What Caused the Decline of the Mughal Empire During the Reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707)?

American Public University System

Charles Town, West Virginia

A Research Project Proposal

Submitted By

Geoffrey M. Fisher

4080844

HIST500 C001 Sum 13

Submitted to the Department of History and Military Studies

Sunday, December 22, 2013

I.

Tentative Title

I propose to title the research paper "What Caused the Decline of the Mughal Empire During the Reign of Aurangzeb (1658-1707)?"

II.

Research Problem

          Since the mid-1970s, there have been many historians who have provided specialized works on the Mughal Empire.  Athar M. Ali,[1] Karen Leonard,[2] M. N. Pearson,[3] and John F. Richards[4] are just some of the historians who have sought to answer what led to the decline of the Mughal Empire during the reign of Aurangzeb.  All four historians have posited theories that are as varied as there are possibilities about its demise.  These theories discuss economic failings, the beginnings of international trade, European financial institution, populations decreases in the empire, stagnation in military technology, the slow transition from an agrarian rural to an urbanized society, the rebellious Marathas, and not fully subduing newly acquired lands in the South.

          All of these accounts provided credible theories on the empire's downfall.  However, all of the authors refuse to look at the end of the empire from a holistic point of view.  I intend to hypothesize that it was not just one or two of these theories, but a combination of all of them that lead to the decline of the Mughal Empire under Aurangzeb.  The evidence that I intend to prove my hypothesis are two sources.  First is Richards' book, The Mughal Empire: The New Cambridge History of India, which has been well received by Western and Eastern historians because it fills a void in the historiography of the empire.  The second source that I intend to use is Ali's essay "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case."  Both sources discuss similar causes that led to the end of the Mughal Empire, such as economic failings and stagnation in military technology.  However, their analysis leads them to different conclusions.  For instance, Richards states it that it was "Aurangzeb's rigid and imperceptive policies, especially in the Deccan, failed to respond to the growing crisis."[5]  While I think there is some truth to Richards' narrow conclusion, I refuse to fully believe that it was Aurangzeb's sole responsibility that led to the end of the empire.  Ali's conclusion takes a more holistic stance by writing "the failure of the Mughal Empire would seem to derive essentially from a cultural failure, shared with the entire Islamic world."[6]  Ali's summation seems to hold that it was a combination of multiple factors that led to the end of the empire.  Still, Ali's holistic perspective needs some critiquing because he does not mention the impact of European banking firms on the empire's health. 

          There are many research implications for further study.  For instance, there has been a discussion on whether or not the Mughal Empire had a centralized government.  There are three sources that I may wish to integrate into this further research.  First, there is M. Athar Ali's "The Mughal Polity—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches."[7]  Ali tracks the historiography about the Mughal Empire being a centralized society.  This may prove helpful for further research since it would tell me what other historians thought about the Mughal government being centralized or decentralized.  In the end, he comes to the conclusion that it was not a centralized society.  Second, there is Chetan Singh's "Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The case of the Seventeenth-Century Panjab."[8]  Singh offers an interesting starting point by connecting the decentralization of the empire to the decline of the Mughal.  He writes, "[i]f the origins of the ultimate fragmentation of the Mughal Empire are to be, in a way, traced back to the seventeenth century, certain doubts begin to arise about the degree to which the Mughal state was centralized."[9]  My third source would be Richards' The Mughal Empire.  I think it would benefit my research and my proposed hypothesis immensely if I can parse out more related concepts about whether or not the Mughal Empire was centralized or decentralized and causes of the decline to the point where I can compare and contrast my sources' analysis and conclusions.

III.

Definition of Terms

Aligarh- a modern city in Northern India.  Location of the Aligarh Muslim University.

Agra- one of the four cities designated as a royal capital in the Mughal Empire.

Akbar- was one of Aurangzeb's sons (1681, went into exile in Persia).  Sought to unseat his father by setting up an alliance with Shambhaji, the successor of Shivaji.

Aurangzeb- a ruler of the Mughal empire (1658-1707).  Expanded the frontiers of the empire through wars against the Marathas in the Deccan and the kingdom of Golconda or Golkonda.

Deccan- a definition used to describe the region south of the Hind.  The city of Hyderabad was located in this region of India.

Diwan-i-khalisa- officer who oversaw all properties and income producing entities managed by the emperor.

Farman- an official documented proclamation sent out by the emperor.

Faujdars- military officer designated army and administrative duties in a certain area.

Fitna- meaning "temptation" in Arabic.  It is a term used in times of hardship in Muslim society.

Golconda or Golkonda- a city in the south central part of the Mughal Empire.  It was besieged and overtaken by Aurangzeb in September 1687.

Hindustan- the home base of Muslim governmental and martial strength in North India.  It was comprised of four cities: Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Jaunpur.

Jagirs- a financial right given by the emperor to gather property taxes from a community or region.

Jamaʻ- all of the profits that were ordered.

Khalisa- territories or extra properties that produced an income for the emperor and the governmental coffers.

Mansab- prestigious title indicated rank in a numerical format.

Mansabdar- an officer with a particular rank given by the emperor.

Marathas- a group of people found on India's west coast.  They were the main military opponents against Aurangzeb and the Mughal empire.

Padshah- the Persian word for emperor.

Paibaqi- unassigned domain managed briefly by the diwan-i khalisa.

Raiyat- Mughal word for peasants.

Shivaji- was the Maratha leader (1627-1680) and an enemy of the Mughal Empire.

Shambhaji- was the son and successor of Shivaji (d. 1689).  Had a shaky alliance with, Akbar.

Suwar- the required figure of cavalrymen every officer had to assemble before a campaign was to commence.

Watan- familial region of a Maratha leader or fighter.  Usually held within the family.

Zabt- a system of property appraisal and collection of taxes that was used by the Mughals.

Zamindari- property-owners or people who held the land also ruled the peasants.

IV.

Background

     The Mughal Empire was one of three Islamic empires that saw its ascent in the early modern period.  The other two were the Ottomans, who spanned three continents: Western Asia, Eastern Europe, and Northern Africa, and the Safavids in Iran.  At its height, the Mughals ruled as far west as Kabul, as far as east Dacca, Bengal, as far north as Srinagar in the Himalaya Mountains, and as far south as the Kaveri River.  Population totals are hard to pin down, which means I will be forced to approximate as my best guess.  For example, 150 million people[10] seems to be the starting point.  In addition to the initial calculation, Douglas E. Streusand, the author of Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals, writes that city populations are harder to calculate, "the populations of Agra and Delhi exceeded 5000,000 in the seventeenth century, with Agra perhaps reaching 800,000 in Aurangzeb's time."[11]  There were some 115 million people living within Mughal control.[12]

     My research will posit four possible causes to the end of the Mughal Empire.  First, how did Aurangzeb's conquest of the Golconda adversely influence the stability of the Mughal?  Second, how did the deterioration of the Silk Road and its trade affect the Mughal Empire?  Third, how did the lack of technology hasten the demise of the empire?  Fourth, what were the cultural trends Aurangzeb established that helped to destabilize the empire?  These four possible causes will provide new research to the historiography to the fall of the Mughal Empire.

The Conquest of the Golconda Kingdom

     The Mughal's objective for the conquest of the Golconda Kingdom was simple.  When Shambhaji left and raided one of the cities in the Burhanpur region, Aurangzeb could not just stand on the sidelines and watch this because it may have threatened trade that was being transported between Eurasia.[13]  From early in the year of 1685 to September 1687, Aurangzeb's forces were repeatedly stymied at various locations throughout the Deccan.  First, there was Bijapur.  Second, was the immense fort of Hyderabad.  The latter would fall to an ignominious end because of duplicity, and large amounts of booty were taken by the Mughals.

     In his analysis Richards offers trade and religious causes for the Mughal conquest.  Richards fails to mention the governmental or military reasons for the expedition into the Golconda.  M. N. Pearson presents a suggestion that belies Richards' thinking:

Our aim in this paper is to show that the move south was itself a symptom of a central weakness in the Mughal empire.  Because of the centrality of military concerns in the upper levels of the state, there was no alternative but to respond aggressively to a military challenge.  The move south was thus a final desperate attempt to crush a formidable enemy that had already inflicted humiliating defeats on the empire.  The move was not expansionist, it was entirely defensive, a product of desperation, not of free of Mughal choice.[14]

Pearson's examination shows that there was an inherent problem not just with the Mughal government, but its policies towards the Deccan.  Moreover, Pearson's comments illuminate the presuppositions of the Mughal government's centralization, a prominent theory held by Richards.  The heavy handed response may have been a part of the plan from the commencement of the operation.

     There is also the issue about the income producing agrarian lands in the Deccan.  In the final chapter of his book, Richards gives a rundown of pervious histiographic interpretations from historians.  He critiques a land revenue policy after the conquest of Golconda by writing:

Examination of post-conquest imperial policies in Golconda suggests that policy choices had a bearing on the severity of the jagir crisis.  Aurangzeb seems to have decided to retain many productive tracts in Golconda and also in Bijapur under direct crown control.[15]

The new taxation system wan an extreme change of administration for the people living in the Golconda and lands that they farmed.  With this new duty system setup, the taxes went straight to the emperor's palace by passing regional officials.

Deterioration of the Silk Road and its Trade to the Mughal Empire

     Trade with other societies was a vital part of the Mughal Empire and its economy.  First, there was the Silk Road.  The significance of the Silk Road was that it allowed people who were ethnically and geographically different to communicate with each other in various ways.  The trading from the West to India with non-indigenous goods was just one of them.  Moreover, the Silk Road was a vital component to the health and stability of the empire.  When trading declined, the lack of trade produced deleterious affects on the empire.  Ali writes in his article:

The Great Silk Road no longer carried the great caravans; and this must have distinctly impoverished central Asia (Uzbek Khanate).  But in India and Iran, too, the costs of luxury articles rose-and, after all, for members of the ruling class it was these luxuries that life was about.  The income previously obtained no longer sufficed.  Here was a factor for an attempt at greater agrarian exploitation; and when that failed, or proved counter-productive, for reckless factional activities for individual gain, lead to interminable civil wars.[16]

Since there was no exporting or importing of goods with the empire and no overland trade with the adjacent civilizations around India, living and buying goods within the empire was becoming harder during Aurangzeb's reign. 

     Second, there were also the European banking firms and their impact on the empire.  European banking companies like the English and Dutch East India Companies presented significant stability challenges to the Mughal government.[17]  Leonard provides another alternative to the demise of the empire by writing, "[w]hen other powers competed with the Mughal for the credit and other services offered by Indian bankers, the imperial bureaucracy was threatened."[18]

     When studying the decline of the Mughal Empire, the lack of military technology is a central part of the story on how it hasten the demise of the empire.  The army was the number one benefactor of these technological improvements.  In particular, the construction of artillery was considered the "heavy industry" in the early modern world.[19]  From a comparative standpoint Europe allocated people who possessed the requisite technical and mathematical skills to produce guns in large quantities, whereas contemporaries in India did not allocate their resources for military technological expansion.  Ali takes this analysis a step farther by writing:

India saw no conscious attempt to design new artillery weapons: making of muskets and guns remained a mere craft, with no touch of science; and accordingly by 1700 these were almost completely out-dated.  The Mughals continued to rely upon sword-wielding cavalry when its days were long over.[20]

Ali's supposition concludes that gunpowder weapons were mainly ornamental objects, and it certainly points to a systemic collapse within the empire.  I think it is interesting that Ali has come up with this conclusion about the lack of military technology since the Mughal Empire was a warlike civilization.     

     The adoption to gunpowder weaponry has proven very difficult to ascertain because of the paucity of documentation about production and distribution of firearms.[21]  Richards provides some of the same analysis that Ali had come up with about the Mughal's opinion about firearms.  He concludes that there was very little support from the government and indigenously manufactured guns were of shoddy quality.[22]  However, it was the date suggested by Richards that aligns with Ali's theory as the dividing point between Mughal parity and inferiority.  Richards writes "[b]y the early years of the eighteenth century Mughal India was not keeping pace with Europe in field artillery."[23]

     This is where I think Ali's and Richards' arguments start to fall apart.  Both of their arguments did not fully articulate why the Mughals refused to acknowledge the rising superiority of gunpowder technology.  Why would a warlike empire not get enthusiastic support from one of its martial emperors on incorporating firearms in its armies?  To fully support my hypothesis I need to know why the Mughals refused to use guns in their armies. Jos Gommans' Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500- 1700 is a great resource to begin this research.  He points out two key reasons for the lack of gunpowder technology in Indian armies.  The first one he proffers points to a military doctrinal philosophy.  "Standardisation in weaponry, drill and uniform hardly appealed to the independent mindset of the Mughal horse trooper."[24]  The second point he suggests is based off of a native cultural practice that emphasized infantry.[25]  "Even before the onset of the infantry revolution, the late-seventeenth-century process of zamindarisation of the Mughal military tended to increase the importance of locally peasant soldiers on foot as these were much cheaper and more pliable than the fully equipped cavalry units associated with the imperial tradition of the Mughals."[26]

     There are also cultural aspects during Aurangzeb's reign that hastened the empire's demise.  From my research there are two ways to look at the decline of the Mughal Empire.  First, there is the big picture when examining the decline of the empire.  Ali is one such historian that advocates for a big picture.

To me, then, the failure of the Mughal Empire would seem to derive essentially from a cultural failure, shared with the entire Islamic world.  It was this failure that titled the economic balance in favour of Europe, well before European armies reduced India and other part of Asia to colonial possessions, protectorates and spheres of influence.  It was this cultural failure again that deprived the empire of the capacity to grapple with their agrarian crises.

[27]

Ali's analysis shows that it was not just one emperor who should be held responsible for the decline of the empire.  Instead, there was something systemically wrong with the empire itself.

     Richards' study does not acknowledge the big picture when studying the decline of the Mughal Empire.  Thus, his suggestion evolves into an entirely different conclusion.  The decline of the empire stems from Aurangzeb's occupation of Bijapur and Golconda.  Richards writes, "Aurangzeb's rigid and imperceptive policies, especially in the Deccan, failed to respond the growing crisis."[28]  From the takeover of these two regions to 1719, which was beyond Aurangzeb's death, the Mughals experienced ever worsening situations on the battlefronts and in the governmental sphere.[29]

V.

Research Methods

     Many of my sources have similarities in the theories they purport.  The objective of my research method is to delineate the similarities to the point where I can find the comparisons and contrasts.  Richards' The Mughal Empire will serve as the basis for my research.  Of all of my sources, The Mughal Empire incorporates the most research that is relevant to my intended topic.  However, it has its limitations.  For example, military history is one of them.  To act as supplemental material to fill that part of my research, I hope to incorporate Gommans' and Streusand's, Mughal Warfare and Islamic Gunpowder Empires, respectively.

     In order to fully support my supposition I need to get more concrete information on the Aligarh School of Historiography that some of my sources adhere to.  When I have more of an understanding of Aligarh School of Historiography, my attempt to collect the necessary data through questionnaires will be more thoughtful and succinct.  If traveling is out of the question, then utilizing email and skype may be sufficient enough to meet my research needs.  As a backup plan, I might have to implement an observation method of collecting data.  However, this might be too difficult for me because of the traveling costs.

     In the outset of my paper, I would like to include a map of the Mughal Empire that show geographical features, such as rivers, deserts, and mountains, as well as cities.  Throughout my research, succeeding maps will show the various strategic conquests Aurangzeb executed and the lands he gained for the empire.  Battlefield maps will be very useful to show where the Mughal army and their opponents positioned their artillery, cavalry, and infantry forces in relation with one another.  I want to give the reader a bird's eye view in three perspectives.  First, I want a map that illustrates the entire empire with man made characteristics, such as cities and roads.  This map would also contain geographical features, such as deserts, mountain ranges, and bodies of water.  Second, I want a map that accurately shows the strategic implications of wars and conquests.  Third, I think it is very important to show maps of key battles and sieges so that the reader knows what tactics were employed during the engagement.

VI.

Research Limitations

     I have several concerns about my proposal's research limitations.  First, there is the difficulty in obtaining the necessary sources to fully articulate my hypothesis.  Richards and a few of my other sources have mentioned there is very little reputable secondary work on the Mughal Empire.  (In order to produce quality secondary work a few requirements need to be met.  Historians need to find more primary sources and accurately analyze them.  Finding primary sources that are germane to my topic could be very hard since many of the emperors, academics, or aristocracy did not show much enthusiasm in printing.[30]  This is really fascinating because of the written documentation that is needed so that a centralized bureaucracy can function.[31]  These primary and secondary sources need to be accessible to historians from other disciplines, and social scientists.  Finding the requisite amount of relevant secondary sources on my topic was one of the most difficult tasks I had to overcome.)  Second, I am concerned about the definitions.  While all my sources have been translated into English from Hindi, I feel the important ideas that I deem necessary to my hypothesis might be lost in translation.  More Westerners need to speak Hindi.  Third, using and collecting physical evidence would entail me traveling to Duke University, where John F. Richards served as a professor, and to Aligarh Muslim University, India.  Traveling to both of these locales is the best way to ensure academic certainty.  Fourth, statistics are very important to the decline of the Mughal Empire.  I would like to look at the statistics, first hand, that Richards used for the sources that I have.  Fifth, I am not as well versed in Indian geography as I am in Western history.  I have been finding it very hard to orient myself geographically in the empire.  If I am having a hard time with the geography, then other non-specialists and amateurs would too.  That is why I would like to incorporate a map of the entire empire, strategic maps that show the conquests under Aurangzeb, and the battlefield maps that demonstrate the tactics that were employed.  Of my four books, Gommans' Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700 provides the most specificity to maps.  The maps supplied with his book show the geographical features, the cities, roads, and the farming land that show the most financial potential.  One characteristic that his book shows, which I did not consider, were the centers of gravity of Mughal power, such as Lahore, Delhi, Agra, and Kabul areas.

VIII.

Working Bibliography

I. Works Cited

Ali, M. Athar.  "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case."  Modern Asian Studies 9,     no. 3 (1975): 385-396.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728 (accessed December         3, 2013).

     To help explain how the Mughal Empire declined, Ali looks at population increases in India and in Europe, the burgeoning of global trade through naval routes which hampered overland trade and markets, the lack of technological and scientific advancements carrying over to Mughal India, lackluster expansion of urbanization and lastly, why the Mughal military did not make an attempt to manufacture gunpowder weapons indigenously.

Gommans, Jos.  Mughal Warfare:  Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire,           1500-1700.  Routledge: New York, 2002. 

     Gommans’ main idea is that warfare was always a significant aspect of Indian culture before it was overtaken by colonial powers.  The content he studies ranges from gunpowder weapons, the technological characteristics of warfare, and the military in a cultural framework.

Hardy, P. "Commentary and Critique."  The Journal of Asian Studies 35, no. 2          (February 1976): 257-263.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053982 (accessed      December 3, 2013).

     Hardy critiques M.N. Pearson's and John F. Richards' theories about the fall of the Mughal Empire.  Pearson and Richards are historians who follow the Aligarh School of Historiography (See articles below.)  He offers a general timeframe on the empire's demise.  For example, he touts the fall of the Mughal Empire happened before the arrival of the East India Company.

Leonard, Karen.  "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire."        Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 2 (April 1979): 151-167.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/178414 (accessed December 3, 2013).

     In her article, Leonard looks at how European companies hastened the decline of the Mughal Empire.  Leonard mentions there has not been a significant amount of study in this area of Anglo-Indian history.  She breaks her argument into sections. The first section dealt with the "Great Firms" and the Mughal Empire to 1750.  The second section is about the "Great Firms" and The East India Company after 1750.

Pearson, M.N. “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire.”  The Association of          Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977): 221-235.       http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).

     Pearson’s argument is about the empire’s demise around the military policy towards the Marathas on the southern end of the subcontinent.  (Pearson’s article appeared before Naqvi’s article.)  The content that he looks at is comprised of several parts: first, the Mughal state and nobility; second, the Maratha Revolt; third, the sack of Surat; fourth, Mughal response; fifth, analysis of the Mughal response; sixth, the Maratha impact; and seventh, the response of the nobles.

Richards, John F. The Mughal Empire.  Vol.5 of The New Cambridge History of           India.  Cambridge University Press, 1996.

     Richards’s main argument is that the Mughal Empire was highly centralized, which left room for competing powers.  The content he examines ranges from political, military, social, economic, institutional, cultural, and religious aspects of the empire.

Singh, Chetan.  "Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The Case of Seventeenth-     Century Panjab."  Modern Asian Studies 22. no. 2 (1988): 299-318.       http://www.jstor.org/stable/312624 (accessed December 3, 2013).

     If historians really want to pinpoint the beginning of the end of the Mughal Empire, Singh believes that an argument about the supposed centralization of the government has to start in the seventeenth century.  Singh looks at the structure of the regional bureaucracy of the Mughal Empire.  It is really a bottom up study.

Struesand, Douglas E.  Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and       Mughals.  Westview Press, 2010.

     Struesand’s main argument is to discuss the Mughal Empire as an intricate society.  The content he scrutinizes incorporates many interesting themes.  They include philosophy, armed forces, and the financial system of the Mughal Empire’s ascent, growth, and eventual demise.

II. Works Consulted

Ali, M. Athar.  "The Mughal Polity—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches."      Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October, 1993): 699-710.     http://www.jstor.org/stable/312827 (accessed December 8, 2013).

     Athar M. Ali's essay has a couple of parts.  First, he revisits the historiographic arguments from various historians of how the Mughals taxed the empire.  He expands upon his case by examining Western states and their laissez faire economy, and then compares the empire to a despotic Asian state labeled by historians who were heavily influenced by Marxist theory.  His second argument is whether or not the Mughal bureaucracy was really a modern, centralized empire on par with the modern European nation-state.

Brown, Katherine Butler.  "Did Aurangzeb Ban Music?  Questions for the        Historiography of his Reign."  Modern Asian Studies 41, no. 1 (Jan. 2007):  77-     120.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/4132345 (accessed December 21, 2013).

     Historically, Aurangzeb is painted as an extreme, conservative Islamic despot overseeing an Asian empire that did not adhere to the same traditionalist view of Islam.  According to Brown's analysis of the available primary sources that she looked at for her article, it appears that Aurangzeb was not the archetypical version of an Islamic despot.  The records show he was a religiously pious man, but he did not impose his beliefs onto others.

Hurewitz, J. C.  "Military Politics in the Muslim Dynastic States, 1400-1750."    Journal of the American Oriental Society 88, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar, 1968): 96-104.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/597901 (accessed November 11, 2013).

     Hurewitz paints a picture of familial rivalry when it comes to succession of an emperor in the Mughal Empire.  Family members would often enlist parts of the military to attain the emperorship.  Aurangzeb was one such ambitious person who spread lies of the Emperor's death and eliminated his brothers.  Aurangzeb's son, Akbar, would later challenge his own father's rule.

Lenman, Bruce.  "The East India Company and the Emperor Aurangzeb."  History       Today 37, no. 2 (February 1987): 23-29.  Academic Search Premier, EBSCOhost      (accessed December 20, 2013).

     Lenman's article recounts the first 150 years of the England's East India Company.  The influence and superiority over the local and imperial Mughal government parallels the rise of one its most ardent supporters, Sir Josiah Child.  Child was not born into an auspicious family.  Yet, he married well, which positioned him in future company appointments where he was handsomely benefited.

Naqvi, Hamida Khatoon. “Aurangzeb's Policies and the Decline of the Mughal          Empire.”  The Association for Asian Studies 37, no 1 (November, 1977): 191-192.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053411 (accessed October 14, 2013). 

     Hamida Khatoon Naqvi’s article was in response to M.N. Pearson’s essay (see below.)   Naqvi’s two part argument is about why the Mughal Empire declined.  First, there is a civil-military dispute on how the politicians paid the military officers.  Second, Aurangzeb failed to establish the rising popularity of Marhatta (or Marathas) as a credible military threat to the empire.

Richards, John F.  “The Seventeenth-Century Crisis in South Asia.”  Cambridge      University Press 24 no. 4 (October, 1990): 625-638.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/312726 (accessed October 14, 2013).

     Richards’s main idea is the seventeenth century saw political strife, economic disruptions, and reductions in population around the world.  However, these maladies did not plague India.  Why?  Richards tries to answer that question.  The content that Richards looks at is the Indian economy and agriculture and how they relate to the political and military potency.  Pearson’s and Naqvi’s may serve as possible counterpoints to Richards.

Syros, Vasileios.  "An Early Modern South Asian Thinker on the Rise and Decline of    Empires: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, the Mughals, and the Byzantines."  Journal of      World History 23, no. 4 (December, 2013): 793-840.  Academic Search Premier,    EBSCOhost (accessed December 20, 2013).

     Syros implements Shah Wali Allah Dihlawi's hypothesis on why civilizations rise and fall.  Dihlawi's supposition is based on several factors that lead to the decline of a civilization.  His examples include civil servants who have motives that run contrary to the state, abnormal behavior like homosexuality, and various kinds of pests.

III. Works to Be Consulte

Blake, Stephen P.  "The Patrimonial-Bureaucratic Empire of the Mughals."  The Journal of Asian Studies 39, no. 1 (Nov. 1979): 77-94.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053505 (accessed December 21, 2013).

     Blake's article is a discussion about the structure of the Mughal Empire.  For instance, a patrimonial government is not set up to have its people obedient to the state but to the ruler in office.  In order for an emperor to maintain his rule over the empire he needed a strong, faithful armed powerbase.  Blake writes that most Mughal emperors were on the move throughout the empire to enforce strict submission to the emperor.  Aurangzeb was one of the most traveled emperors of the Mughal Empire in attempting to shore up the loyalty from his subordinates.

Blake, Stephen P.  "The Urban Economy in Premodern Muslim India:  Shahjahanabad, 1639-1739."  Modern Asian Studies 21, no. 3 (1987): 447-471.     http://www.jstor.org/stable/312638 (accessed December 26, 2013).

     Blake has written an updated version of Marxist theory on the Premodern Indian economy.  The historiography of the Indian economy is very deficient, which makes it very hard to make a definitive conclusion.  The Marxist concepts he looks at are production, exchange, and utilization.

Habib, Irfan.  "Usury in Medieval India."  Comparative Studies in Society and           History 6, no. 4 (Jul., 1964): 393-419 http://www.jstor.org/stable/177929      (accessed January 2, 2014).

     When reading Habib's article, it becomes apparent that usury was so commonplace that in 1684 Aurangzeb instituted a farman to release poverty stricken farmers from paying a tax.  Usury was a widespread practice because it was supported by the empire.  Habib looks at multiple ways usury was implemented throughout Mughal society.

Hasan, Farhat.  "The Mughal Fiscal System in Surat and the English East India           Company."  Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October 1993): 711-718.     http://www.jstor.org/stable/312828 (accessed December 3, 2013).

     Hasan is another disciple of the Aligarh School of Historiography.  His argument is that the English East India Company did not pay the heavy taxes at ports like Bengal, but they were forced to pay the heavy taxes at the port of Surat.  The difference in the taxation amounts between Bengal and Surat was that the English had conspired with Mughal bureaucrats.  This falls in line with M. Athar Ali's article that the English had a preferential trading policy with the Mughal Empire.

Leonard, Karen.  "Banking Firms in Mughal India:  A Reply."  Comparative Studies         in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April 1981): 309-313.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/178738 (accessed December 26, 2013).

     Leonard's article is in response to Richards' essay about state finance and the premodern economy.  She critiques the analysis that Richards concluded.  Instead, she believes there is enough evidence to conclude the Mughal Empire accessed various financial services such as temporary credit and the transmission of money in the empire.  From Leonard's perspective, banking institutions were an integral part of the Mughal Empire and society.

Richards, John F.  "Mughal State Finance and the Premodern World Economy."         Comparative Studies in Society and History 23, no. 2 (April, 1981): 285-308.      http://www.jstor.org/stable/178737  (accessed December 26, 2013).

     Richards has written an article that critiques Karen Leonard's essay about the impact of banking firms in India.  He believes the affects that banking firms had on the Indian economy during the seventeenth century is too scant for historians to draw any definitive conclusions.  Richards wants to see more questioning from historians about land generating revenue during the reign of Aurangzeb.

Richards, John F. "The Hyderabad Karnatik, 1687-1707."  Modern Asian Studies 9,       no. 2 (1975): 241-260.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/311962 (accessed December      21, 2013).

     Richards' article is a discussion about how Aurangzeb brought the newly conquered kingdom of Golconda into the Mughal sphere of influence.  Within the district of Golconda there was Hyderabad.  To ensure that his new possession was successfully brought into the empire, Aurangzeb organized it into one province with the intention of generating revenue that would be directly sent to the Emperor's palace.  In the end, his plan for Golconda to become a revenue producing region did not happen as he had planned it.

Richards, John F. "The Imperial Crisis in the Deccan."  The Journal of Asian Studies          35, no. 2 (February 1976): 237-256.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053981      (accessed November 24, 2013).

     Richards presents a counterargument to the Aligarh School of Historiography, which has said the demise of the Mughal Empire's was due to economic strains.  Instead, Richards promotes an argument that hypothesizes Aurangzeb failed to subdue his newly conquered southern possessions.  If Aurangzeb accomplished pacifying his new possessions, Richards believes that he would have enough resources to meet his upcoming expenditures.

Thompson, William R.  “The Military Superiority Thesis and the Ascendancy of          Western Eurasia in the World System.”   Journal of World History 10, no. I      (Spring 1999): 143-178. http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy2.apus.edu/docview/225237397?accountid=82    89 (accessed September 8, 2013).

     Thompson asks the question about how western Europeans established global empires when resources, like manpower, were lacking.  He looks at five independent cases to answer his question.  One of them is about the British and their involvement in India.  Thompson comes to the conclusion the British were able to take over India not because of their supposed superiority in military technology, but rather naval superiority and getting assistance from local allies.

Notes

[1] M. Athar Ali, "The Passing of Empire: The Mughal Case," Modern Asian Studies 9, no.  3 (1975) http://www.jstor.org/stable/311728 (accessed December 3, 2013).

[2] Karen Leonard, "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire,"  Comparative Studies in Society and History 21, no. 2 (April 1979) http://www.jstor.org/stable/178414 (accessed December 3, 2013).

[3] M.N. Pearson, “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire,”  The Association of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977)  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).

[4] John F. Richards, The Mughal Empire, vol. 5 of The New Cambridge History of India.  (Cambridge:  University Press, 1996).

[5] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.

[6] Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 390.

[7] M. Athar Ali.  "The Mughal Polity—A Critique of Revisionist Approaches." Modern Asian Studies 27, no. 4 (October, 1993): 699-710.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/312827 (accessed December 8, 2013).

[8] Chetan Singh, "Centre and Periphery in the Mughal State: The Case of seventeenth-Century Panjab,"  Modern Asian Studies 22, no. 2 (1988)  http://www.jstor.org/stable/312624 (accessed December 3, 2013).

[9] Ibid., 302.

[10] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 190; Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 387.

[11] Douglas E. Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires: Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals (Westview Press:  Boulder, Colorado, 2011), 272.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 219.

[14] M. N. Pearson, “Shivaji and the Decline of the Mughal Empire,” The Association of Asian Studies 35, no. 2 (February, 1977): 233,  http://www.jstor.org/stable/2053980 (accessed October 14, 2013).

[15] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 292.

[16] Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 388.

[17] Leonard, "The 'Great Firm' Theory of the Decline of the Mughal Empire,"  152.

[18] Ibid., 153.

[19] Ali, "The Passing of Empire," 390.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 288.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid, 289.

[24] Jos L. Gommans, Mughal Warfare:  Indian Frontiers and Highroads to Empire, 1500-1700 (Routledge: New York, 2002), 204.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Ibid.

[27] Ali, " The Passing of Empire," 390.

[28] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Richards, The Mughal Empire, 290.

[31] Ibid.