficial for the people. He considered giving up his wealth but realized that it would not reach out to everyone. As a result, he decided to reduce the prices of the grains as the benefits of that would accrue to everyone living in his empire. This view was also supported by the writings of Amir Khusrau.

The essence of Khalji’s reforms was to bring the villages in closer association with the government in area extending from Dipalpur and Lahore to Kara near modern Allahabad. In this region, the villages were to be brought under Khalisa; lands assigned in charitable grants were also confiscated and brought under the khalisa. The Sultan decreed that three taxes were to be levied on the peasantry viz. the Kharaj or the land-tax; a grazing tax (charai) on cattle and ghari on houses or huts. As far as Khiraj was concerned, the land under cultivation was measured; the yield was estimated per unit area; and then by multiplying the area by the yield the total produce was to be worked out. Half of the produce thus determined was to be exacted uniformly from every peasant without exception.

A significant feature of rural agriculture in India was the existence of a large number of intermediaries. At the village level there was the village head, called the chaudhari or muqaddam. Alauddin’s agrarian reforms implied putting greater pressure for the displacement of the rais or ranas, who were chiefs controlling a trace of land which was parceled out to his clan and other supporters for collecting land-revenue. In the areas brought under the khalisa, Alauddin tried to curb the privileges of the zamindars, muqaddams and chaudharis. These sections formed the rural aristocracy and according to Barani, they were rich enough to ride Arabi and Iraqi horses, wear weapons and fine clothes and indulge in wine drinking. Their wealth was based on holding the best land in the villages. Moreover, in a system where the village was assessed as a whole, they often passed on the burden of their share of the land revenue on to the shoulders of the weak.

Alauddin took stringent measures against this section of society forcing them to pay the grazing and housing taxes like the others and as a result of the system of measurement of area under cultivation to determine the land revenue he prevented them from passing on the burden to someone else. Although, he was unable to offset the trend of land redistribution in the rural areas he was able to infuse a fear of punishment among the rural elite, which made them more obedient and ensured regular payment of land revenue. A contemporary source states “their obedience reached such a pitch that a footman from the town revenue office would tie the necks of twenty zamindars, muqaddams and chaudharis together and kick and thrash them for the realization of tribute”.

While reforming the agrarian system, Alauddin tried to ensure the efficient and honest working of the machinery of revenue administration. This was done by appointing a large number of accountants, collectors and agents in a very short span of time. The accountants of all these officials were audited strictly by the wazir and even if one jital was out of place they were to be punished severely.

Alauddin was more or less the first ruler who looked at the problem of price control in a systematic manner and was able to maintain stable prices over a considerable period of time. Alauddin had set up three markets at Delhi, the first for food grains, the second for cloth of all kinds, and for expensive items such as sugar, ghee, oil, dry fruits etc and the third for horses, slaves and cattle. Detailed regulations were framed for the control and administration of all these markets.

In order to control the food prices, Alauddin attempted to control the supply of food grains from the villages, its transportation to the city by the grain merchants and its proper distribution to the citizens. Alauddin’s first effort was to see that there were sufficient stocks of food grains with the government so that the traders did not try to raise the prices by creating an artificial scarcity or indulging in profiteering. For this purpose royal stores were setup at Delhi. However, Barani had raised the question “how were the Sultan’s grain store-houses so full that they had enough within them to replace normal supplies whenever these failed in the bad season?”

The answer to this question was rooted in Alauddin’s land-tax policy. As stated above, this was half of the produce and in addition taxes were also imposed on the milch cattle and houses. As a result of these high tax demands, and the strict measures adopted to collect these taxes, Alauddin was able to obtain half the agricultural produce for the state. Moreover, Alauddin had made it very clear that grains alone should be collected from all areas in the khalisa in lieu of land-tax, while in all areas lying in the eastern part of Rajasthan only half the revenue was to be collected in grain, the remainder in cash.  Thus, in this way the royal stores always had enough of a stock to face any food crisis. According to Barani “There was no mohalla in Delhi in which two or three houses were not fully stocked with the Sultan’s grain”.

The task of transporting these grains was undertaken by banjaras, some of whom had 10,000 or 20,000 bullocks. These banjaras were ordered to form themselves into one corporate body, giving sureties for each other. They were to settle on the banks of Jamuna with their wives, children, goods and cattle. An official was appointed to oversee them. In fact, in normal times these banjaras were able to bring in so much food grains into the city that it was not necessary to touch the royal stores.

To ensure the regular supply of grains to the banjaras, a number of regulations were made. In the areas, which had been brought under the khalisa, the local officials were charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the grains would be delivered by the cultivator to the grain merchant at a cash price from their fields.  Alauddin ordered the Royal Finance Ministry should take letters from the officials and collectors to say that they would demand the land-tax from the peasants with such harshness that the latter would not be able to bring the grain from the fields into their houses and engross it, and would be forced to sell the grains at low rates by the side of the field to the grain carrier. As a result of this regulation, the grain-carriers found no obstacle in conveying grain to the market and grain supplies constantly reached the market. For their own profit, villagers also brought whatever they could from the fields to the market and sold it at prices fixed by the Sultan. These regulations were imposed mostly in the assigned territories, where the grain was not taken in revenue, but the tax in money was to be so rigorously demanded so as to force the peasant to sell part of his grain to pay the tax.

If the cultivator wished to sell more they could do so but the local officials were asked to sign a bond that said they would not permit anyone to regrate or sell at a price higher than the official price. Anyone who violated this rule were severely punished and the regrated grains were confiscated. All the food grains were to be brought to the market for food-grains set up by Alauddin and sold only at official prices.

Thus, grain supplies at low prices depended upon the extraction of the agrarian surplus through the land-tax, brought directly into the Sultan’s granaries or into the grain-carriers’ hands by the rigour of the tax demand. The Sultan then fixed low prices arbitrarily, which were then enforced in the urban market, by assuring continuous supply of grains. As a result of all these measures there was an adequate supply of food grains in the towns because of which the prices fell. Wheat was sold for 7.5 jital per man, barley for 4 jital, superior quality rice for 5 jital etc. an officer, with an adequate force was also appointed in charge of the market with strict instructions to anyone who tried to raise the price. “So long as Alauddin lived, monsson or no monsoon, there was not the slightest rise in these prices. The permanence of prices in the grain market was a wonder of the age”.

Alauddin received daily reports about the activities of the market from three different sources- controller of the market, intelligence officers and lastly from secret spies who had been appointed for this very purpose. Thus, people tended to behave properly as they were aware of the fact that Alauddin’s spies were informing him about everything.

Alauddin had also instituted a system of rationing during the times of scarcity. Each grocer was issued an amount of grains from the government stores bearing in mind the population of the ward. No individual was allowed to buy more than half a man at one time. However, the amount was more for nobles who did not have villages of lands of their own. As a result of these measures, even during the time of famine there was no shortage of food-grains at Delhi and even the price of food-grains did not increase.

The second market was called sarai-i-adl. It was an exclusive and to a large extent a subsidized market for manufactured commodities and merchandise brought from a long distance, from territories outside the Sultan’s dominion and even from foreign countries. The first regulation with regard to this market was the setting up of a separate market by itself for these commodities. Alauddin had ordered that cloth brought from different parts of the country including foreign lands, was to be stored and sold only in this market at government rates. To ensure an adequate supply of all the commodities, all merchants whether Hindu or Muslim, were registered with the ministry of commerce and their business was to be regulated. A deed was taken from these merchants, who had been importing commodities into the city, that they would bring the same quantities of commodities to this market every year, and sell them at government rates. The “regulated” merchants brought so much merchandise from the provinces and adjoining territories that it accumulated in the market and was left unsold for many years.

However, as most of these goods were imported from outside the price-control zone, Alauddin’s price regulation measures did not apply to these goods. As a result, there was a stark difference between the cost in the place of origin and the retail price at Delhi. The prime costs could not be reduced but other measures were taken to bridge this gap. The rich Multani merchants i.e. those who brought commodities from long-distances including foreign countries, were given an advance of 20 lakh tankas from the treasury, on condition that they did not sell them to any intermediaries but at the market at official rates. The power and responsibilities for obeying these orders were given to a body of merchants themselves. Finally, a permit officer was appointed. Alauddin believed that many of the items available in this market were of extremely high quality and were not required by the general public. Thus, these products were not to be sold to anyone, until and unless, the permit officer wrote out a permit. This was done to ensure that costly cloth was not purchased by people and given to others who would take it out of Delhi, and sold in the neighbouring towns at four or five times the price, an officer was appointed to issue permits to amirs, maliks etc for the purchase of these costly commodities in accordance with their income.

The prices of the commodities even in this market were quite cheap. Thus, for one tanka a person could buy 40 yards of coarse, or 20 yards of fine-woven cotton cloth, one ser of coarse sugar for 1 ½ jital, ½ ser of ghee for 1 jital, 3 ser of oil for 1 jital etc.

The third market dealt with horses, cattle and slaves. The horse trade was more or less a monopolistic trade, with the overland trade being monopolized by Multanis and Afghans. But they were sold in the market by middlemen or dallals.

The horse merchants had become a severe headache for the Sultan. According to the procedure of that day, a man who wanted service with the cavalry had to provide himself with one or two horses and the necessary equipment and then appear at the review, where he was inspected by the officer-in-charge. If he was found fit, the price of the horse would be paid to him. But since most horsemen could not afford to pay the price of their horses before the review, persons with money found the purchase and stabling of horses a good investment. They entered into an alliance with the leading brokers, who not only helped them to raise the price but also took a commission from both the horsemen and the horse-merchants.

Alauddin took harsh measures against such merchants. They were banished from the town, and some of them were imprisoned in forts. A stern order was issue that no horse-merchant or capitalist was to purchase a horse directly or through an agent or come anywhere near the horse-market. Then, with the hep of other dallals, the quality and price of the horses were fixed. Horses of high quality were priced between 100 and 120 tankas, those of the second category 80 to 90 tankas and those of the third 65 to 70 tankas. The price of ordinary horses, which were not used in the army was 10 to 25 tankas.

The prices of the slave boys and girls and of cattle were also fixed. The reasons for doing this are slightly unclear but its believed that these measures were taken to make the life of the nobles or richer sections of society easier, who had become accustomed to buying slaves for domestic and personal service. Likewise, animals were needed for meat, transport and for milk and milk products.

The general markets, scattered throughout the city, were put under the control of the Department of Commerce. Alauddin did not interfere in this arrangement but he made sure that every commodity’s price was fixed irrespective of how insignificant it may have been-hats, comb, betel leaf, needles, sugarcane etc. Alauddin had selected a ruthless and shrewd minister of commerce who was able to keep the shopkeepers under control. The minister would regularly check the prices of goods in the market and thrash the shopkeepers ruthlessly for charging above the price list. These severities compelled the shopkeepers to reduce their prices, but they did not give up all tricks, such as using false weights, keeping aside their best commodities and telling lies to young and ignorant purchasers. As a last measure Alauddin would send children to the markets to purchase goods. The minister would then make inquiries into these purchases and if the shopkeeper had charged over the price list then double his body weight would be carved out of the flesh of the shopkeeper.

It is not possible to define the territory in which Alauddin Khalji’s price measures were effective. Barani speaks as if the prices were set for Delhi; but it is reasonable to infer that the same prices also prevailed in the surrounding areas, which could offer an alternative market to these products. This probably included the entire Khalisa region where the land revenue system was instituted by Alauddin. It is unlikely that price control measures extended to areas outside of this region. A letter in Mahru suggests that prices were kept low under Alauddin in Multan and Ucch as well; but a closer scrutiny of these texts suggests that he comparing the state of affairs in Delhi at the time of that sultan with contemporary conditions in Ucch.

Many of Barani’s contemporaries praised Alauddin immensely for instituting these measures. Amir khusrau looked upon these measures as an act of generosity on part of the Sultan, undertaken for the sake of “general comfort, the welfare of the elect and the public at large’ and ‘of the general benefit of the city-man and the villager”. Ibn Battuta noted how “the people of the hind greatly praised Alauddin on this account.” Isami lauded the measures for the relief that it brought to the people and Nasiruddin Mahmud recounted how the Sultan was anxious to do something from which ‘gain would accrue to all the people’. Similarly, even Barani in his first account had praised the Sultan for implementing these measures.

However, in his later accounts he was far more discriminating in assessments of the benefits flowing from price-control. The entire fabric rested on a very heavy agrarian taxation. The peasants had to part with half their produce and this was collected in such a harsh manner that they were forced to sell all the grain and could not hold back any surplus for stocking or for engrossing. The market reforms had left the peasantry with so little as to be “barely enough for carrying on cultivation and his food requirements. The peasantry was completely impoverished during the reign of Alauddin and could not even raise a voice against the harsh treatment meted out to them by the officials.

Large segments of the upper rural population were also greatly impoverished as they themselves became subject to tax-demand and were forbidden to levy their cesses. No longer could “the chaudhris, zamindars and muqaddams ride horses, wield arms, wear good clothes or chew betel leaf”; even the women of the lords had to take service in Muslims’ houses. Part of the grain and other rural products, which these classes consumed, must have now gone to Delhi and the other towns in tax-payment, thereby augmenting supplies over there.

The gains from the low prices within the city were also not universal. While, some citizens were benefitted by the rationing system as it ensured a regular food supply during famines. A major section of the population who seems to have had its real income reduced was that of the artisans and the unskilled labourers and servants. This arose because of the fall in the prices of the goods, which they used to sell in order to obtain their income. According to Nasiruddin Mahmud, during the reign of Alauddin a tailor could make a robe for 4 or 6 jitals, whereas in his time-1354-no less than 48 jital would be charged for. Similarly, Barani also stated that wages of labourers in Alauddin’s time were a fourth of what they were under his successors. Thus, under Alauddin there was a general lack of money in the hands of the people.

Though the ‘market men’ suffered the proper merchants had a fairly respectable position in Alauddin’s reign; the Multanis indeed received large treasury loans to encourage them to bring supplies of luxury goods from distant places.

The principal gainers of all these moves seem to have been the nobles. According to Barani, under Alauddin “things came to such a pass that except for the houses of the nobles and commanders, officials and Multanis little money was to be found anywhere else”. Their revenues were significantly contracted but their purchasing power was unaffected; they also had a saved up treasury which would have firther enhanced this purchasing power. Moreover, the revenue collected outside the limits of the zone where commutation prices had been reduced would be on the old scale, and yet be worth far more in Delhi in terms of goods. The special provision for supply of high quality cloth, restricted to the nobility or the cheap supply of slaves and good horses clearly shows the concern for the welfare of the nobility.

Alauddin Khalji had seen the need to regulate markets and prices in order to be able to afford a large standing army which could counter the perpetual Mongol threat. He was successful as far as the reduction in prices was concerned. The market prices of all goods from horses to grains to cloth to insignificant items remained low and at the fixed price as set by the Sultan. This had enabled him to organize a large army and also increase the wealth of the treasury marginally. However, the extremely harsh measures used to ensure this had caused a great deal of pain and suffering to the common people. Some of the people in fact were fed up of their lives and wished for death as they could no longer take such a strict control.

Thus, shortly after the death of Alauddin his price control system collapsed; under his successor Qutbuddin Mubarak Khalji prices rose rapidly and the wages went up ‘four times’. He also released the prisoners who had been imprisoned for selling commodities at prices above the fixed rate. Moreover, he withdrew the laws which, to some extent, denied people the freedom to eat, wear, speak or buy or sell what they wanted. The regulations of Alauddin had also resulted in a lot of bureaucratic controls and thus corruption. His policy would have been more successful had he controlled the prices of only a few essential commodities or those meant for direct use by the military. However, he controlled the prices of everything; such centralized control were bound to lead to violations, inviting punishments and thus resentment. Hence, by their very nature, Alauddin’s market reforms were temporary and largely meant to tide over an emergency, or a particular situation.