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A Pen Sharper than the Sword: A Mughal Ideologue's Implementation of Ideals on Diplomacy, 1577-98

 SHOUNAK GHOSH,  Research Scholar,   Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University 

 Sixteenth century Asia represented a heavily contested political  landscape with the establishment of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, the  Uzbek Khanate at Bukhara and the Mughals in the Indo-Gangetic  basin, alongside the existence of the two centuries old Ottoman  Sultanate. A meticulous examination of the official correspondence  between the respective heads of these states unravels the complex  strands of their multilateral interactions. The Mughal response to the  allegations by the Uzbeks regarding the heretical acts of Akbar in  the final quarter of the sixteenth century, couched in diplomatic  language by the ideologue Abū'l Fażl, raises certain problematics  that constitute the subject of study here. Why was it necessary for  Akbar to portray himself as a good Islamic ruler in order to establish  his credibility? What were the politics of drafting missives and  selecting envoys? What crucial role did the vocabulary of symbolism  perform in negotiating the idea of Islam? Or were these engageme nts merely a façade beneath which Islam was subverted for political  and material purposes? By addressing these questions, this paper  attempts to complicate historical understandings of power contests  of global significance in this period. It brings out the remarkable  scribal skills of Abū'l Fażl that evince the astute diplomat in him.  Simultaneously, an inquiry into the volatile relationship between  religious ideology and statecraft highlights the tensions and dilem-mas between Mughal principles of governance and their policies of  existential pragmatism during the early stages of their sovereignty. 

Abdullah, king of Bukhárá, said that he was more afraid of Abū’l  Fażl’s pen than of Akbar’s arrow.  

— Āʾīn-i Akbarī, I, p. 11.

 By a meticulous examination of Mughal diplomatic correspond dence with the Uzbeks and Safavids, this paper argues that the chief idea that conditioned Mughal policy regarding their northwestern frontier in  the final quarter of the sixteenth century was the containment of any form  of armed conflict. It seeks to highlight, through the pen of Abū’l Fażl,  how this idea was put into practice and thereby demonstrates the efficacy  of diplomacy in resolving volatile issues by means of verbal dialogues  rather than military action. Simultaneously, a close reading of the letters drafted by Abū’l Fażl would reveal how power relations were articulated  between political societies and the complex dialectics that transpired such  exchanges. These texts also offer us a glimpse into the ideas that shaped  Mughal practices of power both within and beyond their territorial realm.  It thus casts Abū’l Fażl as an ideologue who was propagating a vision of  state that was gradually unfolding under Akbar.  

 The set of communications between these potentates have excited  considerable interest amongst South Asian historians, who have analyzed  the matter mostly in terms of the bilateral and trilateral relations between  the courts of Agra-Lahore, Bukhara, and Isfahan. In this essay, I intend to  unravel the complex ideas pertaining to religious ideology and geopolitical concerns that shaped the diplomatic conduct of the Mughals. These  ideas find profound expression in the tools and devices employed by  Abū’l Fażl to drive forward Mughal interests. Diplomacy was a mechan ism to implement such ideas through which relations of hegemony,  dominance, subordination, subservience between contending polities  were transacted and defined. The texts circulating between courts and  capitals can be interpreted as discourses of power. The implicit subtleties  contained in these transactions determined how states perceived and  interacted with each other. The following pages would also bring out how letters served as connecting threads between states, thereby creating a  global network of dialogues.  

The Rationale of Diplomatic Conduct  

 The spate of experiments in the fields of religion and governance  that Akbar engaged in from the mid-1570s drew tremendous scorn from  orthodox Muslim circles that saw it as his deviation from the path of  faith.1 A good number of disgruntled theologians made their way to  Bukhara and Turan, lying beyond the northwest frontier of the state,  where they voiced bitter sentiments against what they presented as the ‘heretical practices’ of Akbar to the Uzbek monarch ‘Abdullāh Khan.  The latter certainly must have raised a query regarding this through his  emissaries to Akbar in March 1586. Akbar was thus faced with the tough  challenge of justifying his conduct in the global sphere, for which he  resorted to the skillful craftsmanship of Abū’l Fażl.  

 The reply drafted by Abū’l Fażl has to be examined in the larger  context within which the politics of negotiations were being played out.  The ibādatkhāna debates which commenced in 1575 and reached a  climactic moment in 1579, drew a lot of scorn from Badauni, who  launched a scathing critique on Akbar for his deviation from the path of  faith.  

...the Resurrection, and Judgment, and other details and tradi tions, of which the Prophet was the repository, he laid all aside.  And he made his courtiers continually listen to those revilings  and attacks against our pure and easy, bright and holy faith... and urged and excited them to his own path...2 

Badauni’s ranting, bordering on sheer exaggeration, occupies a large part  of his chronicle, as he presents a picture of the setting of the sun of Islam:  

The prayers of the Islam, the fast, nay even the pilgrimage,  were henceforth forbidden... every command and doctrine of the Islam, whether special or general, as the prophet-ship, the  harmony of the Islam with reason, the doctrines of Rúyat,  Taklíf, and Takwín... all were doubted and ridiculed... During  those days also the public prayers, and the azán... were  abolished.3 

Badauni also miserably notes that owing to these abuses of Islam, many  pious men left the country in disgust. Theologians such as Shaikh ‘Abd un-Nabí and Makhdúm-ul-mulk were either humiliated or banished from  the kingdom. It seems that a good number of these people made their way  to Bukhara and Turan, where they echoed the bitter sentiments voiced by  Badauni to the Uzbek ruler, as the author of the Silsilat us-Salātin would  have us to believe:  

a group of saints and learned men being distressed by Akbar’s  heresy arrived at ‘Abdullāh’s court and reported that, having  been misled by certain mendicants, Akbar had adopted the  religion of Metempsychosis (tanasukhia) and the behaviour of  Jugis and had deviated from the religion of the Prophet.4 

There must have been a query regarding this in ‘Abdullāh’s letters to  Akbar, which brings us to the latter’s reply. Initially, Akbar had asked  Ḥakīm Abu’l Fath, a noble who had immigrated from Gilan in July 1575  along with his two brothers—Ḥakīm Humam (whom we shall come  across shortly) and Ḥakīm Nūr-ud-dīn—on account of Safavid persecu 

tions of Sunnis, to draft a fitting response.5 The reason behind this choice  

seems to have been that Abu’l Fath was an orthodox Sunni whose letters  were invested with ‘the traditional Islamic aura’, with profuse quotations  from the Quran, hadith and verses of eminent Persian poets.6 This style  would have been apt in the circumstances and was expected to serve the  purpose well. The draft prepared by him incidentally found its way to the  inshā collection of Abū’l Fażl. Riazul Islam opines that it was a  composite letter initially drafted by Abu’l Fath and later revised by Abū’l  Fażl.7 However, the missive that was finally send to ‘Abdullāh was  penned by the latter.8 A simultaneous reading of the contents of both the  letters will clearly bring out the Mughal perspective on this matter.  

 Abu’l Fath’s draft is an elaborate rhetoric of defence in favour of  Akbar. It refers to ‘groups of ill-intentioned persons’ who were ‘dis affected, distressed and expelled’ and had gone to Turan and presented  ‘false things as true’ against Akbar. The draft dismisses such charges as ‘absurd’ and ‘baseless’ and expresses astonishment that ‘Abdullāh had  paid heed to such ‘fabricated propaganda’. The narrative lambasts these  people as ‘impudent deceivers and ill-natured destroyers who were...  spreading improper and trifling rumours about Akbar because of their  own perversity and faulty understanding’. It was hoped that these words  from the pen of a learned Sunni who had faced oppression on sectarian  grounds previously would inspire the confidence of the Khan. Repeated  lamentation that ‘Abdullāh had stopped communication due to his belief  in ‘such mischievous gossip by disgruntled and foolish persons’ was  supposed to drive the defence further. Moreover, the assertion that a  ‘sensible envoy’ or ‘some wise men’ should have been despatched to  investigate the matter gives proof of Akbar’s ‘innocence’.9 

 The draft also touches upon an oft-deliberated and volatile theme  in medieval history—the relationship between state and religion, between  the monarch and the ulema. It hints at Akbar’s frustrations in his attempt  to separate the temporal and sacral into distinct compartments. The disti nction is made clear in ‘the affairs of the two worlds of subsistence and  resurrection’. Once again, he lashes out at  the ignorant and malevolent theologians, who, out of their greed  and self-conceit, stick to the literal meaning, misinterpret the  word of God as communicated by His Prophet, and present the  evidence in a different colour by expanding and analysing the  facts in order to gain advantage for themselves, and to claim a  share in the kingly business and sovereignty.10  

There is also a subtle articulation of Akbar’s stand to be the fount of all  authority in the realm, over and above the religious figures. The power  that a monarch is vested with is strongly pursued:  

According to both masters of traditional as well as rational  understanding, rulers have been endowed with the largest share  of the brilliant gem of wisdom and discriminatory power. The  sovereigns possess the capacity for learning more than others,  as the distribution of this talent is in proportion to the needs,  and hence this group possesses the intellect and comprehension  in abundance.11 

The draft also advocates Akbar’s opinion that theologians and scholars,  despite being well-versed in the tenets of religion, are below the king in  hierarchy. The Pādshāh should keep the company of such wise men but  even at the peak of their sagacity, they ‘could not claim equality with the 

rulers in matters of insight, far-reaching intellect and wisdom’. Having  made his stand on clerics explicit, Abu’l Fath proceeds to give a sincere and detailed account of the religious manoeuvrings of Akbar and his  troubles with the dogmatic ulema who were always a hindrance in  matters of administration. There is a straightforward explanation of his  engagements in debates on theology which led to his cleft with thosefeigning to be pious and intellectual. As Mansura Haidar summarizes the  narrative:  

...since there had been a great deal of differences of opinion in  practically every (religious) matter, he (Akbar) had sought for  proof and justification regarding each argument in matters  relating to knowledge and action. For a proper comprehension  of the subtle intricacies of religious questions, he was  examining the interpretations of the jurists, investigating; clarifying and evaluating the objectives of theologians and  deducing the sources of the statements and the arguments, the  beliefs of the past and present generations, and the many  divergent views which had sprung up during the preceding  millennium and whose details were available in various  works.12 

The pretentious nature of many jurists who claimed to hold superior  status were exposed and they were put to shame:  

These discussions resulted in the deterioration of the market (of  such people) and a disfavour of those ignorant persons who  were by hypocrisy appearing in the garb of intellectuals and had  gained favours. The deliberations over these matters have  brought into the limelight certain capable persons, who had till  then remained in obscurity due to the depravity of the pseudo 

theologians, who had acquired an important position among the  people in the guise of wise men and had pushed these persons  into the background. These foolish persons, having a superficial  intelligence, [eventually]... became ignominious among all  sections of people, and later they were humiliated and  annihilated.13 

The above summary captures the essence of the disputations at the ibādat  khānā and the consequences that followed. It also states that the motive  behind these sessions was purely Akbar’s quest for truth and his strive to  surround himself with knowledgeable men. However, it is interesting to  note that the above extracts did not constitute the text that was sent to  ‘Abdullāh. Rather, Akbar demanded another letter to be drafted by Abū’l  Fażl. The missive is testimony to the remarkable scribal skills of Abū’l  Fażl, who did not get into any lengthy explanations and brushed aside all  allegations with one stroke:  

We consider, however, that lengthy discourse about these things  is unfitting, and so content ourselves with this verse which has  been written concerning glorious ones of the Faith. 

Verse.  

Of God, people have said that He had a son; of the Prophet they  have said that he was a sorcerer. 

Neither God nor the Prophet has escaped the slander of men.  Much less I!14 

The reticent attitude of the Mughals, expressed in the words ‘silence is  better than speech in such matters’, was meant to leave no scope for  further questioning. The draft prepared by Abū’l Fath, which incidentally  found its way to the inshā collection of Abū’l Fażl, is an elaborate  rhetoric of defence in favour of Akbar.15 The exclusion of those sections  of Abū’l Fath’s draft, denouncing the theologians and justifying Akbar’s  actions, was a calculated measure driven by a number of factors. To  begin with, the passages were in the form of an apologia from Akbar who  was anxious to cleanse the blotch on his image by heaping all the blame  on the ‘frustrated’ religious groups. This would not have seemed accept able to Akbar at a time when he was contending for supremacy with the  other monarchs of the Islamic world. Akbar certainly did not wish to be  perceived as the prototype of a subordinate in his power relations with  the Uzbek ruler.  

 Secondly, Akbar’s council of advisors must not have considered it  wise to display deep resentment against dogmatic clerics to a ruler who  was being counselled by them. There was a perception in Mughal circles  that a presentation of the true state of affairs might seem offensive to the  Uzbeks, who certainly would not have shared Akbar’s enthusiasm about  having theological discourses with Brahmins and Catholics. Relations  having been strained with the Ottomans, over issues of hajj and claim to  the khilāfat in the early 1580s, the Mughals were careful not to embitter  the Khanate at Bukhara. It was also apprehended that the boundary bet ween dīndārī and dunyādārī that Akbar was trying to draw would not be  taken well in a kingdom where political attitudes did not usually toe on  non-sectarian lines. Given the perpetually precarious situation at the  Mughal northwest frontier, ‘Abdullāh might have taken up the insult on  faith as an excuse to open hostilities. Hence, it was considered best not to  delve deep into this issue.  

 Given these considerations, it is difficult to agree with Mansura  Haidar’s opinion that the exclusion was probably done ‘to ensure that  under the sway of these unpleasant deliberations and religious discourses,  the focus is not removed from major political issues affecting mutual  interests’.16 The importance of the religious angle in interpreting such  transactions and their implications on political matters cannot be under 

mined. In fact, the justification was the product of a fear on the part of the Mughals that by using common sectarian grounds, ‘Abdullāh might  gravitate towards the Sultan of Cairo and wage a ‘holy war’ against them  in conjunction with him. These tensions were satisfactorily handled by  the composition of Abū’l Fażl, which completely diverts attention to the  ideological basis of the Mughal state that was coming into being under  the enigmatic personality of Akbar.  

The ‘Ideal’ Monarch and his Ideas of State  

 After the usual introductory formulas and flamboyant praises on  ‘Abdullāh, the letter infuses a tone of warmth as it acknowledges the  receipt of messages from him which were ‘much appreciated’ and had  ‘greatly rejoiced’ the Mughal court. Hereafter the letter directly proceeds  to its purpose. Abū’l Fażl refers to Akbar as a ‘suppliant at the gate of the  unconditioned (beniyāz) One’ who has reigned for three decades now by  ‘Heaven’s aid’. From the beginning then, there is a conscious attempt to  portray Akbar as one who was a recipient of divine favours. Akbar was a  righteous and just ruler who had eschewed mortal avarices:  

...all this autocracy and world-rule, all this sword-bearing and  clime-conquering, are for the purpose of shepherding, and for  doing the work of watch and ward; not for the amassing of  treasures of gold and silver, or for decorating the throne and  diadem, or for letting one’s feet halt in the mud of transitory  pleasures, or for sinking the head into the collar of unstable  desires.17 

The spectacle of Mughal state formation is expressed in the loftiest of  words:  

There hath been a constant stirring towards the soothment of  mortals, whether high or low, and for graciousness to men of  the age, whether anear or afar. God knows that the cleansing of  the four dāngs of India, and the sweeping away of the weeds  and rubbish from this garden, which is bounded on three sides  by the ocean, did not proceed from self-will and self 

indulgence, and that we had no object except to be kind to  mortals, and to obliterate the oppressors.18 

Akbar is thus portrayed as a benevolent ruler whose principal instruments  of control were favours and affection. In tune with the rhetoric of  religion, the realm of Akbar is hailed as ‘the Sulṭanat which is yoked with  auspiciousness’ and the evidence of being true to the faith is cited as the  main idea behind Mughal expansionism:  

the straight path of religion and faith, and the right road of truth  and certainty have been the desire of our eyes... in accordance  with the saying that rule and faith are twins, the elevation of the  degrees of august sovereignty, and the uprearing of the stand 

ards of daily-increasing fortune are a full and satisfactory proof  of our observance of the Faith.19 

 The response to ‘Abdullāh’s charges of Akbar being heterodox in  his outlook is not concealed in a justification of the latter’s acts but  guised in the fabric of Mughal expansionism. In fact, Abū’l Fażl’s state ments can also be read as a display of the success of Mughal arms and the  glory it brought to the state, a common feature of Indo-Persian diplomatic  correspondence of the time, usually done to impress upon the reader the  strength of the state apparatuses. The next few lines bear the essence of  the normative ideals spelt out in akhlāq literature which emphasizes on  justice (adl) as the chief trait that every ruler should possess:  

And as the sum total of the desires of just princes, who sit on  the thrones of greatness, is that all mankind and every creature,  who are the wondrous deposits of the Almighty, should abide in  peace and tranquillity, and should strive strenuously in obeying  God, and in the ways of a well-intentioned life, we have during  this time striven for the arrangement and ordering of these  extensive dominions, which were the seats of so many great  sovereigns and rulers, and have by God’s favour, which attends  this suppliant at the Divine gate, obtained full repose by the  management of these countries.20 

The emphasis is reiterated in the raison d’être of the Mughals, which lay  in 

promulgating the laws of kindness, the laying the foundations  of justice, the spreading of the lights of benevolence, and the  irrigating of the gardens of men’s hopes and peace, with ooz- ings from the clouds of graciousness, and beneficence, so that  they may be kept fresh and verdant.21 

 From here Abū’l Fażl goes a step forward and paints Akbar in the  typical attire of an Islamic conqueror, quite contrary to the kind of narra tives of imperial ideology that were being produced by the Mughal state  within its domain for the consumption by its subject populace:  

Places which from the time of rise of the sun of Islam till the  present day had not been trod by the horse-hoofs of world conquering princes and where their swords had never flashed,  have become the dwelling-places and the homes of the faithful.  The churches and temples of the infidels and heretics have  become mosques and holy shrines for the masters of orthodoxy.  God be praised! What we wished for has been accomplished,  and arrangements have been made in accordance with our  desires. All the leaders and stiff-necked ones of the hosts of  Hindus and others, have placed the rings of obedience in their  ears and been enrolled among the victorious armies.22 

The attitude of jihād is extended to the Portuguese as well, as Akbar  announces that the next task on his agenda was to dispel them from the  Indian Ocean and thereby ensure safety to the ‘pilgrims and traders’.23 

The Politics of Diplomatic Negotiation  

 Having steered clear of the controversy surrounding Akbar’s  heterodoxy, Abū’l Fażl now addresses the questions of geopolitical  importance. It is imperative to pause here for a while and briefly discuss the major points raised by ‘Abdullāh. Hāfiz Tanish, the official chronicler  of the ruler of Turan, writes that in 1586, a trusted noble Amīr Quresh,  was deputed as an envoy to the Mughal court with the object to seek an  alliance against the Safavids who had lately been causing much trouble:  

The Persians had been occupying the wilayats of Iran for a long  time and were practising tyranny, creating commotion and  committing sins. Having given up the sunni religion, they had  deviated from the laws of the prophet and were heading towards  utter confusion and destruction.24 

The ‘Abdullāh Nāmā also states that the ambassador was to lay before  Akbar the contemplated Uzbek campaign in Khurāsān to subjugate the  ‘heretic Shias’ who were hindering pilgrimage movements to Mecca and  Medina.25 In the eyes of the faithful then, ‘the extermination of such a  group’ was an obligation, which the Uzbek ruler sought to undertake  ‘early in spring’, now that ‘circumstances were favourable’ and ‘there  were no external factors to obstruct the plan’. It was expected of the  Mughal ruler to ‘extend material or moral support in this venture’ and  certainly not provide refuge ‘to those who fled from our sword to your  side’.26 The event finds mention in the Muntakhab that in the year 992  [1584]:  

representations arrived from Mīrzá Muḥammad Ḥakím to the  effect, that Badakhshán had entirely fallen into the power of  Abd-ulláh Khán Uzbek... and that Mīrzá Sháhrukh had fought  with the Uzbek, and being defeated by him... both of them  [Mīrzá Sulaimán] fled for refuge to Hindústán.27 

Badauni further records that Mān Singh had received the Mirzā with all  courtesies on the banks of the Indus and that Akbar was pleased with the  hospitality shown.28 In fact, according to the author of the Rauzat-ut  Tahīrin, this was precisely the cause behind the embassy from ‘Abdullāh  who wished to inform Akbar that he was compelled to quell the disturb 

ances caused by Mirzā Shāhrukh on his villages.29 

Figure 1  

Map showing a large part of Asia and the geographical domains of  the Mughals, the Safavids and the Uzbeks30  

 

 The correspondence otherwise infused with disputes stemming  from sectarian differences was actually a veil beneath which the triangu lar contest between the Mughals, Uzbeks and Safavids with regard to  Transoxiana was being negotiated. The geopolitical factors leading to the  build-up of this situation have been accurately explained by Riazul Islam,  who aptly points out that Akbar wanted to avoid the Uzbeks gaining  control over Khurāsān at the expense of Safavid Iran. The Uzbek take over of Balkh and Badakhshán in two consecutive years (1583-84) prior  to this communication served as a catalyst to this strand of thought. This  would have placed his long-term plans of acquiring Qāndahār into  difficulties and indeed posed a threat to the Mughal northwest frontier.31 The Mughal response to the Uzbek proposal comes as quite an antithesis:  

But as we heard that some of the officers of Persia had proved  disloyal to their sovereign, and had cast away the firm handle of  fidelity—which had been the means of their exaltation—and  had committed various improprieties, it passed into our mind  that we should appoint to that region one of our sons... and not  undertake any other work until that was disposed of. At present  when the Sulṭān of Turkey, regarding the treaties and agree 

ments made by his father and grandfather as non-existent, has  looked to the ostensibly feeble condition of Persia, and has,  several times, sent his troops there, we shall, passing over the  circumstance of the deviation from the highway of Sunnism  (sunnut-u-jamā’at) and looking only to the relationship (of that  dynasty) with the family of the Prophet, proceed thither and  help them.32 

The reference is to the tumultuous political condition of Safavid Iran,  which had not quietened down even after a decade following the death of  Shah Tahmasp (r. 1524-76).33 In order to prevent an upturn in the balance  of powers in the region that would not have been congenial to the  Mughals, Abū’l Fażl advances an argument deftly wrapped in sectarian  differentiation. The Sayyid lineage of the Safavids is given preference  over the commonality of Sunni identity between the Uzbeks and the  Mughals. There were also certain ethics that the conduct of external  affairs demanded:  

ancient things should be borne in mind, especially at this time  when, as we hear, the ruler of Persia has dispatched able men of  that country (to us) with presents, and with a prayer for help.34 

Apart from the fact that the Safavids appealed to Akbar for assistance, the  Mughal debt to the dynasty is acknowledged.35 Akbar’s refusal to comply  with ‘Abdullāh’s request echoes a similar stance he took a decade ago on  the same topic. The event is noted by Badauni in his history:  

In this year (987) an ambassador of ‘Abdulláh Khán Uzbek  came from Transoxiana with a letter containing assurances of  friendship. The Emperor sent Mírzá Fúlád Barlás, with Khwá jah Khaṭíb, who was a native of Bokhárá, to accompany him  with presents and gifts. And the seal of the letter was as  follows:—  

When we are friends with one another, 

Sea and land are free from confusion and evil.36 

However, Badauni does not give any more details about this incident.  The Akbarnāmā fills this gap on the purpose of the mission, carrying the  message:  

that the world-conquering sovereign [Akbar] should make an  expedition from India to Persia in order that they might by  united efforts release ‘Irāq, Khurāsān and Fārs from the throne  occupant thereof.37 

Akbar turned down the proposition because:  

...the dynasty in question was specially connected with the  family of the Prophet, and that on this account he could not  regard a difference in law and religion as a ground for conquest.  He was also withheld from such an enterprise by old and valued  friendships.38 

Returning to the proceedings of 1586, Abū’l Fażl in conformity with  Akbar’s image as a good Muslim, suggested that the ‘two chosen ones of  God’ (Akbar and ‘Abdullāh) should engage ‘in sociability and spiritual  intercourse’ by meeting in person at Khurāsān, where:  

By oral communications, without the intervention of couriers  and messages, the foundations of love and unity may be made  stronger, and various heartfelt words, and secrets allied to  truths, which are concealed in our hearts, and also matters of theology and observance of the truth may be mentioned in the 

friendly meeting, and we may also hear the refined subtleties in  the matters of Divine knowledge which have cast their rays on the soul of that workshop of magnificence (‘Abdullāh).39 

Abū’l Fażl shrewdly floats the prospect of a religious dialogue as an  incentive for ‘Abdullāh to change his mind from his plans of aggrandi- semnt on Persia. Though the sincerity of this prospect from the Mughal  side cannot be ascertained, the deft use of religious sentiments to sharpen  the edges of diplomacy merits attention. Ḥakīm Humam was entrusted as  the return envoy accompanying Mīr Quresh to the Uzbek court. Characte 

ristic of diplomatic procedures in the medieval age, the good offices of  the ambassador and his close relation with the monarch were stated:  

we are sending the wise and loyal Ḥakīm Humām, who is a  sincere speaker of truth and a rightly-acting disciple. From the  beginning of his service he has been in close attendance on us,  and we never had the thought of sending him away. When such  has been his relationship to us that he has made suggestions to  us without the intervention of anyone else, if similar treatment  be accorded to him in your noble audiences, it will be as if we  and you were conversing directly with one another.40 

A sense of goodwill runs throughout the letter, which ends with the hope,  ‘May we always continue to interchange letters and presents’.41 The  whole text can be read as an act of pacification, intended to exert a check  on ‘Abdullāh whose power was on the ascendant. By withholding him  from hatching an alliance with the Ottomans and attacking Iran, Akbar  was only trying to press the brakes on a process, which he did not deem  pragmatic to do by deploying his military machine.  

A Decade Later  

 The next piece of communication came from the Mughal court  ten years later. The immediate political context was the Mughal conquest  of Qāndahār in 1595.42 Since Qāndahār was a perpetual bone of conten tion between the Mughals, Uzbeks and the Safavids, Akbar was anxious  to avoid any unpleasant reaction following his victory that might upturn  his long-cherished dream. The letter with its repeated harping on ‘Love  and Harmony’, ‘the exposition of the ways of peace, and the demonstrat- ion of the rights of friendship’ brings out Akbar’s anxieties in this regard.  Categorizing his relationship with the Uzbek ruler as that of ‘brother hood’, Akbar insists on ‘mutually exerting ourselves to strengthen the  

foundations of Peace, and to purify the fountains of concord’.43  The missive asserts that the inspiration behind the Mughal  ‘righteous practice’ was ‘to follow the path of amity’ and draws  ‘Abdullāh’s ‘attention to instances of such conduct’. To begin with,  Abū’l Fażl refers to the arrival of the Safavid envoy Yādgār Sultān  Shāmlū, whom ‘the ruler of Īrān, relying upon former ties, sent... to us  and asked for help, (but) we did not consent’.44 The assistance sought for  was against the Uzbek occupation of a greater portion of Khurāsān. Abū’l  Fażl quickly passes over to the next example:  

Also, when Shāhrukh Mirza petitioned that he might have a fief  in Kābul, or Kashmīr, or Sawād, Bajaur and Tīrāh... we did not  grant his request, having taken into consideration the proximity  (of ‘Abdullah), but gave him a fief in the province of Mālwa.45 

Mirzā Shāhrukh, who had taken shelter in the Mughal court following  ‘Abdullāh’s conquest of Badakhshán in 1585, was a potential threat to  Uzbek possessions and his activities had become a constant source of  irritation for them.46 This was the final point of the earlier missive, where  his untoward actions were duly noted by Akbar:  

he, on account of youth, self-conceit, and bad companionship,  has exhibited so many improper actions... In the first place, on  account of the promptings of some short-sighted persons, he has  many times failed on obedience to ourselves. Secondly, he has  not behaved to your noble self in a becoming manner. Thirdly,  he has behaved in such an improper manner to his venerable  grandfather, who had so many spiritual and material claims  upon him.47 

The letter also contained a plea to grant him forgiveness:  

Now that he has... turned towards the strong handle of our  graciousness, we cannot be otherwise than kind and forgiving to  him. We hope that, in accordance with your noble nature, you  will overlook his transgressions.48 

 In response to the ‘cloud on your [‘Abdullāh’s] heart with  reference to the matter of Shāhrukh M.’, the tone (in the present letter)  was similar, for it is stated that for ‘the dust of rivalry’ caused by ‘his  (Shāhrukh’s) youth and ignorance’ to settle ‘in the souls of great rulers’,  they should be ‘obliterated by the waters of pardon’. The explanations  given for housing him are no different from what was written before:  

He by his self-will had committed faults against our family, and  in retribution therefore became a bewildered one in the desert of  exile. When he took refuge with us, and signs of repentance  were visible on his forehead we passed over (his offences)... the  coming of Shāhrukh M. and the sons of Muḥammad Ḥakīm to  our court are merely instances of our love for the noble  family.49 

The implicit message that Akbar was trying to convey through the afore cited couple of examples was that he had in his capacity to create troubles  for the Uzbek ruler. Opportunities had presented themselves at his door  but he had been ethical enough not to make undue use of them. The other  two instances were also meant to indicate that Akbar had taken care to  avoid any kind of friction between himself and the Uzbeks:  

We summoned the Mírzās of Qandahār to court and committed  the charge of that country—which belonged from of old to the  imperial territories—to old servants of ours, lest the Tūrān  troops should attack that quarter under the idea that it  appertained to Persia, and also that there might be a great  commingling of your territories and ours.50 

Figure 2  

The Reception for the Ambassador of the Grand Moghul at  the Court of the Shah Tahmasp, 1573-7651 


 Akbar had thus shown respect for mutually defined territorial  boundaries and eliminated any reason for misunderstanding. And finally,  

...a wicked vagabond raised the head of disturbance in the hill country of Badakhshān and claimed to be the son of Shāhrukh  M. and was joined by the landholders there. Though he sent petitions and asked for help, we did not attend to him, and at  last he became a vagabond in the desert of ruin.52 

Abū’l Fażl, with all his powers of conviction, demonstrates that on every  such occasion Akbar had displayed the comportment that was the  hallmark of a righteous monarch. The motive behind raising all these  events was to divert the Khan’s attention from the actual happening,  which was the takeover of Qāndahār by the Mughal army. Moreover,  there had been some degree of violence associated with this episode,  which would have surely not surpassed the notice of the Uzbeks. As  Badauni notes:  

Sháh Beg Khán fought a battle at Zamín Dáwar with a great  army of the Uzbeks, and defeated them. He slew most of their  leaders, and to those whom the sword spared, he gave dresses  of honour and released them. Another body of them fled to a  fortress, and were besieged there. He bombarded the fortress  and took it by storm. Then he continued his advance and took  the Garmsír.53 

The prime concern in Mughal bureaucratic circles at this time seems to  have been to cover up these acts with assurances of peace and friendship.  

The glorious compacts and agreements—which have been  ratified by skilful ambassadors, one after the other, are fixed in  our mind. In the code of Islam and the rules of generosity one hundredth part of them would be sufficient for making per manent the pillars of friendship and concord, and still more in  the case of the liberal and the choosers of truth... Every  assistance that is due from friendship shall be shown (by us), so  that praiseworthy endeavours may be manifested.54 

The focus on these rather minor incidents was thus meant to overshadow  the major one. Yet again, like he had done in the previous letter, the  talented scribe employs a device that would enhance the spirit of ‘broth erhood’ between the two dynasts:  

let a place be fixed and let us there have a feast of concord, and  let us there discuss, without the intervention of any go-between,  matters of religion and state, and things temporal and spiritu al!55 

The Changing Dynamics of Power  

 Many of the instruments of argumentation and persuasion used by  Abū’l Fażl in these letters find resonance in Akbar’s response to the first  embassy from the Safavid ruler, Shāh ‘Abbās I in 1591, with the intent ion of reopening correspondence between Iran and India after a long gap.  After the traditional opening with an array of elaborate titles, the veteran  Mughal diplomat immediately answers the charge ‘about the delay in  writing letters of affection’:  

you must have heard from comers and goers what great affairs,  and continued wars, have occurred to us against the princes of  India, which has been reckoned by geometricians as four-sixths  of the seven climes. During this long period, this vast country  which was shared among so many independent chiefs and martial rulers has by the Divine aid been conquered by the  imperial servants. From the mountains of the Hindu Koh to the  shores of the ocean all the rebels and stiff-necked ones of three  directions—strongfisted rulers and arrogant rajahs, shortsighted  Afghan mountaineers, swiftly-careering, desert-dwelling  Balūcīs and other fortress-dwellers and landowners—have, one  and all, come into the shade of obedience, and the tribes of  mankind have enjoyed equability in concord. By the Divine aid  that which was revolving in our truth-choosing soul has become  accomplished fact.56 

 The Mughal inability to maintain regular contact with the Shahs  of Iran is couched in the exalted language of their preoccupation in  building a kingdom. In tune with the style of Mughal epistolography,  ‘Divine favour’ and justice could never be separated from victory. Hence,  ‘the deliverance of the inhabitants of the heart-rejoicing country of  Kashmīr from the hands of villainous tyrants’ was achieved ‘by the  support of the spirits of the holy Imāms’ and ‘the standards of justice’  established.57 It is interesting to note the use of religious terminology  here. Keeping in mind that the addressees here were the Safavids, who  were adherents of the Shi’i form of Islam, Abū’l Fażl displays extra ordinary wit in stating that the fount of blessings was the Imām.58 

Following the incorporation of Kashmīr into the expanding state,  the Mughal army cleared the marches to the northwest of all those  elements that were ‘a stone of stumbling to travellers to Tūrān’ and ‘a  thorn in the path of Persian travellers were chastised and punished’.59 

Tajiks, Uzbeks, Khurasanis, Afghans, Hazaras, Barkis, Imaqis and  Multanis were the principal carriers of the trade between India and the  regions beyond its northwestern frontier. Textiles, horses and slaves were  the chief commodities of the trade. Other items included spices, sugar,  indigo, dry fruits, drugs and precious stones. Muzaffar Alam argues that  the protection of the land route across the major entrepots such as Lāhore,  Multan, Kābul and Qāndahār was essential for the upkeep of this trade  that fed the economies of these regions. Hence, the rulers from north  India to Central Asia, notwithstanding their political rivalries, were keen  to ensure safety and security to the travellers.60 Akbar’s painstaking efforts in this direction is brought out in his act of subjugating Mirzā Jānī Beg, the ruler of Sīwistān, Thatta and Sind, whose rebellion against the  Mughal authority there had resulted in the route to ‘Irāq and Khurāsan  becoming closed. After bringing him to submission, Akbar could anno unce with ease and satisfaction that the ‘route to ‘Irāq has thus become  shorter and safer than before.’61 

 The letter was written at a time when the Mughal forces under  Abdur Rahim were making inroads into Qāndahār. Within a span of less  than a year (1593-4), both Rustam Mirzā and Muzaffar Husain Mirzā,  sons of the later Sultān Husain Mirzā Safavi, had succumbed to the  pressure and taken up service under the Mughals.62 

...Rustum M. arrived, and the province of Multan—which is  several times larger than Qandahar—was conferred on him.  And Muzaffar Ḥusain M. on hearing of our benignities sent his  mother and his eldest son, and meditated coming in person.  After his arrival the victorious army will proceed to 

Qandahār...63 

The sensitivity of the issue required a politically correct account that  would not invite any kind of remonstrance from the Safavids. True to his  genius, Abū’l Fażl lived up to the expectation:  

the Mīrzās [Rustam Mīrzā and Muzaffar Husain Mīrzā, sons of  the later Sultan Husain Mīrzā Safavi] there showed slackness in  assisting the sublime family, and on the occurrence of accidents  and misfortunes—which is the time for testing the jewel of  fidelity—they did not at all show marks of concord and  unanimity. Nor did they repair to our sublime asylum, which is  the native land of the masters of delight and ease. It therefore  occurred to us that we should in the first place make over  Qandahar to our own people.64 

 The Mirzās had allegedly failed in their task of assisting Shāh  ‘Abbās when he was faced with numerous difficulties and hence, their  place was being taken up by ‘our victorious troops [who] would...  perform every act of assistance that that darling of the Sultanate might 

desire.’65 The annexation of Qāndahār should therefore be seen by the  Safavids as nothing more than an endeavour by the Mughals to render  ‘every kind of help’ to them.  

Figure 3  

This illustration to the Akbarnāmā is a double page designed by the  Mughal court artist La’l66 

Figure 4  

An illustration from the Akbarnāmā, c. 160567 

At this time when the Panjab was the seat of government our  firm intention had been to uprear the sublime standards towards  Transoxiana which was the country of our ancestors, so that  [the] country [might] come into the possession of the imperial  servants, and also that the family of the prophets might be  assisted in a suitable manner.68 

The assurance is made more convincing by reinforcing the oft-quoted  Mughal ‘principle’ that: 

As in the rules of sovereignty and the religion of humanity,  concord is preferable to opposition and peace better than war,  and especially as it has been our disposition from the beginning  of our attaining discretion to this day not to pay attention to  differences of religion...69 

Having made his ‘noble’ intentions abundantly clear, Abū’l Fażl resorts  to the same technique he had used in turning down the suggestion of a  joint invasion by ‘Abdullāh Khān Uzbek against Persia:  

Meanwhile the asylum of benevolence ‘Abdullah Khan the  ruler of Tūrān sent, time after time, loving letters referring to  ancient relationships, and confirmatory of affection, by the  instrumentality of skilful ambassadors, and thereby set in  motion the chain of concord and devotion and laid the founda 

tion of affection. As to go to war with one who is disposed to be  peaceable is contrary to the Divine decrees and is disapproved  of in the balance of lofty reason, our head turned away from  this project.70 

Akbar declares his cordial relations with the Uzbek ruler as not only an  excuse of not engaging him in the battlefield but also as a hint that such  an union, if needed, would be detrimental to Safavid interests. Given the  intricacies of calculations in Mughal foreign policy making that emerges  from a study of these documents in diplomacy, Riazul Islam’s inference  does not hold good:  

...the real cause for the negative decision on the aid to Persia  was that Akbar’s understandings with ‘Abdullah Khan on the  question of mutual frontiers and respective zones of special  interests still held good...71 

The texts clearly reveal that Akbar was not keen to invest heavily in  military resources or enter into any form of alliance or hostility with  either of the potentates. His sole idea seems to have been to prevent any  kind of conflict and keep all potential rivals in good humour in order to  attain his objective. By a curious mixture of friendly gestures and veiled  threats, Akbar wanted to entrench Mughal power firmly in Qāndahār.  

 Abiding by the established norms of correspondence, the letter  concludes with a short description of the envoy and presents:  

We send Zīyā-al-Mulk who is the essence of trustworthiness  and devotion, and have confided to him some loving express ions which he will communicate to you in private. He will also  ascertain the state of affairs in Persia and report to us. Some  rarities of this country have been entrusted to Khwāja Abū Nāṣir.72 

 Another intriguing facet of this letter was the way Akbar chose to  define power relations with Shāh ‘Abbās, who had recently ascended the  throne and was still very young. Citing the turbulent state of affairs from  which Persia had just recovered, Akbar lays down an elaborate prescrip 

tive note on how the ruler should conduct himself and stresses upon the  fact that he should follow a policy of tolerance.73 The image of the Shāh  being a subordinate to the Mughal Pādshāh finds profound expression in  the Akbarnāmā which records ‘the arrival of the Persian ambassadors’ at  the Mughal court at Lāhore in 1598. The chronicler emphatically writes  that:  

It was reported that when Ẕīya-al-Mulk, and Abū Nāṣir arrived  there [at the Safavid court], Shāh ‘Abbās behaved like a dutiful  child and made the Shāhinshāh’s slipper—which the ambassad ors had with them—the diadem of good fortune. He accepted  the regulations (dastūrnāma) of the world’s commander and  gathered bliss by acting in accordance therewith.74 

The metaphor of father-son, a familiar and widely used dice in medieval  diplomacy, is invoked here where Akbar is presented as a paternal figure  and Shah ‘Abbās, as an obedient son. This idyllic scheme placed the  Mughal monarch on an elevated pedestal in the hierarchy of relations.  

 The above paper suggests that diplomacy was a vital instrument  of statecraft practised by medieval polities, particularly on occasions  where either armed force could not be effectively used or warfare was not  the viable solution. The constantly shifting balance of power in the region  lying to the northwest of the Indian subcontinent, particularly Qāndahār,  dictated that the financial and military resources of the Mughal state could not be put at stake. This presented a zone of overlapping interests  where the ambitions of the Safavids, Uzbeks and Mughals seemed to  collide. The imminent possibility of an alliance between the Uzbeks and  the Ottomans—with whom the Mughals under Akbar did not enjoy a  cordial relation—loomed large, which, if materialized would have spelt  trouble for them. The idea here was to exercise caution and restrain  which could be achieved only through diplomacy. Both before and after  the conquest of Qandahar, Akbar was careful not to upset any of his  potential rivals and took all measures to keep them at bay. Mughal  practices of power in the external domain came to be fashioned on the  ideas laid down by Abū’l Fażl through these missives. The aforecited  extracts also contain an implicit assertion of Mughal imperial ideology  and advocate a vociferous defence of Akbar’s policies of governance that  was meant to uphold his image as an upright monarch.  

Bibliography  

Primary Sources

Allāmī, Abū’l Fażl. 2010. Akbarnama, translated by Henry Beveridge, 3 vols,  Delhi, Low Price Publications.

__________. 1998. Mukatabat-i-Allami (Insha’i Abu’l Fażl) Daftar I, translated  by Mansura Haidar as Letters of the Emperor Akbar, New Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal.

Badā’ūnī, ‘Abd al-Qādir. 1986. Muntakhabu-t Tawarikh, translated by W. H.  Lowe, 3 vols, Delhi, Renaissance Publishing House.

Islam, Riazul. 1982. A Calendar of Documents on Indo-Persian Relations  (1500-1750) 2 vols, Teheran and Karachi, Iran Culture Foundation.

Secondary Sources

Alam, Muzaffar. 1994. “Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of  Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations, C. 1550-1750”, Journal of the  Economic and Social History of the Orient, Vol. 37, No. 3, pp. 202-227.

Haidar, Mansura. 1982. “Relations of Abdullah Khan Uzbeg with Akbar”,  Cahiers du Monde Russe et Soviétique, Vol. 23, No. 3/4, pp. 313-331. Husain, Afzal. 1983. “The Letters of Hakim Abul Fateh Gilani: An Unexplored  Source of Akbar’s Reign”, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress,  Vol. 44, pp. 189-97.

Islam, Riazul. 1970. Indo-Persian Relations: A Study of the Political and  Diplomatic Relations between the Mughal Empire and Iran, Teheran, Iranian Culture Foundation.

Rahim, Abdur. 1940. Mughal Relations with Persia and Central Asia, Babur to  Aurangzeb, (reprinted from Islamic Culture, Vol. 8 & 9, 1934-35), Aligarh,  Department of History, Aligarh Muslim University

Rizvi, Saiyid Athar Abbas. 1975. Religious and Intellectual History of the  Muslims in Akbar’s Reign with special reference to Abu’l Fazl, Delhi, Munshiram Manoharlal.

Welsford, Thomas. 2013. Four Types of Loyalty in Early Modern Central Asia: The  Tūqāy-Tīmūrid Takeover of Greater Mā Warā al-Nahr, 1598-1605, Leiden, Brill Academic Publishers.

Notes

1 Muntakhab ut Tawarikh, II, pp. 266, 314-6. Badauni’s ranting borders on sheer  exaggeration as he launches a scathing critique on Akbar whom he holds  responsible for the setting of the sun of Islam in the country.

2Ibid., p. 266.

3Ibid., pp. 314-6.

4 Haidar 1982: 323. This work, dealing with the history of the Mughals and  descendants of Chingiz Khan in Central Asia, was composed in the mid-eighteenth  century by Hajji Mīr Muhammad Salim. Though one has to be cautious while using  it to reconstruct a history of the preceding centuries on account of its ill-repute to be  replete with fictitious interpolations, the extract cited above seems to be fairly in  corroboration with the facts of the time. Welsford 2013: 29.

5 Husain 1983: 189-97; Rizvi 1975: 123-4.

6 Rizvi 1975: 336.

7Islam 1970: 54. Later Akbar had demanded another letter to be drafted by Abū’l  Fażl, which comprised the major portion of the epistle that was finally dispatched to  ‘Abdullāh.

8‘Letter to ‘Abdullāh Khan Uzbek, the Sipahdar of the Country of Turan (3  September 1586)’ in Mukatabat-i-Allami (Insha’i Abu’l Fażl) I, pp. 39-40. 9Ibid., pp. 33-5.

10 Ibid., p. 34.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid., p. 35.

13 Ibid., p. 35.

14 Akbarnama, III, p. 756.

15 ‘Letter to ‘Abdullāh Khan Uzbek, the Sipahdar of the Country of Turan (3  September 1586)’, in Mukatabat-i-Allami (Insha’i Abū’l Fażl) I, pp. 32-41.

16 ‘Letter to ‘Abdullāh Khan Uzbek (Letter written from and inspired by the feeling  of unity, 1586)’, in Ibid., p. 47.

17 Akbarnama, III, p. 755.

18 Ibid., pp. 755-6.

19 Ibid., pp. 756-7.

20 Ibid., p. 757.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid.

24 Haidar 1982: 321-2.

25 Ibid., p. 322; Islam 1970: 53.

26 Haidar 1982: 322.

27 Muntakhab ut-Tawarikh, II, p. 351.

28 Ibid., p. 352.

29 Haidar 1982: 321.

30 Source: Alam 1994: 204.

31 Islam 1970: 53.

32 Akbarnama, III, p. 758.

33 Torn by rebellions from tribal factions and provincial governors who wished to  raise his son Abbas Mīrzā (later Shāh ‘Abbās I, r. 1588-1629) to the throne, the  ruler Muhammad Khudabanda Khan (r. 1578-87) was in a precarious position. This

was made worse by the Ottomans, who taking advantage of the internal discord in  the state, made inroads into his domains. ‘Letter to ‘Abdullāh Khan Uzbek’, in  Mukatabat-i-Allami (Insha’i Abu’l Fażl) I, p. 49; Haidar 1982: 321.

34 Akbarnama, III, p. 758.

35 Shah Tahmasp had provided shelter to Humayun for almost a decade during the  latter’s days as a wandering prince after being ousted from India by Sher Shah and  had also helped him recover his kingdom. As a token of gratitude, Akbar wanted to  refrain from taking any drastic measure against the Shahs of Persia.

36 Muntakhab ut-Tawarikh, II, p. 270.

37 Akbarnama, III, p. 298.

38 Ibid., p. 297.

39 Ibid., pp. 758-9.

40 Ibid., p. 760.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 1053-64.

43 Ibid., p. 1054.

44 Ibid., p. 1055.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., pp. 662-77.

47 Ibid., pp. 759-60.

48 Ibid., p. 760.

49 Akbarnama, III, p. 1023.

50 Ibid., p. 1055.

51 Source: Chehel Sotun, or ‘The 40 Columns’, Isfahan, Iran, Bridgeman Images.

52 Ibid.

53 Muntakhab ut-Tawarikh, II, p. 416.

54 Akbarnama, III, p. 1055.

55 Ibid., pp. 1056-7.

56 Ibid., p. 1009.

57 Akbarnama, III, p. 1010.

58 Shi’ism borrows its essence from the Twelve Imams, who are considered to be  the spiritual and political successors of the Prophet.

59 Ibid., p. 1011.

60 Alam 1994: 203-15.

61 Akbarnama, III, p. 1012.

62 Islam 1970: 58-60.

63 Akbarnama, III, p. 1012.

64 Ibid., pp. 1008-22.

65 Ibid., p. 1010.

66 The left half shows the entourage of the ambassador bearing the gifts sent by  Shah Tahmasp of Iran. The right half depicts Akbar receiving the Iranian  Ambassador Sayyid Beg in 1562. Source: Akbarnāmā, ca. 1590, Victoria and Albert  Museum, London.

67 The figure shows Akbar receiving gifts from the ambassadors of Badakhshán,  which included bows, two small dishes of spinels, swords and hunting falcons.  Source: The Trustees of the Chester Beatty Library, Dublin.

68 Ibid., p. 1011.

69 Akbarnama, III, p. 1011. 

70 Akbarnama, III, p. 1011.

71 Islam 1970: 56.

72 Akbarnama, III, p. 1014.

73 Ibid., pp. 1011-3.

74 Ibid., p. 1112.

 

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