By S. Roy
The main contents of this article are as follows
- Struggle (1530-1540)
- Exile (1540-1545)
- Return
- Restoration
The history of Humayun is a drama in four acts. The first act offers the story of the hectic ten years from 1530 to 1540 during which he struggled for defending his dominion; the second unfolds the tragedy of exile from 1540 to 1545 when he had no place under the sun and sought his fortune in Sind, Rajasthan and in Persia; the third tells the story of the period from 1545 to 1554, when from his bases at Qandahar and at Kabul, he made preparations for the recovery of his dominion; and the fourth deals with the restoration during 1555-1556 when he recovered the throne of Delhi and a fragment of his kingdom.
I. STRUGGLE (1530-1540)
In accordance with Babur’s dying advice to be generous towards his brothers, Humayun allowed Mlrza Kamran to govern the terri¬ tories of Kabul and Qandahar, as well as the western Punjab, while he assigned Sambhal to his third brother ‘Askarl, and Alwar to the youngest, Hindal. The position of Humayun was full of peril; he had to face the combined opposition of the Afghans, nominally under the leadership of Sultan Mahmud Lodi, the brother of the late Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, but under the actual command of Biban Khan Jalwani and Shaikh Bayazld Qarmali, 'heroes of a hundred battles’. From Bihar, now their vantage ground, they had marched triumphantly towards Lakhnau and forced Sultan Junaid Barlas, the Mughul governor of Jaunpur, to retire. Due to indiscipline, disunion and treachery among the Afghans, Humayun easily won a victory at the battle of Dadrah (1532),2 and the main force of the Afghans was routed and dispersed. There was, however, She,r Khan, who had deserted them and thus served Mughul interest at the battle,23 but was in possession of the strategic fort of Chunar on the Gahga (Ganges), south-west of Banaras. Humayun marched to Chunar and laid siege to it. The siege lasted for four months when Humayun, anxious to return to Agra on account of the aggressive movements of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, accepted the terms of Sher Khan who agreed to hold Chunar as a vassal of the Mughul emperor (Decem¬ ber, 1531).
After returning to Agra, Humayun, generous brother as he was, not only acquiesced in Mlrza Kamran’s occupation of Lahore during his absence but added Multan and Hissar (Flruza) to his territory. In August, 1533, he laid the foundation of a new city in Delhi named Dlnpanah (believed by some to be the site of old Indraprastha) which was completed in nine months. This brief respite was soon disturbed in July, 1534, when Muhammad Zaman Mlrza and Mu¬ hammad Sultan Mlrza, who had rebelled soon after Humayun’s ac¬ cession but had been kindly pardoned and reinstated in their ydglrs, again raised the standard of rebellion in Bihar. They were defeat¬ ed and imprisoned; Sultan Mlrza was blinded but Zaman Mlrza es¬ caped to the court of Sultan Bahadur in Gujarat. Humayun now turned his attention again towards Sher Khan and marched up to Kanar in KalpI district, but had to hasten back to Agra on account of the alarming successes of Bahadur Shah who had entered into a pact with Sher Khan that each would open a second front for his ally when attacked by the Mughuls.
Bahadur Shah, who had annexed Malwa to his kingdom (1531) and had next year taken from the Rajput chief Silhadi his territory of Raisen, Chanderi and Bhilsa, captured Ranthambhor and in January, 1533, laid siege to the fort of Chitor. Humayun, who had received an appeal for help from the Rajputs, was not prepared to meet Bahadur but made a diplomatic move to Gwalior which pos¬ sibly prompted the Gujarat king to make peace with the Rana who offered it as he failed to receive active help of the Mughul emperor (March, 1533). Bahadur, however, took Ajmer and Nagaur and in November, 1534, broke the treaty by an unprovoked siege of Chitor. Bahadur’s conquest in Rajasthan thus became a direct menace to the Mughul territory. Bahadur also gave great offence to Huma¬ yun by harbouring notable Afghan leaders like ‘Alam Khan ‘Ala ud-dln Lodi, a son of Sultan Buhlul Lodi, who had once contested the throne of Delhi, and his ambitious son Tatar Khan who still harped on his father’s claims. Bahadur even sent or rather subsi¬ dized a three-pronged campaign led by them, directed against, Ka linjar, Delhi and Agra, and, though Tatar Khan was able to take Bayana and his advance columns raided the gates of Agra, the entire project ended in a fiasco at Mandrel where he was badly defeated by ‘Askarl and slain (November, 1534). Last but not the least, Bahadur warmly received the disaffected Mughuls led by that faith¬ less arch-rebel Muhammad Zaman Mirza, and added insult to injury by sending a most insolent reply to Humayun’s demand for his ex¬ tradition.3 There was now no other way for even slow-moving Humayun but to move.
In November, 1534, Humayun moved from Agra to Gwalior where he halted for two months expecting that this would induce Bahadur to raise the siege of Chitor. When this proved fruitless, Humayun, as expected by Bahadur Shah, allowed him to conquer Chitor, the capital city of an infidel ruler, but took advantage of Bahadur’s pre-occupation by invading his dominion and proceeding to Sarangpur and then to Ujjain in the very heart of Malwa. After the fall of Chitor (8 March, 1535) Humayun moved northward towards Mandasor where Bahadur came down to meet him. The Gujarat sultan, relying upon the advice of his mastergunner Rumi Khan, now a traitor conspiring with the enemy, remained on the defensive and entrenched himself behind a bulwark of baggage carts instead of giving battle in the open field as his nobles suggested. Besieged by the Mughul troops, their supplies cut off, the Gujarat troops found themselves in a prison of their own making and one night Bahadur fled towards Mandu (25 April, 1535).4 Not until the next morning was the real situation revealed to the victorious
Mughuls who, after plundering his camp, pursued him to Mandu. Humayun laid siege to Mandu but realizing the difficulties of be¬ sieging such a gigantic fortress, twenty-three miles in circumference and defended by a large garrison, he opened negotiation for peace on condition that Bahadur should retain Gujarat and surrender the resf of his territories to the Mughul emperor.5 Negotiations were going on and there was prospect of peace when the Mughuls, taking advantage of the consequent relaxation in the Gujarat garrison, made way into the fort through one of its unguarded parts and threw the enemy into confusion. Bahadur, roused from sleep, offered some resistance but, considering discretion as the better part of valour, slipped away to Champaner. Humayun meted out a most severe treatment to the people of Mandu: the lanes and bazars of Mandu ran red with blood. The reduction of Mandu put Humayun in pos¬ session of the whole of Malwa. Emboldened by these successes; Humayun invaded Gujarat with a force of thirty thousand horse¬ men. As soon as he reached the environs of Champaner, Bahadur left the fort in charge of Ikhtiyar Khan and, adopting the scorched earth policy, set fire to the town and fled north to Cambay. Huma¬ yun pursued Bahadur as far as Cambay, but missed the enemy narrowly as Bahadur had left for Diu a few hours earlier. In re¬ venge for a night attack on the Mughul camp by the Kolis, Huma¬ yun sacked the town of Cambay for three days. Considering him
as a spent force, Humayun now left Bahadur to his own fate and returned to Champaner t,o undertake the siege of the fort which his officers had begun on his first arrival there on 13 June, 1535.
The celebrated fortress of Champaner towers over the level plains of the eastern portion of Gujarat. With some of its sides form¬ ed of nearly perpendicular and precipitous rocks and the deep and almost impenetrable jungle covering its foot, the fort was consi¬ dered impregnable in medieval warfare. The provisions of the fort, we are told by the chroniclers, were sufficient against a siege of ten years. The Mughuls, who were not well-equipped for siege operations, realized that the fort would not surrender in spite of their best efforts. Accidentally some villagers, who used to supply food secretly to the garrison, fell into the hands of the Mughuls while they were reconnoitring their position and were forced to re¬ veal the way to a vulnerable point of the fort. Here, at the advice of Bairam Beg, Humayun arranged for escalade by driving iron spikes into the mortar between the stones; and onq night, as the garrison were not so vigilant to guard this side, three hundred Mu¬ ghuls scaled the walls of the fort, Humayun being the forty-first.6 At dawn, attack was made on the fort in all directions and the coup de main so terrified the defenders that three hundred Mughuls seized the gate. Many of the garrison were killed, their provisions fell into the hands of the Mughuls and munitions ran short, and Ikhtiyar Khan, who had taken refuge in the upper citadel, surren¬ dered the fort (August, 1535). All the treasures of Gujarat sultans, accumulated in the fort by generations, fell into the hands of the victorious troops.
After the conquest of Champaner, Humayun became master of all Gujarat as far as the Mahl, but he was so busy in enjoying the booty that he did not take steps to consolidate his rule, not even to collect revenue. The chiefs and people of Gujarat offered to pay revenue even to their exiled king at Diu. Bahadur availed of this sentiment and deputed Tmad-ul-Mulk with this duty as well as with the task of organizing an army of opposition. As he was marching to Ahmadabad, he found himself at the head of a consi¬ derable army of fifty thousand horsemen. Humayun now left Champaner to meet the enemy. His advance guard under MIrza ‘Askar! was defeated by Tmad-ul-Mulk, but in the battle that ensued at a place between Nadlad and Mahmudabad the latter was routed by the main body of the Mughul army. Humayun marched triumph¬ antly to Ahmadabad and this marks the climax of his successful career in Malwa and Gujarat.
Humayun now took some steps to settle the government of the newly acquired province. He appointed MIrza ‘Askar! viceroy of Gujarat with his headquarters at Ahmadabad, and the veteran Hindu Beg as his adviser. Officers were posted at strategic places: Champaner, Patan, Cambay, Baroda, Broach and Surat. Rejecting the sound advice of his counsellors to restore Gujarat to Bahadur in view of the alarming situation in Bihar and Bengal, Humayun marched on towards Diu in pursuit of Bahadur, but the rebellion of local chieftains in Malwa forced him to proceed to Mandu. His ar¬ rival at Mandu restored Mughul authority without serious oppo¬ sition, but after these great successes he relapsed into his chronic lethargy and opiated idleness at the attractive and luxurious capital of Malwa. Taking advantage of this inactivity of his enemy, Baha¬ dur issued out of his retreat. Humayun’s conquest of Gujarat was hardly more than a military occupation and immediately after he left for Malwa, a counter revolution began in favour of Bahadur Shah who was supported by the local chiefs and the people and joined by his scattered troops. The country was in revolt against the invader. The Mughul officers were driven from N'avsarl, Broach, Surat, Cambay and Patan (December, 1535). MIrza ‘Askari, the viceroy of Gujarat, was only imitating his master in the neglect of his duties and himself aspired to sovereign power, while his foster brother Ghaznafar deserted after an angry quarrel to Bahadur and revealed to him the precarious position of the Mughuls. In res¬ ponse to appeals of his followers to recover his territory, Bahadur marched towards Ahmadabad and at Sarkhej, opposite the capital, he fought an indecisive battle with ‘Askarl who was bent on re¬ treating rather than maintaining his position at the capital. After a skirmish near Mahmudabad7 between Bahadur’s vanguard and his rear, ‘Askarl crossed the river Mahl and after severe loss reached
Champaner where he expected reinforcement in men and money. Its loyal governor Tardi Beg Khan answered ‘Askarl with a gallant refusal and the pretender took the road to Agra with a view to esta¬ blishing his authority there. Bahadur now advanced towards Champaner and Tardi Beg, unable to resist or acting on instruction from Humayun, retreated to Mandu taking with him as much of the treasure as he could (25 May, 1536). At long last, Humayun left Mandu in haste for Agra, and at Chitor overtook his delinquent brother whom he pardoned and carried to the capital. With Tardi Beg’s retreat from Champaner ended Mughul domination in Gujarat, and after Humayun’s departure from Mandu, Malwa fell into the hands of Mallu Khan, a nobleman of the late sultans of Malwa and Bahadur’s governor. Gujarat and Malwa were as easily and rapidly lost as they had been conquered.
On his return to Agra in August, 1536, Humayun found the situation embarrassing. That stormy petrel, Muhammad Zaman Mlrza, was still at large, though after his return from Bahadur’s camp at Mandasor, his attempt at the capture of Lahore had proved futile and Hindal had just subdued Sultan Mlrza and his sons. Sul¬ tan Mlrza had escaped from prison and established himself at Bil gram near Kanauj while his eldest son occupied territory in the east as far as Jaunpur, and his second son extended his authority in the south-east as far as Kara-Manikpur. Hindal, who had been left in charge at Agra, marched against the rebels, met them piecemeal, be¬ fore they could unite their forces, at Bilgram and then at Awadh, and pushed on to Jaunpur, while Sultan Mlrza with his sons retired to Bihar among the Afghans.
The danger-spot of Humayun’s empire was Bihar, the vantage ground of the Afghans who, after the battle of Dadrah and the re¬ tirement of the old leaders, found a great leader in Sher Khan, that grandson of a petty and unsuccessful horse-dealer of Roh, who hardly deserves the contemptuous remark of the Mughul historio grapher.8 During the four years (1533-1536) while Humayun was mainly engaged in Gujarat and Malwa affairs, Sher Khan not only consolidated his position in Bihar, of which he became the king in all but name, but extended his power at the expense of the effete monarchy of Bengal. He had inflicted several crushing defeats upon the Bengal army, notably at Surajgarh (1534), as a result of which he became master of the territory from Chuniar to Surajgarh. In 1536 he made a surprise attack on Bengal’s capital through Jharkhand route and forced Sultan Mahmud to conclude peace on payment of huge in¬ demnity.
Humayun, after his return from Mtandu, wasted one full year, partly because of his chronic indolence and partly because he still harped on the idea of recovering his lost kingdom in Gujarat and Malwa in which he was offered the alliance of Burhan Nizam Shah of Ahmadnagar. He, therefore, remained satisfied with the report of Hindu Beg, whom he had despatched to Jaunpur for this pur¬ pose, that all was quiet on the eastern front. Legally, the only offence that Sher had given to the Mughul emperor was the depar¬ ture of Qutb Khan, his son and hostage with the Mughuls (according to the Treaty of Chunar, of December, 1531), during Humayun’s Guja¬ rat campaign, but this was not deemed sufficient by Humayun to serve as the casus belli. Like Bahadur, Sher Khan availed himself of the inactivity of the Mughul emperor and, tearing that ‘scrap of paper’ he had signed, made a second invasion of Bengal with a view to crushing Sultan Mahmud before the latter could secure the pro¬ mised Portuguese help. It was this invasion of Bengal which made Humayun realize at the eleventh hour the gravity of the situation and decide to lead an expedition against his astute adversary.
Accompanied by Mirza ‘Askaiii, Mlrza Hindal and the promi¬ nent nobles, and with a big army, Humayun marched from Agra in July, 1537.9 On the way he received the submission of the in¬ corrigible rebel Muhammad Zaman Mlrza who, after his failure to seize the throne of Gujarat on Bahadur’s death, joined the Mughul camp. The army proceeded partly by land and partly by water along the Yamuna (Jumna) and the Gahga (Ganges) and reached the environs of Chunar. With the help of Rumi Khan, the cele¬ brated military engineer of Bahadur Shah, now in his service, Hu¬ mayun laid siege; to the fort which was gallantly defended by Jalal Khan for about three months until it fell, thanks to a stratagem of the Turkish gunner. Rumi Khan flogged a slave and sent him to the fort where he was able to convince the garrison that he had fled because of the cruelty of his master and, after studying the vulnerable points of the fort, escaped to the Mughul camp. Rum! Khan then moved a floating battery close to that portion of the fort, where a breach was made, and by a severe bombardment forced the garrison to surrender.
The capture of Chunar was an admirable military triumph but a tremendous strategical blunder. A prompt direct march to Gaur might have prevented the fall of the Bengal monarchy and the con¬ sequent growth of Sher Khan’s power. During the period Huma¬ yun wasted at Chunar he allowed his enemy to work according to his plans. Sher Khan besieged Gaur| but, leaving Khavass Khan in charge of the operations, proceeded to Bihar in order to keep watch over the Mughuls. Iiumayun marched from Chunar to Banaras and encamped in its neighbourhood. He now decided to follow a more vigorous plan of operations and march towards Bengal with a view to checking Sher Khan. Yet he attempted compromise with his adversary by offering him Chunar, Jaunpur and any other place except Bengal and Rohtas on condition of payment of tribute. At Muner, on the confluence of the Son and the Ganga, he was met by Sultan Mahmud, the fugitive king of Bengal, who further incited him to march without delay before Sher could become absolute master of Bengal. Sher Khan also became indifferent to the offer of peace as he received the report of the fall of Gaur (6 April, 1538) and he now transferred all his wealth to the fort of Rohtas which he had obtained by a stratagem to redress the loss of Chunar. Conse^ quently, the negotiation fell through. At Patna, Humayun was advised by his nobles to postpone the Bengal campaign until the rains were over, but urged by Mahmud he proceeded further. Sher Khan, who was very near the Mughul army, was pursued, but he
made good his escape and reached Gaur. On his arrival at Bhagalpur, Humayun despatched a force of about 5000 or 6000 men to clear the road at the pass of TeliyagarhT, but the Mughuls found it already oc¬ cupied by Jalal Khan, son of Sher, and being routed by a surprise attack were driven back on the main army at Kahalgaon (Colgong). Sultan Mahmud died here but Humayun pushed on, and as he arrived at the pass, he found it abandoned by Jalal Khan on instruction from his father who had meanwhile arrived safely in South Bihar. Hu¬ mayun therefore could, without opposition, march through Teliya¬ garhi to the capital of Bengal—a capital, devastated, ruined and strewn with corpses (15 August 1538).9a
Humayun’s conquest of Bengal proved his undoing. He re¬ named the city of Gaur as Jannatabad and parcelled out the kingdom among his nobles. But as at Mandu after the successful Gujarat and Malwa campaigns, so at Gaur, his Jannatabad (abode of paradise), he fell a victim to his chronic lethargy and dreamed at opium-eater’s paradise while his enemy was working his ruin. Indeed, Humayun’s entry into Bengal’s capital was no triumph but a strategical defeat, and Gaur proved the grave of his empire—a grave which his astute adversary had dug for him. From his safe Jharkhand base, Sher Khan now cut off the communications of Humayun with Delhi and the desertion of his post by Mirza Hindal at Tirhoot in North Bihar and that at Kanauj by Mirza Nur-ud-din completely blockaded the Mughul emperor at Bengal’s capital. Sher Khan, taking advantage of the situation of which he was mainly the author, took Banaras, sent his son Jalal Khan to besiege Jaunpur, and invested Chunar, while his generals ravaged the whole country as far as Kanauj. Even Jaunpur fell after stubborn resistance and, as ‘Abbas Sarwani says, the whole country as far as Kanauj and Sambhal fell into the hands of the Afghans.10 Humayun could expect help from no quarter. The loyal governors of Delhi and Agra, Mir Faqr ‘All and Mir Muhammad Bakshi, persuaded Hindal and Yadgar Nlasir Mirza at KalpI to move towards the east in aid of the emperor. But their efforts were foiled by the arrival of the Mughul nobles under Zahid Beg who had indignantly refused Humayun’s offer of the govern¬ ment of Bengal and had abandoned him, and now, in collaboration with Mirza Nur-ud-din, incited Hindal to assume royal power. Under their influence Hindal executed the venerable) Shaikh Buh lul whom Humayun had sent from Gaur to reconcile his rebel bro¬ ther. Hindal now advanced to seize Delhi but was prevented by
the arrival of Mirza Kamran who pursued him to Agra, drove him to his jagir at Alwar and forced him to offer submission. If any one could save Humayun at this critical juncture, it was Mirza Kam¬ ran who had at his disposal the resources of Kabul, Qandahar’ and the Punjab intact, but he remained coldly neutral. The brothers indeed led a campaign as if to help Humayun, but after a few marches returned to Agra. Mirza Kamran was selfish and hostile, Hindal a rebel, and Yadgar Nasir Mirza was both incapable and lukewarm. The voice of the loyal governors of Delhi and Agra proved but a cry in the wilderness. All these circumstances awakened Humayun from his torpor and forced him to leave ‘the abode of paradise’ in Bengal.10a
Probably towards the end of March, 1539,11 Humayun set out from Bengal for the capital, leaving Jahangir Quli Beg at Gaur with a force of five thousand men. ‘His troops were demoralized by dissipation, disheartened by inaction, and reduced by sickness’. As he marched along the left bank of the Ganga, he received the disheartening report of the defeat and capture of his vanguard under Dilavar Khan Lodi at Mungir. Humayun then sent Mirza ‘Askar! in advance and joined him at Mungir where, against the counsel of experienced officers, he crossed the river over to the southern bank which was entirely under the Afghan control. Sher Khan and the Afghans were in close pursuit but there was no regular engagement and the Mughul army was able to reach Chausa in Shahabad district with but little opposition from the enemy. Here again Humayun committed a blunder by not attacking the Afghans immediately before they could be ready, and played into the hands of his adversary who was waiting for the rains. The two armies lay encamped for about three months. Humayun’s position became extremely critical; the rains were coming and there was no hope of succour from any quarter, and he therefore opened negotiations for peace. The terms are variously stated in different chronicles. It ap¬ pears that Humayun allowed Sher Khan to retain Bengal and his old jagir in Bihar as well, on condition of Sher’s acknowledgement of the Mughul suzerainty by striking coins and reading the khutba in his name. Negotiations for peace were in progress and there was consequent relaxation in the Mughul camp, when suddenly at break of dawn Sher Khan, after a feigned night attack on Maha ratha Chero, attacked the Mughul army and completely surprised it (26 June, 1539).12 Many were killed asleep, many who at¬ tempted to escape were drowned in the swollen waters of the Ganga, and Humayun who owed his life to his personal valour and to the generosity of a water-carrier, somehow reached Agra with Mirza ‘Askari. The army was completely annihilated; it was a disastrous and absolute defeat.
After this easy victory Sher Khan hastened to Bengal and des¬ troyed the Mughul army and its leader left by Humayun at Gaur. He again assumed the royal title, struck coins and read the khutba in his own name.13 At Agra, Humayun excused the veiled hosti¬ lity of Kamrian and the open rebellion of Hindal and tried his best to combine his brothers in a joint attack against Sher Shah, but they simply deliberated and did not act. Mirza Kamrian would not lend his troops but under his own command and retreated to Lahore on the pretext of illness. ‘Seven months were wasted in weary in¬ decision, until the opportunity was lost, and Sher Shiah was on the Ganga (Ganges), ready for war’.13a Sher Shah had meanwhile con¬ solidated his position in Bengal and then marched again along the bank of the Ganga. Humayun hastily collected a big army mostly consisting of rabble and, encouraged by the defeat of Sher’s advance guard under his son Qutb Khan at Kalpi which was still held by Yadgar Nasir Mirza, marched towards Kanauj to meet his adversary. The two armies remained for about a month facing each other with the Ganga between them, until Humayun crossed it to give battle, as there were already considerable desertions from the Mughul camp. Various estimates are given in different chronicles as to the strength of the belligerents, but there is no doubt that the Af¬ ghan army was much smaller, about half in number.14 As the Mughul camp in the lowland near the river was flooded owing to rains which came rather early that year, at the suggestion of Haidar Mirza, Babur’s cousin who had recently joined Humayun and was now his virtual commander, the Mughul army decided to move to a higher ground. It was during this manoeuvre on May 17, 1540, when the artillery and a portion of the army were being transferred, that Sher fell upon the Mughuls and put them to confusion. Dis¬ affection and indiscipline among the soldiers as well as half¬ heartedness of the nobles, combined with bad management, added to the confusion in the Mughul army. Except the initial success obtained by Hindal Mirza, who was placed in the left, against Jalal Khan, everywhere the Mughuls were defeated: Mirza ‘Askar! at the vanguard and Yadgar Nasir Mirza in the right were forced to fall back upon the centre, while Jalal Khan, strengthened by re¬ inforcements, pushed Hindal back and the numerous non-comba¬ tants at the rear forced by the Afghan attack pressed on the centre and broke the chains fastening the guns and wagons. Meanwhile an Afghan division turned round the Mughul army and reached its rear, thus encompassing the entire army of the enemy. The con¬ fusion became so terrible that any action became impossible: the battle became a rout. The artillery became thoroughly inactive, not a gun could be fired as Mirza Haidar regrets. Though we can¬ not too literally accept his statement that the enemy did not dis¬ charge an arrow, it has to be confessed that it was rather an one¬ sided game. The Mughuls fled to the Ganga; many were killed by the Afghan army in pursuit and many who escaped the sword of the enemy were drowned in the river.
Humayun crossed the Ganga on an elephant and with a small number of his followers returned to Agra. The rude behaviour that he received on the way from the people of Bhongaon15 and afterwards from the villagers near Rohtak16 testified to the declin¬ ing prestige of the house of Timur in Hindusthan. In the Punjab everything was in disorder. Humayun had nothing to expect from the hostile' Kamran, the untrustworthy ‘Askari and the half¬ hearted Hindal. ‘The nobles were discontented; the peasantry, a prey to misrule and anarchy; the Afghans hard in pursuit’. From Agra, he went to Delhi and, after a very short stay, left for Lahore via Sirhind with the hope of persuading Kamran to make a com¬ bined effort against Sher Shah. The brothers met and deliberated, but could not combine. It was a mighty gathering of the Mughuls but five months were wasted in uncertain planning and barren talk. Humayun’s plan of going to Badakhshan, via Kabul, fell through on account of the opposition of Kamran. Haidar Mirza made the sug¬ gestion to take shelter in the Punjab hills and try fortune in Kashmir, while Hindal Mirza proposed to march to Sind and Gujarat and from that base to make a renewed bid for the throne of Delhi. Humayun was rather inclined towards Haidar Mlrza’s view. During these heated debates Mirza Kamran was secretly making terms for himself with Sher Shah and openly received his envoy,16a but Sher Shah would not give the Punjab to a Mughul, even though it was Kamran. Humayun also made negotiation for peace with Sher Shah who had now taken Agra and Delhi, on condition that he should retain the Punjab, which Sher contemptuously dis¬ missed with the remark that he should go to Kabul. Meanwhile the Afghan leader had reached Sultanpur and, as the Afghans cross¬ ed the Beas, Humayun with his panic-stricken followers, to whom it was like the Day of Resurrection as Gulbadan describes it, left Lahore (end of October, 1540). Even now Humayun thought of moving to Kashmir but on account of lack of support from his officers as well as Kamran’s hostility the idea was abandoned in favour of Hindal’s proposal to go to Sind.17 Even at this juncture Humayun rejected the counsel of his followers to finish his arch enemy Mirza Kamran who parted with him near Khushab after an angry quarrel over the precedence in entering a defile and left for Kabul. Hindal and Yadgar Nasir Mirza also followed suit and went south for Multan but, harassed by the Baluchis, they joined Huma¬ yun near Uchh. Sher’s general Khavass Khan was hard in pursuit of the Mughuls to drive them out of the Punjab. After a weary journey down the Indus, Humayun reached Bhakkar which was in the dominion of Shah Husain Arghun, the ruler of Sind, and en¬ camped at Rohr! opposite Bhakkar (26 January, 1541). The second period of his history began—the period of exile.
II. EXILE (1540-1545)
Humayun called upon the governor of Bhakkar to deliver the fortress. As the governor replied that he was a mere subordinate to Shah Husain, ruler of Sind, Humayun sent envoys to Shah Husain at Tatta to persuade the latter to join him in an invasion of Gujarat. After considerable and calculated delay Shah Husain replied through his messenger that Humayffn should go to Hajkan18 where provisions would be available and he would present himself before Humayun at the earliest convenience. The nobles of Huma¬ yun suspected this proposal as a stratagem of Shah Husain to drive him out of his territory as Hajkan had never been properly sub¬ jugated by the Sind ruler. Accordingly Humayun laid siege to the fort of Bhakkar and sent Mirza Hindal to attack Sehwan. After the siege had continued for five or six months without any effect, Humayun, suspicious about Hindal’s movements and also because of famine raging in the arqa, marched to join his brother. He met Hindal at Patar19 where, in spite of his brother’s bitter protest, he married Hamida Banu, the daughter of Hindal’s tutor and spiritual guide. Mirza Hindal, in disgust and on invitation from the governor of Qandahar, deserted Humayffn and took the road to Qandahar. Humayffn was therefore obliged to return to Rohr! and it was with difficulty that Yadgar Nasir Mirza was prevented from joining Hindal. Leaving the affairs of Bhakkar in charge of Yadgar Nasir, Humayffn now turned his direction to Sehwan, which he reached on 6 November, 1541. Shah Husain had adopted the same plan as he had done in Bhakkar; he had laid waste the surrounding coun¬ try and cut off all supplies and he himself encamped in the vicinity of Sehwan. Humayffn besieged the fort for several months against heavy odds. His army suffered much on account of the scarcity of provisions and desertion began in his camp. Yadgar Nasir Mirza, whom he had left in charge of the siege of Bhakkar, had been won over by Shah Husain on promise of his daughter’s hand and his kingdom. All these compelled Humayffn to raise the siege of Sehwan (4 March, 1542 )19a and make a hasty retreat to Bhakkar where he found no better prospect. Yadgar Nasir threatened to attack him openly, and scarcity of provisions made the situation hopeless. There was little to hope for in Sind and much to fear from Shah Husain who could have no love lost for Babur’s son20 and risk an Afghan invasion into his territory by a barren Mughul alliance.
In this miserable plight Humayffn threw himself on the pro¬ tection of Raja Maldev of Marwar who had invited him to Jodhpur and promised him assistance. Proceeding by Uchh and the fort of Dilawar,21 Humayffn reached the vicinity of Bikaner on 31 July, 1542, after a horrid journey in which many died and all suffered exceedingly, as Jauhar says. To his great surprise Humayffn found the Raja hostile. Probably the threat of an Afghan attack forced him to revise his policy. Maldev had offered his invitation and help at a time when Slier Shah was preoccupied elsewhere. Huma yun responded to it too late, after one year, when Sher Shah had settled his affairs in the Punjab, Malwa and Bengal, while the Mughul resources had become weaker. Sher Shah sent an envoy to Maldev asking him to capture Humayun, and self-interest, sea¬ soned with Rajput chivalry, induced Maldev to stage a march of Rajput troops against the Mughuls.21a Humayun was accordingly forced to leave Maldev’s territory and turn towards Jaisalmer whose Raja also proved hostile. Pursued by Maldev’s troops, fatigued with thirst and hunger, the Mughuls arrived at ‘Umarkot where the Rana received them with hospitality and agreed to help Humayun to conquer Bhakkar and Tatta. After a stay of about a month and a half, Humayun started on an expedition to Sind at the head of the Mughul and Rajput troops. A few days later, on the way, he received the report that on 15 October, 1542, Hamlda Begam had given birth to a son at ‘Umarkot, the celebrated Akbar of history.22
Humayun took the pleasant city of Jun and remained there for nearly nine months. Shah Husain opposed him with a formid¬ able army. Though no major battle but only skirmishes took place, the situation of the Mughuls became precarious. The arrogant be¬ haviour of some Mughul nobles alienated the Rajputs who left Humayun. One of his prominent noblemen, Mun‘im Beg, deserted him, and desertion to the enemy became frequent and contagious. It was at this critical juncture that Humayun was joined by his valued servant Bairam Beg who had separated from him after the disastrous battle of Kanauj and made an adventurous escape from the clutches of Sher Shah. From this time onwards Bairam Beg becomes Humayun’s chief counsellor and guide. On his advice Humayun concluded a treaty with Shah Husain who agreed to allow Humayun passage through his territory to Qandahar and supply him with money and other requisites for the journey.
On 11 July, 1543, Humayun left Jun for Sehwan and from there via Gandava and Sibi advanced as far as Shal (Quetta). He could not proceed to Qandahar in view of the hostile attitude of Mirza Kamran but retreated southwards to Mastung. Mirza Kam ran had ousted Hindal from the government of Qandahar and car¬ ried him as well as Yadgar N!asir Mirza, who had arrived from Sind, to Kabul. He then sought the alliance of Shah Husain Arghun by proposing to marry his daughter and instructed Mirza ‘Askari, whom he had appointed governor of Qandahar, to oppose Humayun. The idea of going to Qandahar was given up and, on the advice of Bairam Beg, who was a Shiah and whose ancestors were related to, and in alliance with, the former rulers of Iran, he decided to go to Persia. In extreme haste Humayun departed from Mastung, leav¬ ing the child Akbar to the tender mercy of his uncles. From Garm sir he wrote a letter to Shah Tahmasp of Persia asking permis¬ sion to visit him but, pursued by Mirza ‘Askan’s men, he entered the Shah’s territory before he received his reply (January, 1544).
It was not until August, 1544, that Humayun could meet the Shah at his summer capital between Abhar and Sultariiya. Along the entire route wherever he had halted he had been given regal reception and a grand reception was held at the court to welcome him, but they were rather studied displays of the Shah’s magni¬ ficence than expressions of honour to his dethroned guest. Huma¬ yun remained at the Shah’s court for a few months during which he had to suffer humiliation and insult, and was forced by threat of violence to make a confession of the Shiah faith and agree to spread Shiahism in India. In lieu of this sacrifice, the zealous Per¬ sian monarch agreed to render him military help for the recovery of his territory in Afghanistan on condition that Qandahar should be restored to Persia. The Shah’s treatment of Humayun was marked by a curious compound of courtesy and insult, hospitality and hostility, generosity and meanness.
Reinforced with 14,000 Persian troops Humayun arrived at the vicinity of Qandahar on 21 March, 1545,122a and laid siege to it. As the siege went on, he sent Bairam Khan23 on a diplomatic mis¬ sion to Kabul with a view to winning the Timurid princes and nobles over to his side. Mirza ‘Askari surrendered the fort on 3 September, 1545, and Qandahar was made over to the Persians as stipulated. But the Persian troops declined to render any further help to Humayun, who was now being joined by his followers but had no shelter. Pressed by sheer necessity, he made a sudden attack on Qandahar one month later, expelled the Persian garrison, and took it in violation of his agreement with Shah Tahmasp. The occupation of Qandahar was the turning point in the history of Humayun. He had now a place under the sun and a base for fur¬ ther operations. Thus ended the second period of his history, the period of exile. He could now think of recovering his kingdom in Afghanistan and ultimately his dominions in India. The signifi¬ cance of Humayun’s Persian exile is indeed very great. Without it the restoration of the Mughul power in India would not have been possible. Not .only was diplomatic relation established bet¬ ween the Safavi and Mughul courts, but it led to closer contacts between Iran and India whose full significance was realized in the reign of Akbar.
III. RETURN
Humayun appointed Bairam Khan to the government of Qan dahar and set out for Kabul. On the way Mirza Hindal joined him and, as he advanced, desertion in his camp forced Mirza Kam ran to escape to Sind by way of Ghazni, and Humayun entered Kabul without any opposition (18 November, 1545) and met his son Akbar after an interval of about two years. The occupation of Qandahar and Kabul made Humayun master of southern Afgha¬ nistan.
In March, 1546, Humayun set out on a campaign in Badakh¬ shan (Northern Afghanistan) whose ruler Mirza Sulaimian had re¬ cently been set free from Kamran’s bondage at Kabul. Humayun took ‘Askari with him and ordered execution of Yadgar Nasir Mirza who had rejoined his service but had shown signs of disaffection. Humayun’s campaign met with success; at Tirgiran he defeated Sulaiman and forced him to escape to Kulab. Humayun then ad¬ vanced to Kishm and from there to Qil‘a Zafar, but on the way fell dangerously ill which caused disaffection in the army and en¬ couraged Karnran to move out of Sind. Reinforced by his father in-lav/, Shah Husain, Mirza Karnran returned to Afghanistan, took Ghazni, whose governor Zahid Beg he put to death, and marched upon Kabul. Kabul also fell into his hands and Mirza Karnran began a reign of terror, brutally killing and executing many of the followers of Humayun. Winter was at its worst, but Humayun had to hurry back towards Kabul. He besieged the city and the siege continued for several months. The contest was bitter, so much so that Karnran placed Akbar on the battlements, exposed to his father’s gun and musket shots. Realizing, however, that it was im¬ possible to hold the city, he fled through a hole made in the fort wall (27 April, 1547), narrowly escaping capture by Haji Muham¬ mad or, according to Jauhar, Mirza Hindal who pursued him. He first went to Mirza Sulaiman but, failing to win him over to his side, approached the Uzbeg chief Fir Muhammad Khan of Balkh, and with his help captured much of the territory of Badakhshan. Humayun accordingly set out on a second campaign against Badakh¬ shan (June, 1548). By way of Andarab, where he was joined by Mirza Hindal who arrived from Qunduz, he proceeded to Taliqan and besieged it. Mirza Karnran, failing to secure further help from the Uzbegs, surrendered the fort after some resistance (17 August, 1548) and rendered homage to Humayun who pardoned him and granted him Kulab, north of the Oxus, as his jdgir, which, how¬ ever, was considered as an insult by the ex-king of Kabul and Badakhshan. In October Humayun returned to Kabul.
In February, 1549, Humayun led a campaign against Balkh and the Uzbegs, his hereditary enemies. Though he was joined by Mirza Hindal and Mirza Sulaiman on the way, Mirza Kamran re¬ fused to come to his aid. Humayun, after gaining some successes against the army of Pir Muhammad Khan, was able to reach Balkh and was on the point of taking the city when the bogey of Kam ran’s attack on Kabul told upon the morale of the Mughul officers and, as they retreated, they were hard-pressed by the enemy from behind and many were killed. The retreat became a rout and the campaign ended in a trjagic fiasco. MIrzia Kamran now marched against Mirza Sulaiman, took Taliqan and Qil‘a Zafar, and attacked Mirza Hindal, but was afterwards forced to withdraw into the Hazara country on account of the combined opposition of Hindal and Sulaiman.
In the middle of 1550 Humayun marched from Kabul towards Ghurband to chastise his incorrigible brother. He was surprised by Mirza Kamran in the Qibchaq defile24 and in the battle that followed Humayun lost many of his soldiers and was himself wound¬ ed. Kamran made a hurried march to Kabul, took it and held it for three months. Kabul believed Humayun dead, while he was waiting in Andarab. With the help of reinforcements sent by Mirza Sulaiman’s wife, Humayun marched against Kamran who rejected his terms, fought the battle for Kabul and won it. Mirza Kamran fled and Mirza ‘Askari, who had joined Kamran, was captured and banished.25
The battle for Kabul had been won but the problem of Kamran remained. He was now joined by one of Humayun’s most promi¬ nent officers, Haji Muhammad Khan. To meet this dangerous situation Humayun recalled from Qandahar Bairam Khan who was able to conciliate Haji Muhammad and bring him to his master. Humayun, who had on account of adversity and misfortune become wiser and sterner and put Yadgar Nasir to death and banished ‘Askarii, now executed Haji Muhammad. Mirza Kamran gathered the Afghans under him and stirred up strife in the territory be¬ tween Kabul and the Indus. During one of these engagements on 20 November, 1551, Mirza Kamran surprised his brother at night at Jiryar in Nangnahar! and, though he was defeated,253 Mirza Hindal was killed in action. Humayun pursued him but he fled to the Punjab and sought shelter with Islam Shah who treated him with cold neglect. Ultimately he took refuge with Sultan Adam, the Gakkhar, who after some hesitation surrendered him to Humayun who had reached the Indus on receiving report from the Gakkhar chief.26 On the advice of his nobles Humayun had Kamran blinded and gave him leave to proceed to Mecca (1553).27 ‘The great mate¬ rial of sedition and strife’, as the Mughul imperial historian calls him, Mirza Kamran has been more sinned against than sinning, and so far as Kabul was concerned he was rather ‘the defender of rights than their assailant’.273 Humayun now planned to lead an expedi¬ tion into Kashmir where the short-lived Mughul rule under Haidar Mirza had beejn overthrown two years ago, but on account of the opposition of his nobles he returned to Kabul by way of Peshawar (December, 1553).
During Humayun’s stay in Afghanistan he was greatly helped by Bairam Khan in the consolidation of Mughul power. While all around there was frequent commotion and strife, Qandahar was ably maintained by its governor as the undisputed base of Mughul operations. In 1554 Bairam left Qandahar for Kabul to join Humayun in his Indian campaign for which he had been making preparations. He was now master of Qandahar, Kabul and Ghazni. His brothers were no longer on the scene and ‘there was now no rival to the throne and no noble behind and above the throne.’ When he received the report of Islam Shah’s death and the anar¬ chical condition of Hindusthan on account of the accession of the boy king Firuz and the outbreak of civil war among the Afghans,28 he realized that the time had come for making a renewed bid for the throne of Delhi. The third chapter of his life ends here.
IV. RESTORATION
With an army of about 3,000 men, Humayun set out and reach¬ ed Peshawar on 25 December, 1554. He was soon joined by Bairam Khan, but Sultan Adam, the Gakkhar, refused to attend on the ground that he had already concluded a treaty with Sikandar Shah Sur, who now held the Punjab after the murder of Firuz, and had surrendered his son as a hostage. Tatar Khan Kashi, who held the fort of Rohtas for Sikandar Shah, abandoned it on hearing of the advance of the Mughul army. Humayun marched on to Lahore and the Afghans of the city took to flight. The Mughul force under Shah Abu-’l-Ma ali defeated the Afghans at Dipalpur, while the main army under Bairam Khan had driven the Afghans at Hariana29 and as he proceeded to Jullundur, the enemy retreated. Sirhind also fell into the hands of the Mughuls. Alarmed at the rapid pro¬ gress of the Mughuls, Sikandar Shah now despatched an army of 30,000 horse towards Sirhind. Bairam Khan, not unnerved by the enemy’s superiority, hastened from Jullundur to give battle and crossed the Sutlej before the arrival of the enemy. Towards sun¬ set, the two armies met at Machiwara in Ludhiana district, and the battle began. As it grew dark at night, it became impossible for soldiers on either side to fight. Accidentally, fire broke out in the village in which the Afghan army had drawn up.30 It enabled the Mughuls to see clearly every motion of the Afghans and discharge arrows at them, whereas the Afghans, who had no view of the enemy, shot at random, and ultimately failed to maintain their ground and took to flight (May, 1555).
Bairam Khan marched at the head of the victorious Mughuls to Sirhind and took it. The battle of Machiwara was but a big round in the struggle between the Mughuls and the Afghans; the battle for Delhi was yet to be fought. On learning of the defeat of the Afghans, Sikandar Shah marched from Delhi with an army of 80,000 horse and a big train of artillery and war elephants, and encamped at Sirhind. Bairam Khan, whose forces amounted to seven or eight hundred horse,31 appealed to Humayun at Lahore to come to his aid but, on account of illness, Humayun could not arrive at Sirhind before 27 May, 1555. The two armies remained en¬ camped opposite each other for twenty-five days during which occa¬ sional skirmishes took place. On 22 June, Khvaja Mu‘azzam, Atga Khan and others advanced and fell in with Kala Pahar, the brother of Sikandar Shah, and the battle began. The Afghans con¬ centrated their main attack on the division of Bairam Khan who stood on the defensive, while the two Mughul divisions under Shah Abu-’l-Ma^alJ and Tardl Beg Khan wheeled round the enemy, and in a short time the Afghan army became a mass of confusion and took to flight. The Mughul troops, who were vastly inferior in number,32 pursued the defeated Afghans to a long distance and kill¬ ed many of them, and a pyramid was made of the heads of the slain. Sikandar fled to the Siwalik hills. Machiwara and Sirhind undid the work of Chausa and Kanauj which had put an end to the empire of Babur; they sealed the fate of the Afghan empire of Sher Shah.
From Sirhind Humayun proceeded towards Delhi. When he reached Samana, he appointed Shah Abu-T-Ma‘all, governor of the Punjab, and despatched him to Lahore. Meanwhile Sikandar Khan, the Uzbeg, had occupied Delhi. Humayun accordingly left Samana and on 23 July, 1555, re-entered the city of Delhi. He now dis¬ tributed offices and commands to his faithful servants. Atga Khan took Hissar which surrendered after a siege of twenty-three days, while ‘All Quli Khan suppressed Qambar ‘All, an unknown Mughul adventurer, who headed a rebellion at Badaun, and put him to death, though he had appealed to Humayun for pardon which th^ king was willing to grant. Haidar Muhammad Akhta Begl took Bayana after treacherously putting to death its Afghan governor Ghazi Khan, the father of Ibrahim Khan Sur, though he surrender¬ ed after he had received promise of pardon. The conduct of ‘Ali Quli Khan and Haidar Muhammad offers but typical examples of the weakness of the royal power and the overpowering influence of an irresponsible and lawless aristocracy.
On account of Abu-’1-Ma‘ali’s misbehaviour, Humayun placed the government of the Punjab in the nominal charge of prince Akbar but under the real control of his guardian Bairam Khan. On learn¬ ing of the advance of Bairam Khan and Akbar, Sikandar, who had meanwhile come out of the hills, retired to the fortress of Mankot. When they arrived at Hariana, they received the report of Huma yun’s accident.323 On 24 January, 1556, in pious response to the sacred call of the mu'azzin for evening prayer, Humayun, while hurriedly coming down from his library, stumbled out of the stairs and, two days later, in the picturesque words of Lane-Poole, he tumbled out of life as he had tumbled through it.
The brilliant conquests of his father and the unique genius of his son have eclipsed the manifold good qualities of Humayun, but there is no doubt that his many virtues could not compensate for his serious defects. Generous and kindly in disposition, affable and urban in manners, possessing social bonhomie and ready wit, brave and chivalrous in temperament, cultured and fond of learning and the arts,33 as became the son of Babur, Humayun was the very flower of humanity and the model of a gentleman, the knight-errant of the Mughul dynasty. The very virtues of his character bred some of his defects; his charity bordered on prodigality, his affec¬ tion, on weakness. He lacked resolution and sustained energy; his lethargy was chronic and contagious and he had no steady sense of duty and self-respect: ‘he revelled at the table when he ought to have been in the saddle’. Daring as a soldier, he did not possess the superior talents of a general. He was equally deficient in the gifts of diplomacy and statesmanship. Mandu and Gaur revealed the obverse of the medal. A distinct improvement in his character is discernible after the period of his exile when some of his fatal defects which cost him his throne seemed to have been toned down. The author of the Tlmurid restoration of 1555 was different from the gay prisoner of the harem who lost Gujarat, Malwa and Bengal; Kabul did not prove a second Mandu, He was a pious Muslim' rigid in the observance of rituals and regular in his devotions, with a mixture of mysticism and superstition in him—a liberal Sunni with predilection for the Shlahite faith.34 In some traits Humayun, who loved opium probably more than the throne, resembles his bohemian grandson who practically abdicated in his loyalty to the wine cup. With all his weaknesses and failings, Humayun has a significant place in Indian history which is not, perhaps, always duly appreciated. The well-timed restoration of the Mughul power was a real achievement which paved the way for the splendid im¬ perialism of Akbar, while the Indo-Persian contact, which he rein¬ forced and stimulated, was a factor of far-reaching consequence in the history of Indian civilization.
Appendix
1. Dr.'S. K. Banerji ascribes this delay of four days in Humayun’s accession to Mir Khalifa’s plot to place Mahdi Khvaja on the throne, but from Nizam-ud Din Ahmad, who is our authority for the incident, it appears the Khalifa’s attempt was made while Babur was still alive (Tabaqat-i-Akbari, Eng. Trans. Vol. II, p. 43).
2. Dadrah on the Gumti in the Musafirkhana talnsil of the Sultanpur district and not the Dadrah in the Nawabganj tahsil of the Bara-Banki district, as S.K. Banerji suggests (Humayun Badshah, Vol. 1, p. 42, f.n. 2) . According to Dr. Qanungo (Sher Shah, p. 72) the battle took place at Dauroh, and according to the Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, pp. 21, 49, at Daunrua on the river Sai, 15 miles east of Jaunpur. Hodivala, Studies in Indo-Muslim History, Vol I, p. 450, suggests Deunruh. Ishwari Prasad, p. 50, f.n. 1, has Daurah. The MSS. of Jauhar (Sarkar; British Museum; India Office; Bylands Library, Manchester) give the word in such a way that it can be read both as Daurah and Dadrah, but Faizi Sirhindi’s recension of Jauhar (India Office MS.) has clear Dadrah; and Dadrah on the Gumti fits in with the description of Jauhar. Details are given in the writer’s Bairam Khan, pp. 48-49 (In the press).
The date 1532 is given in the Akbar-nama I, p. 289, and Tdrikh-i-Alfl, I.O.MS., fol. 406b: 939 A.H., August, 1532-July, 1533. The year 1531 is based on the statement of Gulbadan Begam.
2a. According to some chronicles he remained aloof.
3. Mirat-i-Sikandari, pp. 239-241; Abu Turab, Tdrikh-i-Gujarat, pp. 9-11. 4. Akbar-ndma, Eng. trans. I, p. 303, but Mirat-i-Sikandari, p. 246, gives the date 20 Ramazan, 941/25 March, 1535. The Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, p. 22, seems to accept this date.
5 .Abu Turab, Tdrikh-i.Gujardt, p. 16.
6. Fortieth according to some chronicles. There is a picture depicting the siege of Champaner in the Tarikh-i-Khanddn-i-Timuriya at the Oriental Public Library, Patna.
7. 22° 50' N., 72° 48' E.
8. For the early history of Sher Shah, see the next chapter.
9. There is a discrepancy among the chroniclers about the date of this cam¬ paign. The correct date seems to be that given by Firishta (Vol. I, p. 216): 18 Safar, 944/27 July, 1537, and confirmed by the Riyaz-us-Salatin (p. 141). The Dacca University History of Bengal, Vol. II, edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, p. 166, has curiously the incorrect date, July, 1538 (945 A.H.), and wrongly states in f.n. 2 that the Riyaz-us-Salatin gives 945 A.H., on p. 143. What the chronicle states there is that Humayun left Bihar for Gaur in the beginning of 945 A.H. and he had already undertaken in 944 A.H. the siege of
Chunar which surrendered after six months. See p. 141. Cf. Chapter IV, p. 74 and f.n. 20.
65 9a. According to Firishta I, p. 216, Humayun, after he was met by Sultan Mahmud, marched towards Bengal in the beginning of 945 A.H. As 945 A.H. commences on May 30, 1538, we may fix June, 1538, as the date of the battle of Teliyagarhi. After the battle the Mughul army returned to Kahalgaon. Sultan Mahmud died here. We are told by Jauhar (British Museum MS. ff. 16a-17a) that Haji Muhammad was sent from Kahalgram to reconnoitre the position of the enemy at the pass. Haji Muhammad found the pass under the occupation of Jalal Khan; and it was only after the departure of Jalal Khan that Humayun started from Kahalgram and reached Gaur in a few days. From the above description of Jauhar it appears that Humayun probably reached Gaur early in July, 1538. The Afghan chronicles suggest a later date According to the Makhzan-i-Afghani (Dorn 1, 115) and ‘Abbas (E. & D. IV. 367) Humayun was detained after the battle of Teliyagarhi for one month and then he left for Gaur.
So, from the above, July, 1538, appears to be the correct date. Dr. S. K. Banerji (Humayun 1, 213, f.n.) gives definite date Rabi‘ 1, 20, 945/15 August, 1538, but I have not been able to find out his authority, nor does he men¬ tion it. Ishwari Prasad gives the date as June, 1538.
10. Tarikh-i-Sher Shdhi (Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript), p. 152. 10a. Akbar-ndma I, pp. 339-40.
11. The chronology of Humayun’s expedition to Bengal, as given in the chro¬ nicles, is confusing. As already stated above, Humayun reached Gaur pro¬ bably early in July, 1538, and both Jauhar and Gulbadan state that he stayed there for 9 months. Calculating 9 lunar months, we find Humayun set out from Bengal at the end of March, 1539.
12. The treachery of Sher Khan is related not only by a neutral historian like Firishta (Vol. I, p. 217), but by the Afghan chroniclers as well: Tdrikh-i Sher Shdhi, pp. 158-162, Tarikh-i-Ddudi pp. 184-5; (MS. Sarkar); Makhzan-i-Afghani (A.S.B. MS.) f. 98a. Tdrikh-i-Saldtin-i-Afdghina, pp. 153, 197, 199. (Somewhat different account is given in Ch. IV. [Ed.]).
13. Tdrikh-i-Sher Shahi, p. 172. Tarikh-i-Ddudi, pp. 185-86. Coins struck in 945 A.H. (May, 1538-May, 1539) exist, from which it seems that he had as sumed royal title earlier. See Islamic Culture, 1936, pp. 127-30.
13a. Tdrikh-i-Rashidi, Elias and Ross, pp. 471-72.
14. Tdrikh-i-Rashidi, Elias and Ross, pp. 476-77. Tabaqdt-i-Akbari, Vol. II, p. 45; Firishta, Vol. I, p. 218; Ahmad Yadgar, pp. 155-56, 203-4.
15. In the Mainpuri district, 27° 15' N, 79° 14' E.
16. 28° 54' N, 76° 38' E.
16a. Akbar-ndma, I, 358-59.
17 .\ Haidar MTrza was able to carve out an independent kingdom in Kashmir, though short-lived (1541-1551).
18. Ain-i-Akbari, Jarrett, Vol. II, new ed., p. 341.
19. About 100 miles (fifty kos) south of Rohri.
19a. Akbar-ndma I, p. 369.
20. Shah Husain’s father, MIrza Shah Beg Arghun, had been deprived of Qan dahar by Babur. See the last chapter. 21. In Bahawalpur State, Punjab, 28° 44' N, 71° 14' E.
21a. Cf. Abu-’l-Fazl A.N. I. 37. Other reasons have been suggested for change of Maldev’s policy. For example, Syamaldas states in the Virvinod (II, 809) that Humayun’s party slaughtered cows, on which Maldev asked them to get out of his territory.
22. We accept the date of Akbar’s birth as given by Gulbadan Begam, Abu-’l Fazl and ‘Arif Qandaharl, p. 16. For the other view see Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1886, pp. 80-85 and Indian Antiquary, November 1915 pp. 233-44.
22a. Akbar-ndma, I, p. 459.
23. The Shah of Persia had conferred on him the title of Khan. 66
24. Near Ghurband.
25. In 1551 ‘Askarl went to Mecca and remained in exile till his death in 1558. 25a. Akbar-nama, I, p. 582, Nizam-ud-din, II, p. 127.
26. The Gakkhars ruled in the territory between the Indus and the upper courses of the Jhelum.
27. He went to Mecca by way of Sind and died there on 5 October, 1557.
27a. This view is not likely to be accepted by all; cf. e.yg. Ishwari Prasad, op. cit., p. 319. S. K. Banerji, who at first accepted the view, seems to have changed his mind (Vol. II, pp. 281-82). But in judging Kamran we should remember that we know Kamran only from the writings of the Mughul historians of Akbar’s court who could not but be somewhat biassed against the arch-enemy of their patron’s father. BadaunI takes a different view (1.585). [Ed.]
28. For details, vide the next chapter.
29. 31° 38' N and 72° 52' E, in Hoshiarpur district.
30. Bayazid, pp. 191-92. Some chronicles suggest that the Afghans kindled fire with a view to obtaining a view of the enemy which does not seem probable. 31. Jauhar, India Office MS. f. 52a.
32. According to Jauhar, Aligarh MS. (Sir J. N. Sarkar’s transcript), p. 224, the number was 5,000. The highest estimate puts it at 10,000.
32a. Akbar-nama, I, 662.
33. He took interest in astrology, mathematics and literature and wrote good verses. The Dlwdn-i-Humayun in MS. was exhibited by Professor Sayyid Hasan Askari at the Indian History Congress, Calcutta, 1939. See Proceed¬ ings, pp. 1674-75.
34. Khvand Amir, Humdyun-nama (Qanun-i-Humdyunl), pp. 31-44; Gulbadan Begam, Humdyun-nama, English Translation, pp. 118-26; Muntakhab-ut-Tawa rlkh (Eng. trans.) Vol. I, pp. 467-68 and Vol. Ill, pp. 6-10; Firishta (Lucknow text), Vol. I, p. 243.