Umer Hameed*
Usman
Hameed**
Saima
Umer
* National Textile University. email: umerhameeddtad@hotmail.com
** Scope Academy Lahore. email: usmanhameed1981@gmail.com
Abstract
Until the early Sixteenth Century, India was in self-imposed isolation from the outside world. However, with the development of relations be tween Mughals and Ottomans, India came out of this seclusion. Several factors were responsible for this historic development. The present study is, therefore, a pioneering effort. It seeks to fill a gap in the Indian and Ottoman historical literature. Fundamental questions guide this study are what factors determined Mughal policy towards the Ottoman Empire. Did the interests of the Mughal state guide it? On the other hand, was it govern by the whims, passions, and prejudices of the Mughal Emperors? How did Mughal relations with the Safavids, the Uzbeks, and the Sharif’s of Mecca have any bearing on Mughal Ottoman relations? The present study discussed the three major aspects. The first aspect is the Mughal Empire’s political and diplomatic rela tions with Istanbul from its beginning in 1556 to Emperor Shahjhan's deposition in 1658. The second aspect relates to the story of the Mugh al-Ottoman relations from the accession of Aurangzeb in 1658 to the death of Muhammad Shah in 1748. The third aspect includes Mughal relations with the Sharif’s of Mecca.
Keywords: Mughal India, Ottoman Empire, Political & Diplomatic Relations
INTRODUCTION
Early
Muslims knew the art of conducting negotiations with foreign countries as a
substitute for war. The Prophet Muhammad
had sent emissaries to Byzantium, Egypt, Persia, and an Ethiopia. However, the intent of these
missions was purely religious; the rulers of these coun tries were invited by
the Prophet to embrace Islam. The Umayyads had frequently exchanged embassies with the Byzantine Empire for
negotiating peace treaties. The Abbasids also main tained diplomatic relations
with their contemporary Muslim monarchs. The arrival of an em bassy from a
rival power was always an occasion of great fanfare in Baghdad; the
brilliant reception accorded to the
Byzantine ambassador in 918 bears testimony to the elaborate dip lomatic
protocol observed by the Abbasids. The successor states of the Abbasid Empire
con tinued this practice and frequently exchanged envoys with each other. The
hectic diplomatic activity carried on by
the monarch of Darul Islam in the fourteenth and fifteenth century is evident from the mass of epistolary
literature available in the collections of diplomatic corre spondence as well
as in the contemporary chronicles1.
In
his book Foreign Policy of the Great Mughals (1967), R.C. Verma has devoted
only a few perfunctory remarks to
Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic relations. Moreover, these observations betray the author's lack of awareness as to
the information available on this subject in the Mughal and Ottoman sources. Standard monographs
on individual Mughal Emperors are also
available. 2,3,4,5,6,7
These,
while narrating Mughal relations with Persia and Central Asia in detail, have
almost totally ignored the
Mughal-Ottoman relations. For instance, Professor B.P. Saksena in his ex
cellent study of Emperor Shahjahan (1932) has devoted only three pages to the Emperor's diplomatic relations with Istanbul.
In
his monumental History of Aurangzeb (in five volumes, 1912-24) Sir J.N. Sarkar
has likewise spared barely two pages for
Mughal-Ottoman relations. The situation is no better in Ottoman historiography. Professor Karpat's
observation that "Ottoman history is the stepchild of historical studies" is especially
applicable to the studies of the Ottoman Empire’s relations with her contemporary Muslim states.8 Only
two short monographs on Ottoman-Persian relations are available. These cover
barely 43 years of the more than four centuries of contacts between the two states. 9,10
Notwithstanding
the abundance of material in Turkish archives on Ottoman relations with
the Uzbeks and with the Khans of Crimea,
historians to date have sketched only the barest out-lines of these
relationships. Ottoman historians have also neglected Ottoman-Indian
relations for, which enough source
material is not forthcoming. Professor Hilanet Bayur's Hindis Tari hi (two
volumes, Ankara, 1947-1950) has devoted only a few cursory remarks to Ottoman
Mughal relations. Standard works on Ottoman history, such as Professor
Uzunrili's Osmanli Tarihi (6 vols.
Ankara, 1947-1959) and Ismail Danismend's Izhali Osmanli Tarihi
Kronolojisi (4 vols., Istabul, 1947-55),
likewise, contain very little information on the subject under re view.
COLLECTION
OF DATA
It
is necessary here to define the chronological limits of this study. The paucity
of source ma terial dictated that I take my evidence from a very long period,
roughly 1556-1748. Neverthe less, these dates have importance of their own. The
year 1556 marks the beginning of the dip lomatic relation between the Mughal
and the Ottoman states, when Emperor Humayun
(1530-1556) wrote his first, and his last, letter to the Ottoman Sultan.
The year 1748, on the other hand, marks
the termination of Mughal-Ottoman relations. It was in this year that the last Ottoman embassy to the Mughal court left
Shahjahanbad, the Mughal capital, on its
homeward journey to Istanbul. After 1748, there is no record of any
exchange of diplomatic missions between
the two sides. The background for the interaction of the Mughal Emperors, Humayun to Muhammad Shah, with their
contemporary Ottoman Sultans, is provided by ex amining the attitude of Babur
(1526-1530), the founder of the Mughal Empire in India, to wards the Ottomans.
This is been done to highlight the continuity or the change in Mughal policy towards the Ottomans after Babur’s
death.
The
basic sources used in this study is classified under four headings: official
documents of the Ottoman government,
chronicles of the Ottoman Empire, court histories and private chronicles of the Mughal Empire, and
collections of letters and diplomatic correspondence. The first category includes those documents,
mainly farmans (decrees) of the imperial Ottoman government, which provide
information on Ottoman-Indian relations. These decrees are recorded in a kind of official letter-book
called Muhimme Defteri (Register of Important Af fairs).
It
contains copies of the dispatches from the Ottoman Sultans and occasionally
from the Grand Wazir and Sheikh al-Islam
to provincial, military and religious officials in all parts of the empire. Another set of documents, which have
proven very fruitful for this study, are the
Name Humayun Defteri (Register of Imperial Correspondence). Preserved in
the Vekalet Archive, these registers contain copies of the Ottoman Sultan's
letters addressed to foreign po tentates and dignitaries; letters received from
foreign monarchs and dignitaries are recorded
in these registers.
The
second category includes the chronicles of the Ottoman Empire written by
contemporary or near-contemporary
Ottoman historians; these chronicles provide supplementary infor mation on the
diplomatic exchanges between the courts of Shahjahanabad and Istanbul. Al most
all the major chronicles have been used. However, two chroniclers in
particular, because of their interest in
Indian affairs, have been relied upon extensively: Mustafa Naima and Suleiman Ibn Khalil Izzi. Naima, the
first occupant of the office of Vakanuvislik (official court chronicler) was the author of Revzat
al-Hiisaeyn fi Hulasat Ahbar al-Hafikeyn.
This work, popularly known as Tarih-i-Naima and described by Professor
Shaw as "a landmark in Ottoman
historiography, 1"4 covers the period 1591-1660. Naima's account of the diplomatic relations between India and
the Ottoman Empire during the reign of Shahjahan is very valuable. It is through Naima alone
that we can know about the arrival of the Mughal prince Baisanghar in Istanbul
to seek Ottoman aid against Shahjahan. For this study, the text edited by Zuhuri Danisman (6 vols. Istanbul,
1967-1969) is used.
Suleiman Izzi, who served as Vukanuvis from 1743-1745 and again from 1746 1753, was the author of Tarih-i-Izzi. The period covered by this chronicle extends from 1744 to 1752. It provides firsthand information on the diplomatic exchanges between Sultan Mahmud I (1730-1754) and the Emperor Muhammad Shah (1719-1748). Izzi has copied the text of the letters exchanged between the two monarchs; the chronicler has also reproduced the petitions sent by the Mughal Nizam ul-mulk Asaf Jab I and his son Nasir Jung to the Ottoman Sultan. These letters and petitions are almost exact copies of the originals recorded in the Name Hu mayun Defteri. However, Izzi has not copied the confidential letter sent by Nizam ul-mulk to Mamud I, exhorting the Sultan to invade Persia. This indicates that contrary to the observation of modern scholars, the official Ottoman chronicler did not have access to all the state documents.11
For
the present study, the manuscript preserved in the British Museum (B.M. Or.
9318, tran scribed in 1769) is used. Most of the major Mughal chronicles,
official as well as private, are
available in print. Many of these, especially those dealing with the
reigns of Humayun and Akbar (1556-1605),
is translated into English. Sheikh Abul Fazl's Akbar Nama is an authen tic
history of Akbar's reign. Though not very helpful for assessing Akbar's
attitude towards the Ottoman, the
chronicle does provide reliable information on the Emperor's relations
with the Sharifs of Mecca. Abul Fazl's
account of the Ottoman dynasty is inaccurate. This proba bly indicates the
chronicler's lack of interest in Ottoman affairs. The chronicles of Shahja
han's reign are, however, very useful for reconstructing Mughal-Ottoman
relations; Abdul Hamid Lahori's Badshah
Nama and the Aml-i-Salih of Muhammad Salih Kanbu, published in the Bibliotheca Indica series, have been
mainly used for this study. The latest edition of Aml-i-Salih, revised by Dr. Waheed Qureshi (3
vols. Lahore, 1967-72), has also been used.
Khafi Khan's Muntakhab-ul-Lubab is the best-known private chronicle of
the Mughal Em pire.
Compiled
in 1731, this work provides additional information on the diplomatic exchanges between the Mughals and the Ottomans. Khafi
Khan's account of European piracy against
Indian pilgrim and merchant ships during the reign of Aurangzeb is very
useful in examining the Mughal attitude
towards the problem of Haj traffic.
My references are to the Persian text published in the Bibliotheca Indica series. Extensive use has been made of the diplomatic correspondence of the period. In all, almost sixty dispatches were consulted; many of these are preserved in collections of correspondence. For the present study, Munshaat-us-Salatin has proved to be very helpful. Compiled by Ahmad Feridun Bey, Secretary to the Grand Wazir Sokullu Muhammad Pasha, it contains almost all the letters exchanged between the Mughals and the Ottomans in the seventeenth century. The text pub lished from Istanbul in 1848-49 has been used. On the Mughal side, the most well-known collection of letters is Maktubat-i-Allami of Sheikh Abul Fazl. It contains letters written by the Sheikh to foreign potentates in the name of Emperor Akbar as well as the Sheikh's own dispatches to Mughal dignitaries. The imperial epistles sent to the Uzbek monarch Abdullah Khan Uzbek are very useful for reconstructing Akbar's attitude towards the Ottomans. The text published from Lucknow in 1863 is used. The unique collection of Emperor Aurangzeb's Hasbul Hukms (decrees), dictated to his secretary.
The
present study discussed the three major aspects. The first aspect is the Mughal
Empire’s political and diplomatic
relations with Istanbul from its beginning in 1556 to Emperor Shahjhan’s deposition in 1658. The contacts
of the pre-Mughal Muslim states of the subcon tinent with the Ottomans as well
as Babur's attitude towards them is briefly outline to provide proper background to the policies of Babur's
successors. The influence exercised by the
events in the neighboring Safavids and Uzbek empires and of the personal
whims and pas sions of the Mughal, monarchs on the over-all Mughal-Ottoman
relations is scrutinize. The efforts
made by the Ottomans to maintain friendly relations with the Mughals and the
kalei doscopic attitude of the Mughals, together with its causes, is emphasize.
The second aspect relates to the story
of the Mughal-Ottoman relations from the accession of Aurangzeb in 1658 to the death of Muhammad Shah in 1748. The
change in the pattern of the Mughal-Ottoman
relationship, which occurred in this period, is review and the factors
responsible for this change is been
analyzed. The downfall of the Safavids dynasty and the rise of Nadir Shah
in Persia is been briefly discussed. The
impact of these events on the fortunes of the Mughal and the Ottoman states and their effects on
Mughal-Ottoman relations is also been appraised. The third aspect includes Mughal relations with
the Sharif’s of Mecca.12
Forth
aspect discussed the problems of Indian Muslims going to Mecca on pilgrimage
during the period under review. The
major hurdle was the Portuguese blockade of the sea route to the Holy Land. The pilgrims going by the land
route via Persia had to suffer the sectarian
hostility of the Safavids government. In the sixteenth century the
Muslims of South East Asia, who were
also victims of Portuguese aggression, petitioned the Ottoman Sultan to re
lieve them from the Portuguese yoke. At about the same time the rulers of
Central Asia re quested the Porte to help them against Russian aggression. They
complained that the Russian conquest of
Kazan and Astrakhan had blocked the only land route to Mecca available to Cen
tral Asian pilgrims.
Political
& Diplomatic Relations
The
departure of Manzade Husain Agha from India marks the end of the first phase of
the Mughal-Ottoman diplomatic and
political relations. It was a phase of mutual indifference, occasional outbursts of concord and harmony,
and spasmodic hostility. Babur, the first
Mughal, was steepe in Turkish culture. He spoke and wrote beautiful
Turkish. The Emperor also admired and
utilized Ottoman military tactics and methods. Yet, he remained
indifferent towards the Ottomans. A
staunch enemy of the Uzbeks, Babur considered the Ottoman Uzbek friendship as
damaging to his aims and interests in Central Asia; consequently, he did not attempt to establish diplomatic relations
with the Ottomans. Akbar, who followed Humayun, not only reversed this policy,
but also even demonstrated outright hostility towards the Ottomans. Akbar’s foreign policy based on
"real-politik."13 However, in his dealing with the Ottomans, a combination of Ottoman navy
and Mughal army - could have posed serious
problems for the Portuguese. Indeed, it could have curtailed, if not
ended, the Portuguese depredations on
Indian commerce and Haj traffic. Akbar, by ignoring the potential of such
a collaboration, missed a good
opportunity to fulfill his oft-repeated promise of declaring jihad against the Firangis (Europeans), and thereby
clearing the sea route to the Holy Cities of the Portuguese.
Jahangir's
diplomacy constructed on friendship and to some extent, even dependent on Sa
favids Persia. This was at the expense of cordial relations with the Uzbeks and
the Ottomans. He recognized the
inexpediency of this policy towards the end of his reign and had to fall back upon Uzbek and Ottoman support against
the Safavids. However, for the Emperor's
death in 1627, Mughal-Ottoman relations would have certainly improved.
Shahjahan, early in his reign, revived
his father's idea of an association of Sunni powers against Persia. He was also the first Mughal to establish
full-fledged diplomatic relations with the Ottomans.
Nevertheless,
the Emperor's overweening ambition and arrogance coupled with his
obsession with the idea of conquest of
his ancestral domains wrecked his plans as well as his prestige.14 Shahjhan’s
military intervention in Central Asia left him isolated in the world of Islam.
The Ottoman initiative in 1649 restored
suspended diplomatic relations. At the time of Shahjhan’s deposition in 1658, the Mughal-Ottoman relations
had improved considerably. Babur and
Humayun had maintained cordial relations with Persia.
In
the time of Akbar, Persia was not strong enough, as it subsequently became
during the reigns of Abbas Abbas II, to
pose any serious threat to the Mughals and I. Akbar, therefore, never felt obliged to court the Ottomans.
However, Jahangir and Shahjahan did feel imperiled by Persia and toyed with the idea of a Sunni
alliance against the Safavids15.The Mughals,
however, remained wedded to this policy as long as it served their
immediate interest; they abandoned it
when it fulfilled its primary objective and ceased to offer any dividends.
Shahjahan,
for example, relinquished the policy of Sunni solidarity after the capture
of Qandahar, unilaterally suspending
diplomatic relations with the Ottomans. Their predilection for maintaining the territorial integrity of
the Uzbek empire al o constrained them to woo the Mughals. The Ottomans seem to have been
genuinely interested and sincere in their wish to befriend the Mughals. Shahjhan’s acerbity and
over-sensitiveness at minor discourtesies of
diction in the Ottoman imperial epistles, the Ottoman moderation and
large-heartedness in acknowledging their
own faults graciously as well as their conciliatory messages and desire to continue the exchange of embassies without
interruption demonstrate their positive ap proach, ardor, and probity.16 What
transpired in the time of Aurangzeb (1658-1707) and his successors? Did the steady decline of the
Mughal and the Ottoman empires in the late 18th
century change the pattern of Mughal-Ottoman relationship? Did the
collapse of the Safavid dynasty bring
about any change in their priorities and strategies or in their attitude
towards one another?
The
last 90 years (1658-1748) of Mughal-Ottoman relations were mark by many
vicissitudes. Throughout his long reign
of almost fifty years, Aurangzeb had remained indifferent towards the Ottomans.
His response to the Ottoman diplomatic initiative of 1690 was too lukewarm
to resume friendly relations with them.
The steady decline of the Safavid power, after the death of Shah Abbas II in 1666, had eased the
pressure on the north-west frontier of the Mughal Empire. On the other hand, the annexation of
Bijapur and Golkunda by 1687 and the execu
tion
of the Maratha ruler Shambhaji in 1689 had considerably strengthened
Aurangzeb's posi tion. Practically the entire subcontinent was now under his
sway. He had never seriously en tertained the idea of the re-conquest of
Qandahar from the Persians and, therefore, did not need Ottoman assistance on that account.
The
Ottomans were also guilty, from Aurangzeb's point of view, of not giving
recognition to him when he needed it the
most. All these factors seem to have guided Aurangzeb's attitude towards the Ottomans. Nonetheless, the
responsibility of suspending Mughal-Ottoman dip lomatic and political relations
seems to lie upon Aurangzeb's shoulders. He had also stopped the exchange of embassies with Persia.
"The state of diplomatic isolation" aptly remarks Pro fessor Riazul
Islam, "in which Aurangzeb left the Mughal Empire was by no means envia
ble."17
Farrukhsiyar
attempted to break this diplomatic isolation of the Mughal Empire. He sent em
bassies to Istanbul and Isfahan. However, his efforts to revive the
long-suspended Mughal Ottoman relations met with little success. His letter to
Sultan Ahmad III did not create a fa vorable impression on the Ottoman court.
In this period, the Ottomans were also preoccupied with protecting their European territories
from the Austrian threat. Moreover, by 1716, when the Mughal ambassador arrived in Istanbul,
the downfall of the Safavid dynasty had become
an established fact.
Hence,
the Ottomans did not feel obliged to foster close relations with the Mughals.
Ahmad III, therefore, did not send a
return embassy to Istanbul. He remained content with a friendly reply to Farrukhsiyar's letter.
Farrukhsiyar's death in 1719 doomed any chance of further cultivation of Mughal-Ottoman
relations.18
Early in his reign, Muhammad Shah exchanged epistles with Sultan Ahmad III. However, the real incentive for the establishment of closer ties came with the rise of Nadir Shah in Persia, who was destined to prove equally perilous to both Mughals and Ottomans. Both exhibited profound concern and anxiety to eliminate the new Persian peril. Hence, the Ottomans welcomed Muhammad Shah’s overtures for a Mughal-Ottoman alliance against Persia. Several embassies and epistles were exchange between the two sides. Shahjahanabad Istanbul axis had come into existence. Muhammad Shah had, thus, the satisfaction of bringing the Mughal Empire back into the mainstream of the Islamic world; by the time of his death, Mughal Ottoman relations had improved considerably. This, however, was the last flicker of the lamp; after 1748, these relations abruptly came to a standstill. As far as the Ottomans were concerned, for all practical purposes, the Mughal Empire had passed into history.19
The
second phase of Mughal-Ottoman relations was also mark by a change in the
pattern of their relationship. This
change triggered the decline of the Safavid dynasty in Persia and in- creased
pressure of European powers on the western frontier of the Ottoman Empire. The
fo cus of Ottoman strategies had now shifted from the Shia menace to Islam to
the threat posed by the Christian
powers. Suleiman I's letter to Aurangzeb and Ahmad III's epistle to Far
rukhsiyar does not dwell upon the Shia peril at all. They focus mainly on the
theme of pro tecting the 'land of the Faithful' from the aggression of the
Christian powers. Suleiman II even
solicited Aurangzeb's support against the Christians and urged him to wage holy
war against them. Farrukhsiyar's letter
to Ahmad III, likewise, is conspicuous by its omission of any reference to Persia.
Persia,
nevertheless, came back to play an important role in shaping the Mughal-Ottoman
re lations. Nadir Shah's invasion of India and his aggressive designs against
Ottoman Empire made her an object of
fear, suspicion, and hostility in the eyes of Mughals and Ottomans alike. Ambassadors began to travel between
Shahjahanabad and Istanbul; highly conciliatory
and friendly letters were exchange. In these, the ancient accord between
the two houses was recall; sectarian
unity and the identity of faith were assert repeatedly. Both sides also
pledged to undertake Jihad against kufr
(infidelity) and tyranny. The Ottoman-Persian treaty of 1746, the assassination of Nadir Shah in 1747, and
the death of Muhammad Shah in the following
year, put an end to this frantic diplomatic activity.
Emperor
Ahmad Shah (1748-1754) did not care to send a letter, through Haji Yusuf Agha,
to the Ottoman Sultan. There is no
record of any Ottoman congratulatory mission on the acces sion of Ahmad Shah
either. Diplomatic exchanges between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire had reached a dead One noteworthy
development in this period was the exchange of
letters between ministers and other notables of the two empires. This
was by no means an un precedented phenomenon. Letters had earlier been exchange
between Shahjahan's Wazir and his
Ottoman counterpart in the 1640s.
Mughal
Relations with the Sharifs of Mecca
Mughal relations with the Sharifs of Mecca were mark by many vicissitudes. Babur, the first Mughal, was cognizant of the influence wielded by the Sharif of Mecca in the Islamic world. Hence, he took care to propitiate the Sharif. He sent Naizur to Mecca after his victory in the battle of Panipat. Babur also displayed his zeal for the Holy Land by sending a copy of the Quran transcribed by himself. Of Humayun's contacts with the Sharifs of Mecca, during his stormy reign of sixteen years, we have no knowledge. He, however, deported two of his brothers to Mecca; the Emperor, thereby, became unconsciously responsible for setting up a dangerous precedent. Henceforth all of his successors sought to use Mecca as a convenient place for banishing political offenders. It was only in the eighteenth century, when the later Mughal Emperors no longer had the power to enforce their will on their unruly subordinates that they gave up this practice. Akbar began his reign by establishing close links with the Hi jaz. He sent gorgeous gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The Emperor initiated the policy of organizing ar1 annual Haj caravan to Mecca. He also began to appoint a royal Mir Hai. Every year, to represent him in the Raj. Nevertheless, Akbar soon got involved in an unfortunate broil with the Ottomans over the affairs of the Indian pilgrims. The disbursement of the sadagat sent by the Emperor was ban. The Sharif was order to expel the Indian pilgrims from Mecca, including the women of his household, after the Haj season. This, coupled with Akbar's own religious policies, led to a temporary breach in Mughal-Hijaz relations.
Jahangir
did not attempt to break this deadlock. Sharif Idris's initiative in 1607 did
not make any impression on him; the
Emperor did not dispatch a return embassy to Mecca. Only twice in his long reign of 22 years did Jahangir send
gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The Emperor did not revive the practice of
organizing annual Haj caravan to Mecca. Given Jahangir's Luke warmness to everything religious, his
indifferent attitude towards the Sharif of Mecca is not surprising. With the accession of Shahjahan
to the throne, the situation began to change. He regularly sent emissaries to the Holy Cities
with splendid gifts in cash as well as in kind.
Shahjahan started the practice of sending Indian merchandise to Mecca;
the proceeds of these goods, along with
the profit, which accrued from this transaction, were distributed between the Sharif and the needy of the Holy Cities.
The Emperor revived the organization of the an nual Haj caravan to Mecca. He
also enrolled a former envoy of the Sharif of Mecca, to his court, in the imperial service. By the time
of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658, the Mughal Sharifian relations had considerably
improved.20
During
the first three decades of his reign, Aurangzeb maintained cordial relations
with Mec ca. Several diplomatic missions arrived from Mecca; the Emperor
reciprocated with equally warm and
affable gestures. Imperial agents, carrying subventions for the Sharif and
their in habitants of the Holy Cities, visited Mecca at regular intervals. Haj
caravans with royal Mir Baj continued to
sail for Mecca for the annual pilgrimage. In the later years of his reign, however, the avarice of the Sharifs of Mecca
disillusioned Aurangzeb. He stopped entertain ing the Sharif's request for
pecuniary aid and suspended official relations with Mecca alto gether.
Relations were restore after Aurangzeb's death. Bahadur shah, Farrukhsiyar, and
Mu hammad Shah received embassies from Mecca. They also sent gifts to the
Sharifs. Far rukhsiyar even sanctioned an annual subsidy of 100,000 rupees for
the Sharif. During the reign of Muhammad
Shah, a permanent representative of the Sharif began to reside in Surat.
At
the time of Muhammad Shah's death in 1748, the Mughal-Sharifian relations were
steady and stable. Notwithstanding the
religious prestige enjoyed by the Sharifs, the Mughals did not treat them as their equals. They never sent a
full-fledged imperial mission to Mecca. This is
the impression we get from the narrative of the Mughal chroniclers.
While designating the messengers of the
Sharifs as ambassadors, these chroniclers invariably describe the Mughal officials going to Mecca as imperial agents
or emissaries. They style the letters of the Sharifs, brought either by Sharifian envoys or by the
imperial agents, not as Murasla or Maktub,
terms which stand for correspondence between equals, but rather as
arzdasht, which desig nates a letter addressed by an inferior to a superior1.21
Akbar's
letter to Sharif Abu Numay II is a good example of the air of superiority
assumed by the Mughal Emperors, while
addressing the Sharifs. The letter is authoritative in tone, assures the Sharif of the unlimited imperial favours,
and commands him to carry out the royal in structions. The Sharifs, on the
other hand, did not object to this unobtrusive treatment. They were willing to play the role of a subaltern
as long as the Mughals were ready to grease their palm.
Relations with the Sharifs of Mecca did not exercise much influence in shaping the Mughal Ottoman relations. Mughal policy towards the Ottoman Empire was largely govern by the developments in Persia. In this, the Sharifs of Mecca had hardly any say. Likewise, the Sharifs, though powerful in their own realm, could in no way influence decisions, whether in favor or against the Mughals, at the Ottoman court. Only once did the developments in Hijaz, have an adverse effect on the Mughal-Ottoman relations. This was the row over the activities of the Indian pilgrims in Mecca, during the reign of Akbar, which led to hostility between two sides. However, this was solely Akbar's handiwork. He overreacted to a minor incident and blew it out of proportion. For this, neither the Sharif of Mecca nor the Ottoman Sultan could be held responsible. After this incident, the Indian pilgrims seem to have kept themselves out of trouble. Henceforth the relations between these two premier Muslim States fol lowed its usual course.22
CONCLUSION
Babur,
the first Mughal, had his eyes fixed on Uzbek Central Asia, his ancestral domain,
as an area of expansion. He, therefore,
regarded Ottoman-Uzbek alliance as damaging to his aims and interests in that region. This made
him a natural enemy of the Ottomans; hence, the
Emperor did not attempt to establish formal diplomatic relations with
Istanbul. He also did not show any
inclination to acknowledge the Ottoman claim to the Khilafat of Islam.
During the early years of his reign,
Humayun also remained indifferent towards the Ottomans. Elated by his conquest of Gujarat and Bengal, he regarded
the Ottoman Empire as an inferior power.
During his days of exile, he did not seek Ottoman support against his
Afghan adversary. However, Humayun was
not hostile to the Ottomans.
After
restoration to the Indian empire, the Emperor displayed a genuine desire to
establish diplomatic relations with the
Ottomans on a permanent basis. He cordially welcomed the Ot toman admiral Sidi
Ali Reis, complimented the admiral for his military and literary talents, and offered him a high position in the Mughal
government.
The
Emperor wrote a very friendly letter to Suleiman the Magnificent. He also
acknowledged the Sultan as Khalifa.
However, for the sudden death of Humayun in 1556, Mughal-Ottoman relations would have considerably improved.
Akbar abandoned Humayun's conciliatory poli cy altogether. Sultan Suleiman's
failure to send a congratulatory embassy on his accession coupled with the Emperor's own military
achievements and the rapid expansion of his empire were probably responsible for Akbar's lukewarm
attitude towards the Ottomans. The row
over the activities of the Indian pilgrims in Mecca in the late 1570's
and early 1880's also produced
considerable tension between Akbar and the Ottomans.
The
rise of the Uzbek power under Abdullah Khan Uzbek and the Ottoman support for
the Khan's expansionist designs in
Khurasan and Badakhshan also wade the Emperor highly skeptical of a lasting Mughal-Ottoman
rapprochement. Akbar even entertained the idea of invading Ottoman territories in collusion
with the Portuguese.
Far
from acknowledging the Ottoman claim to Khilafat, the Emperor made a bold bid
to get himself recognized as the
temporal leader of his Muslim subjects. However, Akbar's policy towards the Ottoman was unrealistic and
unsound. Friendship with the Ottomans would have obliged the Uzbeks to give up the anti-Mughal
propaganda, which they had unleashed in the
northwestern provinces of the Mughal Empire. Mughal-Ottoman
collaboration would have paid dividends
in other areas of mutual interests. More than anything else, it would have saved the Indian Muslim pilgrims from the
suffering and humiliation, which they had to en dure at the hands of the
Portuguese freebooters.
Shahjahan
established full-fledged diplomatic relations with Istanbul. He also revived
his fa ther's idea of a Sunni alliance against Persia. However, this alliance
did not materialize; the Emperor's
invasion of Central Asia wrecked the chances of its fruition. The invasion even
led to the suspension of Mughal-Ottoman
relations. Shahjahan also assumed the title of Amir al Muminin, thereby showing
his disregard for the Ottoman claim to Khilafat. Sultan Muham mad IV's
initiative in 1649 broke the diplomatic deadlock and relations between
Shahjahana bad and Istanbul was resume. Henceforth embassies were exchange
between the two sides at regular
intervals. At the time of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658, Mughhal-Ottoman
relations had improved considerably.
Aurangzeb gave up his father's policy of friendly alliance with the Ottomans. During his long reign of almost
half a century, he remained indifferent towards
them. Sultan Suleiman II's effort to revive the Istanbul-Shahjahanabad
axis made no impres sion on him. It is indeed surprising that though the
Emperor contemplated an alliance with the
Corsairs of Masqat for combating piracy in Indian waters, he did not
seek the help of the Ot tomans to deal with this problem.
Like
his great-grandfather, Aurangzeb failed to perceive that a joint Mughal-Ottoman
cam paign against the European freebooters would have curtailed, if not ended,
the European brigandage against his
pilgrim ships. The Emperor's policy towards the Ottomans, thus, leaves much to be looked-for. Diplomatic
relations with Istanbul were resume after Aurang zeb's death. Farrukhsiyar sent
a good will embassy to the court of Sultan Ahmad III. The Sul tan responded
with a friendly reply but did not dispatch a return embassy to Shahjahansbad.
It was not until the rise of Nadir Shah,
who had provided dangerous for both Mughals and Ot tomans, in the 1730's that
the real need for closer ties between the two states was felt. Several embassies were exchange. Highly conciliatory
letters, underscoring the necessity for making
common cause against the Persian 'heretic,' were penned. Emperor
Muhammad Shah also acknowledged the
Ottoman Sultan as khalifa. It was, however, the last flicker of the lamp. The rapid disintegration of Mughal Empire
after Muhammad Shah's death made further ad vancement of Mughal-Ottoman
relations practically impossible. After 1748, there is no rec ord of any
exchange of diplomatic missions between the two sides. The Shahjahanabad
Istanbul axis had passed into history.
Factors
of amity Between the Mughals and the Ottoman
Primarily was the community of faith and the identity of sect; both Mughals and Ottomans were Sunni. In their diplomatic correspondence, the sovereigns of both houses vied with each other in displaying their sectarian prejudice and their enthusiasm for Sunni solidarity.Safavid Persia was the main target of this orthodox tirade. They condemned the Safavids as kafir and mulhid (one who swerves from the true path), ridiculed them as Redheads and Zindigs (misbelieving hypocrites), and exhorted each other to "demolish the precepts of heresy and misbe lief." They also styled each other "annihilator of mulhids and rafizis (schismatics)" and "sup porter of the dominion of the Sunnis and breaker of the head of the Shias." However, vocal in their avowal to Sunni solidarity, the Mughals never used it as a guiding light of their policy towards the Ottomans. They invoked it at the time of their conflict with Persia and abandoned it as soon as it had served its purpose. The Mughals as a convenient tool calculated to serve their personal interests but not as an ideology thus used the theme of sectarian unity. It is, therefore hardly surprising that the oft-repeated proposal of Sunni alliance against Persia could never materialize.
Safavid
Persia was a menace to the Mughals as well as to the Ottomans; both powers had
a common defense problem against the
Persians. In the seventeenth century, Safavid designs against Qandahar and Baghdad had drawn the
two sides closer. In the Nevertheless, the
Mughal-Ottoman accord on the Persian question exercised only a transient
influence on Mughal-Ottoman
relations.The Mughals remained wedded to the policy of friendly alliance with the Ottomans as long as Persia posed a
threat to them. Once the Safavid power declined
and the threat from Persia disappeared, the Mughals quickly abandoned
their pro-Ottoman posture. From time to
time, they also maintained active and cordial relations with the Safavids.
Factors
of conflict Between the Mughals and the Ottoman
Among
the factors of conflict, the foremost was Ottoman friendship with the Uzbeks,
whom the Mughals considered as their
principal foe. Mughal-Uzbek enmity was traditional. One Emperor Shahjahan son’s, did invade
Mawara-an-nahr; the invasion, however, turned out to be the greatest failure of Shahjahan's career.
In addition to territorial rivalry, there were a few other areas of conflict between the Mughals
and the Uzbeks. The Uzbek presence in the
neighborhood of the Mughal province of Kabul was a thorn in the Mughal
flesh. The Mughals were extremely conscious
of their ancestry from Timur. Proud of the achievements of Timur, they considered all contemporary
Muslim sovereigns, ruling in the erstwhile do mains of Timur, as inferior to
them. Jahangir believed that the Mughals had a claim upon Ottoman gratitude
because of Timur's generosity in restoring Sultan Musa challenged to the domains of his vanquished father. Even the
fugitive Mughal prince Baisanghar, who had tak en refuge in Istanbul in 1632,
did not hesitate to brag about his illustrious descent. The Otto mans, on the
other hand, were proud of their own lineage and conscious of their
ancestor’s services to Islam. In their
eyes, Timur was nothing but an upstart. Ottoman chroniclers have generally adverted to Timur with great
contempt; 16 Naima has even denounced him as a
usurper. This "war of lineage" was naturally very irritating
to the sovereigns of both houses and
often caused considerable unpleasantness between them.
CONCLUSION
Mughal
relations with the Sharifs of Mecca were mark by many vicissitudes. Babur, the
first Mughal, was cognizant of the
influence wielded by the Sharif of Mecca in the Islamic world. Hence, he took care to propitiate the Sharif.
He sent nuzur to Mecca after his victory in the
battle of Panipat. Babur also displayed his zeal for the Holy Land by
sending a copy of the Quran transcribed
by himself. Of Humayun's contacts with the Sharifs of Mecca, during his stormy reign of sixteen years, we have no
knowledge. He, however, deported two of his
brothers to Mecca; the Emperor, thereby, became unconsciously
responsible for setting up a dangerous
precedent.
Henceforth
all of his successors sought to use Mecca as a convenient place for banishing
po litical offenders. It was only in the eighteenth century, when the later
Mughal Emperors no longer had the power
to enforce their will on their unruly subordinates that they gave up this practice.
Akbar
began his reign by establishing close links with the Hijaz. He sent gorgeous
gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The
Emperor initiated the policy of organizing ar1 annual Haj caravan to Mecca. He also began to appoint a royal Mir
Hai. Every year, to represent him in the Raj.
However, Akbar soon got involved in an unfortunate broil with the
Ottomans over the affairs of the Indian
pilgrims. The disbursement of the sadagat sent by the Emperor was ban. The
Sharif was ordered to expel the Indian pilgrims from Mecca, including the women
of his household, after the Haj season.
This, coupled with Akbar's own religious policies, led to a temporary breach in Mughal-Hijaz relations.
Jahangir
did not attempt to break this deadlock. Sharif Idris's initiative in 1607 did
not make any impression on him; the
Emperor did not dispatch a return embassy to Mecca. Only twice in his long reign of 22 years did Jahangir
send gifts to the Sharif of Mecca. The Emperor did not revive the practice of organizing annual
Haj caravan to Mecca. Given Jahangir's lukewarmness to everything religious,
his indifferent attitude towards the Sharif of Mecca is not surprising. With the accession of Shahjahan
to the throne, the situation began to change. He regularly sent emissaries to the Holy Cities
with splendid gifts in cash as well as in kind.
Shahjahan started the practice of sending Indian merchandise to Mecca;
the proceeds of these goods, along with
the profit, which accrued from this transaction, were distributed between the Sharif and the needy of the Holy Cities.
The Emperor revived the organization of the annual Haj caravan to Mecca. He
also enrolled a former envoy of the Sharif of Mecca, to his court, in the imperial service. By the time
of Shahjahan's deposition in 1658, the Mughal Sharifian relations had
considerably improved.
During
the first three decades of his reign, Aurangzeb maintained cordial relations
with Mec ca. Several diplomatic missions arrived from Mecca; the Emperor
reciprocated with equally warm and
affable gestures. Imperial agents, carrying subventions for the Sharif and
their in habitants of the Holy Cities, visited Mecca at regular intervals. Haj
caravans with royal Mir Baj continued to
sail for Mecca for the annual pilgrimage. In the later years of his reign,
the avarice of the Sharifs of Mecca
disillusioned Aurangzeb. He stopped entertaining the Sharif's request for pecuniary aid and suspended
official relations with Mecca altogether.
After
Aurangzeb's death, relations were restore. Bahadur shah, Farrukhsiyar, and
Muhammad Shah received embassies from
Mecca. They also sent gifts to the Sharifs. Farrukhsiyar even sanctioned an annual subsidy of 100,000
rupees for the Sharif. During the reign of Muham mad Shah, a permanent
representative of the Sharif began to reside in Surat.At the time of Muhammad Shah's death in 1748; the Mughal-Sharifian
relations were steady and stable.
Notwithstanding the religious prestige enjoyed by the Sharifs, the
Mughals did not treat them as their
equals. They never sent a full-fledged imperial mission to Mecca. This is the
impres sion we get from the narrative of the Mughal chroniclers. While
designating the messengers of the
Sharifs as ambassadors, these chroniclers invariably describe the Mughal
officials go ing to Mecca as imperial agents or emissaries. They style the
letters of the Sharifs, brought either
by Sharifian envoys or by the imperial agents, not as Murasla or Maktub, terms
which stand for correspondence between
equals, but rather as arzdasht, which designates a letter ad dressed by an
inferior to a superior. Thirty eight (38) Akbar's letter to Sharif Abu Numay II
is a good example of the air of
superiority assumed by the Mughal Emperors, while addressing the Sharifs. The letter is authoritative in
tone, assures the Sharif of the unlimited imperial fa vours, and commands him
to carry out the royal instructions. The Sharifs, on the other hand, did not object to this unobtrusive
treatment.
They
were willing to play the role of a subaltern as long as the Mughals were ready
to grease their palm.139 Viewed from
this perspective the Mughal-Sharfian relations could at best be describe as a kind of patron-client
relationship. Relations with the Sharifs of Mecca did not exercise much influence in shaping the Mughal-Ottoman
relations. Mughal policy towards the
Ottoman Empire was largely govern by the developments in Persia. In this, the
Sharifs of Mecca had hardly any say.
Likewise, the Sharifs, though powerful in their own realm, could in no way influence decisions, whether in
favour or against the Mughals, at the Ottoman court. Only once did the
developments in Hijaz, have an adverse effect on the Mughal Ottoman relations.
This
was the row over the activities of the Indian pilgrims in Mecca, during the
reign of Ak bar, which led to hostility between two sides. However, this was
solely Akbar's handiwork. He overreacted
to a minor incident and blew it out of proportion. For this, neither the
Sharif of Mecca nor the Ottoman Sultan
could be held responsible. After this incident, the Indian pilgrims seem to have kept themselves out of
trouble.
REFERENCES
Al-Amr,
Saleh Muhammad. The Hijaz under Ottoman rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman vali, the sharif of Mecca, and the growth of British
influence. Riyad University Publications, 1978.
Avasthy,
Rama Shanker. The Mughal Emperor Humayun. No. 1. History Department, Uni
versity of Allahabad, 1967.
Fleischer,
C. H. (1976). Robert W. Olson, The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Rela
tions 1718–1743 (Bloomington: Indiana University Publications, Uralic and
Altaic Series, Volume 124, 1975). Pp.
237+ xiv. $16. Review of Middle East Studies, 10(2), 41-42.
Karpat,
Kemal H., ed. The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History: Introduction.
Vol. 11. Brill, 1974.
Khadduri,
Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.
Kütükoğlu,
Bekir. Osmanlı-İran Siyasi Münasebetleri: 1578-1590. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1962.
Qureshi,
Ishtiaq Husain. Akbar: the architect of the Mughul Empire. No. 40. Idarah-i
Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1987.
Rushbrook
Williams, L. F. "An Empire Builder of the Sixteenth Century." (1918).
Saksena, B. P. "History of Shah Jahan of Dihli (Allahabad, 1932)." ff
81, no. 310: 63. Sarkar, Jadunath. "History of Aurangzeb." (2017).
Srivastava,
A. L. A Short History of Akbar the Great. Agra, 1965.
Notes
1
Khadduri, Majid. War and Peace in the Law of Islam. Majid Khadduri. Johns
Hopkins Press, 1955. 2 Rushbrook Williams, L. F. "An Empire Builder of the
Sixteenth Century." (1918).
3
Avasthy, Rama Shanker. The Mughal Emperor Humayun. No. 1. History Department,
University of Allahabad, 1967. 4 Srivastava, A. L. A Short History of Akbar the
Great. Agra, 1965.
5
Qureshi, Ishtiaq Husain. Akbar: the architect of the Mughul empire. No. 40.
Idarah-i-Adabiyat-i-Delli, 1987. 6 Saksena, B. P. "History of Shah Jahan
of Dihli (Allahabad, 1932)." ff 81, no. 310: 63.
7
Sarkar, Jadunath. "History of Aurangzeb." (2017).
8
Karpat, Kemal H., ed. The Ottoman State and Its Place in World History:
Introduction. Vol. 11. Brill, 1974. 9 Kütükoğlu, Bekir. Osmanlı-İran Siyasi
Münasebetleri: 1578-1590. İstanbul Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1962. 10
Fleischer, C. H. (1976). Robert W. Olson, The Siege of Mosul and
Ottoman-Persian Relations 1718–1743 (Bloomington:
Indiana
University Publications, Uralic and Altaic Series, Volume 124, 1975). Pp. 237+
xiv. $16. Review of Middle East Studies,
10(2), 41-42.
11
See for example the following observation of Professor Stanford Shaw: ''The
vakanuvislik was established as a separate
division of the chancery of the Imperial Council, so that the court
chronicler would ha e direct, immediate and continu ous access to the Muhimme
registers of Council decisions as well as other state papers, and he could set
them down or swmnarize them before they were lost or scattered."Ibid., p.
288.
12
Al-Amr, Saleh Muhammad. The Hijaz under Ottoman rule, 1869-1914: Ottoman vali,
the sharif of Mecca, and the growth of
British influence. Riyad University Publications, 1978.
13
Professor Aziz Ahmad's observation that diplomatic exchanges between Mughals
and Ottomans continued until the end of
the eighteenth century and that Haji Yusuf Agha was one of the many Ottoman
envoys, who came to Delhi between
1750-1799 is incorrect. See his Studies , p. 45. Yusuf Agha had left
India in 1748. His return to Istanbul has been de scribed by Izzi in the events
of 1750 (see above). It is probably to this embassy of Yusuf Agha that both
Aziz Ahmad and Bernard Lewis ("The
Mughals " p. 8) has referred.
14
M.D., 153, p. 278, Evail Rajab 1161 (Middle of June, 1747). In 1762, Ahmad Shah
Abdali also proposed an Ottoman invasion
of Persia. But Sultan Mustafa III turned down this proposal. See Name Humayun
••• vol. 8, pp. 481-484; Ibid., pp.
485-487. Also see Hilanet Bayur, "Nadir Sah Af rin••• "pp. 409-469.
15
Hukum Namah, Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal Ms. No. 1677, ff 10b-16a, quoted
by Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu
Sultan, Calcutta, 1971 (second edition), pp. 128-130. Also see
Waga-i-Manazil i-Rum, ed. Mohibbul Hasan, Asia Pub lishing House, 1968, pp.
1-2. This is the diary of Tipu's embassy to Turkey. It was maintained by Khwaja
Abdul Qadir, the Secretary of this
embassy.
16
M. Hasan, History of , p. 137; Waga-i- , p. 62; Name Humayun., vol. 9, pp.
219-220.
17
Riazul Islam, Indo-Persian , p. 134.
18
13Bayur, "Mysore Sultani, " p. 651; Mahmud Husain (ed.), !. History
of Freedom Movement, Karachi, 1957, vol. I, pp.
488-489; M Hasan, History of . pp. 295-296. It should be mentioned here
that the Nawabs of Arcot had also sent envoys
to Istanbul. See Maghrebi, "Ottoman-Gujarat Relations," p.
185, Note 7.
19
Name Humayun , vol. 9, pp. 360-362. Sultan Selim III had also contemplated
sending an embassy to Tipu. A letter was
drafted for this purpose on June 8, 1799 (See Ibid., pp. 388-389). Tipu
had, however, already died on May 4, 1799 (His tory of , pp. 317-318).
Probably, the letter was never dispatched.
20
Ibid., p. 271; T.A., III, p. 472; M.T., II p. 217.
21
For the Haj caravans of Egypt and Syria, see Abdullah Ankawi, "The
Pilgrimage to Mecca in Mamluk Times," Arabian Studies, Ed. R.B. Serjeant and R.L. Bidwell,
London, 1974, vol. I, pp. 146-170. According to Nizamuddin Ahmad, Ak bar was
the first Muslim ruler to send a caravan from Hindustan to Mecca. He writes:
"Up to the time of the rising of the
Sun of this Sovereign [Akbar], no other monarch had such an honour and
grandeur, that he should sent a caravan from
Hindustan
to Mecca the revered, and should remove the custom of need from the poor of
that honoured place." T.A., II, p.
472.
22
17A.H., III, p. 306. For an account of Mir Abu Turab's return from the Hijaz
with an impression of the Prophet's footprint
and of Akbar's reception to it, see A.N., III, pp. 410-412; T.A. II, pp.
557-558; M.T., II, pp. 320-321; Mirat-iAhmadi, I, pp. 138-139.