Ashoka and Akbar (Negotiations and Coalitions under the Two ‘Greats’ of Indian History: Ashoka and Akbar)

By: Anurag Anil | MA (International Relations) | SAU/IR(M)2016/22

An essay submitted for the consideration of Dr. Medha Bisht as a part of the assessed coursework for ‘Introduction to Diplomacy and International Negotiations’ course.

Negotiations and Coalitions under the Two ‘Greats’ of Indian History: Ashoka and Akbar AN ANALYSIS OF ‘DHAMMA’ AND ‘SULH-I-KUL’

ABSTRACT

This paper aims to look into the policy stratagems of two ‘greats’ in the pantheon of distinguished Indian rulers – Ashoka and Akbar, which were ‘Dhamma’ and ‘Sulh-i-Kul’, respectively. When we think of negotiations and coalitions, most of the times, we tend to ignore their manifestations in history, and, even then – give little weightage to the events, negotiations and policies which happened in the ‘Eastern’ realm. ‘Dhamma’ and ‘Sulh-i-Kul’ were devised, innovatively, to bind the diverse pluralities in harmony and generate order. These novel policies would be discussed under the lenses of – ancient Indian board strategy game of Chess and the existing theoretical frameworks of – negotiation-analysis and coalition-building, leading to a concluding denouement which would highlight their relevance for the policymakers in the modern world.

Keywords: Ashoka, Dhamma, Akbar, Sulh-i-Kul, Chess, diplomacy, negotiations, coalitions.

introduction

Serendipity. It’s quite a fascinating trigger, especially in academic research as it gives you an opening when you are facing a wall of opaqueness, even when you know what lies beyond the wall. And, so – despite knowing about the structure and concomitant arguments, I was looking for that ‘opening’, which would provide the gist of the entire essay succinctly. Therefore, when I was reading this article by Rajeev Bhargava – a political theorist with the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi, in yesterday’s ‘The Hindu’ (Bhargava, 2017), it led me to a sense of exhilaration. Bhargava has conceptualised typology of tolerance in the following manner:

1)    When one desists from interfering in the matters of others, even if they are morally reprehensible, and even if she has the power to intercede.

2)    When two groups may find each other’s activities morally abhorrent and have almost equal powers, but – they, still, refrain from any intervention as the cost of ensuing conflict would be very high.

3)    The third type of tolerance is based on the ‘attitude of live and let live’. Until, the actions are not deliberate and in-your-face, the groups are indifferent to each other.

4)    The final strain of toleration, as per him, is the ‘patronising’ one, which is based on the idea of fraternity where we overlook faults in others’ actions as we have feelings of – love, friendliness, and fellowship for the ‘others’. He calls it ‘positive toleration’, in contrast to the negativity shown by the other three, which were mentioned earlier.

This paper takes the above definition of ‘positive tolerance’ as the conceptual departure point and tries to build it as a fascinating aspect, to be looked into in detail in the field of analyses of – negotiations and coalitions, where there is – typically – preponderant influence of issues germinating from the above-discussed three types of ‘negative tolerance’. It, also, stresses on the importance of ethics and morality, which is – generally – pooh-poohed when one is practising, or studying, diplomacy, in general and negotiations/coalitions, in particular.

Normatively, two choices exist before the decision-makers about the sustenance of peace – when faced with adverse situations which may/have spiralled out of their control. Either, they can go for the solution provided by their military capability, or – they could opt for peaceful means. The second one leads to opening of diplomatic parleys and facilitation of negotiations. But, the protagonists of this paper – Ashoka and Akbar – despite living and reigning in turbulent periods, would twist the second option innovatively, further, for durable peace and order – by their respective policies of – ‘Dhamma’ and ‘Sulh-i-Kul’, making their names etched, forever, in the annals of Politics and History.

Emperor Ashoka was hailed as “(the) most celebrated exponent” of this peaceful approach, with “the inscribed pillars he had erected all over India and the edicts he had carved on rock faces (being) witness to his repentance and compassion for all living beings (Pandit, 1956, pp. 432-433). Despite being at an inconceivable position of strength where he could have steamrolled opposition and dictated terms to any opposition, he “foreswore conquest by war and replaced it with conquest by piety (dhammaghosha)” (Jha, 1977, 2005, p. 94). On the same note, the enduring ‘influence’ of the Mughal empire on the Indian nation-making, specifically, and on almost all the facets of modern India, whether political, social, cultural, economic, generally – as a resultant of conciliatory policies devised, professed and adopted by its greatest ruler, Akbar – makes him a worthy case study for modern practitioners of governance and diplomacy. “Integration and negotiated order… a composite ruling class… centrality of debate… mediating of different world-views” makes the reign of Akbar “an early precursor to the secular state in India” (Vivekanandan, 2011, p. 6).

In the defence of using historical cases, from not the modern era, but the early and the medieval ages, and that too, from the ‘Oriental’ part of the World, in the field of study of International Relations, and there – rationality-infatuated diplomacy and negotiations, I would assert that: historical engagement helps in – “build(ing) contingency and open-endedness into theoretical assertions”, gives a broader conception of power (too much emphasis has been given on the material exhibitions of it, instead of more impactful – in  my opinion – normative expositions), the “caricature” of ‘Occidental’ imagining of the ‘Oriental’ world as incapable of making contribution in strategic conceptualisations, prevalence of ‘Eurocentricity’ and ‘ahistoricty’ making the field of International Relations shorn of reflection (limited, as it focuses on recent events, mostly) (Vivekanandan, 2011, pp. 2-5).

conceptual framework

The priority – here, in this section – would be to lay down the theoretical definitions and dimensions associated with – negotiations, coalitions, and Chess, in as lucid manner as possible, so as the readers can gain insights, related to them, when Ashoka and Akbar’s policies would be discussed in the following two segments of this paper.

“Thinking coalitionally” is akin to “thinking negotiations” (Dupont, 1996, pp. 62-63). The two are inter-related and indispensable to each other, giving them a fascinating import, specifically – when you try to locate them in the power dynamics, existing and evolving, different interest-groups have in between them, more riveting this becomes when trying to discern them in the context of – empires, where “linkage between unrelated or loosely-related issues in order to gain increased leverage in negotiation is an ancient and accepted aspect of diplomacy (emphasis mine)”. The success of negotiations is seen in “bring(ing) out prominently the common advantage to both sides and to link these advantages that they may appear equally balanced to both (all) parties” (Sebenius, 1983, pp. 281-282). In fact, forging coalitions, based on this perspective about negotiations, is all about – reducing complexities and power enhancement “derived from uniting dispersed forces” (Dupont, 1996, p. 61). In the cases of fledgling empires of – the Mauryas and the Mughals, this would be utilized to the hilt to bind the diverging forges into a cohesive unit, as we will see later. The evaluative sagacity shown by – Ashoka, first, and Akbar, later about vicissitudes in then Indian Polity and Society, policy innovations devised and promulgated for coalition formation and maintenance, their own personal involvements in conducting fair, open and honest communication with diverse sections, support given to the ‘epistemic’ communities (as in the garb of – officials, group leaders) for easier and wider acceptance of conceived policies against the machinations of reactionary ‘defenders’ and ‘brakers’, use of channels of – persuasion and argumentation (whose significance has been put forward, stoutly and brilliantly, in the context of India in the self-defined ‘The Argumentative Indian’ by Amartya Sen!), not only show the nuts-and-bolts of good negotiations for effective coalitions, but – also – reveal how these theoretical functions and processes were integrated into the ancient and medieval Indian statecraft, much before their conceptualization by the Western academia!.

The ingenuity of – Ashoka and Akbar did not lie in only increasing the static (as described in the figure above) Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), between multitude of – actors and issues (including the immobile assertiveness associated with personal and societal views on the intrusion of state into ‘sensitive’ religion), but – also – in recalibrating and reformulating it!

If we give a progressive structure to the processes involved in negotiations, as well as coalition formations, it can be proposed of comprising:

1)    Formulation: With issues and parties taken as variables, instead of fixed entities (Sebenius, 1983, p. 307) before the process starts, during the process and, even after the culmination – so as to, efficiently, coalesce them with the ever-changing dynamics. The two ‘greats’ excelled in this, while going for – ‘addition’/’subtraction’ of parties and issues to suit political and social exigencies.

2)    Procedural: Here, the most inventive of innovations in bargaining, even going against the conventional grain of diplomatic negotiations, is seen when both the emperors go for Full and Open Truthful Exchange (FOTE). Bargaining ability has been linked to ability to fool and bluff, one by misleading about facts, and the other where the parties don’t have anything to hide from each other (Howard Raiffa, 2003, p. 86) (Schelling, 1960, 1980, p. 23). The second way is very rarely seen in normal diplomatic parlance. Astonishingly, this would be employed by both the rulers – along with, incorporating all the concerned parties in a nebulous sort of joint decision making – almost 2200 and 500 years back to the present date!

3)    Agreement: Maintenance of mutually agreed decisions, post-negotiations, is dependent on leadership and integrative cohesion issues – especially, when it comes to the resolution of disputes related to changing interests and status (Dupont, 1996, p. 62). The way Ashoka and Akbar have dealt with these multilateral negotiations, their complexity visible in this interpretation where they have been defined as “multiplicity of dyadic interactions” (Dupont, 1996, p. 48), shows their tactical acumen and creativity.

At this juncture, I’ll like to elucidate on three more conceptual propositions, which are very much relevant when dissecting the unconventional policy prescriptions of Ashoka and Akbar:

1)    In the ancient Indian political thought, there were fuzzy notions about geographically-distinct political realms. So, conquest by force was, sometimes, less preferred over “expansion of sovereignty or svavisaya by effecting alliances with ‘those who are likely to be won over’ under the enemy’s sovereignty or paravisaya” (Vivekanandan, 2011, p. 101).

2)    The “standards, laws, rules, and norms present in the community, existing at an intersubjective level” becoming legitimate when an individual, or community, “internalizes its content and reconceives his or her interests to the rule” (Vivekanandan, 2011, p. 158).

3)    And, I am – theoretically – turning Modelski’s assertions (Modelski, 1964, pp. 551-552) on its head in two ways: I am aligning “power” and “happiness” {“which are the determinants of (king’s) status in the international society} to an empire’s human constituents, as the two emperors did; and – insistent stress on accommodation (sandhi), a part of the “six-fold policy” (sadhgunya), being the preferred course of option for the inferior ruler – being, spectacularly, overturned, with its use, in the policy prescriptions of – Ashoka and Akbar!

Completing my theorization, and taking ideational inspiration from David Lai’s work on how one needs to learn to play the ancient Chinese board game of Go to understand China (Lai, 2004) (Johnson, 2011) , I propose that the Indian strategy game of Chess, or Shatranj, can be seen as a major influence on the strategic thought of Indian decision makers and power brokers, considering its popularity across the social strata, through the ages. It has been described as “a mimic battle fought upon a field of sixty-four squares with pieces moved according to an elaborate system and having powers suggestive of a variety of fighting units (italics mine)” (Cleveland, 1907) , with importance being given to – visual imagination, simultaneous planning, perception of position of various pieces, including the minor pawns (actors), the strategic distinctness of – opening, middle and end games (linkages), novelties like gambits, sacrifices and conversions (a la addition and subtraction of players and issues), and – even constant use of ‘bluffing’ by selling ‘traps’ to the opponent. But, the most important winning premise in Chess is based on forming ‘alliances’ between various pieces, differing in their positional values, where you try not to move a piece until you have a ‘support’ backing it up. And, the plebian pawns (people) play a very important in this. We find all these characteristics (including the courageous, but ‘truthful’ bluffs) in the policies of – ‘Dhamma’ and ‘Sulh-i-Kul. No wonder, Russia’s “Grandest Master”, and one of the finest exponents of Chess playing, Garry Kasparov has used Chess to analyse the politics of – Middle East, the Arab Spring and his own ‘battles’ against Putin (Kasparov, 2012, pp. 25-34)!

ashoka and his policy of ‘dhamma’

The conceptual magnitude of Ashoka’s policy of ‘Dhamma’ can be gathered from its reflection in – UNESCO’s constitution where it has been proclaimed that “…since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed” (Gelblum, 1957, p. 261). Its practical manifestation has led to claims that the Mauryan empire was “the world’s first secular welfare state… (with) equality of all free citizens or Aryas before the law, irrespective of caste or birth” (Ghoshal, 1959, p. 63). And, then – when you dig deeper into the annals of History, you realise that the name of Ashoka was a forgotten footnote until 1837 when James Prinsep deciphered an inscription in Brahmi script which referred to a king named ‘Devanama Piyadassi’ (beloved of the gods). Corroborations about him, later, from other chronicles and inscriptions led to full comprehension about the Ashokan empire and its rule. Coming to rule, after a violent fratricidal struggle, in 269 BC, his name has been etched with the paternal sermon-like messages seen in various insciptions found in places, showing the vastness of his empire, located in modern-day Afghanistan to Karnataka, and Kashmir to Bihar. The tale of bloodshed (in his own description – “a hundred and fifty thousand people were deported, a hundred thousand were killed and many more died”), and the impact of it on his psyche – in and after the infamous Kalinga War in 260 BC, led him to follow the policy of ‘dhammaghosha’ (conquest by piety), instead of the accustomed ‘bherighosha’ (conquest by war). Under its influence, he would send diplomatic missions to south India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Syria, Egypt, Greece, and South-east Asia. His edicts of sermons would direct people about conducting themselves in various realms of social life, propagating and disseminating the message of ‘Dhamma’ (Jha, 1977, 2005, pp. 94-95).

So, what was ‘Dhamma’? And, what was its relevance when it comes to politics and statecraft, negotiations and coalitions?

To understand the conceptual ingenuity of ‘Dhamma’, we should note that before Ashoka, three major streams of political thought had, till then, dominated politics in the Indian sphere – “Dharma” (based on the Brahmanical Vedic literature, with stress on liberation, but whose existence was intertwined with the state and the king), “Artha” (emanating from the Kautilyan line of thought, “it was a manual of political expediency”), and Buddhism (which entailed all men being equal, including the king – who was, just, an agent “to pull the community back together”) (Albinski, 1958, pp. 63-65). Deviating from the usual intellectual discourse, where the origin of ‘Dhamma’ is located in then-upcoming heterodox reaction to prevalent, influential and domineering Brahmanism, I propose that Ashoka, though – mainly moved by his Buddhist disposition, took insights from the other two, also, in formulating his policy of – ‘Dhamma’, considering – the (increasing) vastness of his empire, potential assimilation of tribes and newer agricultural communities as a by-product of its territorial expansion, the resultant political/social/economic strain on the Mauryan administration and military apparatuses, heterodox reactions to dominant and entrenched Brahmanism in the guise of – Buddhism and Jainism, the growing importance of ‘commercial’ trade and, thus – the emergence of the Vaishyas (the trading community) as a powerful interest-group challenging the established Varna-based hierarchy.

Multiplicity of issues and players converging on the scene of a nascent empire. And, so a ‘leader’ – for his and his state’s survival – needed an alliance of sorts, which would mitigate all these differences, and look to, as earlier said, “pull the community (and, thus – the state) back together”! And so, we see the birth of the philosophy of ‘Dhamma’ (“the Prakrit form of the Sanskrit word – Dharma, meaning according to the context, the Universal Law or Righteousness or, by extension, the Social and Religious Order”), which was – definitely – a novel thought in “Indian political and social theory”. Tolerance and non-violence being the guiding principles with finer details, about the proposition, deliberately left vague, the policy of ‘Dhamma’ was a “plea to suppress differences of opinion in the interests of general harmony”. His insistence on carrying each and all along, for trying to build a grand social alliance, of sorts, can be seen here in his address in the Rock edict XII – “…consideration towards slaves and servants, obedience to mother and father, generosity towards friends, acquaintances, and relatives, and towards priests and monks” (Thapar, 1966, 1990, 2001, pp. 84-87). And, here – the value of having an ‘open, direct and truthful communication’ with his heterogenous subjects, through his inscriptions in rock and pillar edicts installed in various parts of his vast empire, cannot – at all – be negated. This would be, further, accentuated by his going on ‘Dhammayatras’ (royal tours) which would facilitate his direct interaction with the general populace. The appointment of ‘Dhammamahamatras’, as a designated class of officers, to look into the adherence, conduct and spread of his policy of ‘Dhamma’ even in the remote frontiers of his huge empire (Jha, 1977, 2005, p. 107) was akin to the role of ‘epistemic communities’ in building and nurturing causes and policies

It has been claimed, as stated earlier, also, that Ashoka was aware of the political exigencies behind his conceptualization of ‘Dhamma’ as he felt that “he has established a sense of law and order, a kind of ‘Kingdom of Righteousness’…compared with the preceding period…(which) appeared unruly, even chaotic” to him (Scialpi, 1984, p. 69). On being alleged that ‘Dhamma’ was not a strategic intervention but state’s patronage to Buddhism, it has been pointed out that Ashoka never had any intention, as visible in his inscriptions, to propagate a religious order (Sinha, 1994, p. 9). The doyen among the Indian historians, DD Kosambi has assessed ‘Dhamma’ as “not Buddhism, but as some code of behavior for all society which could be followed without damage to the various older group dhammas” (Kosambi, 1959, p. 204). Taking this further, and something which would intrigue the discipline of International Relations, Ashoka has been evaluated as “a realist, a firm and strong-minded ruler, but a spiritualised one” in which lied his innovation in the statecraft (Gelblum, 1957, p. 262); and, even a “power-oriented ruler” and a “deviant”, who was trying to “circumvent” the powerful Brahmanical order for assimilating the new social classes in an egalitarian order for the sustenance of his empire (Cohen, 1964, p. 210). Doing justice to Ashoka and his policy of Dhamma, he has been lauded for being, both – “a statesman in the context of sustaining an empire in a particular historical period, and as a person with a strong commitment to changing society through what might be called the propagation of social ethics”, so much so that it was like “reversal of (well-established and rooted) Varnashrama-dharma” (Thapar, 2009, pp. 31-32), leaving an enduring lesson for the modern political and social negotiators/policymakers, too.

AKBAR AND HIS POLICY OF ‘SULH-I-KUL’

Now, when one envisages the board of Chess in the polity of the 16^th century AD India, with the survival of the newly-regained and re-established Mughal empire at stake, the outside and inside threats looking for every minute possibility to wrest control representing the other side, what Akbar has got to play with in his side? His disjointed nobility (the Turanis, the Persians, the Rajputs, the Indian Muslims), his own scheming brothers, overbearing guardians (first, Bairam Khan, later – Maham Anga), and something which queers the pitch more difficult for him when – even – compared to Ashoka, being a Muslim ruler of foreign ethnicity in a Hindu-majority then-India, with Muslim fundamentalist clergy looking for utter domination. And, then – he was able to negotiate and conjure a grand strategy and a tactical masterstroke, encompassing political, social, cultural, economic, ecclesiastical tenets, that it – still – reverberates, leaving an enduring legacy on modern India. Therefore, it’s not surprising that some have studied him and his policies to understand “the evolution of the perception of a national India (emphasis mine)” (Ali, 1996, p. 80), while – others have “celebrated” his reign “not because he was just a ruler, but because of the ideas, or the new ideology that he was committed to (italic mine)” (Satish Chandra, 1992, p. 68).

Born in 1542 and saddled into the Mughal throne at the tender age of 14 after the untimely death of his father, Akbar would come into his own after 1560. Initially choosing coercion over conciliation as he had to stamp his authority, the gradual increase in the extent of his empire, and – thus, facing increasing complexities in players and issues, Akbar – like Ashoka – would, increasingly, look for accommodation, in – both, the realm inside his direct control and what was under his indirect suzerainty. Considering that military solutions have proved bleeding for the health of empires, politically, financially, and socially, “negotiation, alliance and as a corollary – brokerage were the elements that largely made up medieval Indian political-military behaviour (italic mine)”. What makes Mughal strategy, under and initiated by Akbar, different was its “coheren(t) and integrated approach towards eliciting the support of diverse social groups…(with) socialization (becoming) a crucial component of Mughal hegemony…(for) the systemic function of order maintenance (italic mine)” (Vivekanandan, 2011, pp. 146-147). The International Relations’ scholars should take note of the motive behind the aforementioned stratagem! His formulation of matrimonial alliances with the Rajputs evolving into not only making them the sword-arm of his military-machine, but – also – amalgamating them as partners in “the sovereign power and the wealth of the empire” (Zaidi, 1994, p. 77) is too well-known a policy to be discussed, here, in detail.

Akbar’s syncretic religious policy, considering the heterodox social milieu he was grappling with, has been divided into three phases, aligned progressively with his growing consolidation of power: the early phase between 1556-1573, when he remitted the pilgrim-tax and abolished jizyah showing his “broad-mindedness”, but looking to avoid direct confrontation with the reactionary ulamas as he was – still – finding his feet; the middle phase between 1573-1580 when he initiated the Ibadat Khana debates (where not only the ulamas, but – sufi shaikhs, Hindu saints, learned men among the Jains, the Christians and the Zorastrians, too, were invited) which “convinced him that all religions had elements of truth, and that all of them led to the same Supreme Reality”, leading to the evolution of the concept of ‘sulh-i-kul’ (“peace between all religions”), and thus, promulgation of the Mahzar – an attested statement signed by seven leading ulamas, which declared – Akbar’s pre-eminence as the supreme “interpreter” in any dispute relating to ecclesiastical matters for domestic coherence and stability (having international ramifications, too as it put him at par with “the powerful West Asian rulers”); and, the final phase between 1580-1605, when he – influenced by the Sufi tradition (and, dictated by the demands of utility of a systemic order) – established Tauhid/Din-i-Ilahi, or – “uncompromising monotheism” with Akbar being “the spiritual guide of the people”, which had influences – also – from the Hinduism, Jainism, Christianity and Zoroastrianism, leading to final breach with the ulamas (Chandra, 2004, pp. 166-185).

 

Equating it with Ashoka’s ‘Dhamma’, ‘Sulh-i-Kul’ has been interpreted as an “ideology of paternalism” for its rationale of binding diverse political and social actors into a grand, integrated, stable coalition, with Akbar having the image of “the upholder of balance and harmony in society”. Abul Fazl, the contemporary biographer of Akbar, has commented on its innovativeness by asserting that “he had to formulate a theory of sovereignty that at once set Akbar apart from his subjects, his predecessors and his contemporaries while at the same time sought to integrate all” (Vivekanandan, 2011, pp. 169, 172). It has been extolled for its strategic acuity in “successfully managing” diversities among – poltical elite, dynasties, sects and religions, and, even – migrants (Alam, 2009, pp. 135-136). Further highlighting about the sagacious ingenuity behind the conceptualization of ‘Sulh-i-Kul’ and giving a rebuttal to bigoted detractors, it has been contended that the ‘gambit’ (Oh! Chess!) didn’t lose good of other religious influences, instead turned them into a better syncretic whole (McVittie, 1950, p. 89). But, the greatest tribute to him and his policy would be that “he built a bridge of understanding between the Hindus and Muslims, effect(ing) a fusion of the two great elements of India’s religious and social life…(giving shape to) create one great commonwealth of India…a kingdom for all religions and for all races” (Fischel, 1948-1949, pp. 141-142). We do owe him the existence of this nation, along with the two neighbouring others, by instilling this Andeson-ian “horizontal comradeship” among all the existing pluralities, which – still – resonates within all of us.

conclusion

When we talk about the “political legitimacy” of India, even before its independence, in multilateral diplomatic interventions, its indomitable reputation, and thus – heft of being an “idealist moralizer”, when even seen with its recent transition to an “occasional pragmatic dealmaker” (Malone, 2012, p. 1048) , it’s beholden to the unorthodox negotiated policy-prescriptions of Ashoka and Akbar. ‘Dhamma’ and ‘Sulh-i-Kul’, as we have seen, had elements of all Putnam-ian ‘two-level bargaining’ in forging an integrative alliance. The level of difficulty, in their incorporation and implementation, gets enhanced because, here – on the board of Chess, these two ‘greats’ were not only planning their moves against the other side, they had to take into account the machinations being devised on their own sides, too. Principally, as they were fighting against the dominant and entrenched establishment in their own realm, and, thus – had to devise ways to – tactically – ‘integrate’ them. Not surprising, Churchill had said – “Diplomacy is the art of telling people to go to hell in such a way that they ask for directions.”

Or, may be, an existential ‘heaven’ here, itself!

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