Ashish Das
Q. What were the political and religious challenges faced by Akbar. What steps did he take to tackle them?
Akbar has been seen as one of the greatest rulers of the Mughal dynasty in India. He came to the throne in 1556 upon the death of his father Humayun. The time at which he ascended the throne was a particularly unstable period, when the still developing Mughal state was confronting a great deal of problems – both political and religious. The challenges came not only from the ruling groups but also from indigenous forces in Hindustan. Akbar has been credited with the establishment of the institutional basis of the state and the crystallization of its ideological and political stance.
Before
we analyse the challenges faced by Akbar, it is helpful to look at the primary
contemporary sources and how they influence our perception of Akbar. Abul Fazl’s Akbarnama and Ain-i-Akbari
are the two primary accounts giving what can essentially be seen as the
official position on various affairs. Abul Fazl was in favour of Akbar’s
ideology and being the court chronicler has presented him in a very positive
light. As a corrective to Fazl’s almost eulogical work is Abdul Qadir Badauni’s
Muntakhab-ut-tawarikh. Badauni was
also at Akbar’s court, but he was a man of orthodox beliefs, who did not
endorse Akbar’s liberal ideology and is hence overly critical of his policies.
There are however many things mentioned in his account like the Mahzarnama,
which are not present in Badauni, thereby giving us a complete picture of
Akbar. Another source is Nizamuddin
Ahmad’s Tabaqat-i-akbari. We also have the accounts of the Jesuit missionaries at Akbar’s court.
Their accounts however are restricted due to their lack of local knowledge.
Also, they held a grudge against Akbar who never promoted Christianity the way
they would have expected him to. Hence, they too look upon his policies with a
prejudiced eye. We need to study these sources in conjunction in order to
arrive at a more or less accurate picture of the time.
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When
Akbar ascended the throne at Kalanaur on 14 February, 1556, he had only a
tenuous hold on the Punjab and the
Delhi-Agra area. What can be called Mughal political patterns and
institutions developed during the first half of Akbar’s reign. Babur had brought the Timurid dynasty to India but could not
develop distinctively Mughal institutions, practices, and political and
cultural styles. Akbar’s reign saw the
development of a new set of administrative institutions, a new conception of
kingship and the constitution of government, a new military system, and new
norms of political behaviour.
Douglas
Streusand believes that evolution of Mughal institutions under Akbar are
characterized by the element of
compromise. The regime survived because it satisfied both the ruler and the
members of the political elite. It represented a compromise between the ideals
represented in the rituals and texts which propounded the constitution and
economic and military realities, and also between the desires and expectations
of the ruler and the nobility. Akbar
created the Mughal Empire from two sets of components, what he found in
Hindustan and what his father had brought with him from Central Asia. He
synthesized these two legacies to produce a distinctly Mughal polity and
culture. This fusion involved individuals, institutions, patterns of behaviour,
and literary and artistic styles.
Before
we analyse challenges faced by Akbar, we can get a better understanding of the
operative forces by looking at the composition of the Mughal nobility, which Akbar
inherited. The nobility which came with Babur to Hindustan was predominantly Turani of which the nobles of Mongol descent constituted a
majority. The position of Timurid
royalty and its relations with the nobility were governed to a very large
extent by the Chengizi tradition of
kingship, in which the tribal
character of the Mongol polity did
not permit the rise of absolutism in terms of monarchy. The basic principle
was that ‘the empire belonged not to the
ruler, but to the ruling family’. Claimants to a share in sovereignty were
therefore many. But the gradual elimination of the Chaghatai features of the
polity in due course, seems to have facilitated the transformation of the
Mughal Empire into a highly centralized absolutism under Akbar, who began to draw heavily upon Turkish traditions and
practices The groups which formed the Mughal ruling class had different
ethnic and religious characteristics as well as different political
expectations, which the Mughal polity had to satisfy. Mughal officers initially
belonged to three different ethnic groups. Most were the Chaghatais, who expected a central position in the ruling class and
considerable autonomy in the provinces. There were the Irani bureaucrats who desired a centralized bureaucratic government
and lastly, there were Turkmen who
were pastoral nomads from the Safavi Empire. This classification made by
Streusand isn’t an ethnic classification, but is based on political
characteristics and expectations.
Political Challenges:
When
Akbar took his father’s throne, he confronted a series of regional polities and smaller fragments. No dynasty had been able
to unify Hindustan for some two centuries. After Sher Shah Suri’s death in
1545, three members of the Sur dynasty, Adil Shah, Sikandar Shah, and Ahmad
Shah contested the throne. Humayun had defeated Sikandar Shah, but the others
still remained undefeated. The Sisodia Ranas of Mewar, the Kachwahas of Amber,
the Rathors of Marwar and Bikaner, and the Hadas of Bundi, were also important
powers in Rajasthan. Another powerful local group Akbar had to content with was
the zamiondars. Zamindars or the
powerful local gentry controlled a significant proportion of military power
in Hindustan. They employed a large number of peasants as soldiers and even had
small forts (qal ‘achah) sometimes.
They formed a vital part of the political structure in Hindustan, which Akbar
faced.
The
beginning of Akbar’s struggles can
be traced to the conflict with Hemu,
even though at this time he was a minor ruler. The return of Humauyn following
Sher Shah Suri’s reign to Delhi in 1555 had not ended the Afghan danger, and
the Mughal state was once again threatened following the death of Humayun at
Delhi (1556). The resurgent Afghans drove the Mughals out of Bayana, Etawah,
Sambhal, Kalpi, Narnaul and Agra. At this time Hemu, a prominent Afghan general
of Adil Shah began to advance upon
Delhi. In November 1556, Hemu and Bairam
Khan, Akbar’s regent, fought the Second
Battle of Panipat. Hemu was eventually defeated. The Afghan danger however
did not disappear even after Hemu's defeat.
Humayun’s sudden death in
January 1556 came at a time when the Mughal position in India was far from
secure. The Mughals were handicapped by the minority of Akbar. A regent, who would
rule in the name of the king, had to be found, and Bairam Khan was the obvious choice. Since the Mughal position at
that time was unstable, and there was a lot of factionalism and demoralization in the nobility, no one objected to
the high position accorded to Bairam Khan.
But the de facto exercise of
sovereign authority by one of the nobles was bound to disturb the position of
the nobles, and was hence fraught with serious dangers to the stability of the
administration.
Bairam Khan dominated the situation
after Akbar’s enthronement, and used his position to install his dependants in
positions of power. Although no section of the nobility challenged the
assumption of the office of wakil-us-sultanate
by Bairam Khan, it seems that the senior nobles wanted to share power and
influence with him, and were not prepared for his absolute and personal
command. Bairam Khan on the other hand was determined from the very beginning
to exercise his powers with a firm hand. He even started to take measures to
eliminate from effective positions all those nobles from whom he expected a
challenge to his authority.
Iqtidar
Alam Khan however raises a few questions about this kind of a portrayal of
Bairam Khan. Khan has explored a new angle when he writes that Bairam Khan’s
power probably was not steadily increasing. In fact probably he was compelled
not to increase his power a great deal, precisely in order to forestall his
fall. Khan also asks whether political and military events outside of the
king’s personal attachments and the factional groupings within the nobility
influenced the vicissitudes in the fortunes of Bairam Khan.
In
1556, Bairam Khan, without obtaining the king’s sanction, had Tardi Beg executed on the charge of ‘knowingly and treacherously’ bringing about
defeat at Tughlaqabad by fleeing from the field of battle. After the execution
of Tardi Beg Khan, the struggle between Bairam Khan and his adherents and other
Humayuni officers intensified. Bairam Khan’s move to eliminate rivals is also
seen with regard to Munim Khan, the
governor of Kabul, whose departure from Kabul to India was postponed.
The
factional tussle at the court,
during March 1558-March 1560, only
reflected a growing contradiction between the centralizing tendencies of an expanding state and the desire of the
nobility to preserve their traditional privileges. Bairam Khan’s dilemma
was that, on the one hand he wanted to curtail the independence and autonomy of
the nobles and on the other hand he had to depend for his power and authority
on one or other section of the nobility. Throughout the period of Bairam Khan’s
regency (January 1556-March 1560), the political powers seems to have rested
mainly with the Chaghatais and other
Turani groups. Bairam Khan was apparently able to exercise his powers as
regent only as long as it was condoned by the broad sections of the Mughal
officers.
As
a result of the long-drawn factional struggle at the court that had continued
since the arrival of the royal ladies from Kabul in March-April 1558 Bairam
Khan got isolated from the king as well as the majority of the nobles. It was
under these circumstances that Akbar escaped from Agra in March 1560 and was
taken to Delhi by the opponents of the regent. At Delhi, Iqtidar Alam Khan
believes that Akbar was persuaded to proclaim the dismissal of Bairam Khan. Royal farmans
were issued to all the important grandees of the state inviting them to
Delhi. Bairam Khan retaliated by open revolt. He had entered the Punjab and
near Lahore, he was overtaken by Shamsuddin Mohammad Atka near Sultanpur, and
was defeated on 23rd August. He tried to flee but was eventually
defeated. The downfall of Bairam Khan
has been seen by some modern historians as a reaction by the nobles against a
centralizing tendency. It has also been suggested that Shia Sunni conflicts
could also have been a causative factor for Bairam Khan’s downfall, but
Streusand has rejected this as there isn’t enough evidence.
Even
after the dismissal of Bairam Khan, Akbar had remained under the tutelage of Maham Anaga, his foster mother. This was the phase when Akbar’s foster family
wielded great influence at the Mughal court. Some historians see the period
from the downfall of Bairam (March 1560) to the first wikalat of Munim Khan,
(Sept. 1560-Nov. 1561) as the period when Maham Anaga's influence was at its
height. According to Abul Fazl, this was the period when she considered herself
as the “the substantive wakil”. Some scholars have even gone on to call it a
period of “petticoat government". But this is not a valid statement
because irrespective of the control exercised by the foster family, Akbar's
wishes had to be taken into account.
The foster family was known as the Atka Khayal. Shihab al-din Ahmad
Khan, Bahadur Khan Uzbek, Munim Khan and Shams al-Din Muhammad Khan Atka,
Akbar’s foster-father, all served as chief officers between April 1560 and
December 1561. Shams al-din Muhammad Khan Atka’s brothers Mir Muhammad Khan
Khan-i-kilan, Qutb al-din Muhammad Khan, Sharif Khan Atka and son, Khan-i-Azam
Mirza Aziz Koka were other important members of the clan. Maham Anaga’s son,
Adham Khan and Pir Muhammad Khan also held influential positions during this
period.
Towards
April 1561, when Akbar became
dissatisfied with the state of affairs in the central government, he
started tightening his control over the central ministers. These measures
obviously led to a curtailment of Maham Anaga’s powers as well. The bulk of the
state’s claims against the jagirdars were
lying unrealized and the central treasury was literally empty. There was at the
same time a growing tendency among the nobles
holding commands in different regions to circumvent the central authority.
Following the conquest of Malwa, Adham
Khan kept most of the booty, sending only a few elephants to Akbar. When the
young emperor heard of this withholding of the spoils he hastened to Malwa
where Adham Khan was forced to surrender all the booty except for two
concubines. Soon a similar incident also occurred at Jaunpur where Ali Quli Khan
too refused to surrender the war booty. Akbar was forced to march to Jaunpur
and recover the spoils. These incidents show that Akbar considered the plunder
taken on imperial campaigns as imperial booty. Whatever Akbar’s motivation, his
marches to Malwa and Jaunpur did redefine the status of the mansabdar. It is
clear therefore that increasingly centralizing tendencies of Akbar were leading
to a great deal of discontent and restlessness among the nobles.
Munim Khan's removal,
in November, 1561, and appointment of Atka
Khan as wakil intensified
existing rivalries within the court, and led to a diminution of Maham Anaga's
influence. This eventually led to the murder of Atka Khan by Adham Khan (June
1562). Akbar punished Adham Khan by
having him thrown from' the staircase of the fort till he died. This marked the
end of Maham Anaga's surviving influence, and she died soon afterwards. From
this time on, no single group or faction dominated Mughal politics; Akbar had
considerable freedom of action and used it.
As
Akbar took the reins of government in his hands, he devised ways and means to
ensure that such a situation, where one group of people began to dominate the
court affairs did not arise again. Some successors of Bairam Khan thought that
they could continue to exercise the type of powers which Bairam Khan had
enjoyed. The drastic punishment of Adham Khan for stabbing Atka Khan signalled
that Akbar would not allow the vikalat to be the tool of factional politics.
Akbar made it clear that the post of a vakil was a favour for him to bestow but
which was not indispensable for the administration.
Once
Akbar started to function in an independent manner, it was extremely important
for him to reorganize certain institutions, which would strengthen the basic
structure of the state enabling it to control dissenting voices. At this time
the imperial government received little
revenue from the provinces because the governors diverted what they
collected to their own households and followers. There was little khalisa land, whose revenue went into the central treasury.
The first step taken in 1561 was to order an enquiry into the revenue arrears of different sarkar and subahs
(called vilayats) administered by different commanders. Many nobles had started
to encroach on the income of the khalisa areas, especially if they were the
commandants (hakims) in the area in which their jagirs were located. It was due
to this that the imperial treasury was almost empty. Another step taken at this
time was to separate the executive and
revenue responsibilities of jagirdars, there by reducing the size of a
jagir, and even breaking it up.
A
second stage of administrative reform began with the appointment of Muzaffar Khan Turbati as wazir in 1564. He ordered a new revenue settlement for the empire. Most importantly, he promulgated
a regulation fixing the number of troops each mansabdar should support and how
much those troops should be paid. This important step towards the Mansabdari
system indicated a formal shift in the status of Mughal officers. They ceased
to be chieftains with their own followers and became cogs in the imperial
machinery, maintaining troops for their masters.
The beginning of Chaghatai opposition
to Akbar’s political agenda was seen in the form of the Uzbek revolts. By incidents like the one following Ali Quli Khan’s
withholding of war booty in Jaunpur in 1561, Akbar was clearly trying to re-define the relationship between
provincial governors and central authority, where the former would now have
a reduction in autonomy and security. The Uzbeks had played a very important
role in the conflict against the Suris and felt that they were not being
adequately compensated and that they deserved a more central role in the
regime. Therefore they obviously resented Akbar’s claims to the spoils of victory.
The
strict measures that Akbar took against
the Uzbek officers during the three following years after the suppression
of Ali Quli Khan were further necessitated by the demands of his basic policy
with regard to the nobility. Akbar was anxious to eliminate, as far as possible, clan-groups
inside his nobility; for such groups tended to become the nuclei of warring
factions and undermined the ties of loyalty between the King and his nobility.
He took measures such as the assessment of arrears against jagirdars (1561),
downgrading the position of the wakil, the creation of the post of
diwan-i-wizarat-i-kul (1564) and the tendency to reduce the size of jagirs
resulting in the separation of executive and revenue charges.
Akbar’s
struggle with the Uzbeks began with a confrontation with Abdullah Khan Uzbek, who had led the Mughal re-occupation of Malwa in 1562 and became governor of
the province. By mid 1564 Akbar began to suspect Abdullah Khan of trying to
revolt, and proceeded towards Malwa intending to subdue him. Abdullah Khan
refused to surrender and eventually lost in an armed conflict on August 6 1564.
Abdullah Khan escaped to Gujarat, while Akbar returned to Agra after appointing
Qara Bahadur Khan as the governor of Malwa.
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The
next conflict came in 1565 when Akbar was informed that Iskandar Khan Uzbek planned a rebellion. Akbar made an attempt at
reconciliation, but this proved abortive. The Uzbek officers joined hands with
Khan-i-Zaman while Iskandar Khan and Ibrahim Khan were to occupy Lucknow. The Uzbeks apparently hoped
to imprison Akbar and take effective control over the empire. The Uzbeks were
ultimately defeated but Akbar pardoned them and even restored their jagirs to them.
The
last act of the Uzbek rebellion came in the spring of 1567, when Khan-i-Zaman, Bahadur Khan, and Iskandar
Khan proclaimed their allegiance to Mirza
Muhammad Hakim, whom Akbar had just driven back to Kabul. The Uzbeks had
managed to take over Lucknow and the entire region north of the Ganges, while
moving towards Manikpur, Oudh and Qanauj. The Uzbek forces were defeated once
again. Ibrahim Khan was pardoned and Iskandar Khan even re-entered imperial
service as fawjdar of Lucknow.
Meanwhile,
Akbar had to face a new danger. His half-brother,
Mirza Hakim, had been ousted from Kabul and had sought refuge in the
Punjab. However on the way, Mirza Hakim laid siege to the fort of Lahore. Mirza
Hakim, who had failed to win over the nobles of Punjab by bribery and promises
of reward, retreated when Akbar reached near Lahore in early 1567. Akbar did
not pursue Mirza Hakim beyond the Indus. Mirza Hakim was able to make peace
with Mirza Sulaiman who left Kabul and returned to Badakhshan. Further Mirza
rebellions lasted from 1567 to 1577, after which like before Akbar granted them
pardon and even set up a matrimonial alliance. Unlike the Uzbeks, the Mirzas
had no supporters at court or constituency broader than their own followers and
were therefore no more than a minor irritant.
One
of the major steps taken by Akbar in order to consolidate his hold over the
state and create a strong institutional base was the establishment of the Mansabdari system. Mansabdari was a
unique system devised by the Mughals in India. In its broadest aspect, the
mansab or rank awarded to an individual fixed both his status in the official
hierarchy as well as his salary. It also fixed the number of armed retainers
(tabinan) the holder of a mansab was supposed to maintain. The holder could be
given any administrative or military appointment, or kept in attendance at the
court. Thus, mansabdari was a single service, combining both civil and military
responsibilities. The salary could be paid in cash, but generally it was paid
by grant of a jagir. Grant of a jagir implied the right of collecting all the
payments due to the state. Satish Chandra writes that the institution of
salaries subtly changed the character of the nobility.
The
mansabs granted to nobles ranged from 10 to 5000, forming sixty-six categories
in multiples of 10 up to 100 and thereafter by 50 or 100. Mansabs above 5000 up
to 10,000 were reserved for princes of blood. However, towards the end of
Akbar's reign, two nobles, Mirza Aziz Koka and Raja Man Singh, were raised to
the rank of 7000. Through the Mansabdari system all nobles were made officials
of the state, owing responsibility to the centre. Control was further increased
by the introduction of the branding or
dagh system in 1573-74. The dagh system implied that the descriptive role
of every soldier entertained by the mansabdar was noted, and the number and
quality of the horses were periodically inspected. Those who failed to do so
were penalized. Promotions also depended upon conforming to it.
Akbar
had soon realized that military power
was not enough to ensure the stability of any regime. It was necessary to have
the support of indigenous groups to establish an enduring administration and
give the state firm institutional roots. The two main groups which Akbar
inducted into the state machinery were the Rajputs
and the Indian Muslims. The evolution of relations between the Mughals and
the Rajputs during the reign of Akbar can be placed within more than one
historical context. It can be seen in terms of the expansion of Mughal
territorial control and State power, the evolution of Akbari religious policy,
and the mutual need for some kind of a political accommodation on the part of
both the Rajputs and the Mughals. It is also possible to look at the obverse of
this, as Norman Ziegler has done, and look at the constitution of Rajput
identity in the context of Mughal suzerainty. Akbar did not wish to be
dependent on the Central Asian nobility and felt that it was essential to
promote the indigenous Rajput group as a counter-weight to his nobility. At the
same time cultivating a relationship with the Rajputs based on the superiority
of the Mughals was a challenge especially since the Rajputs were a strong
martial community who had a great deal of pride and self-respect.
The
Rajputs controlled formidable contingents of their own. To employ them effectively
on terms acceptable to the state as well as to themselves, needed an
open-minded ruler like Akbar ready to adjust to change. In 1562, Akbar
developed a close relationship with Raja Bhara Mal Kachwaha of Amber. Akbar's marriage with Raja Bhara Mal’s daughter Bai
Harkha, at Sambhar on his way back from Ajmer where he had gone the first
time to pray at the tomb of Muinuddin Chishti was one of the first steps he
took with respect to his relations with the Rajputs. After his marriage with
Bhara Mal's daughter, Akbar emphasized in various ways his special
relationships with the family. In fact in 1572, when Akbar left for the Gujarat campaign, Bhara Mal, along with
Abdullah Sultanpuri, was placed in charge of the capital, Agra, where all the
royal ladies were living.
With
the alliance with Raja Bhara Mal, Ajmer
already an important centre of pilgrimage became an important military base
from which Akbar could direct military expeditions against disaffected Rajput
chiefs. An important factor was also that the Rajputana was an area of strategic importance from which the route
to the Deccan could be accessed. Hence, Akbar would have wished to establish an
alliance with the groups there. Akbar did use force but even the force was
accompanied by definite political action and administrative relationship to
transform their hostility and resistance into active support and cooperation
with Mughal state. Scholars like Vincent Smith and Beni Prasad have seen this
alliance in terms of Akbar’s imperialist ambitions. But Iqtidar Alam Khan
believes that Akbar wanted to establish a composite homogenous nobility above
all kinds of religious and clan differences.
It
has often been asked what the Rajputs had to gain by an alliance with the
Mughals. There is little reason to believe that matrimonial alliances such as
the marriage of Bhara Mal's daughter were forced upon the Rajputs. It was more
the force of circumstances, and a realization on the part of the rajas the
benefits these marriages might confer on them. As Abul Fazl says, the rajas
entering into such alliances were considered “distinguished among other
zamindars”. Nor did Akbar treat such an alliance as a test of loyalty and
submission. Rulers like Bharal Mal, who had belonged to inferior and
insignificant and inferior clans in the Rajputana gained a great deal of social
status by becoming an important part of the fast expanding imperial Mughal
state.
In
the initial years of what has been called Akbar’s Rajput policy, he tried a
conciliatory policy. Between 1556 and 1567, Akbar made a number of liberal
overtures to attract the Rajputs to Mughal service. In August 1563, he remitted
the pilgrimage tax, which according
to Abul Fazl, ‘amounted to crores’ from all parts of his kingdom. Akbar took a
still more revolutionary step by abolishing jiziyah in March 1564,
amidst loud protests from Muslim nobles, who drew his attention to the
financial losses. At this stage however none of the Rajput groups except for
the Kachwahas responded, and Akbar was forced to adopt a more aggressive and
offensive policy.
The
second phase may be seen as lasting between 1568 and 1580 and the climax of
this policy was the capture of the Mewar
capital Chittor. Akbar was able to resolve his relations with almost all
the states of Rajasthan in this period with the exception of Mewar. Because of
its size and its heavily wooded, hilly terrain, Mewar was ideally situated to
stand out for independence, unlike the other Rajput states. It was also
conscious of its position as the leading state of Rajasthan, and its
acknowledged leader. In 1572, when Maharana
Pratap succeeded to the gaddi of Mewar, a series of diplomatic embassies were sent by Akbar to solve
the outstanding issues with the Maharana. However, no agreement could be
arrived at because the Rana refused Akbar's insistence on his personal
submission. Early in 1576, Akbar moved to Ajmer, and deputed Raja Man Singh
with a force of 5000 consisting of Mughal and Rajput warriors to lead a
campaign against Rana Pratap. The battle
of Haldighati was fought in February 1576, and Rana Pratap was defeated and
forced to flee. Following this battle, a fathnama was issued by Akbar in which
the victory was extolled in religious terminology. This was a period where many
measures taken by Akbar were being seen as a sign of his closeness to the
orthodoxy, but we must note that in the case of the fathnama, Akbar was merely
following a set precedent and not implying anything more.
A
major outcome of the victory over Chittor was that soon most of the other
Rajput states also began to enter into alliances with the Mughals. In 1569, Ranthambore, and in 1570, Jodhpur, Bikaner
and Jaisalmer entered into alliances with the Mughals. By this time most
Rajput states did not have much of a choice, because if they resisted the Mughals
they faced the prospect of being exterminated. Not only were the Rajput chiefs
inducted into the administrative structure but a number of matrimonial
alliances were also established. It should be noted at this stage that Akbar
never forced the Rajput brides to covert to Islam and they were given full
religious freedom.
1580 onwards
we can witness a perceptible change in Akbar’s policy once again. The policy of
aggressive aggrandizement was abandoned and sulh-i-kul or a policy of peaceful
coexistence with all was adopted. This is a clear reflection of a change in
Akbar’s ideological outlook. This was
the period when Akbar began to move away from the orthodoxy, a move
symbolized by the mahzarnama. In this period a number of prominent Rajput officials began to be given charge
of important areas. Raja Bhagwan Das was given Lahore, Raja Man Singh was
given charge of Kabul and at Ajmer Raja Jagannath was installed.
The induction of the Rajputs and
other Hindus into the Imperial service, and according them a
status of equality with the others was a big step in the creation of a
composite ruling class. An analysis of the list of nobles holding ranks of 500
and above given in the Ain-i-Akbari shows that between 1575 and 1595, the
Hindus numbered 30 out of a total of 184, or about one-sixth of the total. Out
of the 30 Hindus, the Rajputs numbered 27.
The
Rajput rajas were accorded broad autonomy within their own principalities, and
most often they were given back their own regions as jagirs when they became part
of the mansabdari system. These kinds of jagirs were not transferable and are
known as watan jagirs. The Mughals claimed a kind of paramountcy in Rajput
affairs and while they did not interfere in the internal functioning, they
tried to ensure peace and stability, thereby becoming embroiled in local
conflicts. Another point of trouble in the various states was disputed
successions, as there was no law of succession such as primogeniture. The
Mughal ruler claimed the right of giving his concurrence to a succession. It
was made clear that in the ultimate resort, the approval of the Emperor was
necessary before succession could be considered legitimate. In other words, succession
was a matter of Imperial grace, rather than right.
Apart from including Rajput and other Hindu rajas or zamindars, into the service, a second channel of promotion, that of the Indian Muslims was opened up. During the times of Babur, among the local groups, mainly Afghans had been inducted into the Imperial service. Many of them however dropped out, particularly after the conflict with Humayun. After their return to India, the Mughals decided to induct two sections of the Indian Muslims. These were, first, the Saiyads of Barha, famed for their military valour, who were supposed to have come to India from Arabia during the Sultanat period. A second section was the Shaikhzadas. These included those who belonged to learned families or Shaikhs who had been settled in India for long. Badauni, himself a mullah, held an unfavourable view of these sections, calling them time-servers and hypocrites.
Religious Challenges: (Already done in Akbar’s religious
policy).
A balanced nobility including
different ethnic and religious groups could have paved the way
for an integrated ruling class. But for that an integrated religious, cultural
and political outlook was necessary. However before we analyse Akbar’s
religious policy, we first need to look at the various challenges he faced from various religious groups. This of
course was in addition to the constant struggle between the Crown and the
Ulama, which we will discuss later.
One
of the most serious religious conflicts of the time was between the Shia and
Sunni sects. The Mughal state clearly had Sunni affiliations, but unlike its
contemporary Islamic states no public proclamation to the effect was ever made.
A prominent shia group of the time was the Isna Asharia or followers of seven
imams. The Mughal state followed a
policy of tolerance and all sects were accepted without persecution. This was
based on the policy, which even Timur had followed where he believed that a
state should not be based on any religious or sectarian differences, but should
rise above them. Consequently, the Mughal state also witnessed a large number
of migrations of Shias from the Safavid state in Persia, which followed a very
orthodox policy. Salaries in the Mughal court were also among the most
lucrative of the time. However, in spite of the open policy of the state, Shia
Sunni conflicts within the empire intensified.
In
the early years of Akbar’s reign, Srinagar
was the scene of some very bitter Shia-Sunni conflicts. In this period, the
Shias often lived outwardly like Sunnis and avoided conflicts with the strong
Sunni elements in the administration. Bairam
Khan is also believed to have held Shia beliefs but the evidence is
inconclusive. During his regency he exhibited sufficient respect to Sufis and
Sunni saints. In the Decanni states of
Bijapur and Golconda the sizeable Shia population had declared their
allegiance to the Safavid state and even had the Khutba read in its ruler’s
name. Akbar soon responded with military power. However, it should be noted
that this was not due to purely ideological reasons, as even Akbar did not want
his sovereignty subverted even in the name of religion. In fact the Mughal
state continued to follow a pro-Persia
policy in spite of the ideological differences, in order to check the
growth of the Uzbeks and thereby maintain the power balance in Central Asia.
Another
very important group at the time were the Mahdawis
The Quranic verse ‘Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is
the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of Prophets’ precluded all possibility of
the advent of a new prophet, but the followers of the Mahdawi sect believed
that the advent of a Mahdi or a messiah was forecasted. At the beginning of the
fifteenth century, expectations of the advent of the Mahdi engaged the
attention of every Muslim thinker and increasingly upset the rulers. Afghan
soldiers and merchants provided many adherents to Mahdawism. In Akbar’s early
years these easily identifiable classes, generally not well affected to Mughal
rule, could easily be accused of disloyalty as well as of unorthodoxy. Orthodoxy saw them as heretics, but it should
be noted that the Mughal state still did not persecute them.
Sufism and Bhakti ideas
were also an important force at the time of Akbar’s reign. A prominent Sufi
silsilah of the time was the Shattari silsilah, headed by Shaikh Muhammad
Ghauth. A number of local Indian practices, customs, and traditions were
incorporated by them including yogic and tantric practices, which were an
important part of the khanqah life. Another significant Sufi influence was the
scholar Ibn Arabi, whose ideas of
wahdat-ul-wajud or unity of existence
were very instrumental in shaping Akbar’s own religious beliefs and
consequently to some extent the outlook of the Mughal state as well. This idea
implied that there was more than one way to experience the universal reality
and that neither was superior or inferior.
We
may also note at this point an important challenge which came to Akbar from the
side of an orthodox group known as the Raushaniyas,
who were based in the northwest Afghan regions. They were extremely critical of
Akbar’s liberal religious ideas and tried to disrupt the political stability of
the region. Akbar was very keen to establish control over the region due to its
vital strategic importance, but met with heavy resistance from the local
tribes. The Raushaniya influence only added a stronger ideological dimension to
the conflict.
We
can understand the relations between Akbar and the ulama and the challenges
posed by the latter in the context of three landmarks in what is called Akbar’s
religious policy. While this essentially refers to Akbar’s public action it
cannot be divorced from his own views on religion.
In the first twenty years of his
reign, Akbar made serious departures from the traditional Sunni system of government, but his
deference towards the leading orthodox Sunni personalities prevented any overt
breach and he gave them full and independent control over religious affairs. In
this period dominant scholars included Makhdumul Mulk Abdullah Sultanpuri and
Sudur Shaikh Abdun Nabi. The conquest of Godwana, the suppression of the
Afghans of the Eastern provinces, the conquest of Chittor and Ranthambhor, of
Gujarat, Bihar, and Bengal; together with revenue, military and other reforms,
kept Akbar increasingly busy from 1564 to 1574. During this period, the ulama
dominated affairs and Akbar’s concessions never satisfied them. Under these
orthodox elements deviant sects like the Mahdawis were persecuted. Thus, while
Akbar pursued a broad, liberal religious state policy, this was a period when
the orthodox ulama ruled the roost at the court.
A
change can be seen in Akbar’s religious beliefs around 1573 onwards. This was a phase of intense discussions and introspection on the part of Akbar which
led to a radical change in his religious views, and deeply affected future
state politics. Akbar’s growing awareness of the repercussions of the traditional orthodox Sunni dominance
over his administration compelled him to an active search for new solutions. He
therefore encouraged the emergence of a
new elite group, whose spokesman was Abul Fazl. From his early childhood
Akbar had held a special interest in spiritual matters and had felt that the
orthodox view of Islam was not giving him the needed answers.
This
period is characterized by the discussions at the Ibadat khana literally, the Hall of Worship. In the Ibadat khana,
the Muslims often indulged in public arguments on points of theology both to
satisfy intellectual curiosity and to prove the superiority of their faith over
other religions. Akbar too, having a keen interest in religious and
intellectual discussion, hoped to educate himself through these discussions.
These polemics were not, however conducted by the participants in the right
spirit of enquiry and research but rather with a view to obtaining favours and promotions at
the court. By 1757, the continued bickering and quarrellings of the ulama
disillusioned the emperor. Slowly, Special efforts were made to associate
distinguished Sufis with the activities of the ‘ibadat khana’. Before long the
debates were opened to shias as well. It seems that Hindus started to be
admitted to Akbar’s favour in the Ibadat Khana between 1576-77 and 1595-96.
Akbar also invited Zoroastrian priests broadening the scope of discussions.
Soon, Jesuit missionaries also began to come to the court of Akbar. Jainism was
also apparently a considerable influence at the Ibadat khana and on Akbar’s own
mind. This, however apparently led to further confusion. A modern historian,
R.P. Tripathi, says, "Instead of bringing credit, the Ibadat Khana brought
growing discredit." Akbar himself became convinced of the futility of
these debates, and closed finally the Ibadat Khana in 1582.
In
this period we see Akbar clearly breaking away from the orthodoxy and this
attitude is most clearly symbolized with the promulgation of the Mahzarnama. The immediate background to
the Mahzar was a division among the ulama caused due to the nature of
punishment to be given, according to the shariya to a Brahman from Mathura, who
had abused the Prophet and Islam. The controversy became prolonged, and the
ladies of the imperial harem also came to be involved. Eventually Shaikh Abdun
Nabi without the emperor’s permission independently ordered the execution of
the Brahman. This incident made Akbar realize the need for certain measures to
control the ulama. At this time Shaikh Mubarak told Akbar to make a claim to
the ijtihad and demand from the
orthodoxy a mahzar. According to this document, which was in the form of a
petition, the ulama gave Akbar the right to adopt any position in case of a
conflict among the orthodoxy, and that position would be held as superior.
Badauni tells us that except for Shaikh Mubarak all the members of the ulama
had to be corced to sign it.
In
the mahzar it was argued, citing Quran and some Hadis that a just and wise
ruler like Akbar not only had the right to claim the allegiance of everyone,
but that his position was higher than a mujtahid (interpreter of holy laws) in
the eyes of God. It was also written that Akbar himself could issue any degree
which did not go against the nas i.e. explicit decree of Quran, and the hadis
and is “calculated to benefit humanity at large.” Any opposition to such a
degree passed by His Majesty would “involve divine displeasures in this world
and the next.”
There
has been a great deal of debate over the implications and meaning of the
Mahzar. While Abul Fazl calls Akbar a mujtahid or interpreter, Akbar does not
claim to be so. In fact it is clear that his was a role where he could choose
between different interpretations, or between rulings given by earlier law
givers, bearing in mind political exigencies and needs of government. S.M.
Ikram and S.A. Rashid, two Pakistani historians say that "...studied
carefully and dispassionately, it appears to be a major constructive effort,
fully in conformity with the Islamic Law and providing a basis for the
adjustment of temporal government and the Shariat." However, the authors
go on to say. "But the limitations laid down in the Declaration of 1579
were not observed by Akbar, and in practice it became an excuse for the
exercise of unrestrained autocracy."
The
real significance of the Mahzar, it seems, was that "it was the first
effective declaration of the principles (of sulh kul) which he (Akbar) had
decided to implement firmly". (S.A.A. Rizvi) This made a final breach
between him and the orthodox ulama inevitable. A final breach between Akbar and
the orthodox ulama was not delayed for long, since it was clear that Akbar
would chart his own course. By this time in fact, the ulama were themselves
deeply divided, with even the two leading figures, Abdullah Sultanpuri and
Shaikh Abdun Nabi, being openly ranged against each other. In 1579, Akbar
appointed Abdullah Sultanpuri and Abdun Nabi to lead the parties of haj pilgrims
to Mecca, with orders not to return without permission. The break with the
ulama also needs to be seen in terms of the broadening of the base of the
political structure where indigenous elements were increasingly becoming a
vital part of the state machinery. In such a situation, the Mughal state could
no longer afford to follow orthodox policies.
Another
aspect of the power of the orthodoxy was the madad-i-maash land grants. Akbar
decided to reform their working as well. By 1851, Akbar was convinced that no
single individual could administer the madad-i-mash tenures for the whole
empire. In order to streamline the work of making grants and supervising them
adequately, he introduced a scheme of appointing provincial sadrs. From the beginning of his reign,
Akbar had also intended to break the monopoly of the Afghans over large areas
of the madad-i-maash grants.
The
Third or Final Phase of Akbar's Religious Belief and State Policy (1581-1605)
is characterized by the crystallization
of Akbar’s ideological beliefs. The crux of Akbar's religious beliefs was
his faith in uncompromising monotheism
or Tauhid-i-Ilahi, based largely on
the Islamic philosopher, Ibn-i-Arabi.
The character of Tauhid-i-ilahi has been debated; whether it was a religion or
not. It seems however that this was merely Akbar’s personal faith, which he
welcomed people to join in. Nobody was coerced and membership was voluntary.
There were a few initiation rituals, which involved the giving of an emblem to
the new entrant. Also, due to Akbar’s strong association of light with
divinity, initiation was done on Sundays when the sun was believed to be at its
peak.
The
contemporary sources give us different views about the tauhid-i-ilahi. Abul
Fazl, clearly a supporter of Akbar’s ideology has given detailed accounts of
tauhid-i-ilahi in his Ain-i-Akbari. Badauni however, due to his inherent biases
has presented Akbar as a heretic who abandoned Islam. Jesuit missionaries at
Akbar’s court too appear confused about what tauhid-i-ilahi meant.
It
seems that the members were expected to give up jan (life), mal (wealth),
din (faith) and namuz. It is believed by many that because he expected the
followers to give up din or faith, he was abandoning Islam. This however is not
true, because central to Akbar’s ideological thought was the giving up of
formal, outward religion or taqlid
and not rational, practical belief or aql.
Once again, the elaborate initiation rituals are seen as reflective of his
desire to set up a new religion. However, this could not have been possible
because a religion is a set of beliefs, which develop over time in an organized
manner and among a number of people. Many scholars also believe that this
period was a historical low for Islam, since Akbar began to persecute Muslims.
This once again is not true because there is clear evidence that Akbar never
abandoned Islam. However it cannot be denied that he moved away from the
orthodox form of the religion. Central to this were the policies of sulh-i-kul
and wahdat-ul-wajud, which in essence denoted his break from the ulama.
In
conclusion we can say that it was under Akbar that the Mughal Empire as we know
it acquired its definitive characteristics. Akbar gave the state an extremely
strong institutional basis which sustained the dynasty for nearly two centuries
after him. His ideological thought strengthened the roots of the foreigners in
Hindustan. One of Akbar’s greatest contributions was the raising of the status
of the monarchy to such a level in the minds of the people that even in 1857,
the Mughal emperor continued to be the ‘highest manifestation of sovereignty’.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Satish
Chandra - Medieval India: From Sultanate to the Mughals
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Saiyid
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Alam Khan - The Political Biography of a Mughal Noble: Munim
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JF
Richards – The Mughal Empire
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Articles
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