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BRITISH JOURNAL OF MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES, 2016
Foreign relations and semi-modernization during the reigns of Haidar ‘Ali and Tipu Sultan
Kaveh Yazdani
Center for Indian Studies in Africa (CISA), University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa
Some
EIC clerks were anxious about Tipu’s diplomatic relationship with Zaman
Shah, although they were not entirely
convinced that the Afghan ruler would actually threaten them in India. Nonetheless, in late 1798, the
Governor General in Council wrote the following
words to the Secret Committee, indicating that preventive measures would
have been taken in case of an attack:
we are aware of the obstacles which are likely to delay, if not absolutely to prevent the approach of Zemaun Shah […] we have thought it our duty to take every precaution against the possibility of an event which combined with the designs of Tippoo and the French might become of the most serious importance.69
The
concern that the possible invasion of Zaman Shah had fomented in the minds of
some Company oicers inally convinced the
Governor of Calcutta, Lord Mornington, to give orders to Mirza Mehdi ‘Ali Khan, the Company’s agent
at Bushehr, to frustrate Zaman Shah’s advance
into India. In his response to Lord Mornington, Mehdi ‘Ali Khan made
clear that the willingness of Persia to
assist the British conspiracy depended on the speciic inancial means that
the Company was inclined to ofer. The
expense of equipping Zaman Shah’s hostile brothers Mahmud70 and Firuz with Persian troops in
Yazd would account for one lakh of rupees
(c.£10,000). Another Rs 10,000 (c.£1000) had to be paid to the vazir
Mirza Ibrahim so as to dispatch the
Afghan brothers with the Royal troops from Khorasan. What is more, Mehdi
‘Ali Khan wrote that he needed one lakh
of rupees (c.£10,000) for his journey from Bushehr to Tehran. This amount was primarily needed for
the khil’ats and presents that he would have
to ofer to each host in the places he was going to pass through as well
as to the respectable people that would
come to visit him. Apart from that, he warned Mornington that if the king of Persia, Fat’h ‘Ali Shah, were to be forced
to send an army of 30,000–50,000 troops in order to impede Zaman Shah from invading India, the
cost would climb up to 50 lakhs of rupees
(c. £500,000). At the beginning of 1799, the Company accepted the
expense of slightly more than two lakhs
of rupees.71 It is important to add that the British petitions to attack
Zaman Shah were convenient for Fat’h
‘Ali Shah. Indeed, the latter had his own interests in attacking and overthrowing the Afghan ruler and it was
not only the result of British instigation or
mere desire of money but also seems to have relected Fat’h ‘Ali Shah’s
desire to establish himself as the
undisputed ruler of both Iran and Afghanistan.72
Importantly,
the Russian Tsar Paul I (1796) and Napoleon Bonaparte (1799) were both interested in Zaman Shah’s rearmament
and—independently of each other—guaranteed
support for his campaign into India.73 In early 1796, Zaman Shah had
already besieged Lahore since the Sikhs
were not willing to provide for an unmolested passage into India. However, the revolt of his brother Mahmud in Herat
made him return to Afghanistan in 1797.74 In late 1798 Zaman Shah had reached Lahore again,
with a large number of troops, and was heading
towards Delhi. At that time, Major-General Craig wrote to Wellesley that
Zaman Shah ‘was on the point of crossing
Attock for the purpose of attacking Hindustan and that little or no resistance would be made by the Sikhs and I
fear as little is to be expected on the part of
the Marathas’.75 As historian Sheik Ali points out, ‘Only the vigilance
of Wellesley frustrated the designs of
the Shah.’76 Indeed, to Zaman Shah’s chagrin, the diplomatic eforts of
Mehdi ‘Ali Khan bore fruit and in late
1798 the Persian king Fat’h-Ali Shah had dispatched Zaman Shah’s two brothers to Herat, ‘with a
thousand horse […] and has given orders to the chiefs of Khorassaun, who have long looked for such
an opportunity of Revenge, to proceed in
conjunction with the Princes of Heraut & Candahar’.77 What is more,
the Persian Malik-ut Tujjar told Fat’h ‘Ali Shah that the Afghan king had
slaughtered the Shi’a inhabitants of 15
villages between Lahore and Delhi. Consequently:
the Royal Indignation has been kindled thereon to such a pitch that he has thereon issued a fresh command to his oicers in Khorassaun to increase the assistance to the Princes to advance, after the reduction of Heraut, into the Plains of Kandahar and to reduce all that Country.78
When
Zaman Shah found out about the activities of the Persian king, he tried to
appease him with presents which he sent
from Lahore.79 These eforts, however, were unsuccessful and Zaman Shah retreated from Lahore in early
1799. Signiicantly, his withdrawal enabled
the British to send more troops to south India in order to wage war
against Tipu Sultan. Indeed, the
Anglo-Persian collaboration was crucial in bringing about Zaman Shah’s
retreat. As the Governor General
observed, ‘I think there is every reason to believe that the activity of the agent sent by Mr. Duncan under my
orders into Persia has been a principal if not the sole cause of the shah’s precipitate
retreat.’80 Two years later, the Governor General was convinced that, ‘The hostility of Baba Khan
[Fat’h-Ali Shah] unquestionably proved the prin cipal cause of the ruin of
Zemaun Shah’s power.’81
It could be argued that during the twentieth century, segments of the politico-economic establishments of imperial powers such as the US, Britain, France and the Soviet Union pursued destabilization tactics or at least proited from chaotic circumstances of vital regions within the ‘Third World’. Indeed, instability created the necessary circumstances to subdue those countries that were hostile towards imperial interests and facilitated the enforcement of European and North American geostrategic and economic interests. In the past few dec ades, this has especially been visible in the US’ policy vis-à-vis the ‘Middle East’ (above all Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and Iran).82 However, the same may be said about segments of the British politico-economic elites of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. As the Governor General noticed in 1801, ‘To the consolidation and active Government of Zemaun Shah has succeeded a state of confusion in the Country of the Afghans, highly favourable to our security in that quarter.’83
Conclusion
Haidar
‘Ali and Tipu Sultan were neither the irst nor the only sixteenth- to
eighteenth-century rulers of Asia who
endeavoured to modernize their country’s military, manufacturing and institutions by expanding their foreign relations
and recruiting foreign artisans and expertise
from both neighbouring and faraway regions. While in sixteenth-century
Mughal India, the most eminent foreign
experts were of Persian descent (e.g. Fathullah Shirazi), more and more European ones were hired in the course of the
seventeenth century. The independent post Mughal states and rulers were even
keener in recruiting European experts (e.g. Raja Jai Singh, the Marathas, Serfoji II). In Safavid Persia,
Shah Abbas I (r.1588–1629) held diplomatic relations with a number of European powers and
reorganized his army with the help of the English Shirley brothers. In the Ottoman Empire, the
Sultans Ahmed III (r.1703–30), Mahmud I (r.1730– 54) and especially Mustafa III
(r.1757–74) and Selim III (r.1789–1807) took important steps to modernize the military and education
system. As a result of the unprecedented worldwide entanglements that emerged in the sixteenth
century, leading to growing global cross-bor der connections during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the pursuit of closer diplomatic relations became an integral part
of the policies of the old and new powers. At
the same time, Haidar’s and especially Tipu’s eforts to modernize Mysore
were probably the most vigorous attempts
made by the polities of South, Central, West and East Asia at that time. This was especially a result of the
particular political context at hand, as hardly any other non-European region during the second
half of the eighteenth century, possessing
similar levels of socio-economic development, was under such heavy
attack and threat of being conquered by
European forces. Indeed, after the Ottoman Empire, Mysore was appar ently the
irst region of West, Central and South Asia where a process of semi-modernization took place during the second half of the
eighteenth century. While Haidar and Tipu were far from being modern rulers as they were
ingrained in tradition, the reforms they set in motion concurrently relect the early stages of a
transition towards the construction of a modern
society.
From
the 1750s Haidar began to recruit French military experts and in the 1760s he
also engaged European engineers,
artisans, interpreters and doctors. He even forced some of his European prisoners of war to help modernize
the military establishment. Haidar held dip lomatic relations with Persia, the
Portuguese, France, Prussia, Spain, Manila, Denmark and the Dutch Republic. He dispatched two
missions to the Persian king, Karim Khan Zand, and recruited 1000 Persian soldiers, but his
embassy to the Ottomans and France, sent in 1779, never arrived. Similarly, Tipu was in contact
with the Ottomans, Persia, Afghanistan, Oman,
the Portuguese and France. He sent an embassy to Istanbul in 1784 and
again in 1786. In mid-1787 an embassy
was dispatched to France. However, Tipu’s endeavours to recruit sol
diers
and forge an anti-British alliance with the Ottomans and French failed. He was
also unsuccessful in leasing the port of
Basra. He had more success in inding foreign craftsmen and outside expertise. On the whole, 30 or 32
French experts immigrated to Mysore. In
conjunction with the prisoners of war, they were generally treated as
forced labourers. Signiicantly, Tipu
seems to have appreciated the value of coal as he ordered his envoys to import the fossil fuel from the Ottoman
domain and to ind experts who could explore
possible coal ores in Mysore.
In
1796, Tipu sent emissaries to the court of the Afghan ruler Zaman Shah, in
order to instigate an invasion into north
India, and in 1798 he sent an embassy to Persia to recruit soldiers and procure merchandise. However,
apart from minor commercial successes and
the employment of foreign artisans, the upshot of Tipu’s diplomatic
relations was more or less chastening. Tipu’s
embassies to the Ottomans did not achieve the given objective, while his diplomatic relations with the French and
Afghans were rather obstructive, as they pro vided a pretext for the British to
attack Mysore. Lastly, the mission to Persia came too late and, at that time, the British had already
instigated the Persians against the Afghans in order to prevent a successful Afghan invasion into
India.
Acknowledgements
I
am very much indebted to the historian of contemporary Iranian history Nasser
Mohajer for his continuous aid,
guidance, instruction and very useful comments. I would also like to thank the
two anonymous reviewers for their
helpful comments and suggestions.
Disclosure
statement
No potential conlict of interest was reported by the author.
Foot notes
CONTACT
Kaveh Yazdani kavehyazdani@web.de
1See,
for example, Rainer M. Lepsius, ‘Soziologische Theoreme über die Sozialstruktur
der ‚Moderne‘ und die Modernisierung’,
in R. Koselleck, ed., Studien zum Beginn der Modernen Welt (Stuttgart:
Klett-Cotta, 1977); Reinhard Bendix, ‘Modernisierung in internationaler Perspektive’, in W. Zapf,
ed., Theorien des Sozialen Wandels (Köln: Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1969).
2For
a biography of Haidar and Tipu, see Kaveh Yazdani, ‘Haidar ‘Ali and Tipu
Sultan—Mysore’s 18th Century Rulers in Transition’, Itinerario, 38(2) (2014), pp. 101–120. Tipu
introduced Persian as the language of the court and government in 1792. 3See
Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey (New York: Routledge,
1998 [1964]); Stanford J. Shaw, History
of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Vol. 1 (Cambridge: CUP, 1997
[1976]). Next to Ottoman elites, Indo-Persian
bureaucrats were probably the first who analysed the reasons behind
Europe’s ascendancy. I’tesam al-Din and Abu Taleb connected Europe’s expansion to improvements
in the methods of navigation, shipbuilding and transport. ‘Abd al-Latif identified state support for education and crafts,
the patent system, as well as specialization as the main causes of
Europe’s scientific and technological
progress. James Edward Alexander, tr., Shigurf Namah i Velaët, Or, Excellent
Intelligence Concerning Europe: Being
the Travels of Mirza Itesa Modeen in Great Britain and France… (London:
Parbury, Allen, and Co., 1827), p. 140;
Charles Stewart, tr., Travels of Mirza Abu Taleb Khan in Asia, Africa, and
Europe…, Vol. 1 (London: Longman, 1814
[1810]), pp. 299–305; Gulfishan Khan, Indian Muslim Perceptions of the West
during the Eighteenth Century (Karachi:
Oxford University Press (OUP), 1998), pp. 124, 277, 306; Kaveh Yazdani, India,
Modernity and the Great Divergence: Mysore
and Gujarat (17th to 19th Century) (Leiden: Brill, 2017, forthcoming).
4Kate
Brittlebank, Tipu Sultan’s Search for Legitimacy: Islam and Kingship in a Hindu
Domain (Delhi: OUP, 1982), pp. 118–119.
5Ibid.,
pp. 124–125, 154.
6Yazdani,
India, chap. 2.
7Ibid.,
chap. 2.5.
8Linda
Colley, Captives (New York: Knopf, 2003), p. 274.
9Narendra
Krishna Sinha, Haidar Ali (Calcutta: A. Mukherjee, 1959 [1941]), p. 288.
According to Sinha, ‘Some of the European
prisoners who were young, were circumcised, dressed in Muhammadan
fashion and were called European Mussalmans.
They were each given one gold fanam per day with provisions and clothes
and they were to teach discipline to the Chela
battalions’, the children and young men taken as captives by Haidar.
Ibid., pp. 289, 267. Similarly, Colley points out that between 1780 and 1784 Tipu captured ‘several
thousand British males plus a small, but unknown, number of women being held captive there for several years. Over
three hundred of these men are known to have been circumcised and given Muslim names, and to have remained in Mysore
after 1784 as mercenaries and artisans.’ Linda Colley, ‘Going Native,
Telling Tales: Captivity, Collaborations
and Empire’, Past & Present, 168 (2000), pp. 170–193, p. 172.
10India
Office Records (IOR): H/106: Chairman and deputy Chairman: Extract of a Letter
from the Select Committee at Bombay
dated the 30th October 1771, received Overland on the 8th May 1772, p.
112.
11Frankesch-Hallesche
Stiftung (FSH): AFSt/M 1 B 62: 36a: Brief von Gottlieb Anastasius
Freylinghausen an Johann Balthasar
Kohlhoff, Daniel Zeglin, Oluf Maderup, Jacob Klein, Johann Friedrich
König, Friedrich Wilhelm Leidemann und Christoph Samuel John, Halle [Saale] 12.01.1774,
Mikrofilm pp. 0273–4; IOR: H/190: Extract from Mr. Richard Church’s letter to
Sir Edwards Hughes, Tellicherry 18. 11.
1784, p. 197.
12National
Archives of India (NAI): Foreign Department (Secret) 1783, Consultation 11
August, No. 8: Letter from Sibbald to
Lord Macartney: Tellicherry, 12th June 1783, p. 9; IOR: H/436: Captain
Taylor, On the State of Affairs in India…1791, p. 138; Tamil Nadu State Archives (TNSA): Military
Sundries, Vol. 109 A: General Return of Ordnance, Amunition, Military
Stores found in the Fort and Island of
Seringapatam by the Committee appointed for that purpose, 20.5.1799, pp.
219–239; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Penumbral
Visions: Making Polities in Early Modern South India (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan, 2001), p. 20 note 34.
13Iqbal
Husain, tr., ‘The Diplomatic Vision of Tipu Sultan’, in Irfan Habib, ed., State
and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan.
Documents and Essays (Delhi: Tulika, 2001), pp. 20, 24, 56 (58b). See
also Habib, ‘Introduction’, in idem, p. xii; Mohibbul Hasan, ed., Khwaja Abdul Qadir, Waqai-i Manazil-i
Rum: Diary of a Journey to Constantinople (Delhi: Asia Publishing House, 1968), p. 1.
14Yazdani,
India, chap. 2.5.
15Irfan
Habib, ‘Introduction: An Essay on Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan’, in idem, ed.,
Confronting Colonialism: Resistance and
Modernization under Haidar Ali & Tipu Sultan (New Delhi: Tulika,
1999), pp. xxix, xliv note 41; Husain, ‘The Diplomatic Vision’, pp. 26, 53 (f. 52b); William
Kirkpatrick, ed., Select Letters of Tippoo Sultan to Various Public
Functionaries (London: Black, Parry and
Kingsbury, 1811), pp. 418–419.
16NAL
WO 1/1103: Letter from Colonel Wood to Henry Dundas, 15.2.1799, p. 404.
According to Wood, ‘The Captain of the
Sloop of War and eleven of the Crew being killed, the ambassadors […]
returned immediately, from Mocha, to India, whilst St Lubin, scrambled his way to France, and
[…] was shut up in the Bastile [sic!], on account of this disappointment. /
During the remainder of Hyder Ally’s
reign, I do not think that he made another attempt, to send ambassadors to
Europe’ (ibid.). To my knowledge,
Haidar’s endeavour to send an embassy to Europe has not been touched upon in
the existing literature. In 1780, the
Maratha peshwa Raghunath Rao sent two agents as delegates to England: the
Brahman Hunumant Rao and the Parsi
Maniar. It was probably the first successful post-Mughal embassy that was sent
to Europe. Edalji Dosabhai, A History of
Gujarat: From the Earliest Period to the Present Time (New Delhi: Asian
Educational Services, 1986 [1894]), p.
208. For Shah Alam’s delegation, see Alexander, Shigurf Namah, chap. 1.
17Kirkpatrick,
Select Letters, pp. 15–16; Major Mark Wilks, Historical Sketches of the South
of India, in an Attempt to Trace the
History of Mysoor, Vol. 3 (London: Higginbotham, 1817), pp. 51–52.
18Hasan,
Waqai-i Manazil-i Rum, p. 25; Mohibbul Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan (Delhi:
Aakar Books, 2005 [1971]), pp. 115–117;
Husain, ‘The Diplomatic Vision’, p. 19.
19Tipu’s
envoys seem to have been pious Muslims since they did not drink wine and
refused to eat dishes that were not halal. Archives Nationales (AN): C/2/189:
Monneron à Monseigneur (1788), p. 142; Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan (2005),
pp. 119, 120 note 2.
20Husain,
‘The Diplomatic Vision’, p. 29 (f. 4a).
21Husain,
‘The Diplomatic Vision’, pp. 26, 32–33, 36–37, 42, 53 (3b, 16b, 6b, 7a–b, 52b,
10b, 11b, 61b); B. Sheik Ali, Tipu Sultan:
A Study in Diplomacy and Confrontation (Mysore: Rao and Raghavan, 1982),
p. 137. As Parthasarathi points out, in India,
‘the abundance of wood meant that there was no need to experiment with
coal and the exploitation of its sizable deposits would await the nineteenth century’—Prasannan
Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global Economic Divergence, 1600–1850 (Cambridge: CUP, 2011),
p. 11. However, we should also bear in mind that, in England, wood scarcity alone does not explain the
application of fossil energy. Warde points out that, ‘By the early 18th
century, over half of the energy
consumed in England was supplied by coal’—Paul Warde, ‘Energy and Natural
Resource Dependency in Europe,
1600–1900’, BWPI Working Paper, 77 (2009), p. 9. As Vries emphasizes, ‘Britain
was already experimenting with new ways
of producing energy when population pressure still was quite low. Wood scarcity
was often a problem because demand was
so high, not because supply was so low’—Peer Vries, ‘Challenges, (Non)
Responses, and Politics: A Review of
Prasannan Parthasarathi, Why Europe Grew Rich and Asia Did Not: Global
Economic Divergence, 1600–1850’, Journal of
World History, 23(3) (2012), pp. 639–664, here p. 649.
22Husain,
‘The Diplomatic Vision’, p. 23; Habib, ‘Introduction’, p. xiv.
23Ali,
Tipu, pp. 122–123; Husain, ‘The Diplomatic Vision’, pp. 33 (7b, 10b–11b), 53
(f. 52b).
24Habib,
‘Introduction: An Essay’, p. xxxi.
25Wilks,
Historical Sketches, p. 57.
26Ibid.,
pp. 54–55; Denys Forrest, Tiger of Mysore: The Life and Death of Tipu Sultan
(London: Chatto & Windus, 1970), pp.
117–118; Ali, Tipu, p. 124; Husain, ‘The Diplomatic Vision’, pp. 22–23,
31 (f.5a), 36–37 (11a), 41 (16a); Habib, ‘Introduction: An Essay’, p. xxxi. See also Habib,
‘Introduction’, p. xv. Three of the four ships that Tipu sent to the Ottoman
Empire (1786–87) were destroyed in
Basra. One of the ships caught fire, whereas the other two vessels were
destroyed by a storm.
27Ali,
Tipu, p. 128; Nikhiles Guha, ‘Tipu Sultan’s Quest for Legitimacy and his
Commercial Measures’, in Habib, ed., State and
Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan. Documents and Essays (Delhi, 2001), p. 113.
28M.P.
Sridharan, ‘Tipu’s Drive towards Modernization: French Evidence from the
1780s’, in Habib, ed., Confronting Colonialism:
Resistance and Modernization under Haidar Ali & Tipu Sultan (New
Delhi, 1999), p. 144.
29Ali,
Tipu, p. 283.
30Husain,
‘The Diplomatic Vision’, pp. 24, 33 (8b), 48 (29b).
31AN:
C/2/177: Copie de la réponse de Mr. De Cossigny au nabob Tipou Sultan en datte
de 20.3.1786, p. 146. 32The French officer Lally confirmed that France merely
wanted to chase the British away from India. According to Lafont, France’s non-colonial policy was due to the
fact that, in contrast to Africa or America, India was considered to be a
great civilization by the intellectuals
of the eighteenth century. Jean-Marie Lafont, Indika: Essays in Indo-French
Relations 1630–1976 (New Delhi: Manohar,
2000), pp. 151–152, 170 note 4; idem, tr., ‘The Mémoires of Lieutenant-Colonel
Russel Concerning Mysore: In the Service
Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Chateau de Vincennes, Paris’, in Habib, ed.,
State and Diplomacy under Tipu Sultan.
Documents and Essays (Delhi, 2001), p. 98.
33Husain,
‘The Diplomatic Vision’, p. 24.
34Lafont,
‘The Mémoires of Lieutenant-Colonel Russel’, p. 99.
35Joseph
Michaud, History of Mysore under Hyder Ali and Tippoo Sultan (New Delhi: Asian
Educational Services, 2003 [1801]), p.
84.
36AN:
C/2/187: Traduction d’une lettre persanne remise au Sr. Ruffin à bord de la
Thétys par les trois ambassadeurs Indiens
et adressée à Monseigneur, p. 24. The translation has been taken from
Suman Venkatesh, tr., The Correspondence of the
French during the Reign of Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan, 1788 to 1789
(Bangalore: Karnataka State Archives Department, 1998), Vol. 3, p. 268.
37Quoted
in Venkatesh, The Correspondence of the French, p. 274.
38Ibid.
39Ibid.
40Lafont,
Indika, pp. 166–167.
41AN:
C/2/174: Traduction de l’Office présenté au Roi pour les ambassadeurs de
Tippo-Sultan, 30.7.1788, p. 255; Kirkpatrick,
Select Letters, pp. 454–455 (quotation on p. 455); Hasan, History of
Tipu Sultan, pp. 123–124 note 7; Venkatesh,
Correspondence of the French, p. 210. Tipu was also interested in
procuring clove and camphor trees from the French. Venkatesh, The Correspondence of the French,
p. 97.
42AN:
C/2/236: Cossigny: Pondichery le 4.5.1786, p. 53; Traduction d’une Lettre du
Nabob Tipou Sultan à Mr. De Cossigny,
Gouverneur de Pondichery, en date du 21.10.1786, p. 267; Venkatesh,
Correspondence of the French, pp. 210–211, 278–281; Habib, ‘Introduction’, p. xix; Sridharan,
‘Tipu’s Drive towards Modernization’, p. 145; Husain, ‘The Diplomatic Vision’,
p. 57 (61a). Quotation from Lafont,
Indika, p. 168. Hasan gives a much higher number of artisans who agreed to
enter Tipu’s service. See Hasan, History
of Tipu Sultan, pp. 123–124 note 7. Similarly, Sridharan writes that, ‘just
before leaving France in October 1788,
the ambassadors had drawn up contracts of appointments in Mysore for a number
of French professionals, almost all of
whom reached Mysore.’ See Sridharan, ‘Tipu’s Drive towards Modernization’, p.
145. However, the evidence in the
Archive National suggests that Tipu was far from engaging the quantity of
Europeans that he originally desired. Though
Tantet’s figures seem to be too low, they are more accurate than Hasan’s
evaluation. Tantet assumed that some technicians, a carpenter, a weaver, a blacksmith, a locksmith,
a cutler, a watchmaker, a dyer, a physician and a surgeon were brought to Mysore. M.V. Tantet, L’ambassade de
Tippou-Sahib à Paris en 1788 (Paris, 1899), p. 28 quoted in Ali, Tipu, p. 141.
With regard to barometers, it is
interesting to note that, in late 1786, Tipu asked Cossigny to send him a
Persian translation of a European book
on that instrument. Kirkpatrick, Select Letters, pp. 464–465.
43AN:
C/2/189: Isle de France le 7 ventose au 6eme de la République française, p.
264. In a newspaper article, Bristow men tioned that there were 32 artisans,
consisting of founders, glass blowers, sugar bakers, China makers, watchmakers,
broad cloth weavers, armourers, a
surgeon and doctor. FSH: AFSt/M 2 A 2: 18: ‘Escape from Captivity. Narrative
given by Bristow, whose escape from
Tippoos, Dominions, was mentioned in a former Calcutta Paper and who is now
there’, Calcutta Gazette 30.6.1791. However, in his book he reduced the number
to 30 foreign artisans. James Bristow, A Narrative of the Suferings of James Bristow (London: J. Murray, 1793),
p. 104.
44In
1793, more than four years after M Monnot had left for Mysore, his family
appealed to a Minister to procure any available
information on his situation since they had not heard anything from him
for a long time. AN B/224: L’adjoint de la […]
Division Au Citoyen Ordonnateur à Pondichery, Paris 17.6.1793, p. 39.
45AN:
C/2/189: Convention particulier pour les artistes, p. 256; C/2/187: Convention
Particuliére pour les verrier et un maître
méchanicien et ouvrier pour le teint des Glaces, 6.11.1788 [par Denis
Monnot], p. 13; Convention Particuliére pour des fondeurs de canons, pp. 15–16; Lettre à
Monseigneur, à Brest le 10.11.1788, p. 14; Traduccion d’une lettre persanne
remise au Sr. Ruffin à bord de la Thétys
par les noirs ambassadeurs Indiens et adressée à Monseigneur, Brest 18.11.1788,
p. 27. See also Venkatesh,
Correspondence of the French, pp. 209, 214–215, 278–281.
46According
to Michaud, the emissaries ‘talked at the court of Tippoo only of the splendours
of the kingdom they had visited’.
However, Tipu ‘forbade his ambassadors to talk of France in this manner.
His orders were not followed strictly, and the
description of France was a favourite topic among the great and the
small. Tippoo Saheb became so furious that he vowed the death of his faithless envoys’—Michaud,
History of Mysore, pp. 84–85.
47AN:
C/2/191: Mr. De Fresne, à Pondichery, 4.11.1789, p. 103.
48Ibid.,
p. 104. Similarly, Sridharan found some documentary evidence about a French
surgeon by the name of Benard. The
surgeon briefly worked for Tipu Sultan, but was dissatisfied with the
breach of contract and other inequities. According to Sridharan, Tipu argued that the surgeon was
not needed anymore since he was not able to introduce any medical
novelties into Mysore. Sridharan,
‘Tipu’s Drive towards Modernization’, p. 145. But without further evidence this
remains rather dubious.
49Hasan,
History of Tipu Sultan, pp. 282–285; Ali, Tipu, pp. 283–284. Hasan has opined
that Ripaud’s voyage to Srirangapatna
and the Malartic proclamation were a fabrication. Mohibbul Hasan,
History of Tipu Sultan, Calcutta: Bibliophile 1951, pp. 293–294.
50AN:
C/2/299: de la Traduction d’une lettre de Tipou Sultan a Mr. Defresne,
25.5.1792, p. 159.
51AN:
C/2/189: Isle de France le 7 ventose au 6eme de la République française, pp.
264–265.
52AN:
C/2/189: Debay au Directeur, p. 265.
53The
Asiatic Annual Register 1799, Vol. 1 (London, 1801), p. 169; Copies and
Extracts of Advices to and from India…
(London, 1800), pp. 163–164. According to an anonymous reviewer, in this
context, the word ‘block’ should not be translated as ‘wheel’ or ‘engine’, but as a pulley or
system of pulleys encased in a housing.
54M.
Athar Ali, ‘The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case’, Modern Asian Studies, 9(3)
(1975), pp. 385–396, here p. 392. 55Habib, ‘Introduction’, p. xix.
56According
to Montstuart Elphinstone, Zaman Shah was instigated by the Delhi prince Mirza
Ahsan Bakht, ‘who had fled to Caubul in
Timoor’s reign, as well by ambassadors who arrived about this time from Tippoo
Sooltaun, and who made great pecuniary
offers to the king, on condition that he should attack the British’—Mountstuart
Elphinstone, An Account of the Kingdom
of Caubul, and its Dependencies in Persia, Tartary, and India (London: J.
Murray, 1815), p. 565.
57Aniruddha
Ray, ‘Tipu Sultan and the Invasion of Zaman Shah’, Sultan, 4 (1986), pp. 13–25,
here p. 14; Stig Förster, Die mächtigen
Diener der East India Company. Ursachen und Hintergründe der britischen
Expansionspolitik in Südasien, 1793–1819
(Stuttgart: Steiner, 1992), pp. 102–103 note 45. Ahmad Shah Durrani (c.1722–73)
had already invaded India several times
and exploited the Punjab, Kashmir, Sindh and Multan. For an overview, see J.L.
Mehta, Advanced Study in the History of
Modern India 1707–1813 (New Delhi: New Dawn Press, 2005), pp. 246–319; Jos J.L.
Gommans, The Rise of the Indo-Afghan
Empire, C.1710–1780 (Leiden: Brill, 1995).
58IOR:
MSS Eur E 196 (Neg 7622): Kirkpatrick to the Earl of Mornington, Fort St.
George, 26th July 1799; NAI: Miscellaneous
Records of Foreign Department 1799/78: Letter from Edmonstone, Fort St.
George, 10th August 1799, p. 134; AN: C/2/305:
Mémoire sur l’importance actuelle de l’Inde et les moyens les plus
efficaces d’y retablir la Nation Françoise dans son ancienne spleandear, 6.8.1801, p. 67; Habibo Brechna,
Die Geschichte Afghanistans: Das Historische Umfeld Afghanistans über 1500 Jahre (Zürich: VDF Hochschulverlag,
2005), p. 83. Maharashtra State Archives (MSA): Public Department Diary,
No. 65 Part II, Bombay Castle 18th May
1774, p. 376. I did not find out whether Tipu’s correspondence with Timur Shah
was initiated before or after the French
Revolution.
59Archives
des Affaires Etrangères (ADAE): Asie; Mémoire et Document; Indes Orientales et
Possessions Francaises (1785–1826), Vol.
11: Renseignements donnés par Raza ali Kan, de Mémoire, pp. 296–297.
60Quoted
in Ray, ‘Tipu Sultan and the Invasion of Zaman Shah’, p. 19. As early as 1797,
Shore was aware of the fact that the
Afghans were capable of invading Delhi or Lahore, but he thought that
the threat was not so serious as to augment security expenses. Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, p.
299; Förster, Die mächtigen Diener, pp. 102–103 note 45. 61The nawab of Awadh
between 1754 and 1775.
62IOR:
G/29/25: Translation of a Letter from Mirza Mehedi Ali Khan to Jonathan Duncan,
received 27.4.1799, pp. 387–388.
According to an extract of the EIC, ‘Shums ud Dowlah […] had addressed
Letters to Zemaun Shah urging that Prince also
to invade your Territories […] he had taken measures in concert with
persons at Muscat, for the introduction of a Body of Arabs into the Provinces on Ships from that
Port, and had also employed Agents to form a confederacy amongst the zamindars in Bengal, and to induce them to
rise in rebellion whenever he should give them, the signal for that
purpose. Shums ud Dowlah had also
entered into correspondence with a Frenchman at Chensura of the name of Strother.’
See IOR: H/587: Bengal Secret Letter
16.8.1799: Para 9, p. 56. In another extract from the Governor General it is
stated that: ‘I am already in possession
of sufficient evidence to prove that a conspiracy had been formed for the
purpose not only of restoring Vizier
Alli to the throne of Oude [Awadh] but also of favouring the Invasion of Zemaun
Shah and of expelling the English Nation
from the Province of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa […] the Conspiracy stated to have
existed among the Zemindars of the
Province of Bahar is wholly void of foundation.’ See IOR: H/587: Extract
Governor General to Secret Committee 22.4.1799,
p. 62; Ray, ‘Tipu Sultan and the Invasion of Zaman Shah’.
63Anne-Joseph-Hyppolite
Malartic, Commander in Chief and Governor General of the Isle of France and
Réunion, and Commandant General of all
French establishments to the eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, mentioned in
the procla mation that Tipu desired an offensive and defensive alliance with
the French and that he would bear the expenses of the French troops that would be sent to India.
However, the proclamation did not go further than inviting volunteers,
including Africans that were willing to
serve under the command of Tipu. Forrest, Tiger of Mysore, pp. 341–342. Governor-General Wellesley was fully aware of the fact that
the volunteers—not even counting 100 persons—were of no threat. But he
took advantage of the situation and used
it as a welcome pretext to attack Tipu. Hasan, History of Tipu Sultan, pp. 288,
296–297; Förster, Die mächtigen Diener,
pp. 138, 148.
64Compare
to Ray, ‘Tipu Sultan and the Invasion of Zaman Shah’, p. 20.
65ADAE:
Perse. 1707 à 1805. Mémoire et Documens: P08169: Histoire des Révolutions
arrivées dans la Perse depuis la mort de
Nadir Shah jusqu’en 1788, 1.9.1788, p. 103.
66MSA
Public Department Diary, No. 65 Part II, Bombay Castle 18th May 1774, p. 376;
Wilks, Historical Sketches, Vol. 2, pp.
164–165; Ali, Tipu, p. 124; Hasan, Waqai-i Manazil-i Rum, pp. 1–2,
12–14.
67Mir
Hussein Ali Khan Kirmani, The History of the Reign of Tipu Sultan, Being a
Continuation of the Neshani Hyduri, Colonel
W. Miles, tr. (London: Allen, 1864), pp. 240, 243. See also Ali, Tipu,
p. 299.
68IOR:
H/463: Letter from Edward Lord Clive to Marquis Wellesley, 31.1.1801, pp.
101–107, 110 (quotation on p. 107); IOR
H/472: John Duncan to the Right Honourable Richard Earl of Mornington, Surat
Castle, 21.5.1800, p. 359; The Asiatic Annual
Register, 1801, p. 198.
69IOR:
H/587: Extract Letter from the Governor General in Council to the Secret
Committee dated 3.10.1798, pp. 36–37. 70According to two inhabitants of Herat,
Mahmud had fled to Tehran, after being incapable of maintaining his post at
Herat. In Tehran, he seems to have been
entertained by the king for a year. See NAI: Miscellaneous Records of Foreign
Department 1800, S. No. 79: Translation
of a written Report from two Inhabitants of Herat, p. 5.
71IOR:
G/29/25: Extract of a Letter from Mirza Mehedy Ali Khan, Resident at Bushire,
to the Honble the Governor, 4.12.1798,
pp. 290–292; IOR: G/29/25: Translation of a Letter from Mehedi Ali Khan
to Mr. Manesty, dated 20.5.1799, p. 376.
72This
is confirmed by James Mill who wrote that Fat’h ‘Ali Shah ‘had already
threatened, if not attacked, the province of
Khorassan. Mehedi Ali Khan was entrusted with a mission, the objects of
which, as they fell in with the existing politics of the Persian government, were successfully
attained’—James Mill, The History of British India, Vol. 3 (London:
Baldwin, Cradock, and Joy, 1817), p.
467. Sheik Ali notes that Mehdi Ali Khan was a Shi’a from Muradabad—Ali, Tipu,
p. 301.
73Brechna,
Die Geschichte Afghanistans, p. 83.
74IOR:
H/587: Extract Bengal Secret Letter dated 30.9.1796, pp. 3–4; Extract Bengal
Political Letter dated 31.12.1796, p. 11;
Extract Bengal Political Letter dated 25.1.1797: Para 32, p. 12; Extract
Bengal Secret Letter 2.5.1797: Para 2, pp. 23–24. 75Quoted in Ali, Tipu, p.
296.
76Ibid.,
p. 297.
77IOR:
G/29/25: The Governor of Bombay to Mehedi ali Khan, Resident at Bushire,
11.1.1799, p. 302; IOR: G/29/25: Translation
of a Letter from Mehedy ali Khan, received 26.1.1799, p. 303. Interestingly,
at the close of the year 1798, the British had
sent 500 muskets with 5000 cartridges to Bushehr, destined for the Vizir
Mirza Ibrahim. But the arms were rejected since
the military used pieces called jezayer (jezail), that were sparked with
matches and also because the Vizir seems to have preferred money over arms. See IOR G/29/25:
From Mehedi Ali khan, 10.1.1799, p. 307; IOR G/29/25: Translate of a
Letter from mehedi ali khan of the
11.1.1799; IOR: G/29/25: Extract of Letter to Mehidi Alli Khan, 1.11.1798, p.
316. According to Cooper, a jezail was a
South Asian matchlock, often a ‘very accurate long-barreled’ matchlock—Randolf
G. S. Cooper, The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns
and the Contest for India: The Struggle for Control of the South Asian Military
Economy (Cambridge: CUP, 2007 [2003]), p. 338.
78IOR:
G/29/25: Translation of a Letter from Mullick Ettigar to the Governor of
Bombay, pp. 391–392. The name of the Malik ut-Tujjar is not mentioned in the
letter.
79IOR:
G/29/25: Translation of a Letter from Kheleel Mullick ettejaur of Persia to
Jonathan Duncan, dated 9.4, received 27.4.1799,
p. 400.
80IOR:
H/587: Extract Bengal Secret Letter dated 5.2.1799, p. 52; Letter from the
Governor General to the Secret Committee,
dated 12.2.1799, p. 53; Extract Governor General to Secret Committee
12.2.1799, p. 55.
81IOR:
H/587: Extract Letter from Governor General to Secret Committee 20.9.1801, p.
75.
82Mohssen
Massarrat, ‘America’s Hegemonic Middle East Policy’, Global Research, 4
September 2007, http://www.globalre
search.ca/america-s-hegemonic-middle-east-policy/6683 (accessed 22 November
2016). With regard to the Iran–Iraq war,
Ramsey Clark has argued that the Iraqi ‘attack served US interests by
weakening Iran and of course war against much larger Iran would weaken Iraq as well. Washington
did not want either side to win.’ In a similar vein, the influential US
statesman Henry Kissinger summarized the
US’ policy towards Iran and Iraq with the following words: ‘I hope they kill
each other and too bad they both cannot
lose.’ Quoted in Ramesh Chandra, Global Terrorism: A Threat to Humanity (Delhi:
Kalpaz Publications, 2004), pp. 2–3. For
a similar argument with regard to the US strategy vis-à-vis Syria, Hizbollah,
Iran and Iraq in 2013, see Jürgen Wagner,
‘Syrien: Giftgasangriffe und die Verstetigung des Bürgerkrieges‘, Ausdruck
Oktober, 5 (2013), pp. 1–6.
83IOR:
H/587: Extract Letter from Governor General to Secret Committee 20.9.1801, p.
75.
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