SAMIRA SHEIKH
Abstract
This article argues for a
re-evaluation of the ‘Islamist’ policies of the Mughal ruler Aurangzeb ‘Alamgir
(r. 1658–1707), many of which were arguably harsher towards Shi‘i and
millenarian groups than towards Hindus. By charting Aurangzeb’s trials of millenarian
leaders throughout his long reign, it suggests that the emperor’s desire to
introduce a more standardised legal system was at odds with the ‘millennial’
nature of his own kingship. The article further suggests we should look more
closely at the influence of regional politics on Mughal policy-making. The fact
that Sunni Gujarati clerics acquired a remarkable intimacy with Aurangzeb, both
as prince and emperor, demonstrates how Gujarat’s sectarian disputes and
political economy could play out in the imperial court. Finally, the article
calls for a realistic reappraisal of the long shadows cast by Aurangzeb’s
Islamist legalism.
The sixth Mughal emperor Aurangzeb
(r. 1658–1707) was born in Gujarat, in the town of Dohad (modern Dahod, now in
Madhya Pradesh), and maintained a regard for the province of his birth
throughout his life. He spent a formative nineteen months there as governor
when he was a young man. While in Gujarat he got to know a number of Gujarati
clerics and officials, some of whom became close advisers who helped shape his
signature policies. Gujarati politics played an unexpectedly powerful role in
shaping Aurangzeb as a person and as a ruler. While the emperor remembered his
birthplace with fondness, not all the region’s inhabitants reciprocated his
sentiments. This should not surprise anyone: there is a powerful prevalent
narrative that Aurangzeb imposed a narrow-minded and censorious version of
Sunni Islam and persecuted Hindus, Shi‘as and others who failed to conform to
his authoritarian line. From this perspective, Aurangzeb is seen as the
opposite of his great-grandfather Akbar (r. 1556–1605) whose empire is seen as
a capacious, difference encompassing canopy, almost a precursor of modern
secular India.1
A number of arguments have been made
to counter or nuance this popular, dichotomising, perception of Aurangzeb.2 One
strand of revisionist thought holds that Aurangzeb’s austere religious
proclivities were largely personal and did not transform the empire or
governance fundamentally. This discussion includes Katherine Schofield’s
argument that while Aurangzeb was tortured by his forbidden love for music, he
did not succeed in restricting music throughout the empire, nor did he really
attempt to do so.3In a similar vein are arguments that his imposition of jizya
(tax levied on non-Muslims) in 1679 was limited and largely ineffective,4that
his orders to have temples destroyed were generally aimed at political rivals
and rebels,5and that his actions against religious rebels were political and
contingent. To argue that Aurangzeb’s acts of bigotry should always be seen in
close political context, historians point to his patronage of Hindu medical
asceticism,6 his grants of land for temples,7and his large number of senior
Hindu courtiers and generals. While critics of the ‘Aurangzeb as arch-bigot’
line of thinking concede that Aurangzeb was driven by a literalist Sunni
legalism, they do not believe that he was able to change the essential
tendencies of the Mughal empire (and South Asian civilisation) towards
catholicity, diversity, and religious accommodation.8
While such revisionist arguments have
nuanced Aurangzeb’s actions, many current scholars are reluctant to
interrogate, or even name, his Islamism or examine its legacy in South Asia.
This is in line with a common tendency among secularist historians
(understandable, given that emphasising Aurangzeb’s Islamist tendencies
increases the likelihood of provoking communal passions and, consequently,
violence) to privilege pragmatism over discourse, especially with respect to
Muslim rule in South Asia. In other words, historians have tended to downplay
the triumphalist Islamist rhetoric of some of the courtly sources and the
intense antipathy to Aurangzeb in the records of his opponents in favour of
emphasising his regime’s more business-like or conciliatory actions. But surely
this risks, as Shahid Amin warned, abandoning “the field of sectarian strife as
the special preserve of sectarian and ‘communal’ histories”?9 Can we start to
subject Aurangzeb’s version of Hanafi Sunni legalism to the same careful historicising as his more pragmatic
actions? Perhaps we need to return to Aurangzeb’s more ‘bigoted’ and ‘orthodox’
legal and political actions to examine their outcomes— some of which favoured
religious minorities—but also the intent, rhetoric and practice of such
actions. In other words, what was Aurangzeb trying to achieve by evoking (and
shaping) normative Sunni practices while eschewing well-established Mughal and
South Asian conventions of inclusivity? And, importantly, how were these
normative practices configured not only with reference to non-Muslims—which
prior scholarship has addressed to a greater degree—but also in records of the
emperor’s encounters with Muslim groups considered heretical or challenging by
his regime?
In the pages that follow, I offer a
new turn to the generally-accepted revisionist perspective of the sixth Mughal
emperor. First, I suggest that Aurangzeb, in certain limited arenas, was
attempting a more profound refiguring of law and sovereignty than many
historians would like to admit. He was beset by constraints—military,
administrative, fiscal, institutional and personal—of which the most
restrictive was perhaps the mould of sacred kingship created by his ancestors. Even
as a prince Aurangzeb had been uncomfortable with certain aspects of Mughal
kingship and had started to unravel some of its key manifestations. In doing so
he was effectively sawing off the branch on which he sat, for his authority
rested on being accepted as a sacred king. By circumscribing the previously
capacious vocabulary of sacred kingship with recourse to sectarian (Sunni
Hanafi) law, Aurangzeb excluded charismatic, messianic strands of popular
belief from finding shelter under the imperial canopy.
His dilemma was manifested most
dramatically, I will suggest, not in his administration’s dealings with Hindus
and other non-Muslims, but in encounters with Shi‘i, ‘Alid and messianic
groups. Such groups increasingly found themselves stigmatised and shut out from
previously available pathways to imperial discipleship or service and, thus,
came to reject the fundamental principles of Mughal sacred kingship and
authority. It was in such encounters that Aurangzeb’s administration began to
revise the old charismatic absolutism in favour of a politically contingent
application of Sunni Hanafi law, risking in the process a demystification of
the emperor and the Mughal empire itself. Whether we attribute such change to
political exigency or to deliberate intent—on which more below—Aurangzeb’s
partly disenchanted rule represents a new form of early modernity.10
Secondly, I argue that we need to
consider regional politics more closely in our consideration of the Mughal
empire. In spite of brilliant new work on seventeenth-century India, we still
pay too little attention to how regional politics affected imperial
state-making. Some of Aurangzeb’s key policies and practices—and legal
modernisation, if you will—were shaped in response to regional exigencies and
personalities, including those of Gujarat. As the western coastline of India
became ever more affluent and cosmopolitan, the Mughals faced a constant need
to redefine the relationship between the imperial centre and the prosperous
peripheries, some of which—the Shi‘i sultanates of the Deccan (Qutb Shahis and
‘Adil Shahis in particular), Shi‘i intellectuals, courtiers and merchants, as
well as Isma‘ilis of different persuasions—looked towards Persia and at
Persianate models of political and religious authority. Aurangzeb’s strategy
against the Persianate and Shi‘i-oriented cosmopolitanism that was chipping
away at the moral and economic centrality of the empire was to shore up Sunni
groups and institutions. In his attempts to build resistance to such
tendencies, Aurangzeb found a deep well of support in Gujarat, especially among
Sunni clerics who had family histories of anti-Shi‘i activism or scholarly
linkages with Mecca and the Hadramaut. For its disproportionate effect on
subsequent politics, Gujarat may be considered the crucible that shaped
Aurangzeb’s subsequent pattern of behaviour towards Persian-oriented Shi‘i and
millenarian groups.
Aurangzeb’s cohort of Gujarati Sunni
allies was deeply enmeshed in the sectarian politics of the region. In
addition, and partly as a result of their association with the crown, they were
players with growing economic stakes in a region of considerable trade and
agrarian prosperity. Aurangzeb’s links to Gujarat and the motivations of his
Sunni allies, as we shall see, cannot be explained only in political or
religious terms; they bear an essential link to the political economy of the
region.
Mughal millenarianism
Sanjay Subrahmanyam has argued that political millenarianism was a key element of early modern kingship from the Mughal empire to Portugal, an essential attribute closely guarded from pretenders.11 Such millenarianism promised a perfect, just, future world foretold by portents and prophecies discernible in the present. It occasionally afforded a common language and symbolism across religious denominations in the sixteenth century, as in reported conversations between the Jesuit Father Monserrate and Akbar.12 At least in the sixteenth century, it was not always a language for overturning established hierarchies. On the contrary, it was often used by states and rulers to shore up their power. Sixteenth century Mughal emperors, as Azfar Moin has shown, made adroit use of millenarian and messianic symbolism to define and personify their sovereignty as the Islamic millennium approached in 1592.13 Akbar used a ‘non-sectarian Islamic Messianism’ to provide an ideology that could draw in a range of groups, including non-Muslims. Much of this potent Mughal millenarianism, and indeed Mughal kingship itself, was forged from Shi‘i or non-Shi‘i ‘Alid sources as well as astrological, alchemical, Zoroastrian, Christian and Indic motifs. In Akbar’s day, millenarian rivals tended to be assimilated into the regime and their ideologies appropriated for imperial purposes.14 Three generations later, groups and states who professed a millenarian mode of discipleship and authority emerged as a profound challenge to the Mughal monopoly on millenarianism.
A growing body of research suggests
that Aurangzeb’s administrative innovations have been overstated and that he
followed his forefathers’ practices more than he has been given credit for.
Careful new work shows that Aurangzeb retained and even promoted manifestations
of ‘millennial sovereignty’: he continued to patronise astrology15 and music.16
He publicly paraded a goat and a lion to assert his even-handed justice.17
Although he curtailed practices such as jharokha-darshan (the practice
inaugurated by Akbar of appearing to the public framed by a window), the
celebration of the Persian new year Nawruz, and public weighing, he recognised
that the Mughal model of millennial sovereignty provided the moral
justification for his occupation of the office of emperor. But, as I will show
below, there was a profound contradiction between Aurangzeb’s continued
adherence to established Mughal conventions of sovereignty and his promotion of
Sunni legalism that came to the fore in his dealings with groups and
individuals who professed millenarianism, thus challenging the imperial
millenarian monopoly.
While Akbar had met such challenges
with a combination of force and creative appropriation, the response of
Aurangzeb and his close associates was to shore up imperial authority with
legalistic techniques (interrogations, checklists of appropriate Sunni
behaviour, punishment), neutralising leaders and groups who pretended to
millennial authority by calling them out as un-Islamic or insufficiently
Islamic on Sunni Hanafi grounds. There was no longer a way for the regime to
assimilate, condone or appropriate Muslim millenarianism without compromising
Aurangzeb’s professed Islamic ideals and alienating his closest advisers. At
the same time, legalistic responses could undermine his authority as the
semi-divine embodiment of justice and sacred kingship, unveiling him as an
all-too-human, opinionated individual surrounded by bigoted, even venal,
officials. In some cases this is exactly what happened, and explains the
dichotomous image that survives of Aurangzeb today. Indeed, it is perhaps the
case that Aurangzeb’s success and failure both lay in his displacement of the
millennial Mughal image in the face of millenarian challenge. His success lay
in generating a systematising code and institutions of law; his failures lay in
provoking armed resistance and shrinking the canopy of Mughal justice. The
‘image’ of Aurangzeb that survives from resulting encounters with Muslim and
other millenarian mystics embodies some of the fundamental contradictions of
his rule. Let us turn to some examples.
The Mahdavis (1645-47)
Prince Aurangzeb was appointed the
governor of Gujarat in 1645, reaching Gujarat in April with Shaykh ‘Abd
al-Qavi, one of his teachers and close advisers.18 The following year, he was
called upon to adjudicate a dispute relating to the Mahdavi community whose
headquarters were in Palanpur, a town in the district of Patan in north
Gujarat. Accounts diverge about what happened next. One relates that a group of
Panni Pathans, arriving in Ahmedabad from Burhanpur to sell horses, fell into
dispute with some of the religious authorities of the town, including Shaykh
‘Abd al-Qavi and Qazi ‘Abd al-Wahhab, about their Mahdavi persuasion.19
Smelling a way to enter the favour of the religiously scrupulous prince, the
mullahs counselled Aurangzeb to summon the Mahdavi leader, Sayyid Raju, to
Ahmedabad to be questioned. The Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı has a slightly different
tale in which Sayyid Raju was already in Ahmedabad, having come with members of
his community to Ahmedabad to enter Aurangzeb’s service (possibly as soldiers
or horse-dealers). In this account, the prince had praised Sayyid Raju as a
virtuous and brave man before hearing about their belief that the promised
Mahdi, or messiah, had already come and gone.20
It was well known at the time that
the Mahdavis were not Shi‘a. The community’s origins went back to a mystic
named Sayyid Muhammad Jaunpuri (1443-1505) who came to Gujarat in the late
fifteenth century. Although his followers claimed to be Sunnis and to follow
the Hanafi school of law, their founder professed that he was the
personification of the Mahdi, the figure who, in Shi‘i eschatology, will return
to reorder the world at the end of the millennium. In spite of some interest
shown by the then sultan of Gujarat, the ‘ulama had Jaunpuri expelled from
Ahmedabad and then from Patan. He eventually died in Baluchistan or southern
Afghanistan.
The Mahdavis had political interests
even during Jaunpuri’s lifetime.21 His followers, initially mostly Afghans,
grew in influence in Gujarat, in the Deccan, and also in North India among
certain Afghan groups. In the sixteenth century, the Mahdavis signalled
millenarian defiance to court officials and clerics. Mahdavi disciples, “clad
in a curious mix of rags (to signify their poverty) and coats of mail (to
signify their militancy)”, were seen as a threat by the ‘ulama of Islam Shah
Sur’s court in 1550.22 Gujarat was the most important centre of their
activities and Palanpur, near Patan, their headquarters. Some accounts even
claim that the sultans of Gujarat, Mahmud III (r. 1537–54) and Muzaffar III (r.
1561–73 and 1583–4), were Mahdavis who lost the support of Sunni Muslims by
raising taxes on them.23
The third Mughal emperor Akbar did
not find the Mahdavis threatening. In fact two of Akbar’s closest advisers—the
brothers Abu’l Fazl and Abu’l Faiz (Faizi)—were sons of a prominent Gujarati
Mahdavi sympathiser, Shaykh Mubarak Nagauri. When Akbar invaded Gujarat in
1572, the Sunni clerical establishment in north Gujarat was led by the
anti-millenarian jurist Muhammad b. Tahir Patani who assembled a coalition of
‘alims to circumvent Akbar’s eclectic interests and “enforce a juristic
orthodoxy in Gujarat”.24 Although the clerics managed to get the Mahdavi Shaykh
Mustafa Gujarati imprisoned and interrogated by the governor (Akbar’s foster-brother)
Mirza ‘Aziz Koka, they were not successful in turning away the emperor’s
interest in Mahdavi doctrine. Akbar met Shaykh Mustafa at Patan in 1572 and in
1574–75, invited him to participate in religious discussion at his court.25 It
has even been argued that Akbar flirted with a Mahdi-like persona or “a
Mahdavi-derived millennial state ideology” as the Islamic millennium approached
in 1592, to project himself as the Lord of the Conjunction.26 He certainly used
Shaykh Mustafa’s Mahdavi arguments to annoy his court ‘ulama, a tendency that
probably intensified the orthodox scholars’ relentless opposition, especially
in regions like Patan where the Mahdavis were active.
After Akbar’s invasion of Gujarat in
1572, the Mahdavis appear to have taken a ‘quietist’ approach, giving up
political ambitions.27 Their early phase of recruiting literati and powerful
officials gave way to a policy of recruitment from the artisanal castes in
north Gujarat and southwestern Rajasthan who supported the Mahdavi leadership through
the tithe. Rituals were now carried out in private, enabling Mahdavis to
participate in the outside world without fear of censure. “As long as the
Mahdawiyah was perceived as challenging the state through the active
recruitment of an oppositional elite from within groups constituting the state,
the Mahdawiyah appears to have been repressed. It was not the doctrine of the
Mahdi by itself that led to the suppression of the movement, but the class,
location and political volatility of its supporters”.28
Akbar, as we have seen, showed no
inclination to use force against the Mahdavis. Nevertheless, for his opponents,
like Muhammad b. Tahir Patani, the Mahdavis were not only heretics, they were
rivals on his home turf of Patan.29 He raged against Mahdavi intellectuals such
as Shaykh Mustafa, who, at Akbar’s ‘Ibadat kh ¯ ana ¯ (house of religious
debate) in 1574–75, referred to ‘alims such as Patani as mukhannas.(unmanly,
effeminate) and even kafir ¯ s (infidels), much to Akbar’s amusement. Akbar’s
indulgence of—even attraction to—these Mahdavi tendencies surely enraged
Muhammad b. Tahir even more. Although there was no overt persecution of
Mahdavis after Akbar’s death, and the Mahdavis detached themselves from
oppositional politics in north India (although not in the Deccan30), Gujarati
clerics did not forget their antipathy towards this millenarian group and its
leaders.
Returning to Aurangzeb’s Gujarat in
1646, we find the Sunni ‘ulama of Ahmedabad united in disapproval of the
Mahdavis. They convinced the prince to invite the Mahdavi leader Sayyid Raju to
a public interrogation, which took place on 21 May 1646 in Aurangzeb’s
presence. According to the Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, Sayyid Raju was asked about his
belief in the Mahdi, the “rightly-guided one” who is to reappear at the
millennium. Raju proclaimed, “He has come and gone”.31 Aurangzeb turned to the
assembled clerics for their opinion. They asserted, on the basis of the h.
ad¯ıth (the traditions of the Prophet), that the Mahdi would manifest towards
the end of the world. How then could Sayyid Muhammad Jaunpuri be considered the
Mahdi? At this repudiation, Sayyid Raju declared “The sword is our proof”. As
it appeared that a violent fight would break out, Aurangzeb dismissed the
assembly and had Raju and his followers expelled from the city, backed by a
decree delivered by the clerics.32
The Mahdavis did not return
compliantly to Palanpur. Sayyid Raju and his followers camped north of the city
in Rustam Bagh, where they summoned more supporters—many of whom were “weavers,
carders, dyers, milk-sellers”—and assumed a “defiant attitude”.33 The chief qazi
again ordered them to leave their
encampment. When they refused, they were attacked by the kotwal¯ of Ahmedabad
and his troops.34 In the ensuing conflict, Sayyid Raju and twenty-two of his
followers were killed and were buried close to where they fell. The author of
the Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı heard reports from an old man—although he disclaims
responsibility for their veracity—that the killing of Sayyid Raju, by then
known as Raju Shahid or martyr, had been personally ordered by the prince.35
Whether or not Aurangzeb had a personal hand in the massacre, the clerics and
officials of Ahmedabad were firmly opposed to the Mahdavis’ millenarian beliefs
and were determined to thwart Sayyid Raju’s attempts to bring his relatively
prosperous horse-trading and martial group into Mughal service. While Mahdavi
courtiers reached exalted positions in Akbar’s court, they were not welcome in
Aurangzeb’s evolving order.
Aurangzeb left Gujarat at the end of
the year and we do not hear more about the Mahdavis for almost forty years.
Later in his life Aurangzeb took a more benign approach to the Mahdavis,
accepting that they were Sunnis and excusing their former misguided belief in the
Mahdi. MacLean quotes a discussion that took place in 1683 in Ahmadnagar
between the emperor, his chief qazi Abu Sa‘id, and a delegation of Mahdavis.
The qazi had interrogated the Mahdavis
and then pronounced them to be “simply a legal school (madhhab), not asect or
heresy”. On these grounds there was no justification for executing,
imprisoning, or banishing members of the Mahdavi community. This ruling
satisfied Aurangzeb who is said to have responded:
I am pleased to know this, for they
are orthodox (mutasharri‘) in thought and deed. They conducted the
interrogation with proofs from the Qur’an, the traditions, and the words of
established religious scholars. They speak the kalima (‘creed’) of our Prophet,
are not opposed to religious law, act in agreement with the command of God and
the prophet, and follow the orthodox community (ahl-i sunnat wa jama‘at ¯ ).
They do say that the Mahdi has come and gone, but this phrase does not require
any legal penalty. Give them permission to depart.36
In an earlier time, the Mahdavis’
beliefs about the Mahdi had got them into deep trouble. Although the qazi Abu
Sa‘id was a Gujarati, the son-in-law of the infamous Qazi ‘Abd al-Wahhab, he
and Aurangzeb accepted the Mahdavis’ ‘quietist’ face. According to MacLean, a
compromise had been reached and “[t]he Mughal state clearly did not perceive
its legitimacy threatened by a millennial movement whose theology had turned
inward and whose lay members could be manipulated like any other”.37 Whatever
their private religious inclination, the Mahdavis had now formally abjured
messianism and could be accepted as regular, observant, Sunni subjects.
The Isma‘ili (Da’udi) Bohras
The confrontation with the Mahdavis
may have been Aurangzeb’s first collaboration with the anti-Shi‘i,
anti-millenarian Sunni clergy of Gujarat, some of whom would go on to become
his staunch allies. At the time, the ‘ulama of Ahmedabad were not mere
provincial clerics. A senior Gujarati ‘alim, Sayyid Jalal Bukhari of the
Bukhari Sufi family, had been since 1642 the chief s.adr (officer in charge of
religious grants) and the highest ranking cleric in the empire. His son Sayyid
Ja‘far was the guardian of the Bukhari tombs and lineage in Ahmedabad.38 An
even more lasting connection would be forged with the grandson of Akbar’s old
adversary, Muhammad b. Tahir Patani. Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab was a prominent
jurist in Patan, in north Gujarat, the author of a laudatory biography of his
grandfather, Risala-i man ¯ aqib ¯ , and an inheritor of the latter’s antipathy
towards Shi‘i and messianic groups, in particular the Mahdavi community, many
of whom lived in and near his hometown of Patan. It is likely (although not
certain) that Aurangzeb met ‘Abd al-Wahhab in 1645–46. ‘Abd al-Wahhab later
became the chief judge of the Mughal empire and Aurangzeb’s close companion
until the former’s death in 1675.
The fallout from local tensions
between Sunni clerics and their rivals in Patan, Palanpur and Ahmedabad
continued to play out across the empire throughout Aurangzeb’s long reign. A
couple of months after the Mahdavi episode in 1646, the governor-prince took on
another millenarian group, this time one that was openly Shi‘i. Unlike the
Mahdavis, the merchant dominated community of Isma‘ili Bohras had no political
ambitions. Nevertheless, they were persecuted throughout Aurangzeb’s regime.
The Bohras are a Shi‘i Isma‘ili group
(also called Musta‘lian and Tayyibi) who accept the authority of the first
seven Shi‘i imam¯ s (up to Imam Ja‘far al-Sadiq), and then the Isma‘ili imam¯ s
in the lineage of Isma‘il b. Ja‘far al-Sadiq up to al-Musta‘li b. al-Mustansir
(r. 1094– 1101) who they believe went into occultation. In their understanding,
the imam¯ in hiding will reappear at the millennium. Until that time the
community is subject to the spiritual and temporal authority of the da‘¯ ¯ı, or
summoner.
The Bohras had begun settling in
Gujarat in the twelfth century and from then on had enjoyed a precariously
prosperous position. In the fifteenth century, they had been subject to Sunni
‘re-education’ and persecution during the rule of the Gujarat sultan Ahmad Shah
and again in the early sixteenth century under Muzaffar II. This had caused a
split in the community between those who remained Isma‘ili and others, like
Muhammad b. Tahir Patani’s family, who became Sunni and came to be known as
Sunni Bohras. During Akbar’s reign, a property dispute had led one of the da‘¯
¯ıs, Da’ud b. Qutbshah, to seek the emperor’s intervention, leading to a split
in the community between the Da’udis, whose headquarters were (and are) in
Surat, and the Sulaymanis, whose da‘¯ ¯ı lived in Yemen. As a result of Akbar’s
ruling in 1597–98, the Isma‘ili Bohra community was left relatively unmolested
for a number of years. When Aurangzeb came to Gujarat in 1645, Sayyidna Qutb
al-Din (known as Qutb Khan in the Mughal records) held the office of da‘¯ ¯ı of
the Da’udi Bohras.
As with Mahdavi leaders (Sayyid
Muhammad Jaunpuri by the ‘ulama of Gujarat, Shaykh Mustafa Gujarati at the
hands of Mirza ‘Aziz Koka, and Sayyid Raju by Aurangzeb), the Bohra da‘¯ ¯ı was
subjected to an interrogation. A Bohra eyewitness, Sayyidi Hasanji Badshah b.
Sayyidi Shams Khan, relates that ‘Abd al-Qavi, Aurangzeb’s s.adr and teacher,
prepared the case against the Bohras, alleging that the leader of the Bohras
was an apostate (rafd.¯ı) and had changed the pillars of Islam (arkan al-Isl ¯
am¯ ).39 These were serious charges, calling upon long standing pejorative
notions of Shi‘as, both Twelver and Isma‘ili, as rafiz ¯ .¯ı (literally,
rejecters or deserters, rafid ¯ .¯ı or rafd.¯ı in Arabic). Other Bohra accounts
relate further charges, that the Bohras regarded ‘Ali as divine, that they
prostrated themselves before the da‘¯ ¯ı, believed that dues paid to the da‘¯
¯ı were equivalent to performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and finally, that
they observed the ‘Id festival earlier than other Muslims. 40 Venerating ‘Ali
as divine was another common imputation against Shi‘as. Disavowing the
long-established Mughal and South Asian Sufi tradition of revering ‘Ali as a
saintly, heroic and messianic figure, the indictment implied that the Bohras
practiced idolatry. The charge that Bohras paid part of their income to their
summoner, da‘¯ ¯ı, rather than undertaking the recommended pilgrimage to Mecca
was another serious accusation, one that suggested abrogation of one of the
five pillars of Islam. The final, calendrical, offence was one also recorded by
the author of the Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı. Aware that the Bohras kept their beliefs
secret because of persecution, he remarked that their calendar was of ‘Hindu’
derivation. This meant that the Bohras began and ended the month-long fast of
Ramadan a day or two earlier than Sunni Muslims and their feast for the end of
Ramadan was held while Sunnis were still fasting. During Aurangzeb’s reign, he
relates, “these people were forced to take food on the last day of Sha‘ban and
abstain from it on the closing day of Ramazan”.41 The indictment suggested
grave infractions by the Bohras, deriving from both millenarian Shi‘ism and
from Hinduism.42
Following the charge, the da‘¯ ¯ı
Qutb al-Din was imprisoned and his books were impounded to be examined by Sunni
scholars while ‘Abd al-Qavi prepared the case for the prosecution. Meanwhile
the Bohra community rallied around their leader. A hastily raised ransom to get
him released was angrily rejected by the puritanical prince. In due course, a
formal interrogation was held in Aurangzeb’s presence. ‘Abd al-Qavi asked the
da‘¯ ¯ı to admit he was a rafd.¯ı and to repent. Qutb al-Din refused to do so
and declared he and his followers were true Sunni Muslims. He declared, “My
faith is the faith of Islam which Muhammad—blessings and peace upon
him—brought. I bear witness to what he called people to bear witness to, that
is, that there is no God but Allah, and that Muhammad is the prophet of God. We
recite the Qur’an and say prayers to the Merciful, and fast during the month of
Ramad.an, during which the Qur’an was sent down, and we give alms and we go on
pilgrimage to the Revered House of God”.43 Fearing this argument would convince
Aurangzeb, ‘Abd al-Qavi declared that he was certain Qutb al-Din was an
apostate and that it was essential to execute him lest he corrupt others. Qutb
al-Din replied, “If you kill me with no proof that would necessitate killing
me, and without manifesting [my guilt] and with no interrogation and no reason,
then you would have killed my body that would eventually be annihilated even if
you do not kill it. But you have no power on my soul which is ascending to the
Merciful”.44
As Qutb al-Din’s declarations
appeared to sway the judge and Aurangzeb, ‘Abd al-Qavi was obliged to suspend
the trial, ordering Qutb al-Din back to prison while he resorted to less
scrupulous means. According to Sayyidi Hasanji, ‘Abd al-Qavi forged an
affidavit in Qutb al-Din’s name, confessing to being an apostate, and induced
unwitting courtiers to sign it. The judge, however, insisted on hearing the
confession with his own ears. Eventually, ‘Abd al-Qavi promised Qutb al-Din’s
son and brother that the da‘¯ ¯ı would be released if they denounced him in
court. In the presence of Aurangzeb and the judge, ‘Abd al-Qavi asked the men
questions about their faith and doctrine and whether Qutb al-Din believed the
same. Although the unnamed judge suspected trickery, he had no option but to
issue an order for Qutb al-Din’s execution.45 Continuing to proclaim that ‘Abd
al-Qavi had brought him to his death “without asking me about my affairs, and
without a sin that would necessitate it to kill me”, Qutb al-Din was executed
on 27 Jumadi II, 1056 (August 9, 1646). Since his death, the da‘¯ ¯ı Qutb
al-Din has been revered as shah¯ıd, or martyr, among the Bohras, while
Aurangzeb and ‘Abd al-Qavi are reviled in the strongest terms.
Soon after this event, in September,
Shah Jahan recalled Aurangzeb from Gujarat and dispatched him to the border wars
in Afghanistan. The prince departed from Gujarat in November. According to
Bohra records, he also took with him Pir Khan Shuja‘ al-Din, the son of the
executed Bohra da‘¯ ¯ı, who was released after a while and returned to his
community in Ahmedabad.46 The new governor, Shaista Khan, lifted restrictions
on the Bohras but trouble broke out again under the next governor, Ghairat
Khan, who was ruling as the deputy of Aurangzeb’s elder brother, Prince Dara.
This time the problem was money. Again according to Bohra records, Ghairat Khan
attempted to extort from the wealthy Bohra community the large sum of money
that had been raised to ransom the late da‘¯ ¯ı Qutb Khan and that Aurangzeb
had rejected. The new da‘¯ ¯ı refused to pay Ghairat Khan and was promptly imprisoned
and sent to Agra for eight months.47
While Pir Khan was away in
Aurangzeb’s entourage, a rival faction arose within the Bohra community. In
1653, they complained to the new governor, this time the youngest prince,
Murad, and again secured Pir Khan’s imprisonment. It took large bribes, some
allegedly paid directly to Murad, to get the da‘¯ ¯ı released this time. These
payments seem to have secured some peace for the Bohras for the next decade or
so, but after Aurangzeb became emperor, an order from the eighth year of his
accession (1667) stipulated that Bohra mosques should have Sunni-style prayers
five times a day and Sunni imam¯ s and muezzins were deputed to Bohra
mosques.48 Aurangzeb clearly continued to keep an eye on the Isma‘ili Bohras’
practices in Gujarat.
We may suspect the hand of the
powerful Sunni Bohra qazi Abd al-Wahhab
(and perhaps other Gujarati Sunni clerics) in this continued campaign against
the Isma‘ili Bohras of Gujarat. But Aurangzeb continued to target the Bohras
long after ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s death in 1675, in fact until the end of his
reign.49 In 1682, the governor of Gujarat, Mukhtar Khan, received reports
against the Bohra da‘¯ ¯ı, Sayyid ‘Abd al-Tayyab Zaki al-Din.50 The da‘¯ ¯ı
escaped to Jamnagar where he lived for a while until trouble started between
him and the exiled ruler which led to the imprisonment of the da‘¯ ¯ı’s son.
Meanwhile, several prominent Bohras of Ahmedabad were arrested and sent to
Aurangzeb. This inaugurated, according to Bohra accounts, a new phase of
taqiyya or protective dissimulation.
According to the Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı,
these events took place twenty years later. In 1703, the emperor heard (from
the s.adr of Ahmedabad, Shaykh Akram al-Din, grandson of Qazi ‘Abd al-Wahhab)
that two Bohra cloth merchants named ‘Isa and Taj were engaged in spreading
“evil” doctrines (bad-maz. hab) in Ahmedabad.51 Crucially, they were
individuals from whom Prince Muhammad A‘zam had formerly taken a “bond”
(muchalka¯), possibly financial in nature. They were arrested and sent to the
court. Soon after, Aurangzeb received news that Mulla Khanji, the deputy of
Qutb al-Din (the da‘¯ ¯ı executed in 1646) was collecting money to have the
imprisoned Bohras released and had sent twelve missionaries (da‘¯ ¯ı) to
instigate their people. He had raised 114,000 rupees and in addition, he
possessed about sixty religious books of the Bohra community. Aurangzeb ordered
the governor and judge of the province to arrest the men and confiscate the
money and “heretical books”, sending them all to the court. In addition he
ordered that Bohra children and illiterates be given Sunni religious
instruction, the costs of which were to be borne by the Bohra community.52
Clues about the persecution of the
Isma‘ili Bohras can be discerned in the repeated invocation of money. The
Bohras were prosperous merchants and their religious difference made them
excellent candidates for extortion. In each subsequent account of Bohra
persecution, we hear of large sums raised to pay ransoms or to bribe officials.
Clearly, the persecution of the Bohras was only partly ideological. They were
an easy and lucrative target, unprotected by any military authority.
Other millennial challenges
The Mahdavis and the Isma‘ili Bohras
were by no means the only groups who presented Gujarat-based millenarian
challenges to Aurangzeb’s preferred order. Gujarat was one of the richest
provinces of the empire but was also known as lashkar-khez, a land “bristling
with soldiers”.53 Millenarian challenge could quickly develop into military
challenge. Aurangzeb had seen for himself the influence of the Isma‘ili Bohras
and Mahdavis during his governorship. Some years later he would also be struck
by the support that his more ‘millennial’ brother, Dara, received from
zamindars and religious figures in Gujarat.54 Among Dara’s supporters were Rao
Tamachi (r. 1654–62) of Kachchh, who gave his daughter in marriage to Dara’s
son, and the Jam of Nawanagar. Both ruling houses, though nominally Rajputs,
were linked to Isma‘ili practices and histories.55 After Aurangzeb’s first
coronation in 1658, Dara fled to Gujarat where he raised, with his allies, a
substantial army with which to face his brother. Among the accusations against
Dara drawn up in the ‘Alamg¯ır nama ¯ were terms used regularly to characterise
Shi‘i and millenarian opponents: bad-maz. hab, ibah¯. at (free-thinking) and
ilh. ad¯ (heresy).56
Soon after his accession, Aurangzeb
ordered the trial and execution (in 1661–62) of Sarmad, a Jewish-Sufi mystic
who had received attention from his brother Dara.57 A charismatic naked
poet-renunciant with the gift of prophecy, Sarmad had once declared that Dara
would become emperor. Once Aurangzeb came to the throne, he had Sarmad tried
and questioned by ‘Abd al-Qavi (who had also handled the Ahmedabad trials in
1646). After his trial and conviction, Sarmad was put to death. While Sarmad is
popularly believed to have been accused of heresy, Rajeev Kinra makes the
persuasive case that Aurangzeb was more annoyed by his prediction of Dara’s
succession than his heterodoxy. At a time when Aurangzeb’s authority was still
shaky, a proclamation by a popular renunciant such as Sarmad “constituted a
threat to the very legitimacy of Awrangzib’s nascent political authority”.58
Sarmad’s millenarian temerity had to be proved wrong.
In 1672, Aurangzeb put down a massive
millenarian uprising by the Satnamis. Although this uprising did not feature
explicitly Shi‘i motifs, observers were struck by the fervour of the
shaven-headed Satnamis and their fierce resistance to imperial rule. The author
of the Ma’asir-i ‘Alamgiri ¯ , one of the official histories of Aurangzeb’s
reign, described the Satnamis disdainfully as “a rebellious horde of low people
like goldsmiths, carpenters, scavengers, tanners, and members of other menial
professions, who are naturally weak and foredoomed to slaughter...” (Note the
similarity with descriptions of Mahdavi adherents— weavers, carders . . . .)
These shaven-headed rebels “sprang out of the ground like termites (winged
ants) and descended from the sky like locusts. It was said that these wicked
people considered themselves immortal, and believed that if one of them was
slain, seventy others would spring up in his place”.59 A closely fought battle
followed; Aurangzeb’s generals faced serious resistance, and many casualties,
before the rebellion was suppressed. According to Khafi Khan, Aurangzeb had to
channel his own sacred authority to suppress these millenarian protestors: “He
then wrote some prayers and devices with his own hands, which he ordered to be
sewn on the banners and standards, and carried against the rebels”.60
A less violent but no less
millenarian movement was that of the Pranamis in Gujarat and central India. Led
by the charismatic preacher Prannath (1618-94), the Pranamis developed a
complex theology in which Prannath himself was regarded as an avatar¯ or as the
manifestation of the promised Mahdi.61 Prannath’s hagiography describes how he
tried in the 1670s to find a niche at the Mughal court in the manner of
Mahdavis, Jains and other groups in the past. When he was barred from an
audience with the emperor, he and his merchant followers began to strategise a
way for Prannath to reach the emperor, characterised as “amal saitan¯ ” or
agent of Satan, to enlighten him about true Islam.62 In 1679, the year when
Aurangzeb imposed jizya (tax on non-Muslims), Prannath preached about “nab¯ı
aur nar¯ ayan ¯ . ”—the prophet and God (usually Vishnu)—at one of the gates of
Delhi.63
Prannath and his followers,
displaying a close familiarity with the structures of power in Delhi, then
wrote to five of Aurangzeb’s courtiers to try to get an audience with the
emperor. The first three are easily identifiable as senior clerics of the
empire: Kazi Shaykh Islam (qazi al-quz.
at¯ Shaykh al-Islam and son of Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab), Razavi Khan (Raz.av¯ı
Khan, the ¯ s.adr al-s.udur¯ and son of Sayyid Jalal Bukhari of Ahmedabad),
Shaykh Nizam (the compiler of Aurangzeb’s monumental compendium of Hanafi law,
the Fataw¯ a-¯ i ‘Alamg¯ır¯ı). The others, Amir Aqil Khan64 and Kotwal Sidi
Faulad,65 are equally easily identified as senior Delhi officials. None
responded to the letters. Next we hear that one of Prannath’s followers—an
attendant of Aurangzeb—pasted the group’s manifesto where the emperor could not
miss it. In a nice illustration of Aurangzeb’s standard legalistic technique,
the hagiography tells us that after the emperor rebuked and demoted the
attendant, he had the group arrested and questioned by the kotwal¯ , Sidi
Faulad, and the chief qaz¯.¯ı, Shaykh al-Islam. He directed, “Tum unk¯ı bat¯
am¯ .suniyo, puch dekho buniy ¯ ad¯ ” (Listen to what they say, ask about their
beliefs). Shaykh al-Islam advised the emperor not to meet Prannath and his
associates in private. Denied an audience with the emperor, they were granted a
hundred rupees and told to leave.66 That was when Prannath and his companions
realised that because the emperor was none other than dajjal¯ (a ruler whose
tyranny signals the end of time), all efforts to meet him would inevitably come
to naught. Soon after, Prannath formed a successful alliance with Chhatrasal
Bundela, the ‘rebellious’ ruler of Bundelkhand, who had posed a serious
challenge to Mughal authority since 1671, and after 1681, ruled Bundelkhand
virtually independently.
In Prannath’s hagiography we may
discern several motifs common in accounts of Aurangzeb’s rule. A millenarian
leader finds no way of hitching his wagon to the hierarchy of Mughal
discipleship. He is cross-questioned and turned away, lucky to escape with his
life, by the clerics and officials who surround the emperor. Thus thwarted, he
realises that the emperor is not in fact the Lord of the Conjunction, the
Mahdi, or a great Sufi master, but is the ultimate tyrant who must be
overthrown. Prannath’s anathematisation of Aurangzeb is a perfect example of
how the new order had no room to assimilate openly millenarian impulses. The
only option was confrontation.
In 1685, Aurangzeb was faced with
another major millenarian challenge from Gujarat, the Matiya rebellion of
Nizari Isma‘ili peasants and agriculturists whose appearance and customs
corresponded to those of their neighbouring Hindus.67 The governor of Gujarat,
Shuja‘at Khan, had heard that disciples of the Matiya leader honoured him by
paying a tithe and showering coins on his outstretched feet. He ordered Sayyid
Shahji, a member of the Satpanthi Isma‘ili lineage of Pirana, to present
himself to be interrogated in Ahmedabad. When the Sayyid refused, he was
arrested and brought to the capital where he mysteriously died. The Matiyas,
incensed by the arrest and death of their leader, marched on the Mughal fort of
Bharuch, killed its commander, and captured it for several days, succeeding in
disrupting the lucrative traffic between north India and Surat.68 Although
Aurangzeb’s forces soon put down the uprising and massacred the Matiya rebels,
these events were another reminder of Aurangzeb’s inability to assimilate or
head off millenarian revolt. Once again, the regime’s attempt to investigate,
interrogate, and correct religious ‘heterodoxy’ provoked violence and
contributed to the emperor’s growing reputation for legalistic intolerance.
Along with explicitly millenarian
groups, Shi‘i individuals could face censure or be stigmatised for political
opposition or disobedience. In 1672, an old courtier named Muhammad Tahir, was
put to death, accused of “cursing the three caliphs”, a common euphemism for
Shi‘i practice. “According to the canonical law and the insistence of the chief
of the Ulema, Mull ¯ a ‘Auz Wajih, he was beheaded on the ¯ 3rd November, 22nd
Rajab”.69 Another anathematised Shi‘a was Abu’l Hasan, the last Qutb Shahi
ruler of Golkonda (r. 1672–87) who put up a long resistance to the Mughal
forces before being captured in 1687.
[He] was stupid and sunk in sinful
lust; misled by his evil fortune, he shut his eyes to the sins punishable in
the next world, and made vagabond Hindus the managers and administrators of the
affairs of his State, and gave currency to the rites of that accursed race.
And, those travellers in the wrong path of futile wandering and ignorance,
those carrion-eating demons (ghul) of the wilderness, (namely) the Persians
(i.e., Shias) with the support of that worthless sect (the Hindus) began to
practice there publicly all kinds of shameful sins. No respect was left for
Islam and its adherents; mosques were without splendour, while idol-temples
flourished; the requisites of canonical practice remained closed under bolts,
while the gates of irreligious practices (bid‘at) were flung open . . . 70
While Azfar Moin is right to point us
to the long and difficult relationship of the Mughals and Safavids as part of
the context for Sunni-Shi‘a confrontations in Mughal India, in Aurangzeb’s time
we also need to pay attention to the foreclosing of Shi‘i and ‘Alid strands in
the imperial vocabulary and the increased ‘othering’ of groups and individuals
with such loyalties.
Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab and the Sunni
Bohra faction ¯
As we have seen, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, a qazi
and member of an old family of the ancient city of Patan in north Gujarat, had
met Aurangzeb when the prince was governor either of Gujarat (1645-46) or of
the Deccan (1652-59).71 The prince and the jurist found kindred souls in each
other. While in the Deccan, ‘Abd al-Wahhab joined the prince’s retinue with the
title of mufti (legal expert) of the army and soon became one of Aurangzeb’s
closest and most powerful advisers.
In 1659, Aurangzeb’s elder brother
and crown prince, Dara, was executed and Aurangzeb made a bid to be declared emperor
even though their father Shah Jahan, imprisoned in Agra fort, was still alive.
In keeping with Mughal convention, the empire’s most senior jurist was
commanded to read the Friday sermon, the khut.ba, in the name of the new
emperor. When the judge refused, on the grounds that it was illegal to proclaim
the son when the father was living, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab stepped forward. He
disputed with the qaz¯.¯ı, arguing that Shah Jahan’s enfeebled state allowed
for the khut.ba to be read in his son Aurangzeb’s name.
The Shaikh declared after refutation
of theological problems, rational arguments and narrative proofs that His
Majesty (Shah Jahan) has become very weak. He has lost his consciousness. He
has lost control over administrative machinery of the empire such as
organization of affairs, welfare and comforts of people who are the wonderful
deposits of the Almighty Creator. Recitation of the Khutbah, under these
circumstances, in the name of the son who is worthy of Saltanat and Khilafat is
permissible and allowable in the holy religion. He quoted many reliable
traditions in this respect before the Chief Qazi, other ‘Ulama and scholars. He
convinced all of them.72
Aurangzeb gave ‘Abd al-Wahhab
permission to read the prayers and rewarded him by appointing him the supreme
judge of the empire, qazi al-quz. at¯ ,
a position he held until his death in 1675. In return, ‘Abd al-Wahhab became
one of the new emperor’s closest aides, helping to carry out his wishes. He was
a ‘stickler for religion’ and believed himself to be carrying out the emperor’s
wishes by stamping out ‘heresy’ (bid‘at, rafd. /rafz.)—terms which often meant
the kind of millenarian or Shi‘i influenced movements Aurangzeb opposed from
the start of his career—on the principle that the maintenance of the far-flung
empire depended on the strict application of laws against heresy.73
‘Abd al-Wahhab’s animosity towards
Shi‘as and those of similar millenarian tendencies arose from his own family
history. He belonged to the Sunni Bohra community of Patan, a community that
rose in wealth and influence in Aurangzeb’s time. The Sunni Bohras had split in
the fifteenth century from the Shi‘i Isma‘ili Bohras, resident in Gujarat since
the twelfth century.74 Their divergence had become increasingly rancorous in
the sixteenth century, helped along by the efforts of ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
grandfather, the aforementioned Muhammad b. Tahir Patani (d. 1578), who had
dedicated his life to opposing Mahdavis and ‘re-educating’ Isma‘ili Bohras to
accept Sunni ways. “They say he had made a vow that until the blackness of
Sh¯ıism and other heresies had been cleansed from the hearts of his tribe he
would not bind his turban on his head”.75 He was encouraged in his efforts when
Akbar, during his campaign in Gujarat in 1572–73, personally tied a turban on
his head and pledged to assist him in his efforts. Later, Muhammad b. Tahir
took off his turban, disappointed that Akbar’s government advanced some Shi‘as
and had even included them in the administration of Gujarat.76 He set off towards
Agra to appeal to Akbar again but was killed while travelling between Sarangpur
and Burhanpur in 1578.77
In spite of ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
reputation as a powerful censorious qaz¯.¯ı, there were rumours that belied his
fac¸ade. Manucci wrote in 1699, “It was so common to drink spirits when
Aurangzeb ascended the throne, that one day he said in a passion that in all
Hindustan no more than two men could be found who did not drink, namely,
himself and ‘Abd-al Wahhab, the chief qazi appointed by him. . . . But with
respect to ‘Abd-al-Wahhab he was in error, for I myself sent him every day a
bottle of spirits (vino), which he drank in secret, so that the king could not
find it out”.78 While we might discount Manucci as a notoriously unreliable
source of information, we also hear from the Ma’asir al-umara ¯ that for all
his piety, the qazi was not above pecuniary concerns: “ . . . they say that the
qazi had a long arm for hauling and
snatching, and collected large sums of money”.79 When he died he left a large
inheritance to his sons, “a lac of ashraf¯ıs and five lacs of rupees, besides
jewels, etc”, some of which, Shah Nawaz Khan suggests, he had acquired through
bribes and by charging commissions for tasks like marriage and dowry
certificates.80
‘Abd al-Wahhab’s large fortune may
also have had to do with his commercial interests. He founded a neighbourhood
in Ahmedabad known as Wahhab Ganj, ordering that “different kinds of aromatic
roots and drugs—imports from Surat—should be sold here free of excise duty, so
as to increase the population and prosperity of the suburb”.81 It is likely
that Wahhab Ganj and the neighbouring Cloth Market, run by ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
son-in-law Muhammad Jamal, generated a nice income for the qaz¯.¯ı’s family. It
may not be coincidence, in light of the business interests of some of his
closest associates, that in 1665 Aurangzeb had customs duty on Muslims fixed at
2 ½ per cent and on non-Muslims at 5 per cent. In 1667, customs duty on Muslims
was abolished altogether. Those with a religious motive in promoting Muslim
business also had a commercial motive that would give them an edge over rival
Jains and Hindus in Gujarat’s wealthy and fiercely competitive markets.
After ‘Abd al-Wahhab died in 1675,
Aurangzeb quickly appointed his son Shaykh al-Islam to succeed him as qazi
al-quz. at¯ , a post the latter accepted only with reluctance.82 Shaykh
al-Islam, by all accounts, was a principled man, not one to accept bribes or
commissions. It was during his tenure, in 1679, that Aurangzeb imposed the
jizya tax on non-Muslims. Some years later, Shaykh al-Islam fell out with his
master for refusing to sanction as jihad¯ the emperor’s campaign against the
Shi‘i sultanates of the Deccan in 1683.83 Although he was relieved of his
duties and sent off to Mecca, Aurangzeb retained a respect for this
independent-minded cleric, even offering him a job on his return from the
pilgrimage. He was succeeded as qazi of
the imperial camp by ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s son-in-law, Abu Sa‘id, who remained in
his post for less than two years and was replaced in 1685.
Although members of ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s
family remained close to Aurangzeb throughout the emperor’s long and eventful
career, their influence was not universally accepted. In 1682, one of his sons,
Shaykh Muhyi al-Din, who held several portfolios in Ahmedabad including those
of judge, am¯ın or senior tax collector, collector of jizya, and
price-recorder, was accused of taking bribes and fixing the price of corn.
Popular unrest broke out against him, an incident that may have contributed to
the dismissal of his brother, Shaykh al-Islam, in 1683.84 In spite of the allegations,
the family remained loyal information-gatherers for the emperor. In 1703, Muhyi
al-Din’s son, Shaykh Akram al-Din was the powerful s.adr of Ahmedabad who
informed on the activities of the Bohra merchants ‘Isa and Taj to Aurangzeb.
‘Abd al-Wahhab and his sons were not
the only Sunni clerics with Aurangzeb’s ear. There were several others. One
prominent Gujarati family was that of the Bukhari Sufis of Ahmedabad,
descendants of the fifteenth century Shah-i ‘Alam and Qutb-i ‘Alam Bukhari.
Sayyid Jalal Bukhari was Shah Jahan’s chief s.adr when Aurangzeb was governor
of Gujarat in 1645–47.85 His son, Sayyid ‘Ali, titled Raz.aw¯ı Khan, became
s.adr al-s.udur¯ during Aurangzeb’s reign, from 1669 to his death in 1680.86
When ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s son-in-law Qazi Abu Sa‘id was relieved of the post of qazi
in 1685, he was replaced by another
Gujarati ‘alim, this time the former qazi of Ahmedabad, Khwaja ‘Abd Allah, who remained
in post until 1698.87 Between Aurangzeb’s accession to power in 1659, and his
death in 1707 was a period of 48 years. Qazi ‘Abd al-Wahhab was at his side
even before he came to power. After ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s death, Gujarati ‘alims
held the post of chief qazi for another
twelve years. It is no wonder that Aurangzeb was so well-informed about goings
on in Gujarat and no wonder that his administration found every opportunity to
monitor the activities of millenarian groups.
Further, the persecution of the
Isma‘ili Bohras during Aurangzeb’s time coincided with the rise to prosperity
of Sunni Bohra merchants, including one of the richest men of the time, the
celebrated Mulla ‘Abd al-Ghafur (d. 1718). The latter was the head of the Bohra
merchants from Patan, a man who rose very quickly to wealth and influence after
coming to Surat in the 1660s or 1670s. Although he generally88 stayed out of
politics, he once tried to cobble together a jihadi coalition against the
Portuguese, ultimately unsuccessful, and at his death he left seventeen ships
and eight million rupees. He was not the only Sunni Bohra merchant prominent in
Surat’s commercial life; others included ship owners and merchants such as
Kasim Bhai, Haji Kadir and Haji Kasim.89 I have not found a direct connection
between ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s family and the Sunni Bohra merchants of Surat, but it
would seem possible that the latter benefited from the exalted connections of
the qaz¯.¯ıs.
While the anti-Shi‘a,
anti-millenarian outlook of the Gujarati clerics clearly derived from their
personal and historical circumstances, it is equally clear that ‘bigotry’ could
be profitable. Imperial officials in Aurangzeb’s Gujarat singled out
non-conformist groups who showed signs of wealth and influence. For officials,
carrying out the emperor’s orders might as well be profitable (and as we have
seen, ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s family profited from imperial policy and their exalted
status). The Isma‘ili Bohras were an easy target who repeatedly faced demands
for money. The Matiyas came to imperial notice when they became visibly
prosperous and disputes arose about property. Even the Mahdavis originally came
to Prince
Aurangzeb’s notice in 1646 in a
dispute about service and horse ownership, but later they ceased to be a threat
either politically or economically. Money talked in Aurangzeb’s Gujarat. Even
if Aurangzeb’s desire was to create a lofty system of Qur’anic justice for all
his subjects, the mercenary transactions and petty score-settling carried out
by his closest underlings undermined his efforts and caused him to be reviled
by the targets of his reforms.
Aurangzeb’s Hanafi legalism
Aurangzeb’s attempts to control and
face down millenarian and Shi‘i orientations among his subjects persisted
throughout his career, from his early days as governor of Gujarat to the very
end of his life. More work needs to be done on comparing the specifics of the
trials from official and community accounts, but it would seem that the
emperor’s method of dealing with Shi‘i-style messianic and millenarian groups
was standard.90 The leader would be arrested or summoned for questioning. The
trial, featuring questions about practice as well as doctrine, was generally
conducted by a senior judge. (Before his murder in 1667, this was generally
Aurangzeb’s trusted teacher and jurist, ‘Abd al-Qavi.) If found guilty, the
leader was punished. In some cases, as with the Bohra da‘¯ ¯ı and Sayyid
Shahji, the leader’s son or senior disciples were made to join the imperial
entourage, thus learning the ways of the court and becoming acculturated to
Mughal ways. Meanwhile, ordinary followers were subjected to various forms of
persuasion, from ‘re-education’ according to Sunni norms, to fines and even the
threat of death.
The actual trial procedure did not
differ much from the guidelines to judges set out in the A¯¯ın-i Akbar¯ı: “He
shall begin with asking the circumstances of the case and then try it in all
its parts. He must examine each witness separately upon the same point and
write down their respective evidence. Since these objects can only be
effectually obtained by deliberateness, intelligence and deep reflection, they
will sometimes require that the cause should be tried again from the beginning
and from the similarity or disagreement, he may be enabled to arrive at the
truth”.91 Compared to his predecessors, Aurangzeb paid more attention to judicial
matters, was more diligent in attending court, and systematised judicial
procedures. Aware of the potential for corruption, he introduced penalties for
corrupting judges,92 and charged newly appointed judges to be honest and to
reject gifts and invitations from the populace they served.93
These trials of millenarian and Shi‘i
leaders were part of Aurangzeb’s larger effort to establish a more standardised
form of Hanafi law in his realms and to strengthen the religious judiciary at
both the central and provincial levels. His elevation of clergy over senior
courtiers, as with ‘Abd al-Wahhab, was one instance of his method. But
Aurangzeb was not content with appointing powerful judges and scholars to high
office. Between 1667 and 1675 he commissioned a massive compendium of Hanafi
rulings that came to be known under his name as the Fataw¯ a-i ‘Alamg ¯ ¯ır¯ı,
a volume intended to be used as a ready reference of Hanafi law for judges
throughout the Mughal empire. The compilation of the volume was directed by a
senior scholar, Shaykh Nizam, who oversaw forty or more scholars over a period
of several years, and who answered directly to the emperor.94 While most of the
contents of the Fataw¯ a¯ were copies of authoritative judgments by Hanafi
scholars of the past, significant portions were based on the writings of Indian
scholars. Some sections—especially those on conversion, apostasy and personal
law—were based on current practice in the Mughal empire.95 According to Mouez
Khalfaoui, the purpose of the volume was to ward off Persianate customs,
standardise and make available legal convention, and correlate current practice
with the legal rulings of the Hanafi school of law.
While the intended systems treated
subjects unequally and privileged observant Sunni Muslims, what is more
significant is that they were systems. Once they accepted their station and
duties in the new dispensation, subjects could expect to be treated according
to predetermined Shari‘a-derived laws.96 Regularised religious trials, the
development of a judicial bureaucracy with considerable power and autonomy, and
a standardised book of law—one with local precedents when it came to matters of
religious belonging and apostasy—surely suggest a political system that was
beginning to rely less on the emperor as the absolute fount of justice. The
judicial system was becoming, at least in theory, increasingly distinct from
the person of the emperor. While Aurangzeb continued to keep a close hold on
the implementation of justice, especially in sensitive cases of millenarian
challenge, judges were increasingly being empowered to act based on their
training and judicial precedents as laid out in the Fataw¯ a¯.
Nevertheless, and regardless of
Aurangzeb’s intentions, his cadre of judges and close courtiers were inadequate
for the task of overhauling and systematising the judicial administration of
the empire. In practice, the emperor and his courtiers were all too human, even
venal, and their application of law was always subject to local rivalries and
politics. As we have seen, clerics from Gujarat held immense power over the
religious administration of the empire for forty years without a break, helping
shape the emperor’s systematisation of governance. But the circumstances in
which these clerics tested their authority arose out of contingent local
rivalries. Law and ideology often turned out to be ways to settle local scores
or to ensure the enrichment of a particular family or community. Aurangzeb’s
apparent bigotry and legalism were not borne out of a transcendent or
predetermined Islamism but were intimately tied to his experiences in Gujarat.
In turn, his experiences in Gujarat likely set the tone for his approach to the
rest of his empire.
Two final questions. Firstly, was it
coincidence that Gujarati clerics rose to such levels in Aurangzeb’s regime? I
suspect that it was no accident. Gujarat offered particularly fertile ground
for religious cosmopolitanism. Since the fifteenth century, and even earlier,
Gujarat’s trade prosperity had drawn religious entrepreneurs, many of whom
established orders and lineages. A significant number of such religious orders
owed allegiance to millenarian Shi‘i or ‘Alid practice in one way or another.
Since the reign of the sultan Mahmud Begada (1458-1509), one key role of the
state had been to assimilate and stabilise this proliferation of religious
difference.97 Aurangzeb’s administration was attempting similar stabilisation,
albeit with a different vocabulary of religion and politics from those that had
gone before. Where the sultans had encouraged a diverse set of religious
entrepreneurs, often with land grants, and where Akbar had harnessed Mahdavi
millenarianism and protected Isma‘ili Bohra practices, Aurangzeb’s
strategy—through his clerics—was to exact uniformity in religious practice.
What transpired in Gujarat cast long shadows over the rest of the kingdom.
Aurangzeb’s experience with Gujarat and the solutions he pursued in the region
to exert control over unruly and intractable populations suggests it was a source
or test case for his decisions in handling other parts of the empire.
Secondly, how are we to assess the
impact of Aurangzeb’s legal and political experiments? As we have seen,
Aurangzeb’s ‘Islamism’ was born out of a combination of factors. To recapitulate
only a few of those that have come up here, there is first his early encounters
with millennial groups in Gujarat, perhaps compounded by his subsequent service
against ‘turbulent’ groups in Afghanistan, Sindh and the Deccan. Second, there
is his deep and bloody rivalry with his millennially-oriented elder brother
Dara Shukoh. And finally there is his patronage of an anti-millennialist
Gujarati faction of clerics who were embroiled in political and economic
rivalries with Shi‘as, Isma‘ilis, Jains and Hindus. In each of these
encounters, Aurangzeb drew on the resources of legalistic Sunni Islam. Although
distracted by almost constant military conflict, he grew increasingly more
ambitious in his recourse to Islamic law over Mughal precedent, especially with
the commissioning of the monumental Fataw¯ a-i ¯ ‘Alamg¯ır¯ı as a resource-book
for judicial practice in the empire. In many ways Aurangzeb’s efforts failed:
his descendants repudiated much of his Islamism, Shi‘i and millenarian groups
continued to flourish in the eighteenth century, and the empire shrank
dramatically in the decades after his death.98 Nevertheless, his legacy had a
longer term impact. The Fataw¯ a-i ¯ ‘Alamg¯ır¯ı became influential throughout
the Hanafi Sunni world, formed a significant component of Anglo-Muhammadan law,
and filtered into Muslim law codes in both India and Pakistan. As Mughal sacred
kingship crumbled, Sunni legalistic resistance to messianism continued to
grow.99 It is now time to acknowledge that even if Aurangzeb’s attempts to
revise Mughal sacred kingship by building Islamic systems and institutions had
only a partial and temporary effect at the time, they prefigured key modern
movements of political Islam and went on to have a foundational effect on South
Asian modernity.
Notes
1. For a recent argument for Akbar’s
‘secularity’, see Rajeev Bhargava, “Forms of Secularity before Secularism: The
Political Morality of Ashoka and Akbar”, in Worlds of Difference, (eds.) Elisa
Pereira Reis and Sa¨ıd Amir Arjomand (London, 2013), pp. 95, 112–116.
2. The most recent of these interventions
is Audrey Truschke’s even-handed Aurangzeb: The Man and the Myth (New Delhi,
2017), which cites an earlier version of this article.
3. Katherine Butler Brown, “Did Aurangzeb
ban music? Questions for the historiography of his reign”, Modern Asian
Studies, 41, 1 (2007).
4. Satish Chandra, “Jizyah and the State
in India during the 17th Century”, Journal of the Economic and Social History
of the Orient, 12, 3 (1969).
5. Richard M. Eaton, “Temple Desecration
and Indo-Muslim States”, Journal of Islamic Studies, 11, 3 (2000), pp. 307–309.
Eaton does not explain (nor even mention) Aurangzeb’s order for the destruction
of the Chintaman Jain temple in Ahmedabad in 1645, nor his orders to pull down
the Somanath temple in 1659, the year of his accession. On the Chintaman
temple, see ‘Al¯ı Muh.ammad Khan and M ¯ ¯ıt.hal¯ al K ¯ ayasth, ¯ Mirat-i Ah ¯
.mad¯ı (Baroda, 1926-30), 1, p. 220. Romila Thapar mentions Aurangzeb’s two
orders (in 1659 and 1706) to have the Somanath temple pulled down and concludes
that the second order suggests that the first was never carried out. Romila
Thapar, Somanatha: The Many Voices of a History (New Delhi, 2004), p. 68.
6. B. N. Goswamy and J. S. Grewal, The
Mughals and the Jogis of Jakhbar: Some Madad-i-maʻash and Other Documents ¯
(Simla, 1967).
7. Eaton, “Desecration”; Jnan Chandra,
“Aurangzib and Hindu Temples”, Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, 5
(1957); “Alamgir’s patronage of Hindu temples”, Journal of the Pakistan
Historical Society, 6 (1959).
8. “[Awrangz¯ıb’s] “religious policies”
were probably not intended as a far-reaching abnegation of the religiously
inclusive and tolerant imperial policies of previous Mughal rulers”. Munis
Faruqi, “Awrangz¯ıb”, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three (Brill Online, 2014), p.
69.
9. Shahid Amin, “On Retelling the Muslim
Conquest”, in History and the Present, (eds.) Partha Chatterjee and Anjan Ghosh
(New Delhi, 2002), p. 30.
10. Comparative exploration is outside the
scope of this article, but the rise of Shi‘i clericalism in the Safavid empire
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and clerical anti-messianism (as
demonstrated, for instance in the case of Sabbatai Sevi) in the Ottoman empire
may be seen as contemporary instances of anti-cosmopolitan Islamic early
modernities. Gujarat was particularly exposed to developments in the two
neighbouring empires, as well as in the Arabian peninsula, by virtue of its
position, scholarly contacts and trade links.
11. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, “Turning the Stones
Over: Sixteenth-Century Millenarianism from the Tagus to the Ganges”, Indian
Economic & Social History Review, 40, 2 (2003). I will use “millennialism”
and “millenarianism” interchangeably here, following the Encyclopedia of Religion.
“Millenarianism, known also as millennialism, is the belief that the end of
this world is at hand and that in its wake will appear a New World,
inexhaustibly fertile, harmonious, sanctified, and just”. Hillel Schwartz,
“Millenarianism: An Overview”, in Encyclopedia of Religion, (ed.) Lindsay Jones
(Detroit, 2005), p. 6028.
12. Subrahmanyam, “Turning the Stones Over”,
pp. 133-134.
13. A. Azfar Moin, The Millennial Sovereign:
Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam (New York, 2012), pp. 132–138. Akbar began
the observance of the millennium a decade early, in 1582.
14. As with the Mahdavis, see below. See also
Moin, The Millennial Sovereign, pp. 155-161 and Chapter 5, passim; and Derryl
N. MacLean, “Real Men and False Men at the Court of Akbar: The Majalis of
Shaykh Mustafa Gujarati”, in Beyond Turk and Hindu: Rethinking Religious
Identities in Islamicate South Asia, (eds.) David Gilmartin and Bruce B.
Lawrence (Gainesville, 2000).
15. Owen Cornwall, “An Early Modern
Conjunction of Persian and Sanskrit Astrology”, unpublished paper, Annual South
Asia Conference, Madison, 2015.
16. Brown, “Did Aurangzeb ban music?”
17. Moin, The Millennial Sovereign, pp.
233-239.
18. One of Aurangzeb’s teachers and closest
advisers, Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qavi became s.adr al-s.udur¯ (minister in charge of
religious grants and judicial appointments) after Aurangzeb’s coronation,
receiving the title of I‘timad Khan. Remembered for his role in the trial of
the Sufi Sarmad in 1660-61, he was murdered in 1667. See Rajeev Kinra,
“Infantilizing Bab¯ a D¯ ar¯ a: The Cultural Memory of D ¯ ar¯ a Shekuh and the
Mughal Public Sphere”, ¯ Journal of Persianate Studies, 2 (2009), pp. 188–189.
According to Taley Mohammad Khan, ‘Abd al-Qavi had a Gujarat connection, having
previously held the position of muft¯ı of Palanpur and moving to Ahmedabad when
Aurangzeb was appointed governor of Gujarat in 1645. Taley Mohammad Khan,
History of the Palanpur State (Baroda, 1913), p. 80.
19. Khan, History of the Palanpur State, pp.
79-81. Although ‘Abd al-Qavi was at Aurangzeb’s side in 1646, I have not found
a contemporary mention of Qazi ‘Abd al-Wahhab, about whom more below, in other
accounts of the incident.
20. ‘Al¯ı Muh.ammad Khan, ¯ Mirat-i Ah ¯
.mad¯ı, translated by M. F. Lokhandwala (Baroda, 1965), pp. 194–195; ʿAl¯ı
Muh.ammad Khan and M ¯ ¯ıt.hal¯ al K ¯ ayasth, ¯ Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı:
Supplement, translated by Syed Nawab Ali and C. N. Seddon (Baroda, 1928), pp.
62–63.
21. MacLean , “The Sociology of Political
Engagement”, in India’s Islamic Traditions, 711-1750, (ed.) Richard M. Eaton
(New Delhi, 2003), p. 153.
22. Ibid., p. 159; Subrahmanyam, “Turning the
Stones Over”, pp. 147-148.
23. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı Supplement,
translation, p. 62.
24. MacLean, “Real Men and False Men at the
Court of Akbar”, p. 202.
25. Ibid., p. 199. Shaykh Mustafa accused the
‘ulama of effeminacy, of being “false men”. “The Mahdavi charge is against
false Muslims who do not take Islam seriously, and their solution is a radical
millennial space on Indian earth . . . ”, p. 209.
26. Ibid., pp. 203, 213, n. 20. Akbar’s
millennialism was forged with the help of Abu’l Fazl, a critical source of
Mahdavi ideas courtesy of his father. Says MacLean, “Common elements in Mahdavi
and Akbari millennialism include the attack on taqlid, the concern with the
eschatological properties of the year 1000, the emphasis on authoritative
vilayat, and the use of elusive experimental poetry as expressive of that
vilayat”.
27. MacLean, “The Sociology of Political
Engagement”, p. 160. Shaykh Mustafa Gujarati tried to convince Akbar of a
Mahdavi legitimation for the Mughals but was ultimately unsuccessful. MacLean,
“Real Men and False Men at the Court of Akbar”, p. 213.
28. MacLean, “The Sociology of Political
Engagement”, p. 162.
29. Shah Naw ¯ az Kh ¯ an and ‘Abd al-H ¯ .
ayy, Maʾasir al-umar ¯ a¯ʾ (Calcutta, 1888), 1, p. 235.
30. See Shah Naw ¯ az Kh ¯ an and ‘Abd al-H ¯
. ayy, Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translated by Henry Beveridge and Baini Prasad, 1
(Calcutta, 1911; reprinted, 1979), pp. 113-116, for an account of Jamal Khan
and Abu’l Fath Khan Dakkani, Mahdavis active in Ahmadnagar in the early
seventeenth century.
31. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı Supplement, translation,
p. 62.
32. Ibid., p. 62. According to Taley Mohammad
Khan, the clerics wrote a fatwa¯ advising the prince to have Sayyid Raju
expelled from the city. The order was delivered to Raju at the home of one of
his Panni Afghan disciples the following day. Khan, History of the Palanpur
State, pp. 80-81.
33. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı Supplement,
translation, p. 63.
34. Taley Mohammad Khan relates that Shah Beg
the kotwal¯ was joined by Bahadur Khan Chela, Isma‘il Beg, and the ruler of
Navanagar, Jam Ranmal. A Davezai Pathan named Diler Khan delivered the death
blow to Sayyid Raju as he sat at prayer. Khan, History of the Palanpur State
pp. 81-82.
35. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, translation, p. 194.
36. MacLean, “The Sociology of Political
Engagement”, pp.162-163, citing the Mubah¯. athah-yi ‘Alamg ¯ ¯ır¯ı of Abu¯
al-Qasim, n.d., p. ¯ 9.
37. MacLean, “The Sociology of Political
Engagement”, p. 163.
38. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, 1, p. 218, 220;
translation, pp. 192-194. The author of the Mirat¯ says that Sayyid Jalal’s mans.ab
rank was raised to 6000 zat¯ and 1500 savar¯ in 1645. Lahauri states that this
rank had already been awarded by Shah Jahan in 1642. ‘Abd al-H. am¯ıd Lahaur ¯
¯ı, Badshahn ¯ ama ¯ , (eds.) Kabiruddin and Abdur Rahim (Calcutta, 1867-68),
2, p. 718.
39. Sayyid¯ı H. asan-j¯ı Badsh ¯ ah b. Sayyid
¯ ¯ı Shams Khan, “Kitab al-tadhkirah”, MS in the Tayyibi Dawoodi Bohra ¯
Library of Syedna Taher Fakhruddin, Mumbai (ca. 1646/1056 ah), folio 5. I am
grateful for permission to cite this important text. Translated from the Arabic
by Mohammed Meerzaei.
40. Satish C. Misra, Muslim Communities of
Gujarat: Preliminary studies in their history and social organization (New
York, 1964), p. 31. Misra gives no citation but his sources appear to be the
following community histories: Muh.ammad ‘Al¯ı b. J¯ıvabh ¯ ai, ¯
Mausam-i-bahar¯ (Bombay, 1882) and Isma‘¯ ¯ılj¯ı H. asanal¯ı Badripresswala,
Akhbar al-da‘wat ¯ al-akarm¯ın (Rajkot, 1937).
41. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı Supplement,
translation, p. 110.
42. The Bohras used (and continue to use) the
Fatimid ‘Mis.r¯ı’ calendrical system, a variant of the lunar calendar in which
months are assigned a predetermined number of days. As month lengths were
calculated arithmetically rather than by astronomical observance, the Bohras
did not regard sighting of the moon as the end of the Ramadan fast. While I am
not aware of Bohras adopting a ‘Hindu’ calendrical system, the accusation may
have come about because other Isma‘ilis in Gujarat, such as certain Satpanthi
groups, used Indic calendars and observed certain Indic festivals.
43. Sayyid¯ı H. asan-j¯ı Badsh ¯ ah, “Kitab
al-tadhkirah”, f. ¯ 11
44. Tahera Qutbuddin, “The 32nd Dai Al-Mutlaq
Syedna Qutub-Khan Qutbuddin RA”, Fatemi Dawat Biography Series
http://www.fatemidawat.com/assets/images/Published%20Works/Dawat%20History%20and%20Biography/
32%20Syedna%20Qutbuddin%20Shaheed%20tarikh%20author.pdf, pp. 4-5 (accessed 1
January 2018).
45. Sayyid¯ı H. asan-j¯ı Badsh ¯ ah, “Kitab
al-tadhkirah”, f. ¯ 14, Misra, Muslim Communities, p. 32. According to Tahera
Qutbuddin, “Due to the hundreds of martyrs buried in her soil, Ahmadabad is
known in Bohra parlance as “Little Karbala¯ʾ” (chhoť¯ı Karbala¯)”. Tahera
Qutbuddin, “Bohras”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three, (eds.) Gudrun Kramer ¨
et al. (Brill Online, 2013).
46. This was an attempt to inculcate in him
the appropriate ethos of Mughal discipleship and reverence—an example of a
millennial tradition that Aurangzeb preserved.
47. Misra, Muslim Communities, p. 35. It is
not clear whether Dara knew about his deputy’s actions, but this incident may
dent his reputation for religious open-mindedness.
48. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, 1, pp. 352-353;
Jadunath Sarkar, History of Aurangzib mainly based on Persian Sources
(Calcutta, 1912), 3, p. 320.
49. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, 1, pp.
433-434.
50. His name is not mentioned in the Bohra
accounts but Mukhtar Khan was governor of Gujarat in 1682. Misra, Muslim
Communities, p. 39. The da‘¯ ¯ı remained in Jamnagar and Khambhalia until his
death in 1699. After this time, trouble started between the da‘¯ ¯ı and the
exiled ruler of Jamnagar, Lakhaji (r. 1690-1709), resulting in the imprisonment
of the da‘¯ ¯ı’s son who was released only after the payment of 10 lakh (1
million) Mahmudis.
51. Misra, Muslim Communities, p. 37; Mirat-i
Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, 1, pp. 356-359.
52. Ibid., p. 358.
53. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, 1, p. 81.
54. The goodwill felt by many Gujaratis for
Dara may be related to his period as governor shortly after Aurangzeb. While
one of Aurangzeb’s first acts after taking office as governor of Gujarat in
1645 was to have the Jain temple built by prominent Ahmedabad trader Shantidas
Jawahari destroyed and replaced by a mosque, in Dara’s tenure (from 1658–62,
during which time his deputy Ghairat Khan functioned in Dara’s place), Shah
Jahan issued a farman¯ restoring the Jain temple destroyed by Aurangzeb to
Shantidas Jawahari. (3 July) The farman¯ bears the seal of Dara Shukoh. Although
the Jains considered the temple property desecrated and abandoned it, the
gesture may have resonated among non-Muslims more widely. M. S. Commissariat, A
History of Gujarat (Bombay, New York, 1938), 2, p. 130.
55. See Samira Sheikh, “Alliance, Genealogy and
Political Power: The Cud¯ .asam ¯ as of Junagadh and the Sultans ¯ of Gujarat”,
Medieval History Journal, 11, 1 (2008).
56. C. Davis, “Dara Shukuh and Aurangzib:
Issues of Religion and Politics and their Impact on Indo-Muslim Society”, PhD
thesis (Indiana University, 2002), p. 237.
57. Kinra, “Infantilizing Bab¯ a D¯ ar¯ a”,
pp. ¯ 184–192.
58. Kinra, “Infantilizing Bab¯ a D¯ ar¯ a”,
p. ¯ 187.
59. Muh.ammad Saq¯ ¯ı Musta‘idd Khan, ¯
Ma’as¯.ir-i ‘Alamg¯ır¯ı: A History of the Emperor Aurangzib ‘Alamgir (r.
1658-1707 A.D.), translated by Jadunath Sarkar (Calcutta, 1947), pp. 71–72.
60. Muh.ammad Hashim Kh ¯ af¯ ¯ı Khan, ¯
Muntakhab al-lubab¯ , in H. M. Elliot and John Dowson, History of India
(Allahabad, 1969), 7, p. 143.
61. On Prannath and the Pranamis see
Dominique-Sila Khan, “The Mahdi of Panna: A Short History of the Pranamis, Part
1”, Indian Journal of Secularism, 6 (2003) and “The Mahdi of Panna: A Short
History of the Pranamis, Part 2”, Indian Journal of Secularism, 7, 1 (2003);
articles by P. S. Mukharya, Bhagwan Das Gupta, and Hafiz Muhammad Tahir Ali in
Medieval Bhakti Movements in India, Sri Caitanya Quincentenary Commemoration
Volume, (ed.) N. N. Bhattacharyya (Delhi, 1989); and Brendan P. LaRocque,
“Trade, State and Religion in Early Modern India: Devotionalism and the Market
Economy in the Mughal Empire”, PhD thesis (University of Wisconsin-Madison,
2004).
62. The following summary of Prannath’s
movement is taken from LaRocque, “Trade, State and Religion in Early Modern
India”, pp. 205-213, and Sandhya Sharma, “Society and Culture in Northern India
as Reflected in the Reeti Poetry During the Late Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Century”, PhD thesis (Jawaharlal Nehru University, 2000), Chapter 5, both of
whom quote modern, late twentieth-century editions of a seventeenth-century
hagiography of Prannath by a disciple named Lal Das (see for example, Lald¯
asa, ¯ B¯ıtaka, (eds.) Manikl ¯ al Dh ¯ ami and Vimal ¯ a Meht ¯ a¯ [New Delhi,
1991]).
63. The hagiography dates Prannath’s visit to
Delhi to VS 1735 (1678-9). Jizya was imposed in 1679.
64. Amir Aqil Khan should probably be
identified with ‘Aqil Khan M ¯ ¯ır Askar¯ı who became a bakhsh¯ı-i tan
(superintendent of grants) in 1679 and two years later, the governor of Delhi,
a post he held until his death in 1695. He had a long and close acquaintance
with Aurangzeb, consoling him with a verse of his own composition when the
prince’s beloved companion Hira Bai Zainabadi died in 1654. Ma’as¯.ir
al-umara’¯ , translation, pp. 73-74.
65. Sidi Faulad Khan was kotwal¯ of
Shahjahanabad under Aurangzeb and his successor Muhammad Shah.
66. Sharma, “Society and Culture in Northern
India”, p. 234, citing B¯ıtak, sections 40, 41, 44.
67. A full study of the rebellion will appear
in Samira Sheikh, “The Matiya Rebellion and Religious Categories in Early
Modern Gujarat” (forthcoming).
68. On the rebellion, see Aniruddha Ray,
“Franc¸ois Martin’s Account of the Matiya Uprising in 1684”, (paper presented
at the Indian History Congress, 31st session, Benares, 1969). On the Satpanthis
of Pirana, see D.-S. Khan and Zawahir Moir, “Coexistence and Communalism: The
Shrine of Pirana in Gujarat”, South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 22
(1999).
69. Ma’as¯.ir-i ‘Alamg¯ır¯ı, translation, p.
74.
70. Ibid., p. 174.
71. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, p.
236.
72. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, translation, p. 220.
73. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 1, p.
75.
74. For more details about the split, see
Misra, Muslim Communities, pp. 19-22.
75. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 1, p.
74.
76. According to Dockrat, this episode was
prompted by the appointment of ‘Abd al-Rahman Khan-i Khanan, a Shi‘a, as
governor of Gujarat in 1573-76. Muhammad Ashraf Ebrahim Dockrat, “Between
Orthodoxy and Mysticism: The Life and Works of Muh.ammad Ibn T. ahir Al-Fattan
¯ ¯ı (914/1508-986/1578)” (University of South Africa, 2002), p. 66.
77. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 1, p.
235. According to S. C. Misra, based on Bohra records, the assassin was an
Isma‘ili Bohra. Misra, Muslim Communities, p. 24, fn.26. Other accounts say he
was assassinated by a Mahdavi, perhaps helped by Akbar’s chronicler and close
associate Abu’l Fazl, whose father was a Mahdavi. Dockrat, “Between Orthodoxy
and Mysticism”, p. 68.
78. Niccolao Manucci, Storia do Mogor, or
Mogul India, 1653-1708, translated by William Irvine, (London, 1907), 2, p. 4,
fn.86, cited in Brown, “Did Aurangzeb ban music? Questions for the
historiography of his reign”, p. 96.
79. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 1, p.
239.
80. Ibid., p. 240.
81. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı Supplement,
translation, pp. 13, 155.
82. According to his employee Ishwardas
Nagar, a fellow resident of Patan and author of the Futuh¯. at-i ‘Alamg ¯
¯ır¯ı, Shaykh al-Islam resisted the appointment. His Majesty replied, “In view
of your acquisition of knowledge and character (halat), I ordered you to
undertake the task of a qazi, which is incumbent on all men, and authorised you
to perform the works of the world and the ascertainment of the truth in it,
which too is among the great acts of devotion”. At last the Shaikh in
consideration of the Emperor’s extreme kindness and grace, accepted the post,
and adorned the woolsack of the (court of) Holy Law”. ¯Ishwardas N¯ agar, ¯
Futuh¯. at-i ‘ ¯ Alamg ¯ ¯ır¯ı, (eds.) Raghubir Sinh and Quazi Karamtullah,
translated by M. F. Lokhandwala and Jadunath Sarkar (Vadodara, 1995). p.44.
83. See Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, p.
239. Satish Chandra, basing himself on Abu’l Faz ¯ .l Ma‘mur¯ ¯ı’s text, gives
the wrong date for this event. Chandra, “Jizyah and the State in India during
the 17th Century”, p. 336, fn.1. For a detailed note on accounts of this event
see Rafat Bilgrami, “Shaykh ‘Abd al-Wahhab and his family under ‘Alamg¯ır”,
Journal of the Pakistan Historical Society, 31, 2 (1983), p. 110, n.1.
84. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, 1, p. 359.
85. According to the Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı,
Sayyid Jalal held the position of chief judge, qaz¯.¯ı al-quz. at¯ . Mirat-i Ah
¯ .mad¯ı, 1 pp. 217–219. According to Shah Nawaz Khan, he “accepted the
s.adarat of India” (became ¯ s.adr al-s.udur¯ ) in 1642 and held the position
until his death in 1647. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 3, pp. 447-451.
Intriguingly, Shah Nawaz Khan reported that Sayyid Jalal and his ancestors were
said to belong to the Imamiya (Shi‘i) religion. (p. ¯ 448) In light of
Aurangzeb’s views, it would be curious if his son, Raz.av¯ı Khan, professed
Shi‘i beliefs or practices.
86. Maʾas¯.ir al-umara¯ʾ, translation, 2, pp.
307-309.
87. Mirat-i Ah ¯ .mad¯ı, 1, p. 310.
88. Ashin Das Gupta conjectures that Mulla
‘Abd al-Ghafur was an Ism ¯ a’¯ ¯ıl¯ı but there is no doubt that he was a Sunni
Bohra. Ashin Das Gupta, The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 1500–1800.
Collected Essays of Ashin Das Gupta (New Delhi, 2004), p. 336, n. 7. See also
Om Prakash, “The Indian maritime merchant, 1500–1800”, Journal of the Economic
and Social History of the Orient, 47, 3 (2004), pp. 441, 445. According to
Ashin Das Gupta, he came to Surat around 1678. Om Prakash suggests he came to
Surat in the 1660s, which would have been while ‘Abd al-Wahhab was still alive.
89. Makrand Mehta, Indian Merchants and
Entrepreneurs in Historical Perspective: With special reference to the shroffs
of Gujarat, 17th to 19th centuries (New Delhi, 1991), p. 35.
90. For a description of the trial of Sarmad
see Kinra, “Infantilizing Bab¯ a D¯ ar¯ a”, pp. ¯ 188-189.
91. Abu’l Faz.l Allam¯ ¯ı, The A´ın i Akbari
(Calcutta, 1873-94), 1, p. 258.
92. Wahed Husain, Administration of Justice
During the Muslim Rule in India (Calcutta, 1934), p. 51, citing Mirat¯
al-‘alam.
93. Jadunath Sarkar, Mughal Administration
(Calcutta, 1920), p. 37, citing an early eighteenth-century Mughal
administrative manual: “Be just, be honest, be impartial. Hold trials in the
presence of the parties and at the court-house and the seat of government
(muhakuma) . . . Do not accept presents from the people of the place where you
serve, nor attend entertainments given by anybody and everybody . . . Know
poverty (faqr) to be your glory (fakhr)”, (pp. 41-42).
94. Alan Guenther, “Hanafi Fiqh in Mughal
India: The Fataw¯ a-i ‘ ´ Alamg ¯ ¯ır¯ı”’, in India’s Islamic Traditions,
711-1750, (ed.) Richard M. Eaton (New Delhi, 2003), pp. 213–214.
95. Mouez Khalfaoui, “al-Fataw¯ a l- ¯ ʿAlamg
¯ ¯ıriyya”, in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Three (ed.) Kate Fleet et al. (Brill
Online, 2015).
96. Aurangzeb’s Shari‘a-based reforms
departed significantly from Akbar’s legal and political systematisation of the
previous century as encoded in the Ain-i Akbari and other texts. It would be
interesting to compare conceptions of the imperial subject in these two texts
and regimes.
97. Samira Sheikh, Forging a Region: Sultans,
traders, and pilgrims in Gujarat, 1200-1500 (New Delhi, 2010), Chapter 5.
98. See, for instance, the controversy that
erupted in 1710-11 over Aurangzeb’s successor Bahadur Shah’s proclamation that
caused opponents to allege Shi‘i leanings. A. Kaicker, “Unquiet City: Making
and Unmaking Politics in Mughal Delhi, 1707-39”, Ph.D. thesis (Columbia
University, 2014), pp. 389-416. Kaicker reads Bahadur Shah’s proclamation as a
“maximalist” position which aimed to integrate Sunni and Shi‘i claims to the
state (p. 401), which would be a marked divergence from Aurangzeb’s stance.
99. The resistance, from the late nineteenth
century onwards, to the messianic claims of Ghulam Ahmad and his followers are
another prominent example. See Y. Friedmann, “The Messianic Claim of Ghulam Ah
¯ .mad”, in Toward