SHER SHAH SURI AND HIS SUCCESSORS

By J. N. Chaudhuri 

The main contents of this article are as follows

• Sher Shah (1538-1545)
• Islam  Shah(1545-1554)
• Firuz Shah (1554)
• Muhammad Adil Shah (1554-1556)
• Hlmu—A FORGOTTEN HINDU HERO

I. SHER SHAH (1538-1545) 

Sher Shah is one of the most striking and redoubtable figures in medieval Indian history. From an humble beginning in life he eventually revived the Afghan power in Northern India by de¬ feating and ousting the Mughul emperor Humayun, and gave his newly established empire a well-organized administration, hitherto rare in medieval Indian history. 

Faiild, as was his original name, was the grandson of Ibrahim Sur, an obscure Afghan of Roh in the Sulaiman Range. According to Abu-’l-Fazl, Ibrahim was a horse-dealer,1 but as he could not pros¬ per in his business there, he, along with his son Hasan, migrated to India during the later part of the reign of Sultan Buhlul Lodi with a view to improving his fortune in Hindusthan. 

But, as ill-luck would have it, he did not thrive here also; he could not rise to any higher position than that of a Commander of forty horsemen only, with assignments of some villages in the barren pargand of Narnaul under Jamal Khan SarangkhanI of Hissar Flruza. On his decease, his son Hasan succeeded to his jdglr. 

Farid was born of the first wife of Hasan, The date of his birth is usually given as about 1486; but the modern histo¬ rians hold' different views on the subject. No medieval histo¬ rian, on whom the modern scholars 'depend for reconstruction of the history of Farid, mentioned the exact date of his birth. Among the modern historians Dr. F. Saran, without any indication of evi¬ dence from earlier sources and depending mainly on two late works of the nineteenth century—Jdm-i-Jam written in 1839 and Asdr-us-Sanadid (1846) of Sir Sayyid Ahmad of Aligarh—holds that he was born in A.D. 1472;2 but as these are very late works, it is neither reasonable nor safe to depend upon them in the absence of any such information from the earlier historians. Writing during the reign of Akbar, ‘Abbas SarwanI stated that Farid was “born during the time of Buhlul” (1451-1489) ,3 but this statement is too vague to arrive at an exact conclusion. From the meagre materials available about Ibrahim it is reasonable to hold that he migrated to India in his old age almost at the fag-end of the reign of Buhlul when it was not possible for him to reap the advantage given to Afghan recruits during the early part of the reign of this monarch,

SHER SHAH AND HIS SUCCESSORS 

and hence he could not rise to any higher position than that of the Commander of forty horsemen with a small jdgir in the pargana of Narnaul. Having due consideration to these facts it is not unreason¬ able to fix Farid’s birth about A.D. I486.4 

About his place of birth, also, the modern scholars are not in agreement. Dr. P. Saran is of opinion that he was born at Bajwara, whereas Dr. Ishwari Prasad and Dr. K. R. Qanungo hold that his birth took place in the pargana of Narnaul.5 According to the Makhzan, his birth-place is Hissiar,6 but no earlier historian like ‘Abbas Sarwanl or Abu-’l-Fazl mentioned the place of his birth. It is quite in keeping with the implication of Abu-’l-Fazl’s writing7 to say that Farid was born in the pargana of Narnaul where his father and grandfather lived and which he appears to have remembered so much in his later years as to establish in it a fortified district headquarters and build a mausoleum over the grave of his grand¬ father. On the other hand, no evidence is forthcoming to show his interest for Hissar. 

Hasan’s abilities attracted the attention of Jamal Khan, who after his transfer to Jaunpur as governor, conferred the parganas of Sasaram and Khavasspur Tanda (in the modern Shahabad dis¬ trict of Bihar) upon him as a jdgir for the maintenance of five hun¬ dred troopers. 

By his four marriages Hasan had eight sons, of whom Farid and Nizam were born of his first wife, an Afghan lady, and Suleiman and Ahmad were the sons of his youngest wife, originally a slave girl. The boyhood of Farid was far from happy and peaceful. His father had great attachment for his youngest wife, to the neglect of his first wife. The indifference and unkindness of the father and too much jealousy of the step-mother appeared so unbearable to Farid that he left Sasaram and went to Jaunpur which was, in those days, an important centre of Muslim learning and culture, and where its madrasas gave free board and lodging to the Muslim stu¬ dents. There he studied both Arabic and Persian languages, includ¬ ing the well-known Persian works, the Gulistan, the Bustdn and the Sikandarndma. It is likely that he learnt there Hindi and arith¬ metic as well. 

His efficient administration of his father’s jdgir on the very first occasion leads one to the natural assumption that he might have had opportunities of acquiring experience of civil administration also during his long period of absence from Sasaram. 

He had come to Jaunpur about 1501, and on having a reconcilia¬ tion with his father through the mediation of his well-wishers, he left for Sasaram probably in January, 1518. Dr. Qanungo holds that “the key to the situation that compelled Mian Hasan and Sulai mlan’s mother to agree to a reconciliation with Farid and also induced them to appoint him temporarily to the charge of the parganas, lay in the political crisis of the Lodi Sultanate after the death of Sultan Sikandar in November, 1517.”8 

On his return, Farid acted as his father’s deputy in the parganas of Sasaram and Khavasspur Tanda, and during this period (c. 1518-1522) he administered justice to all, punishing the unruly Zarmnddrs and the unscrupulous and oppressive officials, and pro¬ tecting the ryots from all kinds of oppression and tyranny, as he realized “that the stability of every administration depended on jus¬ tice, and that it should be his greatest care not to violate it, either by oppressing the weak or by permitting the strong to infringe the laws with impunity.”9 Fully awgre that agriculture was the prin¬ cipal source of wealth, he encouraged cultivation in all possible ways and took steps to protect the cultivators from oppression. He said, “if the ruler cannot protect the ryots from oppressors, it is sheer injustice and shame to rece/ive rents from them.”10 His per¬ sonal care for the peasants and far-sighted revenue reforms increased cultivation and satisfied them. By his indefatigable industry he established peace, prosperity and happiness in his father’s jdgir. Little did he know then that he was thus serving a period of appren¬ ticeship for the role of a monarch in the future. 

The successful administration and growing fame of Farid roused the jealousy of Sulaiman’s mother all the more, and, despite his brilliant achievements, his father, who was under her spell, was alienated from him. Finding the position intolerable Farid resigned his post and proceeded towards Agra, the then capital of the Lodi Sultanate. 

He succeeded there in obtaining a patron in Daulat Khan, an influential amir, through whom his case was put before Sultan Ibrahim for taking possession of his father’s jdgir. But the Sultan turned down this request, saying, “he must be a bad man indeed who should complain against his own father”.11 However, it so happened that Hasan died soon after, and Daulat Khan was able to procure a royal farman in favour of Farid on the strength of which the latter got possession of his father’s jdgir. 

On his arrival at Sasaram, Sulaiman, his step-brother, fled to Muhammad Khan, the jagirdar of Chaund,12 and sought his assist¬ ance. To counteract this, Farid entered the service of Bihar Khan Lohanl, who, after the battle of Panlpat in A.D. 1526, declared his independence in South Bihar and took the title of Sultan Muhammad. 

Farid worked very hard in the service of his master and won his favour. We learn from Firishta and ‘Abbas Sarwani that Sultan Muhammad bestowed the title of Sher Khan on him for killing a tiger single-handed in a hunting excursion.13 He also discharged his duties efficiently as the deputy-governor (vakil) of South Bihar and tutor (ataliq) of Jalal Khian, minor son of Sultan Muhammad, in which capacities he had been appointed. 

The rapid rise of Farid was lookejd upon askance by some and specially by Sulaiman, his mother, and Muhammad Khan of Chaund through whose machination he was deprived of his jagir and com¬ pelled to leave Sasaram. He went to the Mughul camp (A. D. 1527), and, rendering useful service to Babur during his eastern campaigns, he got back his jagir through his assistance (A.D. 1528). In the following year circumstances compelled him to join the Afghan rebels led by Mahmud Lodi, the son of Sultan Sikandar Lodi, against Babur, but he offered his submission again, as did many of the Afghan leaders, after their attempts had ended in a fiasco. 

On the death of Sultan Muhammad in A.D. 1528, his minor son Jalal was installed in his father’s place with his mother Dudu as the regent. But his capital was seized by Mahmud Lodi in the same year. He was, however, restored in his position as a vassal of the Mughul emperor by Babur after the submission of the Afghans as mentioned above. 

As it was not possible for Dudu to manage the multifarious duties of the State, Sher Khan, who had already proved his adminis¬ trative ability, was appointed as the Deputy (rbdib) in A.D. 1529. Dudu having died in the beginning of 1530, all the duties of State devolved on him, and although he performed them efficiently, he aimed at centralization of all powers in his own hands. 

He created a strong party of his own and won the support of the greater part of the army to his cause. His position was further strengthened by the acquisition of the important fortress of Chunar, situated on the bank of, the Ganga (Ganges) south-west of Banaras, by his marriage with Lad Malka, the childless widow of Taj Khan, the commandant of the fort (A.D. 1530). After this, he took pos¬ session of the pargand of Chunar. In the same year, as a result of another marriage with Gauhar Gossain, the childless widow of Nlasir Khan Lohanl of Ghazlpur, he got an enormous wealth of three hun dred mans of gold.14 Thus, by the end of 1530, he became a power¬ ful factor to be reckoned with. 

On the personal request of Sultan Mahmud Lodi, Sher joined him against the Mughuls, as resistance was not feasible, but, at the same time he secured a farmdn from him for the kingdom of Bihar, thus acting against the interest of Jalal. In the ensuing battle between Sultan Mahmud and Humayun, fought at Dadrah15 on the bank of the Gomati (c. September, 1531), he treacherously desert¬ ed the Sultan. This battle “marks a turning point in the career of Sher Khan and his relations with the Mughuls .... The almost total destruction of the Afghan army in this battle doomed the Lodi cause for ever, and Sher emerged as the forlorn hope of the Af¬ ghans, whose hatred of the Mughuls was diverted to a new channel by him.”16 

After thus crushing the power of the Afghans, Humayun was not inclined to leave the strategic fortress of Chunar to an Afghan, although the latter had served the interest of the Mughuls on the day of the above-mentioned battle. Humayun opened negotiations with Sher for its surrender, but, on finding the latter unwilling to comply with this, it was besieged. When the siege was in pro¬ gress, Humayun was perturbed at the news of the hostile activities of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, and, accepting the nominal submission of Sher, he raised the siege and left the place (December, 1531). It was a great triumph for Sher, as he not only remained in posses¬ sion of the fortress but got sufficient time to strengthen his position further to enable him to give his opponent a crushing defeat which eventually cost the latter his throne. 

The Lohani Chiefs, who were extremely jealous of the growing power of Sher, became restive and wanted to get rid of him by any means. His alliance with Makhdum ‘Alam, the rebel Bengal gover¬ nor of Hajlpur, brought about an invasion of South Bihar by Sultan Mahmud Shah of Bengal, particularly with the intention of punish¬ ing Sher, and this “had the secret support of the Lohanls.”17 But the deputy-governor of South Bihar succeeded in winning a decisive victory over the army of Mahmud, and took possession of the terri¬ tory of Bengal up to the neighbourhood of Surajgarh. He had also received immense accumulated treasure which Makhdum had de¬ posited with him for safe custody before his defeat and death. 

The defeat of the Bengal army was a blow to the Lohanls whose chance of deliverance from the control of the deputy-governor va¬ nished with it. Jalal, also, was impatient of his tutelage and dic¬ tatorship. The Lohani chiefs conspired to assassinate him, but the latter was too careful and cautious to be thrown off his guard. Accompanied by Jalal, they then left South Bihar and went to Sul¬ tan Mahmud of Bengal who had been burning with rage to take revenge for the discomfiture of his army at the hands of Sher. 

The Sultan of Bengal made a huge preparation to crush him. The expeditionary force was placed under the command of Ibrahim Khan, an eminent commander, and, accompanied by Jalal, it moved cut of Mungir which had become the base of operations for this campaign. A decisive battle w^as fought between Sher and the Bengal army on the strategic plain of Surajgarh, a few miles east of Barh and about eighteen miles west of Mungir. It ended in a complete victory of Sher; Ibrahim fell fighting and Jalal fled to Sultan Mahmud (A.D. 1534). 

The victory was undoubtedly a great feat on the part of Sher, and, besides his military success in routing the Bengal army for the second time, it had far-reaching political consequences. It humbled the power and prestige of Mahmud to a great extent and Sher came to possess a wide territory on the southern bank of the Ganga (Ganges) from Surajgarh to Chunar. After this, his ambition soar¬ ed higher up. Dr. Qanungo has rightly said: “But for the victory of Surajgarh, the son of a nondescript jagtrdar of Sasaram would perhaps never have emerged from his obscurity in quest of a crown.”18 

Apprehending no sudden attack from the west, as Humayun wras busy in his Gujarat campaign against Bahadur Shah, Sher moved against Mahmud Shah before the rainy season of 1535 and con¬ quered the territory as far as Bhagalpur. 

In the following year he again opened his campaign against Mahmud and proceeded towards Gaur, the capital of Bengal. At Teliyagarhl, he had to meet with a strong opposition of the Bengal army and their Portuguese allies. Leaving a detachment there under his son Jalal Khan, he advanced through the unfrequented Jharkhand route and surprised the Sultan of Bengal by suddenly ap¬ pearing before his capital city. If Mahmud would have taken cour¬ age to withstand his adversary, it would have been very difficult for Sher to capture Gaur with its impregnable fortifications, but Mahmud was frightened beyond measure and acted with cowardice by offering terms of peace to the invader. By the terms of the treaty, Sher received thirteen lakhs of gold pieces and a wide terri¬ tory from Kiul to Sakrigali, ninety miles in length with a breadth of thirty miles at various places. 

These achievements enhanced considerably his power and pre¬ stige, and on the fall of Bahadur Shah of Gujarat, some of the Af¬ ghan chiefs, who looked upon him as their future hope, also joined him. The weakness of Mahmud having been completely revealed, Sher was bent upon another invasion of Bengal and this he under¬ took on the pretext of the Bengal Sultlan’s non-payment of the annual tribute (1537).19 He proceeded to Gaur and laid siege to it. After leaving Jalal Khan and Khavass Khan in charge of the siege opera¬ tions, he went to Chunar, and, strengthening its defences, removed his family and treasures to the hill fort of Bharkunda, fifty miles south of Chunar. 

Humayun’s anxiety knew no bounds when the alarming news of Sher Khan’s activities in the east reached him. Although slow to act, he, after necessary preparations, left Agra and proceeded against Sher. But instead of marching straight to Bengal, he made the fatal mistake of first besieging the fort of Chunar. Had he gone direct to Gaur and rendered assistance to Mahmud, as requested, he might have saved the Bengal monarchy and utilized its services in future to his advantage. 

The siege of Chunar dragged on, despite heavy bombardment of Rum! Khan, and, in the meantime, Sher pushed on with his work in Bengal according to his plan. 

After heroic defence for about three months, the fort of Chunar fell in March, 1538.20 But Sher soon compensated this loss by the capture of the impregnable fort of Rohtas in Bihar by a stratagem. Instead of sending Afghan families and his treasure for safe custody in this fort, as had been arranged with its Raja, he sent armed men in dolis into it and they, by a sudden sally, overpowered the garrison and occupied it.21 His men obtained success in Bengal also, and he received the happy tidings of the capture of Gaur and flight of Sultan Mahmud. 

After the capture of Chunar, Humayun opened negotiations with his adversary for a compromise and end of hostility, but it eventually fell through, and he marched towards Bengal. At Muner (on the Son), Sultan Mahmud, the fugitive king of Bengal, met him and he was assured of every possible assistance. 

As soon as Sher received information of Humayun’s movements, he started towards Gaur, narrowly by-passed the emperor near Patna, and sailed swiftly from Mungir to Gaur, reaching there much earlier than the arrival of the Mughul army at Colgong (Kahalgam), twenty-three miles west of TeliyagarhI. He despatched his own son Jalal Khan with some other officers immediately to defend the pass of Teliyagarhi, where, on their arrival, the Mughul advance party suffered a defeat and fell back on the main army of Colgong. 

Not unnerved by the fear of Mughul arms, Sher celebrated his coronation at Gaur (1538) and assumed the title of Farid-ud-duniya Wa-din Abu-’l Muzaffar Sher Shah, as Sultan.212 After this, on com¬ pletion of his arrangements, he evacuated Gaur and went to Rohtas by the Jharkhand route. Jalal Khan, too, had been advised to leave Teliyagarhi at a particular time according to his plan. 

Humayun occupied Garhl without any opposition and thence he arrived triumphantly at Gaur (June, 1558).22a 

Sher did not waste his time at Rohtas but made extensive pre¬ parations for an offensive against the Mughuls. His plans exhibited wonderful dexterity and foresight. He despatched Khavass Khan to recover the lost places of Bihar and watch the movements of Huma¬ yun, while he himself proceeded westward from Bihar. He laid siege to Banaras and captured it. Jaunpur and Chunar were also besieged but they held on, and were closely blockaded. One de¬ tachment under experienced and capable officers was despatched against Bahraich and they expelled the Mughuls from that part of the country. Sher’s activities did not stop there; he ravaged and conquered the whole country as far as Kanauj, and, according to ‘Abbas, Sambhal also was occupied by his invading forces 23 

Humayun wasted precious time (about nine months) in Ben¬ gal, and such thoughtlessness and want of foresight on his part at a time when his powerful adversary was utilizing all his resources to topple him down proved most disastrous to him. At last, the alarming news of his opponent’s activities and the rebellion of his brother Mlrza Hindal roused him from torpor, and, leaving Jahangir Quli Beg with an army of five thousand, he left Gaur (1539). Reach¬ ing Mungir, he crossed the Gangai (Ganges) against the advice of his veteran officers and marched by the southern bank of the river which was under the control of the Afghans. He marched up to Muner without any hindrance, but during his westward march from that place he suffered from their attacks on his flank. At last, he reached Chausa, situated close to the east bank of the Kar manasa and ten miles south-west of Buxar.24 

Sher pitched his camp on the western side of this river close to its junction with the Ganga (Ganges). With what skill and fore¬ sight he made his plans and acted up to them can be understood from his actions. He had harassed the Mughuls from behind on their march from Muner and then crossed the Karmanasa ahead of them to occupy a position from which he could keep an eye on the possible Mughul aid coming from the west, crossing the Ganga (Ganges) there, and, at the same time, prevent the crossing of the Karmanasa by Humayun till rains worsen his position, of which he (Sher) wTould take the fullest advantage. Skirmishes went on between the hostile armies from day to day for a pretty long time. Humayun’s posi¬ tion grew worse; “disease, hardship, and fear of the enemy prompt¬ ed many of his soldiers to desert for their homes.”25 The anxiety of approaching monsoon perplexed him further, and, news from Delhi and Agra being unfavourable, there was no hope of relief from those quarters. So, he commenced negotiations for peace with his foe, which, according to Jauhar, finally broke off due to the em¬ peror’s refusal to give up Chunar 26 

Sher did not sit idle indefinitely but hit upon a plan of surpris¬ ing the Mughuls. He gave out that he was proceeding against Maharatha Chero, the leader of an aboriginal tribe in modern Sha habad district, who had been defying him, and, after marching a few miles in that direction at night, crossed the Karmanasa about five miles below Humayun’s position, unnoticed by the Mughuls, and, in the early dawn of June 26, 1539, fell upon the Mughuls from three sides. The surprise was complete; many were killed in their bed asleep, and many of those who took to flight were drowned in the Gahga, (Ganges). Humayun was able to gather about three hundred men, with whose assistance he fought gallantly, but was wounded in the left arm, and carried towards the Gahga (Ganges), where Nizam, a water-carrier, saved him from drowning with the help of his masak or inflated leather bag. Such was the sad plight of the emperor who reached Agra with difficulty, via Allahabad and Kalpl. 

The loss of the Mughuls, both in men and war-materials, was heavy. Eight thousand men were killed, the Mughul army being “practically destroyed”,27 and the whole camp equipage, stores and artillery fell into the hands of the enemy. Sher’s treatment to¬ wards the captive begam of Humayun and other Mughul women was full of sympathy and respect. 

The Afghan victory at Chausa was decisive and had far-reach¬ ing consequences. Dr. Qanungo says: “The horizon of Sher Khan’s ambition widened immensely; twelve months before he would have been glad to hold Bengal as the vassal of the Emperor. Now he won by this single stroke the whole territory of the Sharqi kingdom of Jaunpur in addition to the kingdoms of Bengal and Bihar in in dependent sovereignty, and could legitimately claim equality with the Emperor. So Delhi was no longer such a far cry for the victor.”28 

Sher then proceeded to recover Bengal. Jahangir Qull, the Mu ghul governor there, had taken his post at Garhi which was besieged. It was soon occupied and Jahangir Qull was treacherously slain along with his followers.29 Gaur was next captured, and, although Sher could not spend time to establish his authority over the whole of Bengal, it appears that his rule extended ‘‘over the country com¬ prising Gaur and Sharifabiad, Satgaon and Chittagong.”30 It appears that during his stay in Bengal, his second coronation took place at Gaur with pomp and grandeur (1539).31 

After appointing Khizr Khan as governor of Bengal, he left this province and proceeded with his further plan of action. He marched towards Kanauj, and on his way, sent a detachment under his son Qutb Khan to harass the Mughul forces from behind, if the empe¬ ror happened to move towards Jaunpur or Kanauj by way of KalpI and Etawa. But Qutb was attacked and slain by the Mughuls near KalpI. 

On his return to Agra, Humayun endeavoured his utmost to unite his brothers to fight against the mighty Afghan foe, but Kare¬ ran did not render any assistance. Despite diverse difficulties, the emperor gathered together a large army and a park of artillery and marched towards Kanauj where the enemies had been active. 

At the Bhojpur ferry, thirty-one miles north-west of Kanauj, Sher foiled the attempt of the Mughuls to cross the Ganga (Ganges) by means of a bridge of boats. Humayun then changed his plan and, proceeding towards Kanauj by marching along the western bank of the river, he encamped at the vicinity of Kanauj. For about a month the two hostile parties remained encamped on the two sides of the Ganga, (Ganges) confronting each other—the Mughuls on the western bank and the Afghans on the eastern bank. As there was a large number of desertions from the Mughul camp, Hu¬ mayun considered it better to face the enemies in an open fight before his fighting strength dwindled abnormally low. He there¬ fore crossed the river and encamped on a low-lying ground which was unluckily flooded by unusually early rains, necessitating the re¬ moval of the camp to an elevated ground in front. When on May 17, 1540, the Mughul army moved according to plan, Sher advanced to attack them. According to Mlrza Haidar, who commanded one division of the Mughul army in this encounter, known as the battle of Bilgram or the battle of the Ganga,32 the Mughul force numbered about 40,000 and the Afghan army was less than 15,000.33 

The Afghan assault was started by Jalal Khan from the right wing but he was worsted by Hindal Mirza and some other Mughul commanders. Sher sent sufficient reinforcements there immediately, and this wing, thus strengthened, made a vehement attack on the enemies who were forced to fall back on their centre. Barmazld Gaur and others commanding the left wing of the Afghan force push¬ ed the Mughul right wing into the rear, driving the innumerable camp-followers into the centre which was still firm behind the artil¬ lery-carriages. But the pressure of the huge number of camp-follow¬ ers from the right, left and rear was too much for the centre to bear and in the midst of disorder and confusion, the artillery became inope¬ rative. By a rear assault, the Afghans made the position of the Mughul army more untenable and compelled them to take to flight; many were slain on the way by the pursuing Afghan army and many were drowned in the Ganga (Ganges). Sir Jadunath Sarkar has justly observed: ‘Tt was not a battle at all but a helpless panic flight, which covered the Mughals with unspeakable disgrace.’’34 

They had left behind in the battlefield immense war-materials including artillery which fell into the hands of the victors. 

After leaving the battlefield, Humayun crossed the river on an elephant with difficulty and fled in panic to Agra. Then he went to Lahore, pursued by the Afghans. Even at such a critical mo¬ ment, his earnest attempt to unite his brothers did not bear fruit and Kamran did not cease from his unbrotherly actions. Humayun next proceeded to Sind. Thus continued his life1 of wanderings from place to place, and being disappointed everywhere, he, at last, left India and took shelter with Shah Tahmasp of Persia. 

Sher had despatched Barmazld Gaur in pursuit of Humayun, and on completion of necessary works at Kanauj, he himself marched towards Agra. Barmazld Gaur had taken possession of the latter city before his chief’s arrival there and slew a number of non-com¬ batant Mughuls. On reaching there, Sher reprimanded his general for his cruelty, and sent him and Khavass Khan to continue the pursuit of Humayun. A detachment under Shuja‘at Khan was also sent to besiege Gwalior. Next he went to Delhi which had been occupied by Naslr Khan, another commander, and during his stay there, he commenced the work of its resuscitation by embellishing it with new structures. 

From Delhi he marched to Lahore in quest of Humayun. He had already received information of the inability of the ex-emperor to unite his brothers and their retreat in different directions, viz, Humayun towards Sind, Hindal towards Multan by a different routed and Kamran towards Kabul. He did not stay at Lahore long but moved westward quickly, driving away the Mughuls. From the bank of the Chenab he sent a detachment to pursue Hindal, then he went to Bhera and thence to Khushab where he halted. Khavass Khan went against Humayun but he was advised not to engage him in battle, but only to drive him out of his dominion. Qutb Khan, another general, was sent against Kamran with similar instructions. Khavass Khan pursued Humayun as far as Mithankot, situated on the confluence of the Sutlej with four other rivers of the Punjab, and then returned to rejoin Sher Shiah at Khushab. Here the Baluch chiefs Fath Khan, Isma‘il Khan and GhazI Khan offered their sub¬ mission to the Afghan sovereign. 

Sher Shah next launched a campaign against the Gakkhars, in¬ habiting a mountainous region between the upper courses of the Jhelum and the Indus. They were inimical to the Afghans and their country occupied a strategic position through which an in¬ vader from the north-west might suddenly enter the Punjab which was then in Sher’s possession. So, for security and safety of his dominion, an offensive had to be undertaken, and the Gakkhar coun¬ try was invaded and ravaged. A proper site was then found out for the construction of a fortress with a view to guarding the nor¬ thern frontier and keeping the Gakkhars under control. A gigantic and impregnable fort was built ten miles north-west of the town of Jhelum and named Rohtas, after his famous strong fortress in Bihar. It was completed by his son Islam Shah. 

On receipt of information of the rebellious attitude of Khizr Khan, governor of Bengal, and his marriage with a daughter of the deceased Sultan Mahmud, Sher started at once for Gaur. Khizr Khan was completely surprised, put in chains and imprisoned (A.D. 1541). A man of keen insight as Sher was, he remodelled the administration there in such a way that rebellion might not recur in future. 

The province was divided into several sarkdrs and over each of them, he appointed a Chief Shiqddr {Shiqddr-i-Shiqddrdn), a Chief Munsif (Munsij-i-Munsifdn), and a Qazi. The Chief Shiqddr was primarily in charge of law and order within his jurisdiction, except the big towns where Kotwals performed these duties. The former also tried criminal cases and had under him an army to be utilized, if necessary, for enforcement of law and order. The duty of the Chief Mwnsif was to try civil cases specially with regard to revenue mat¬ ters. He also supervised the work of the pargand^dmins. Each Sarkdr was subdivided into several parganas, over each of which  there were one Shiqddr, one Amin, one treasurer and two clerks for maintaining accounts. Over the whole province Sher appointed Qazi Fazilat as Amln-i-Bdngala “who was not a Sipah-Salar but a Qazl writ large....to maintain the unity and smooth working of the provincial administration as an arbitrator”,35 for settlement of disputes among the Chief Shiqddrs. His “hold on the administration of Bengal was further clinched by the establishment of thanas or military outposts of imperial troops changed yearly by him.” 

Haibat Khan NiyazI, governor of the Punjab, suppressed the rebel leader Fath Khan Jat who had been in possession of the strong fort of Kot-Kabula in the Lakshmi Jungle (modern Montgomery district) and had been carrying on depredations on the! roads be¬ tween Delhi and Lahore. Fath Khan was defeated, imprisoned and put to death. Haibat Khan also conquered Multan with its depen¬ dencies and expelled the Baluchis. His achievements so pleased his master that he was conferred the title of A‘zam Humayun, with a command of 30,000 horse. Upper Sind with its strong fortresses of Bhakkar and Sehwan also fell into the hands of Sher’s victorious army (A.D. 1543). 

In 1542 Sher Shah had invaded Malwa whose possession he coveted. The cause of this invasion is not far to seek. It was his expansionist policy that was mainly responsible for this attack on the neighbour, whose independence had always been looked upqn askance by all the rulers of Delhi and, as it controlled the road from the south to the north, its possession was all the more neces¬ sary for them. Sher therefore marched towards Malwa by way of Gwalior, the fort of which had been besieged by his army a year ago. Its Mughul commandant now surrendered after long resist¬ ance for want of provisions. Sher then proceeded to Sarangpur where Qadir Shah, the king of Malwa, offered his submission to him. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain in company with Qadir, took posses¬ sion of this city and offered him the governorship of Lakhnawati.36 But the ex-king of Malwa, being apprehensive of Sher’s intention, fled to Mahmud III of Gujarat. From Ujjain, Sher proceeded to Mandu and Dhar which he occupied easily. The subsequent at¬ tempt of Qadir for the recovery of his dominion ended in fiasco. 

On his way back to Agra by way of Ranthambhor, Sher took possession of this well-known fortress from its commandant by peaceful means.37 

The brunt of his next attack fell on Furana Malla of Raisen, a mighty fortress, twenty-seven miles east of the modern town'of Bhopal. This fertile principality had grown into importance by the acquisition of Chanderi. There is no doubt that it fell within the ambit of Sher’s policy of aggrandizement and hence political fac¬ tors were mainly responsible for his invasion. There was also an alleged accusation against Purana Malla of enslaving Muslim women and keeping them in his harem. 

The campaign was started by the siege of Chanderi in January, 1543. Despite gallant resistance of the Rajputs, Chanderi was cap¬ tured by Jalal Khan, who, overcoming the stiff opposition, also oc¬ cupied thei territory between Chanderi and Bhilsa. Sher himself proceeded to Raisen and laid siege to the fortress. Though sub¬ jected to heavy bombardment, the garrison defended it with all their might, and the siege was protracted. At last, on an assurance from him that Purana Malla and his followers with their property would be allowed to move away in safety on their surrendering the fort, they came out of it but were treacherously attacked by the Afghans, and for this act of perfidy, Sher Shah must share the responsibility. In order to save the honour of their women, thei Rajputs had re¬ course to the ghastly step of killing them by their own hands and then they gave up their lives, fighting gallantly against the enemies (June, 1543). 

On the fall of Raisen, Sher made up his mind to invade Marwar, then the most powerful kingdom in Rajasthan, whose boundary at Jhajhar was only about thirty miles from Delhi. Its king, Mal dev Rathor, a capable general and an energetic ruler, extended his kingdom by the annexation of various places like Merta, Jaita ran, Siwana, Jalor, Tonk, Nagaur and Ajmer, the last two of which had formerly belonged to the Delhi empire. The existence of such a powerful kingdom on the border of the Delhi empire was consi¬ dered as a serious menace to its safety. Moreover, some of the dis¬ affected Rajput chiefs, who had suffered defeat and loss of their territories at the hands of Maldev, incited the Afghan ruler to in¬ vade Marwar. The latter was not also well-disposed towards the ruler of Marwar, as he had not acted up to his desire by capturing Humayun and handing him over to the Sultan. 

Fully aware of the strength of his opponent, Sher made mili¬ tary preparations on an extensive scale, and, in the autumn of 1543, set out against Marwar with a huge force of 80,000 horse, unpre¬ cedented in any of his campaigns. Maldev went forth to oppose his enemy with an army of 50,000 horse, and, according as the exigencies of the moment demanded, he concentrated them in the pargand of Jaitaran, about fifty-six miles east of Jodhpur, the capital of Marwar. So, instead of marching to the enemy’s capital, as had been his previous plan, Sher halted in the village of Samel, in the above-mentioned pargaud, facing the army of Maldev. For a month the two parties lay opposite to each other, and, in the meantime, the position of Sher became critical owing to difficulties of food supplies for his huge army. The ruler of Marwar was in an advantageous position and the initiative of action lay with him. To get rid of this uncomfortable situation, Sher took recourse to a stratagem. He caused letters to be addressed to himself, as if writ¬ ten by Maldev’s generals, promising him their assistance, and had them dropped near the camp of the Rathor King in a silken bag. Becoming aware of the contents of the letters, suspicion about the fidelity of the generals upset the king, who, with the greater part of his troops, fell back towards Jodhpur. But, realizing the deceit played upon them by the enemy, the gallant Rajput generals like Jaita and Kupa resolved to fight with their valiant followers against Sher and die an honourable death. In the sanguinary battle which ensued, the laurels of victory rested with the Afghan Sultan, but at a great cost, with a heavy toll of lives. Jaita and Kupa with their brave warriors fell fighting desperately; the Rathor King realized the artifice of his adversary only too late. 

After this victory, Khavass Khan took possession of Jodhpur and Maldev was pursued from place to place, but he succeeded in evading capture. The Afghan army occupied the territory of Mar war from Ajmer to Mount Abu. Leaving Khavass Khan in supreme command of his forces in Marwar and making necessary arrange¬ ments for the administration of the newly conquered territories, Sher marched towards Mewar (1544). He occupied, without any resistance, the fort of Chitor, the keys of which were delivered to him by the commandant on behalf of Mahamna Uday Singh. For the sake of proper administration, Chitor and its dependencies were formed into a separate Sarkdr. 

Sher’s next military expedition was directed against Kalinjar in Bundelkhand. The motive behind this expedition has been differ¬ ently stated by the medieval historians. Firishta says that the Rdjd of Kalinjar, who had witnessed the treachery of Sher against Purana Malla, did not submit and assumed a hostile attitude.38 ‘Abbas says that as Kirat Simha, the Rdjd of Kalinjar, did not come out to meet him, “he ordered the fort to be invested.”39 Ac¬ cording to Ahmad Yladgar, the author of Tdrikh-i-Saldtm-i-Ajdghina, the reason for Sher’s attack on Kalinjar was the refusal of its Rdjd, to give up Blr Simha Deva Bundela who had taken shelter with him.40 But the fugitive referred to was probably Raja BTr Bhan of Arail41 who had been friendly to Humayun; and with this correc tion, the reason adduced by Ahmad Yadgar appears to be quite satisfactory. 

Sher marched on Kalinjar and invested the fort in November, 1544. Despite great efforts, it could not be captured, and the siege lasted for months together. On the day of the final assault the besiegers were engaged in throwing hand-grenades inside the fort. One of the grenades, after striking the fort wall, exploded, and, rebounding, fell into a heap of ammunition near the place where Sher was standing. There was an explosion and Sher was most se¬ verely burnt and carried to his camp. Even when he was thus hovering between life and death, he did not forget to give instruc¬ tion to his officers to continue the assault and capture the fort. It fell about the same evening and he was highly elated to hear this news. But the icy hand of death snatched him away the same night in the midst of his career of triumphant marches (May 22, 1545). 

His body was temporarily interred near Kalinjar and afterwards carried to Sasaram to be laid in the permanent resting place, al¬ ready constructed by the emperor himself. 

At the time of his death, he left an empire comprising almost the whole of northern India, save Kashmir, Gujarat and Assam. It was roughly bounded by the Indus on the west, the Gakkhar country on the north-west, the Himalayas on the north, Assam on the east and the Vindhyas on the south. 

Not only did he thus establish an empire by dint of his great military skill, wonderful courage, ability and resourcefulness, but, with his usual skill and promptitude, he made necessary arrange¬ ments for its smooth and efficient administration. At the helm of affairs was the Sultan himself, and although, like his predeces¬ sors, he was a despot and centralized all power in his own hands, he was a benevolent despot whose primary aim was to do good to his subjects, irrespective of caste or religion. As it is not humanly possible to conduct all affairs of the empire single-handed, he ap¬ pointed several ministers to assist him in his multifarious duties. In fact, these ministers occupied the position of secretaries rather than ministers, as they had no power of initiative or final determination of any policy or transacting matters of importance without Sultan’s orders. Among the ministers, mention may be made of DiwdnA Wizdrat, Dlwdn-iLRisdlat9 Diwdn-i-Arz and Diwdn-i-Inshd. The Dlwdn i-Wizarat was in charge of the Wazir and primarily dealt with finance. The Diwdn-i-Risdlat “dealt with religious matters, pious foundations, stipends to deserving scholars and men of piety. This office was presided over by the Sadr-us-Sudur, who generally was also the Qazi-i-murwdlik; in the latter capacity he controlled the department of justice.”42 The Diwdn-i-cArz was under the lAriz-i-mumdlik who was in charge of recruitment and organization of the army as well as their payment. The Diwdn-i-Insha, dealing with government correspondence, was in charge of Dabir-i-Kbds. Mention may also be made of the Barid-i-mumalik who was the head of the intelli¬ gence department. 

In spite of the paucity of materials regarding the highest ad¬ ministrative unit in the empire of Sher Shah, we find that there were military governorships in cases of Ajmer, Malwa and the Punjab. Bengal was at first administered likewise, but the lesson of a bitter experience in this distant province taught him to adopt a more prudent measure and he abolished the post of the military governor, as stated before, dividing the whole province into several Sarkars with Amm-i-Bdngald (civilian Viceroy) at thb top for smooth running of the administration. The provinces were divid¬ ed into Sarkars, each of which was sub-divided into parganas. Over each Sarkar there were one Chief Shiqdar, one Chief M'unsif, 

and a Qdzi. The Chief Shiqdar (Shiqddr-i-Shiqddrdn) was in charge of law and order in the Sarkar and had a body of troops to assist him in his work, when necessary. He also tried criminal cases re¬ garding infringement of law and order and supervised the work of the Shiqddrs in his jurisdiction. The Chief Munsif (Munsij-i-Mun sifdn) tried civil cases, specially arising out of revenue matters and supervised the work of the pargand^amins. 

Over each pargawd, there were one Shiqdar, one drain, one fotadar (treasurer) and two clerks. The Shiqdar was entrusted with the duty of maintaining law and order in the pargana and assisting the iamin with his army, if necessary, to enforce collection of re¬ venue. The duty of the dniin was to conduct survey of lands, their assessment and collection of revenue. He was to discharge his function as “an impartial umpire between the State demanding revenue and the individual ryots paying it”.43 Of the two Kdrkuns or clerks, one was to write accounts in Hindi and the other in Persian. 

The Sultan introduced the system of transferring the officers of the Sarkars and pargauds every two or three years. 

The land revenue system of Sher Shah has earned an undying fame for him and it became the basis of future agrarian systems in India. He had acquired sufficient experience in survey, assess¬ ment and settlement of land revenue in his father’s jagir at Sasa ram, and when he occupied the throne as an emperor, he came with his system successfully tested. In some regions steps were taken for survey of lands, and revenue was settled according to the fertility of the soil, based on the experience of the past average yield and the expected produce of the land. In many parts of the kingdom there was no survey, and revenue was fixed at a definite share of the produce. Although there are differences of opinion among the modern historians about the government’s share of land revenue, it appears from the Am-i-Akbari and the Makhzan44 that it was less than one-third and probably one-fourth44a of the average yield of the land, payable either in cash or in kind, preference being given to the former method. The Sultan’s instructions to his revenue officers were to show leniency at the time of assessment but to be strict at the time of realization of rent. Due consideration was, however, given in cases of damage to crops caused by movement of troops 

and to paucity of yield, nature’s vagaries like drought, etc. A Kabuliyat (deed of agreement) containing the tenant’s right in the land and his liabilities was taken from him, and the government issued a patta (title-deed) to him stating similar terms and condi¬ tions. Sher tried to do away with the authority of the middle¬ men and establish a direct relation with the tenants who were en¬ couraged to pay their dues direct to the government treasury. But there were also Jaglrs and ZamKmddri systems. As he considered agriculture to be the main source of prosperity of his empire, he took special interest in the welfare of the cultivators and took steps against any oppression or harassment to them. His salutary reforms benefited the peasants, enhanced cultivation, and increased the re¬ venue of the empire. Other sources of revenue included customs duties, Jizya, Zakat, cesses on a variety of articles and khums. 

Sher Shah’s currency and tariff reforms contributed a great deal towards the improvement of the economic condition of the country. The currency was then in a deplorable condition due to the paucity of current coins, the debasement in regard to their metal, and absence of any fixed ratio between the coins of gold and those of other metals. He took steps to remodel the currency. Coins of gold and mixed metal were abolished, and separate coins of gold, silver and copper of fixed standard were issued. He exe¬ cuted gold coins of 168.5 grains, 167 grains and 166.4 grains and his silver rupee, which weighed 180 grains, contained 175 grains of pure silver. He also issued a large number of new copper coins, subsequently known as dam. The silver rupee and the copper dam had their sub-divisions of halves, quarters, eighths, and sixteenths. The ratios between the silver coins and various gold coins were fixed; the rate of exchange between the copper dam and the silvter rupee was 64 to 1. These currency reforms removed the long-felt inconvenience and difficulties of the general public and the busi¬ ness community. “The reformed system of currency of Sher lasted throughout the Mughul period, was maintained by the East India Company down to 1835, and is the basis of the. . . .British currency 

(up to 1947).45 

Sher Shah also facilitated trade and commerce by abolishing many vexatious imposts on merchandise and by realizing duties on them twice only, viz., once at the frontier when a commodity was imported, and again at the place of its sale. 

The Sultan acquired great reputation as a lover of even-hand¬ ed justice. Even if any of his relatives or grandees committed any offence, he did not hesitate to punish him in the same manner as he punished an offender belonging to the ordinary strata of the society. He heard cases in original as well as of appeals. Next to him was the Chief Qdzl of the empire, who heard primarily cases of appeals, but cases at the initial stage were also not outside the purview of his court. Besides, as head of the judicial department, he had to conduct the administration of his department. The head¬ quarters of the Sarkdrs and probably other important cities had Qdzis who tried criminal cases. As has been stated before, crimi¬ nal cases regarding infringement of law and order were tried by the Chief Shiqddrs in the Sarkdrs where the Chief Munsif heard civil cases, specially of revenue disputes, and similar cases were disposed of by the dmlns in the pargands. 

The police system of Sher Shah was simple, and, according to the Persian historians, worked well, achieving the objective aimed at. The Shiqddr-i-Shiqddrdn and the Shiqddr had to maintain peace and order within their jurisdictions. In the villages, the system of local responsibility was followed and the village head men had to bear the responsibility for crimes committed within their jurisdictions. If they could find out the culprits or produce them within the stipulated time, the latter were duly punished, but if the headmen were unable to do so, they themselves would have to face the punishment for such crimes. ‘Abbas says that the head¬ men “used to protect the limits of their own villages, lest any thief or robber, or enemy of their enemies might injure a traveller, and so be the means of their destruction and death”.46 About the effect of the system, Firishta says, “such was the public security during his reign, that travellers and merchants, depositing their property on the roadside, lay down to sleep without apprehension of robbery”.47 

One of the greatest contributions of Sher Shah was his con¬ struction of roads connecting important parts of his empire with his capital. They were necessary for a variety of causes, viz., the im¬ perial defence, quick and regular despatch of news to the emperor, improvement of trade and commerce, and convenience of the tra¬ velling public. The longest road built by him (fifteen hundred kos) ran from Sonargaon (near Dacca), via Agra and Delhi to the Indus; the second road ran from Agra to Jodhpur and the fort of Chitor, the third from Agra to Burhanpur, and the fourth from Lahore to Multan. For the convenience of the travellers, shade¬ giving trees were planted on both sides of these roads. Sard’is were established along them at intervals of four miles and separate arrangements provided for both the Hindus and the Muslims. These Sard’ls not only served as rest-houses for travellers but also as stations of dak chaukl. Sher Shah had a well-organized espionage system and his spies used to send him through the dak chaukl prompt information of every important matter even from the re¬ motest part of his empire. Such a system of conveyance of in¬ formation by means of dcik chaukl was not new to our country but he revived and improved it to a considerable extent. This depart¬ ment was under Ddrogd-i-Ddk-Chaukl and under him there were in¬ numerable news-writers and news-carriers. The efficiency of this department contributed much to the successful administration of this monarch. 

Fully aware of the defects of the feudal levy, the Sultan rea¬ lized the necessity of a strong and well-equipped standing army under his direct control. The system of feudal levy was not dis¬ continued but the well-organized imperial army added to his strength and power. His army consisted of different nationalities including the Hindus, but the Afghans formed the most predomi¬ nant element. He took personal interest in the recruitment of soldiers and revived ‘Ala-ud-din’s systems of branding the horses and recording the descriptive roll of every soldier in order to guard against proxies. His earnest effort was to maintain as much direct touch with the soldiers as possible, hearing their grievances and removing them, when necessary. All payments were made to them individually by the government. In order to minimize the risk of any military rising, his reforms further aimed at establish¬ ing an official relation, in lieu of any personal attachment, between an ordinary soldier and his officers. 

Sher Shah’s military strength under his direct control con¬ sisted of 1,50,000 cavalry, 25,000 infantry, and a park of artillery, besides 5,000 war-elephants. Contingents of imperial troops were maintained at the strategic places of his empire; each of these divi¬ sions known as fauj was under the command of a faujddr. 

The Sultan was a stern disciplinarian and maintained strict dis¬ cipline in his army. 

In spite of the stormy days that he had to pass through, he was fond of architecture, and the buildings which he constructed exhibit his grandeur of design and fine artistic taste. His own mausoleum at Sasaram is one of the most beautiful structures built in India during the medieval period. “The style may be described as intermediate between the austerity of the Tughluq buildings and feminine grace of Shah Jahan’s masterpiece.”48 The magnificent mosque in the Purania-QiTa in Delhi also bears testi¬ mony to Sher’s superb ideas and taste for fine workmanship. In the field of constructing fortresses, he has left a deep impress of his military engineering by his gigantic and magnificent fort named Rohtas in the district of Jhelum. 

It is admitted by all that Sher Shah worked very hard, at¬ tending to minute details, promoted efficiency in the machinery of the State and was one of the greatest and most capable adminis¬ trators of medieval India. But on a careful scrutiny of his ela¬ borate regulations we do not find anything entirely new or origi¬ nal in them except in certain features of his land revenue system. He was thus more a reformer than an innovator. He did not create any new ministry; his administrative divisions and sub-divisions were taken from the past. He did not also introduce anything new either in the administration of justice or in judicial organiza¬ tion. His systems of espionage and dak chaukl were borrowed from his predecessors. Under ‘Ala-ud-dln Khaljl the system of espio¬ nage was carried to frightful perfection, and the institution of dak chaukl is also attributed to him. In regard to the army, Sher Shah revived the system of ‘Ala-ud-din Khalji with improvements, where considered necessary. In addition to reviving ‘Ala-ud-dln’s system of branding of horses, he instituted the practice of record¬ ing the descriptive roll of every soldier to put a stop to the prac¬ tice of sending proxies. Among the Sultans of Delhi it was ‘Ala ud-din who first devised the scheme of measurement of lands and tried to improve the system of assessment prevalent in the coun¬ try, but it was neither so comprehensive nor so well-intentioned as that of Sher Shah. The system introduced by the latter had many salient features, new and original, and primarily aimed at the wel¬ fare of the peasants and increase of cultivation.  

Although Sher Shah was mainly a reformer, he infused a new spirit into the old institutions, improved them, wherever necessary, and supervised the actual workings with plodding industry in order to turn the whole machinery of State into an instrument of popular weal. 

Judged by his wonderful activities and outstanding achieve¬ ments he undoubtedly occupies a high place among the crowned heads of medieval India. From the son of an ordinary jdgirddr harassed by serious obstacles and active oppositions even of his own men, he advanced step by step by sheer merit till he acquired the throne of Hindusthan and revived the Afghan rule by expelling Humayun from India. 

As a soldier, he possessed indomitable courage, extraordinary patience and untiring energy, and, as a general, he had that rare quality of a leader’s personal magnetism which endeared him to his followers whom he led from victory to victory and, with whom he toiled and mixed together, sharing their hardships and priva¬ tions, when necessary. His rapidity of movements and the tact and foresight that he displayed in his campaigns were beyond the ima¬ gination of his adversaries who had to face discomfiture. As far as possible, he tried to avoid open engagements and made sudden sallies on the enemies to take them by surprise. He did not also hesitate to outwit them by cunning and craftiness. Despite the ignoble means which he followed at times, his successes dazzled the eyes of his contemporaries and raised him to the pinnacle of glory. 

But his achievements as a ruler outweigh those as a general, and his place in history rests more on his constructive genius dis¬ played in his administrative policy than for victories in the battle¬ fields. He had a thorough grasp of all the departments of adminis¬ tration and they showed the salutary effect of his reforming hands. He reorganized the district administration and, in the case of Bengal, provincial administration, too; he reformed the land re¬ venue and currency systems, police, intelligence, and army depart¬ ments, and duties on merchandise were made conducive to trade and commerce. He kept in check the individualistic spirit of the Afghans—a hard task, indeed, beset with almost insuperable diffi¬ culties—and utilized their services to an extent which no ruler in medieval India prior to him could do. 

A benevolent ruler as he was, he aimed at the welfare of his subjects. W. Crooke says, “Sher Shah was the first who attempted to found an Indian Empire broadly based upon the people’s will. . . . .He had the genius to see that the Government must be popu larized, that the king must govern for the benefit of his subjects, that the Hindus must be conciliated by a policy of justice and toleration.‘No Government, not even the British, has shown so much wisdom as this Pathan’ as Keene says.”49 

Though he was an orthodox Sunrii in his private life, his general policy towards the Hindus, who formed the majority of his subjects, was one of toleration and good will, as he had enough of prudence and foresight of a true statesman to realize that, unless he could win over their sympathy and co-operation, the stability of his empire would be at stake. He allowed the Hindus to follow their religious tenets without any interference of the government, and many of them were employed both in his civil and military departments. A large part of his infantry consisted of the Hindus and one of his best and trusted generals was Barmazid Gaur whom he sent to pursue Humayun after the battles of Chausa and Bilgram. 

Considering from different aspects his love and sympathy for his subjects, care for the peasantry, liberal outlook, sense of even handed justice, indefatigable industry, devotion to duty even at the cost of personal rest and comfort, and, above all, his construc¬ tive statesmanship, he must be accorded a position much ahead of his predecessors in medieval India and next only to that of Akbar. 

II. ISLAM SHAH (1545-1554) 

Of the three sons of Sher Shah, Qutb Khan, the youngest, had pre-deceased his father, and ‘Adil Khan, the eldest, and Jalal Khan, the second, were at Ranthambhor and Rewa,50 respectively, at the time of their father’s death. Jalal Khan, who had given sufficient proof of his courage, industry and military abilities, and who was available nearer, was chosen by the nobles as the successor of his father in preference to ‘Adil Khan, who, in spite of his physical strength, was indolent and ease-loving, and not so easily available. 

Jalal Khan arrived at Kalinjar on May 26, 1545. He was crown¬ ed on the same day, and assumed the title of Islam Shah. Then he went to Agra, the imperial capital, and in order to enlist the sym¬ pathy and co-operation of the soldiers, he gave them two months’ pay. 

‘Adil Khan refused to give up the fort of Ranthambhor and was reluctant to go to the capital to settle the differences with his brother amicably. But on receiving assurance of safe return from eminent nobles like Qutb Khan Nlaib, Khavass Khan, ‘Isa Khlan NiyazI, and Jalal Khan bin Jalu, he proceeded to meet his brother. In the meantime, Islam Shah had made a plan to murder him, but it did not succeed. Thereafter, Bayana, situated about fifty-three miles south-west of Agra, was assigned to him, but the Sultan again changed his mind and there was therefore no real reconciliation between the brothers, Islam Shah secretly arranged to bring his brother a prisoner, but the four nobles, mentioned above, took up his cause and made a plot to dethrone the sovereign. ‘Adil Khan’s luck did not turn in his favour in the ensuing battle near Agra, and, having suffered a reverse there, he fled towards Bundelkhand, never to be heard of again, while Khavass Khan and ‘Isa Khan NiyazI retreated towards Mewat. At Firuzpur, in Mewiat, they were able to defeat the Sultan’s army sent in pursuit of them, but the royal army having been soon reinforced, they were compelled to retreat to the Kumaon hills. 

The conspiracy to raise ‘Adil Khan to the throne made the Sultan suspicious about most of his nobles. Jalal Khan bin Jalu and his brother were put to death; Qutb Khan, another supporter of ‘Adil Khan, having been delivered over by Haibat Khan, the governor of Lahore, with whom he had taken shelter, was sent along with many other suspected nobles to Gwalior. Most of them were subsequently murdered. Such punishments on the nobility alarmed the rest and aroused the old tribal jealousies which Sher Shah had kept in check. The powerful Niyazis under the leadership of Haibat Khan NiyazI arrayed a strong party of opposition against the Sultan and proceeded to Ambala; Khavass Khan also joined them. But finding that Haibat Khan was ambitious to seize the throne in the event of success against Islam Shah, Khavass Khan, who was in favour of ‘Adil Khan, withdrew his forces on the day of the battle, the natural consequence of which was that Haibat was defeated in the battle fought near Ambala. He was pursued from place to place and eventually took shelter in Kashmir, but his mother and daughters who had fallen into the hands of the royal force, were ill-treated and ultimately put to death. 

Khavass Khan had gone back to the Kumaon hills and taken refuge with its Rdja, but, on his subsequent surrender to the Sultan, he was killed in an ignoble manner. 

The Sultan was too severe on the nobles of his father’s time whom, by his tact and foresight, he might have turned into his supporters and utilized, like his great father, in the service of the empire; but he considered them to have grown too much, almost overshadowing the Crown. His severity and unwonted harshness broke the spirit of the Afghans on whom he was loth to place con¬ fidence. He appointed men of his own choice, many from the Sur clan, in the various key positions of the empire. Ahmad Khan Sur was appointed governor of Lahore; ‘Isa Khan Sur was posted in Malwa in place of Shuja'at Khan; QazI Fazilat was removed from Bengal and replaced by Muhammad Khan Sur; Ghazi Khan Sur was placed in charge of Bayana; while his son Ibrahim Khan Sur received charge of Agra. A very high rank in the army—that of a command of 20,000, with the charge of Sarkar Sambhal—was bes¬ towed on the Sultan’s cousin and brother-in-law Mubariz Khan, who, later on, proved to be a great sore in the body-politic, en¬ dangering its peace and tranquillity. 

The Sultan was careful enough to watch the movements of the Mughuls, and when he learnt that Humayun had crossed the Indus, he, in spite of his illness, prepared to face the enemy, but the latter returned to Kabul. Islam Shah then went back to Gwalior which was his favourite place. Here a conspiracy was made by his dis¬ affected nobles to assassinate him, but it was foiled, and the ring leaders were put to death. He had also escaped another attempt on his life in the early part of his reign. 

After a reign of nine years and six months he died on 22 November, 1554. 

Like his father, Islam Shah was a strong administrator and strict disciplinarian. He could not brook the idea of disobedience or any action against him, and insisted on implicit obedience from everyone, to whatever rank he might belong. His punishments to those who were implicated or suspected to be implicated in any action against him were severe. His authority was well-establish¬ ed in the empire and the efficiency of his espionage system and dak chauki contributed to this success to a large extent. 

He was very particular in maintaining the prestige and dignity of the King’s position. As the use of scarlet tents was the privi¬ lege of the Sultan alone, he forbade their use by the nobility or any¬ body else. 

Hb not only followed the administrative policy of Sher Shah but improved it, where deemed necessary. Detailed regulations were issued regarding every department of the government like general administration, revenue, and religion, whether these were agreeable to the Shar’iyat or not, for the guidance of the officers and their subordinates. Darbars were held in all districts on Fridays when the military officers, dmlns and other officials used to make their obeisance with reverence to the shoes and the quiver of the Sultan.51 

For better organization and efficiency, he introduced the grad¬ ed system in the army and there were different units, ranging from those of fifty to twenty thousand. Above fifty and below twenty thousand, there were units of two hundred, two hundred and fifty, five hundred, five thousand, and ten thousand.52 

His keen knowledge of the military strategy may be realized from his construction of Mankot53 in the Siwalik Hills, about one hundred and one miles north-east of Lahore, for the defence of the Punjab and keeping the Gakkhars in check. 

He added to the number of sard’is by constructing one sard’i be¬ tween every two sard’is of his father, and a rest-house, a mosque, and water-carriers were provided in them. Arrangements were also made for supplying uncooked and cooked food to the Hindus and the Muslims respectively. Orders were at the same time issued for the proper upkeep and maintenance of the sard’is and gardens construct¬ ed by Sher Shah. 

Besides his capabilities as a general, he was a steadfast admi¬ nistrator who worked with utmost devotion and industry in the in¬ terest of the empire. His reign may be said to be a continuation of that of his father, and in spite of the stormy days that he had to pass through, peace and prosperity prevailed in his empire. He encouraged cultivation and looked to the welfare of the peasantry as his father. 

Although he was an orthodox Sunni in his private life, his work as a ruler was never obsessed by his religious views, and he kept politics apart from religion. 

But in spite of his abilities as a ruler, it must be admitted that he was at times a poor judge of mein and was swayed by feelings of unwonted cruelty and vindictiveness as he showed in his treat¬ ment towards the experienced and veteran nobles of his father’s time. His appointment of Mubariz Khan, who proved to be un¬ worthy of his confidence, was a glaring instance of a mistaken choice, pointing to his poor knowledge and experience of human character, for which his son and successor had to pay dearly, and which was, to a great extent, responsible for the serious troubles that set in after him. 

III. FIRUZ SHAH (1554) 

Islam Shah was succeeded by his minor son Firuz, but Mubariz Khan, son of Sher Shah’s younger brother Nizam and brother of the minor king’s mother, Bibi Bai, murdered him and ascended the throne with the title of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah. 

Such a tragic death might have been averted had Islam Shah acted on his own initiative without waiting for his wife’s consent for the removal of his brother-in-law whose evil intentions he could gauge beforehand. 

IV. MUHAMMAD ‘ADIL SHAH (1554-1556) 

‘Adil Shah (also called ‘Adll Shah) tried to conciliate the nobles and the army by a profuse distribution of wealth and titles, where necessary. But his murder of the rightful sovereign had its repercussions, and it sounded the death-knell of the Sur dynasty. He was weak and incompetent to wield the sceptre and hold in check the disintegrating forces. But he appointed as Wazlr a very capable person called Himu, a Hindu, who, hailing from Rewiari, belonged to the Dhusar caste, and from a humble start in life, had occupied, during the reign of Islam Shiah, the posts of Shahna or Superintendent of the Delhi market, the head of the Departments of Intelligence and Posts (Ddrogd-i-Ddk-Chauki), and afterwards high military command. But the weakness of the Sultan and his worthlessness let loose the centrifugal forces, and in different parts of the empire there were military upheavals which rocked it to its foundation. 

Ibrahim Khan Sur, son of Ghiazi Khan, and brother-in-law of the Sultan, who was in charge of Agra, revolted. He defeated the army which ‘Adil Shah had despatched against him and moved with his victorious forces to Delhi which was captured. There¬ after he assumed the regal title and it was not possible for ‘Adil to displace him. Ahmad Khan Sur, another brother-in-law of the Sultan and governor of Lahore, took the title of Sikandar Shah and declared his independence. Muhammad Khan Sur, governor of Bengal, also revolted and assumed the title of Shams-ud-dln Muham¬ mad Shah Ghazi. The empire, which had been built by Sher Shah and maintained with care by Islam Shah, thus fell to pieces, and it was parcelled out into four main divisions—Delhi and Agra under Ibrahim Shah; the Punjab under Sikandar Shah; Bengal under Shams-ud-din Muhammad Shah; and the territories from the vicinity of Agra to Bihar under Muhammad ‘Adil Shah.  

Not satisfied with the Punjab alone, Sikandar marched against Ibrahim for the possession of Delhi and Agra and defeated him at Farah, about twenty miles from Agra, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the forces of his opponent. Sikandar then took possession of both Delhi and Agra (A.D. 1555). 

The rivalry and hostility among the Afghans not only jeopar¬ dized the peace and security of northern India but also afforded Humayun a good opportunity for the recovery of his lost possessions there. From Kabul, he started on his Indian expedition in Novem¬ ber, 1554. On hearing of his advance, Tatar Khan Kashi evacuated the fort of Rohtas without any attempt to defend it. In February, 1555, Humayun occupied Lahore, too, without any opposition while another detachment of his forces defeated the Afghans at DIpalpur. The Mughuls also occupied Jullundur and their advance guard pro¬ ceeded towards Sirhind. This rapid progress of the Mughul army was due to Sikandar Shah’s preoccupation in his struggle against Ibrahim. The alarming situation in the Punjab roused the former to action, and he despatched a force of 30,000 horse against the enemies with whom an open encounter took place at Machlwara, in Ludhiana district. But the Afghans were defeated and the Mughuls captured Sirhind. Sikandar then marched in person at the head of 80,000 cavalry and met the Mughul army at Sirhind. Despite the vast superiority of his forces in number, he was de¬ feated before the superior generalship and military tactics of his enemies (June 22, 1555) and was compelled to retreat to the Siwa lik hills. The Mughuls marched triumphantly to Delhi and occu¬ pied it. 

Taking advantage of misgovernment by the Mughul governor in the Punjab, Sikandar came out of his retreat to recover his terri¬ tories, but, being unable to achieve anything tangible, he took shelter in the fort of Mankot. 

In spite of the Mughul menace there was no cessation of hostility among the Afghans, and Ibrahim renewed his strife with ‘Adil Shah. HImu, the Wazlr of ‘Adil, defeated him twice—once near KalpI and, again, near Khanua—and compelled him to seek re¬ fuge in the fort of Bayana which was besieged; but, as Muhammad Shah of Bengal had created an alarming situation and was march¬ ing towards KalpI, ‘Adil Shah recalled his minister who, thereafter, 

joined his master at KalpI. Muhammad Shah was defeated at Chhapparghatta, about twenty miles from KalpI, and forced to take to his heels. ‘Adil Shah occupied Bengal, and, after retaining Shahbaz Khan as governor there, he came back to Chunar which he had made his residential capital. 

Taking advantage of the death of Humayun (January, 1556) and the accession of young Akbar, HImu proceeded from Gwalior to Agra with a huge force and occupied it easily, as its governor Iskandar Khan Uzbeg fled to Delhi out of fear, without offering any resistance. Next, he marched on Delhi and took possession of it after defeating its governor Tardi Beg Khan. 

Emboldened by his successes and being in possession of Delhi, HImu assumed independence, with the title of Raja Vikramaditya, and in order to gain the support of his Afghan officers and soldiers he made a lavish distribution of wealth among them. Next he took necessary steps to withstand the Mughuls who had been proceeding against him. But his advance guard was defeated by that of Akbar under the command of ‘All Quit Khan and his artillery fell into the hands of the enemies. This discomfiture did not in any way dispirit him and he marched on with a huge force consisting of infantry, ca¬ valry, artillery and war-elephants to the memorable battlefield of Panlpat, where he met his adversaries on 5 November, 1556. The numerical strength of Himu’s army was decidedly much above that of his opponents. 

i 

The battle began with a bold charge by HImu on the Mughuls whose right and left wings were thrown into confusion. Then, with the help of his 1500 war elephants he dashed against the ene¬ mies’ centre and, although the fight appeared to be in his favour, it continued unabated, when an arrow pierced his eye, making him unconscious. This decided the fate of the day, as his army, con¬ sidering him dead, fled pell-mell in all directions. While he was being carried to a safe place by his elephant-driver, he was cap¬ tured by Shah Quli Mahram, a Mughul officer, and taken to Akbar who, at the request of his guardian and protector, Bairam Khan, first struck him with his sword and, then, the protector followed him, severing his head from the body.54 

The victory of the Mughuls was thus complete, and it not only decided the fate of HImu but also of the Afghans. Delhi and Agra soon fell into the hands of the victors. 

Meanwhile Sikandar had been active in the Punjab, defeating Khizr Khvaja Khan at Chamiari, about thirty-five miles from La¬ hore, and driving him to the latter place. Not content with sending relief, Akbar and Bairam Khan proceeded against Sikandar who, therefore, took refuge at Mankot which was also besieged. He held on for about six months, depending on the strength of the fort as well as in expectation of a diversion to be possibly created by ‘Adil Shah who was still in possession of Chunar. His expectation came to naught at ‘Adil’s defeat and death in a battle against Khizr Khan Sur of Bengal (1557), and this disquieting news disheartened him so much that he surrendered, receiving an assignment in Bihar, whence he was expelled within a short time by Akbar and died about two years later in Bengal. Ibrahim Sur took refuge in Orissa where he met his doom about ten years later (1567-1568). 

Thus disappeared the different Sur rivals from the political arena of northern India which, by their selfish designs, had been converted into an unhappy land of turmoil and confusion, and their exit made room for the re-establishment of the Mughul rule under the strong but benevolent regime of Akbar. 

APPENDIX 

HiMU—A FORGOTTEN HINDU HERO 

Neither fate nor historians have been kind to Hlmu to whom reference has been made above (pp. 94-96). Historians, medieval and modern, have done scant justice to, and failed to show due appreciation of, the unique personality and greatness of a Hindu who, during the heyday of Muslim rule in India, worked his way from a grocer’s shop to the throne of Delhi, and, but for an accident in a battle which turned victory into defeat, might have founded a Hindu ruling dynasty, instead of the Mughuls, in Delhi. Although his career is known to us almost exclusively from the writings of historians who looked down upon him as an upstart Hindu and an arch-enemy of their patrons, the Mughul rulers, yet enough has been preserved in their chronicles55 to show that bare historical jus¬ tice demands that the career of this great Hindu should be impar¬ tially reviewed as a whole, separately, as an important episode in the history of medieval India. For, there is no doubt that he furnishes the only shining example of a Hindu, born and brought up as such in a Muslim State, who once dominated the political stage of North India by sheer merit and personality without any advantage of birth or fortune. As no such attempt seems to have been made in any general history of India so far, no apology is needed for the short sketch of the life and activities of the great Hindu Commoner, Hemchandra, called by his Afghan followers after his accession to the throne of Delhi, Hlmu Shah. 

Hlmu was born in a poor family of Dhansar section of the Baniya caste, living in a town in the southern part of Alwar. Ba dauni calls him “the greengrocer, of the township of Rewari in Mewat, whom Islam Shah had gradually elevated from the position of Police Superintendent of the bazars and confirmer of punishment, and had by degrees made into a trusted confidant”. In other words, Hlmu, originally a grocer (or hawker) by profession in a small township in Alwar, somehow came to the notice of Islam 

Shah who, satisfied with his ability, successively promoted him to the posts of Superintendent of the Delhi market (Shahna), and head of the Departments of Intelligence and Posts (Ddrogd-i'-Dak Chauki). Islam Shah also trusted him with important and confi¬ dential business, involving military commands. 

The death of Islam Shah, as stated above (p. 94), was fol¬ lowed by a period of troubles. His minor son, who succeeded him, was murdered by Mubariz Khan who ascended the throne with the title of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah. But this regicide was hopelessly incompetent, and rebellions broke out in all quarters. Ibrahim Khan Sur, governor of Agra, Sikandar Sur, governor of Lahore, and Mu¬ hammad Khan Sur, governor of Bengal, revolted and assumed royal titles. Other chiefs also broke into revolt from time to time. 

Emperor ‘Adil Shah had already recognised the great abilities of Hlmu and appointed him his Prime Minister, leaving the heavy burden of administration on his shoulders. 

Mughul historians like Abu-’l-Fazl and Badauni paint the cha¬ racter of Hlmu in the blackest colour and represent him as having won the confidence of the king by ignoble means. But this is only natural for those who rightly looked upon Hlmu as the greatest enemy of the Mughuls. But in view of the abilities displayed by Hlmu, we should not put any faith in these slanders. In any case, in this great crisis of the empire ‘Adil practically left the full con¬ trol of political and military affairs in his hands. It reflects great credit upon Hlmu that the Afghan ruler relied upon a Hindu officer in preference to the great chiefs of his own tribe, and that Hlmu proved equal to the task imposed upon him. He had to fight con¬ stantly in order to put down the rebel chiefs, and always won vic¬ tories, sometimes against heavy odds. 

The account of the battles fought and victories won by Hlmu is given by Abu-’l-Fazl and Badauni. As both of them hated Himu as an upstart and painted him in the blackest colour, as noted above, their unrestrained praise is all the more valuable as a testi¬ mony to the valour and military skill of Himu. Abu-’l-Fazl writes: “Battles took place between Hemu and Ibrahim, who was a claimant for the Sultanate, and the former was always victorious. Sultan Muhammad, who had assumed the kingly title in Bengal, was also defeated, and was made to tread the land of annihilation. Hemu also engaged in conflicts with Taj Kararani and Rukn Khan NuhanI and defeated them. He fought two and twenty battles with the opponents of Mubariz Khan, and was victorious in all of them.”56 

Badauni gives more details. Thus when Taj Khan, aided by two other chiefs, openly broke into revolt, Himu, we are told, fought a desperate battle with them, gaining victory (p. 541). 

Regarding the more formidable rival Ibrahim Sur, Badauni says: “Himun, regarding Ibrahim as his own especial prey, considered it essential to overthrow him; Ibrahim came out to oppose him ready for battle, and taking up a strong position showed a resolute deter¬ mination to withstand him, such as perhaps Rustum, if anyone, displayed before. But for all this, by the decree of the Almighty he was not successful.... Ibrahim Khan after this defeat, leaving KalpI, made straight for Baiana with all speed, and Hlmu pursuing him arrived at Baiana.. . . Ibrahim Khan, taking a body of the Nuhani and Afghan cultivators and landholders of Baiana, again went out to meet Hlmun and, making a night attack upon him, the following morning fought a fierce battle with him near to the township of Khanwah, ten krohs distant from Baiana, but could not prevail against his destiny.”57 

Ibrahim Khan then shut himself in the fortress of Bayana “a fort of exceeding loftiness and strength”. Hlmu kept up the siege for three months and made inroads on the districts of Bayana on all sides, pillaging and destroying. While thus engaged, news reached Hlmu that “Muhammad Khan Sur, governor of Bangala, had as¬ sumed the title of Sultan Jalal-ud-Dln, and was marching with an army like the ants and locusts for multitude from Bangala, and having reduced Jaunpur was making for KalpI and Agra. Just at this juncture an urgent summons arrived from ‘Adil to Hlmun in these words: ‘At all costs come to me at once as I am confronted by a powerful enemy.’ Hlmun thereupon abandoned the siege”. But before he could proceed very far, Ibrahim attacked him but was d'efeated. Then, after some time, Ibrahim, after obtaining rein¬ forcements again advanced against Hlmu, was again defeated, and finally abandoned the struggle.58 

Hlmu then advanced quickly to join his master ‘Adil Shah’s forces sent against the other rebel, Muhammad Khan of Bengal. BadaunI thus describes the situation: Muhammad Khan, “confi¬ dently relying upon his superior force to overcome the forces of ‘Adli, had drawn up his cavalry and infantry and elephants to a number surpassing all computation, and was every moment expect¬ ing victory, when suddenly the scale turned against him, and Hlmun swept down upon him like a comet, and no sooner did he reach the ranks of the picked elephants after crossing the river Jamna, than he swooped down upon the army” of Muhammad Khan, tak¬ ing them unawares and practically annihilated the army. ‘The greater part of his Amirs were slain; while the rest took to flight.’ Muhammad Khan vanished for ever.59 

Hardly had these revolts been suppressed when Humayun re¬ turned to India to recover his lost throne. ‘Adil sent Hlmu north¬ wards to oppose him, while he himself retired to Chunar. Humayun, as stated above, succeeded in re-establishing himself for a few months. When he met with his fatal accident, in January, 1556, Hlmu remained in the field on behalf of ‘Adil Shah to prevent Akbar from taking effective possession of his father’s kingdom. When Akbar was formally proclaimed at Kalanaur as Padshah, TardI Beg was appointed governor of Delhi. Hlmu advanced by way of Gwalior and Agra to Old Delhi, and “inflicted a severe defeat on the Mogul forces, capturing 160 elephants, 1,000 Arab horses, and an immense quantity of valuable booty. He thus gained posses¬ sion of both Delhi and Agra.”60 It was at this stage that Himu’s ambitions soared high and he wistfully looked towards the sovereignty of Hindusthan. Accord¬ ing to Abu-’l-Fazl, Himu’s “victories impressed him with evil ideas” and his capture of Delhi “increased his arrogance so that his intoxi¬ cation became madness”.61 Other Muslim chroniclers of old expressed the same view, and many modern historians of India seem to hold the same opinion. V. A. Smith, who takes a more liberal view, observes: “Hemu, who had won Delhi and Agra in the name of his master Adall, now began to reflect that his sove¬ reignty was a long way off, that he himself was in possession of the army and elephants, and that it might be better to gain a kingdom for his own benefit rather than for that of his absent employer.”62 No one today can reasonably claim to know the thoughts in Himu’s mind. But a little reflection will show that there was nothing unreasonable or immoral in the aspiration of Himu. No doubt personal ambition played a great part, but it may not be altogether wrong to think that he was also inspired by the idea of founding a Hindu raj. This is supported by his assumption of the title Vikramaditya. 

The opportunities, as V. A. Smith points out, were really very good, and the recent examples of Babur, Sher Shah and Humayun (after his return from exile in Persia) within living memory, de¬ monstrated the feasibility of a bold military adventurer seizing the throne of Delhi. Himu’s chances of success cannot be reasonably regarded as much less than that of any one of these. This view is strongly supported by the details of the second battle of Panlpat which decided the fate of Himu, to which reference has been made above (p. 96). 

Whatever might have been his motive or justification, Himu decided upon his course of action and made preparations accordingly. He won over the Afghans, who accompanied him, by distributing the spoils of war among them. He occupied Delhi with their con¬ currence, declared his independent status in a practical manner by ascending the throne, with the imperial canopy raised over his head, issued coins in his name, and assumed the historic name Vikramaditya or Raja Bikramjit. 

Bairam Khan, the guardian of minor Mughul ruler Akbar, was advised by his counsellors to retire from India, but, disregarding their advice, he decided to advance against Himu, whose army greatly outnumbered that of the Mughuls. The battle between them was fought at Panlpat, on 5 November, 1556. V. A. Smith gives the following account of the battle: “Each army was drawn up in three divisions. On November 5 Hemu succeeded in throw¬ ing both the right and the left wings of his opponents into confu¬ sion, and sought to make his victory decisive by bringing all his mountain-like elephants to bear on the centre of the enemy, com¬ manded by Khan Zaman. Probably he would have won but for the accident that he was struck in the eye by an arrow which pierced his brain and rendered him unconscious. An Indian army never could survive the loss of its leader, on whose life its pay depended. 

Hemu’s soldiers at once scattered in various directions and made no further attempt at resistance.”63 

V. A. Smith rightly uses the word ‘accident’—and it is un¬ doubtedly a mere accident that deprived Hlmu of victory, throne and life. While Smith, thinks that Hlmu had every chance of win¬ ning the battle, Sir Wolseley Haig asserts that the Mughul forces “would certainly have been overpowered had not Himu’s bye been pierced by an arrow.”64 More or less the same view has been held in this volume also (above, p. 96). It may, therefore, be rea¬ sonably held, that Himu’s failure was, in a great measure, due to that unknown and unknowable factor, called fate or destiny, which plays no inconsiderable part in the affairs of men. Himu was cap¬ tured in an unconscious state and met with a tragic end, as des¬ cribed above (p. 96). 

V. A. Smith writes: 

“Bairam Khan desired Akbar to earn the title of Ghazi, or Slayer of the Infidel, by flashing his sword on the captive. The boy natu¬ rally obeyed his guardian and smote Hemu on the neck with his scimitar. The bystanders also plunged their swords into the bleed¬ ing corpse. Hemu’s head was sent to Kabul to be exposed, and his trunk was gibbeted at one of the gates of Delhi.”65 

But the tragedy did not end here. The forces of Akbar con¬ quered the Sai'kar of Alwar wherein was situated the home of Hlmu. The Mughul officer, who conquered it, proceeded to the township where Himu’s family lived. 

Abu-’l-Fazl, the trusted friend of Akbar and chronicler of his reign, describes what happened in the following words: “The place was strong and there was much fighting, and the father of Hemu was captured and brought alive before the Nasir-al-mulk. The lat¬ ter called upon him to change his religion. The old man answered, ‘for eighty years I have worshipped my God, according to this reli¬ gion. Why should I change it at this time, and why should I, merely from fear of my life, and without understanding it come into your way of worship?’ Pir Muhammad treated his words as if he heard them not, and answered him with the tongue of the sword.”66 

Such was the noble end of the family of Hlmu, a great Hindu who was born in humble life, but made his way to the throne of Delhi by dint of sheer ability and military skill—a unique episode in the history of India during Muslim rule. Unfortunately, Himu’s history has been written almost wholly by his enemies who dreaded him most, and, far from doing justice to his greatness, they have tarnished his name with unmerited odium. It is time to resuscitate the me¬ mory and give a true account of the life of Hemchandra, really a great hero, whose dreams and achievements have been forgotten by his countrymen. 

1. Akbar-nama, I, 326 (English translation). 

2. P. Saran, Studies in Medieval Indian History, pp. 40-46; Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society (1934), pp. 108-122. 

3. ‘Abbas Sarwanl, MS., p. 12, Elliot, IV, p. 308. 

4. K. R. Qanungo, Sher Shah and His Times, Vol. I, pp. 9, 24-25, Ishwari Prasad, The Life and Times of Humayun, pp. 94-95. 

5. P. Saran, op. cit., p. 38, Ishwari Prasad, op. cit. p. 94 (1956 Edition). K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 9-10, 25-28. 

6. Makhzan-i-Afghani, MS., F 204b. 

7. Abu-’l-Fazl, Akbar-nama, Vol. I, p. 327 (English translation). 8. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 39-40. 

9. Briggs, Firishta, Vol. II, p. 100. 

10. ‘Abbas, MS., pp. 28-29 a)s quoted in Qanungo’s Sher Shah and His Times, Vol. I, p. 52. 

11. Briggs, Firishta, Vol. II, p. 101. 

12. The pargana of Chaund comprised a portion of modern Shahabad district and the greater portion of modern Mirzapur district. 

13. Briggs, Firishta, Vol. II, p. 103, ‘Abbas, MS., p. 62. 

14. The Makhzan, MS., p. 19. 

15. For the name of the place and the date of the battle, cf. Ch. Ill, f.n. 2, 2a. 16. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 108-109. 

17. History of Bengal, Vol. II, (Dacca University), Edited by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, p. 160. 

18. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 142. 

19. J.J.A. Campos, History of the Portuguese in Bengal, p. 40. 20. The fort was not besieged by Humayun before the second week of January, 1538. For its siege and capture, vide Jauhar’s Tazkirat-ul-Waqi‘dt, MS., pp. 21-24, Elliot IV, 339, V, 139-140; Elphinstone, History of India, 6th edition; pp. 446-447; K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 175-178. 

21. Briggs, Firishta, pp. 114-117. 

22. Islamic Culture, 1936, pp. 127-130, Introduction, Catalogue of Coins collected by Sayyid A.S.M. Taifur, Dacca Museum, Dacca, 1936; E. Thomas, Chroni¬ cles of the Pathdn Kings of Delhi, p. 393; H. N. Wright, The Sultans of Delhi and their metrology, pp. 269, 270, 323. 

22a. Cf. Chapter III, f.n. 9a and 11. 

23. ‘Abbas, Elliot, IV, p. 368. 

24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Military History of India, p. 63. 

25. Ibid. 

26. Jauhar, Tazkirat-ul-Wdqiedt, pp. 36-37. 

27. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Military History of India, p. 64. 

28. K. R. Qanungo, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 205. 

29. Akbar-nama, English translation I, 345, Riydz-us-Salatin, text, 147. 30. History of Bengal, Vol. II, edited by J. N. Sarkar, and published by the Dacca University, p. 174. 

31. The Makhzan, MS., p. 35; Firishta, text, p. 226; Tabaqat-i-Akban, text, p. 230. 

32. The battle was fought near Bilgram, three miles away from the Ganga (Ganges) and opposite Kanauj. 

33. Haidar’s description of the battle may be seen in Tarikh-i-Rashidi, Elias’s trans., pp. 475-77. 

34. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Military History of India, p. 64. 

35. K. R. Qanungo, op.cit., Vol. I, p. 314. 

35a. Ibid. 

36. Tabaqat-i-Akbari, pp. 271, 592. 

37. Tabaqat-i-Akbari, p. 231; Briggs, Firishta, II, pp. 117-118. 38. Firishta, text. 228. 

39. ‘Abbas, MS, p. 237; Elliot, IV, p. 407. 

40. Elliot, IV, p. 407, footnote. 

41. Arail is situated on the right bank of the Yamuna and opposite to Allahabad fort. 42. The History and Culture of the Indian People (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan), Vol. VI, p. 449. 

43. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Mughul Administration, p. 116. 

44. Ain-i-Akbari, II, pp. 63, 66; Elliot IV, p. 399, footnote. 

44a. According to P. Saran, “Sher Shah used to charge one-third of the produce as revenue” (Studies in Medieval Indian History, p. 85). Reference, however, should be made to an important innovation of Sher Shah, namely, schedules (ray1) of the assessment rates for the different kinds of crops (Rabi crop, Kharif crop, etc.). In other words, land was divided into several classes according to the nature of the crops cultivated therein, and the rate of assessment was fixed for every one of them. For details, cf. ibid (Editor). 

45. Imperial Gazetteer of India, II, pp. 145-146; vide, also E. Thomas, Chronicles of the Pathan Kings of Delhi, pp. 408-409; H. N. Wright, Catalogue of Coins in the Indian Museum, Calcutta, II, pp. 11-12, 84-109. 

46. ‘Abbas, Elliot, IV, p. 421. 

47. Briggs, Firishta, Vol. II, p. 125. 

48. A History of Fine Arts in India and Ceylon, p. 406. 

49. Memoirs of the Races of the North Western Provinces of India, II, 97. 50. About 85 miles south-east of Kalinjar. 

51. BadaunI, text, Vol. I, pp. 384-385. 

52. Ibid, p. 385. 

53. Mankot was built in about two years, and it had four forts and four townships. 54. Briggs, Firishta, II, p. 189; Dacca University Studies, November, 1935, pp. 67- 101. See Appendix. 

55. For example, Abu-’l-Fazl’s Akbar-nama (Reference below is to the English translation by H. Beveridge, Vol. II; Calcutta, 1912) and ‘Abdul-Qadir Badauni's Muntakhab-ut-Tawdrikh (Reference below is to the English translation by G. S. A. Ranking, Vol. I, Calcutta, 1898). 

56. Beveridge, op. cit., p. 45. 

57. Ranking, op.cit., pp. 548-9. 

58. Ibid, pp. 552-3. 

59 Ibid, p. 555. 

60. V. A. Smith, Akbar The Great Mogul (Oxford, 1926), pp. 34-5. 61. Beveridge, op.cit., pp. 45, 50. 

62. V. A. Smith, op.cit., pp. 36-7. 

63. Ibid, pp. 38-9. 

64. CHI, IV, p. 72. 

65. V. A. Smith, op. cit., p. 39. 

66. Beveridge, op. cit., pp. 71-2.