Osama Amin*
Department of Social Sciences and Liberal Arts, Institute of Business Administration (IBA), Karachi, Pakistan. *Corresponding Author Email ID: osamaraja8@gmail.com
A
B S T R A C T
The paper focuses on the reigns and policies of the two Mughal Emperors, Akbar and Aurangzeb, and analyses how they have been remembered in the wider social memory. While Akbar is glorified as a 'secular' and 'liberal' leader, Aurangzeb is often dismissed and ridiculed as a 'religious bigot', who tried to impose the Shari'ah law in diversified India. The paper traces and evaluates the construction of these two grand narratives which were initially formed by the British historians in colonial India and then continued by specific nationalist historians of India and Pakistan, after the independence of the two nation-states. By citing some of the most popular misconceptions surrounding the two Mughal Emperors, this study attempts to understand the policies of these two emperors in a wider socio-political narrative and attempts to deconstruct these ‘convenient’ misinterpretations. Concluding the analysis of how these two emperors are viewed differently in both India and Pakistan, the paper asserts the importance of leaving behind the modern concepts of 'liberal versus conservative' while understanding these emperors and reinforces the practice to understand these historical figures on their own terms.
Keywords: South Asian History, Akbar, Aurangzeb, Mughals, Mughal Emperor, India, Pakistan, South Asia.
INTRODUCTION
Amongst
the six major Mughal Emperors, two
monarchs that have been of particular interest to the South Asian and Western historians have been
Abul Fath Jalal ud-din Muhammad Akbar or
popularly known as Akbar and Abul
Muzaffar Muhi-ud-din Muhammad Aurangzeb
or Aurangzeb. In the collective memory,
these two emperors are often presented as
the opposites of each other whereby Akbar is portrayed as a secular, liberal, and tolerant leader
who led the Mughal Empire to its zenith
while Aurangzeb is looked upon as a
religious fanatic whose intolerance towards
Hindus did not only destroy the syncretic empire that his predecessors had created but also sowed
the seeds for the downfall of the Mughal
dynasty. The creation of this ‘grand
narrative’ can be traced back to the work of
colonial historians who, in an attempt to legitimise their presence in the Indian subcontinent,
vilified the Mughal Empire and then
exploited the resulting divide between
Hindus and Muslims to effectively practice
their policy of ‘divide and
rule.’ The establishment of the
nation-states of India and Pakistan took this
‘communalisation of history’ further as each state searched for its heroes and villains in
history. For instance, in India Akbar
became the ‘idol’ Mughal Emperor while
Aurangzeb was looked upon as a
‘religious bigot’ who demolished Hindu temples and imposed Sharia laws throughout his empire
(Truschke, 2017). In Pakistan, the
figures were the same, however, their
perceptions got interchanged, making Akbar a
villain who posed a threat towards the sanctity of Islam with his religious philosophy of Din-I-Illahi
while Aurangzeb was perceived as a hero who preserved the purity of Islam by reintroducing the Islamic
laws (Khaund, 2017: 1). The purpose of
this essay is to deconstruct some of the
popular perceptions that surround the
Mughal Empires of Akbar and Aurangzeb
and investigate how the historical narratives surrounding their reigns have been
effectively molded by fundamentalists in
modern-day India and Pakistan.
POPULAR
MISCONCEPTIONS SURROUNDING THE POLICIES
OF AKBAR AND AURANGZEB
The historiography of colonial historians played a significant role in establishing the popular narratives surrounding the two Mughal Emperors, Akbar, and Aurangzeb. Therefore, to understand the conventional image of Akbar as a ‘secular’ ruler, it is important to look at how his religious and administrative policies have been deliberately analyzed from a one-dimensional perspective so that he could be portrayed as a liberal monarch. One such perspectival interpretation includes the widely held belief that all of Akbar’s religious teachers and guides held unorthodox views who introduced him to the concept of sulh-i-kul, which means ‘universal peace’ or ‘absolute peace’ (Khaund, 2017: 2). Owing to this worldview of religious toleration and balance, Akbar started working towards the realization of a truly secular state in which the state would be separated from religious influences. The first major step to achieve this separation was Akbar’s issuance of Mazharnama or Infallibility decree in 1579, which gave the royal decree a greater status than the Islamic laws and gave Akbar unlimited powers in both the spiritual and temporal spheres (Ikram, 1964: 159). Akbar also declared himself as Imam-i-Adil or Chief Interpreter of Islamic law. This allowed him to have the final say in all the judicial and religious matters, thereby curtailing the powers of orthodox Sunni Ulemas who had been historically biased towards non-Muslims (Khaund, 2017: 2). Another of Akbar’s decisions, which was influenced by the worldview of sulh-i-kul, was the abolition of the jizya in 1564, which is a tax paid by the non-Muslim population of a state (governed by the Islamic law) to their Muslim rulers. This decision was heavily contended by the Ulemas who emphasized strict adherence to the Sharia law. However, Akbar’s grand vizier Abul Fazl who was known for his ‘liberal’ views defended Akbar’s decision by engaging with the Ulemas and contended that no distinction could be made between subjects on the grounds of their loyalty or religion (Khaund, 2017: 2). Akbar’s liberal outlook towards religion was further strengthened by the discussions that took place in the Ibadat Khana which was established in Fatehpur Sikri in 1575. It was a place where every Friday Muslim theologians, Sufi Shayks, Hindu Brahmins, Jain munis, and later Christian missionaries would meet and discuss the specific teachings of their religions. These debates allowed Akbar to grasp the essence of all these different
faiths
and the innate oneness that they all shared. These discussions later aided him in the creation
of his own religious tradition known as
Din-i-Illahi, which was an attempt to
combine the different elements and essences
that were found in various faiths i.e., a syncretic approach towards Islamic, Jain, Buddhist, and
Hindu teachings.
Akbar’s
attempt to create a ‘secular’ state can also be
seen from his approach towards his administrative affairs and from his multi-ethnic/diverse
nobility. To understand how Akbar
included Rajputs in his nobility, it is
imperative to analyze the mansabdari system that he introduced, whereby a numerical rank was
assigned to each officer in imperial
service. Each mansabdars’ (an official
holding a mansab) status, pay, range of official assignments, and titles were defined by his
personal rank, known as zat (Richards,
1993: 24). Mansabdars under Akbar
consisted of Turanis, Persians, Afghans, and
Turks, however, the most important step in the transformation of the Mughal nobility was the
influx of Rajput chiefs from 1556-75.
Rajputs were given a high status from
the very beginning in the Mughal court of
Akbar and nobles such as Bhagwan Das and his son/successor Raja Man Singh Kachhwaha of
Amber were awarded the status of 5000
mansabdar, the highest rank that any
official could hold till the middle of Akbar’s
reign. By the end of Akbar’s reign (1605), Rajputs and other Hindu nobles constituted about 22
percent of those officials who had a
mansab of 500 zatand occupied roughly
the same numbers for those who held a mansab
of 1000 zator above (Khan, 2001: 30). The bond between Mughals and Rajputs was also sealed
by marriages between the Emperor and
Rajput princesses; oftentimes Rajput
chiefs brought dolas themselves to marry
the princesses to the members of the Mughal
royal family (Zaidi, 1994: 79). A significant way in which Akbar deviated from orthodox Islamic beliefs
was through the projection of a monarch
as a divine being. This was achieved by
Abul Fazl in Akbarnamain which he placed
the Mughal Emperor on the top of the
hierarchy of things in the world receiving Farr-i-izadi (divine light). In this way, the emperor was
portrayed as a figure through which the
divine light was disseminated to the
earthly subjects and who became a source of
spiritual and divine grace for his subjects (Khaund, 2017: 3). These interpretations of Akbar’s
religious and administrative policies
show that despite being true in some
respects such as his treatment of Rajput nobles, his policies have been widely
analyzed from a single perspective
whereby the wider motivations for his
decisions have been conveniently wiped out from the conventional historiography. These wider
motivations will be deeply analyzed later
in this paper.
Similar
to the biased treatment of Akbar by colonial and nationalist historians, Aurangzeb’s policies
have also been analyzed from a very
narrowed lens, which has aided the
creation of his image as a religious fanatic who tried implementing Sharia law in his empire and
vehemently opposed Hindus, their
traditions and their places of worship. Despite
being a successful Emperor under whom
the Mughal Empire reached its territorial zenith, Aurangzeb is rarely commended for his strong
mindedness, shrewd politics, and administrative
practicality that he showed despite being challenged by the uprising of numerous regional powers
during his reign (Khaund, 2017: 4). On
the contrary, Aurangzeb is often painted
as an evil and cruel emperor for his
treatment of his father and brothers, especially that of Dara Shikoh after the War of Succession (1657
to 1659). Dara Shikoh, in recent
decades, has been hailed as a
‘liberal-minded unorthodox’ leader who was preferred as an heir to his father’s (Shah Jahan) and had
all the traits of a great
successor/ruler, for his interest in arts and
philosophy and his heterodox approach towards religion (Sarkar, 1920: 53). Aurangzeb’s decision to
execute the heir-apparent, Dara Shikoh,
has been conveniently used to label him
as an illegitimate leader who claimed the throne as the “Champion of pure Islam” to divert
from the tolerant and heretical
practices of his brother and his
predecessors like Akbar (Khaund, 2017: 4). His decisions to re-impose jizya and pilgrimage tax, ban
religious festivals like Holi and
Nauroz, abolish practices of
Tuladan(tradition of measuring the emperor in gold), and Jharoka darshan (a common practice of
addressing the general public from the
balcony every morning) and demolish
Hindu temples have been widely interpreted as
his attempts to ban ‘un-Islamic’ or Hindu inspired practices, which did not only alienate the
Hindu populace such as the Marathas,
Jats, and Rajputs but also destroyed the
pluralistic fabric of the Mughal Empire that Akbar had introduced and perfected (Sarkar, 1920:
58).
ANALYZING
THE AFOREMENTIONED ‘MISINTERPRETATIONS’
IN A WIDER CONTEXT
Now
that we have discussed the popular narrative or
rather the ‘convenient interpretations’ that have led
Akbar
to be hailed as a liberal and a secular emperor and Aurangzeb to be looked upon as the black
sheep of the Mughal history, it is
important to look at the aforementioned
actions, policies and defining decisions
of both the rulers from a broader perspective and to situate them in their own cultural context,
values, and background.
The
first step that needs to be taken to ensure that we reach a balanced understanding of both the
emperors is to cease the application of
these modern binaries of ‘liberal vs
conservative’ or ‘secular vs religious’ to a 17th Century Mughal India. In this part of the
paper, we’ll attempt to deconstruct some
of the widely accepted notions that
surround both of these Mughal figures. The
first notion that needs to be deconstructed is the idea that Akbar abolished the pilgrimage and jizya
tax in 1562 and 1564 respectively because
he adhered to the principles of
sulh-i-kul, which prevented him from
carrying on such discriminatory policies as he was an equal leader for all his subjects. In order
to understand why Akbar’s unorthodox
worldview of sulh-i-kul the main reason
for the abolition of these taxes was not, we
need to shed light on the fact that there are numerous indications in historical accounts of Akbar
to believe that he started his rule as a
devout, orthodox Muslim who had great
reverence for orthodox theologians of the
court like Makhdum-ul-Mulk and Shaikh Abdul Nabi (Ikram, 1964: 156). S.M Ikram, in his book,
Muslim Civilization in India contends
that Ibadat Khana was initially
established by Akbar out of sincere religious
zeal. However, the hateful conduct of Muslim theologians Makhdum-ul-Mulk and Shaikh Abdul Nabi towards
each other during these debates
eventually drove Akbar out of his
orthodoxy. Subsequently, the event that prompted Akbar to finally distance himself from these
Ulemas was when Shaikh Abdul Nabi
ordered the execution of a rich Brahman,
who had constructed a temple by forcibly
taking possession of building materials reserved for the construction of a mosque (Ikram, 1964: 158).
This incident led Akbar to not only
question the Shaikh’s decision but also
forced him to analyze the power and
influence that such Ulemas held in their hands. Two years later, in 1579, this self-questioning
is what led Akbar to release the
‘Mazharnama’ or the ‘Infallibility
decree’ thereby challenging the notion that this decree was a step taken by Akbar in the pursuit of
establishing a secular state (Ikram,
1964: 158-59). This brief explanation
allows us to understand why sulh-i-kul could have never been the sole reason
for Akbar’s ban on jizya as up until
that point Akbar was still under the
influence of the aforementioned orthodox theologians. Rather, this decision was one of the many
politically incentivized moves that
Akbar had taken to forge an alliance
with the Rajput chiefs in order to persuade them to join his nobility as he wanted to curtail
the influence and authority of Afghan
nobles; a process which had been started
by Humayun back in 1555 when he was
trying to re-establish his rule in Delhi (Khan, 2001: 22).
The
aforementioned strategic alliance that Akbar
established with the Rajputs allows us to deconstruct some of the widely accepted notions
surrounding his administrative policies.
Akbar’s decision to include Rajput
chiefs in his nobility was not motivated by his
desire to create a secular state but rather by his fixed goal to reduce the relative numbers and
influence of his Central Asian nobles as
they constituted a threat towards his
rule. The small group of fifty-one nobles
who returned to India with Humayun in 1555 were all foreign-born Muslims, out of which
twenty-seven were from Central Asia who
belonged to the Chagatai Turkish or
Uzbek Central Asian clans. Although Uzbek nobles had returned to India with Humayun, their
allegiance to the Timurids was not
strong as they traced their lineage back
to one of Babur’s nemesis, Shaiban (Richards, 1993: 17). Moreover, being accustomed to a more
egalitarian political tradition, the
Uzbek’s resented Akbar’s imperious
ruling style and were determined to test the
young ruler as he established himself. This friction reached its culmination with the Uzbek Revolt
in 1564, which despite being squashed by
Akbar in the end, left him with the
constant threat of being replaced by his
half-brother, Mirza Muhammad Hakim (Richards, 1993: 17-18). Thereby, in an attempt to reduce this
threat and to meet the needs of his
enlarging empire, Akbar initially commenced
the process of vigorously recruiting Shi’ite
Persians into the service, who by 1580 numbered forty seven as opposed
to the Chaghatai and Uzbek Turanis who
numbered forty-eight in the royal nobility. It was after this point that Akbar shifted his focus
towards the recruitment of Indian
Muslims into the service, which largely
consisted of Afghans at that time. However, in the face of continued hostility and resistance by
the Afghans in the east, Akbar was left
with no choice but to exclude them and
recruit Hindu Rajput leaders in his nobility,
who along with few other non-Rajput Hindus numbered forty-three members of the nobility by 1580
(Richards, 1993: 21). Over the next two
decades, Akbar created a diffused
political system heavily based on paternal
kinship and marriage alliances. As mentioned before, Akbar maintained matrimonial relations with
the Rajputs as he did with the Turanis,
Persian, and Shaikhzada families,
however, the real intention behind such
relations was to establish a strong bond with these important zamindars. Baburnamaand
Akbarnama mention such marriages, which
were contracted with the girls of local
zamindars families ‘to soothe the mind’
of these zamindars. Therefore, Akbar’s marriages with Rajput princesses, such as that with Raja
Bharmal’s daughter in 1562, were not
necessarily because of his liberal or
secular approach towards such matters but
mainly because of their strategic importance for his rule (Zaidi, 1994: 79).
In
modern times, Aurangzeb has been effectively
portrayed as the ‘black sheep’ of the Mughal dynasty due to these same convenient misinterpretations.
Therefore, it is imperative for us to
analyze his religious and administrative
policies in their own historical, cultural
and social context in order to arrive at a more historically correct and holistic
understanding of this ‘disgraced’
figure. Aurangzeb, like every other Mughal
Emperor, was born a Muslim and practiced his inherited religion throughout his life. Although it is
a well established fact that Aurangzeb was more pious than his imperial predecessors, his approach towards
his inherited religion was hardly
puritanical as he consulted with
prominent Hindu religious figures and Sufi’s
throughout his life (Truschke, 2017). Aurangzeb had a paternalistic attitude towards the subjects
living under his regime and considered
it his responsibility to not only ensure
their physical well-being but also their
‘moral’ well-being. In an attempt to portray himself as a ‘moral leader’ Aurangzeb depended on the
Islamic ideas of morality and justice,
however, this did not mean that his
moral principles were different for Muslims and
Hindus. Rather, Aurangzeb would prescribe similar behavior for all his subjects regardless of
their religion and would apply analogous
principles even when addressing issues
that were specific to one religious group
(Truschke, 2017). The most common type of state
policies that Aurangzeb used to promote such ‘morality’ included bans or restrictions on alcohol,
opium, prostitution, gambling, and
public celebration of religious
festivals (Truschke, 2017). This analysis of
Aurangzeb’s moral character shows that his decision to ban such
activities was not motivated by a desire to
implement Islamic law, as is widely believed, but rather by a desire to preserve the ethical character
of his subjects.
In addition to this, some of the other popular and factual misconceptions that need to be addressed revolve around the nature of the limitations that Aurangzeb imposed on the public observation of religious festivals and holidays, claims of widespread conversion under his supervision, and a ban on the composition of music and other literary works within his empire. Firstly, the decision taken by Aurangzeb in the eighth year of his reign to constraint the widely celebrated religious festivals did not only include Hindu festivities of Holi and Diwali but also included major Muslim holidays and commemorations of Eid al-Fitr, Eid al-Adha, and Muharrum (Truschke, 2017). These restrictions were partly placed because of Aurangzeb’s distaste for such exuberant celebrations and partly because of public safety concerns. It is well-reported that religious festivals were hazardous affairs in Medieval India and would often result in chaotic law and order situations. Foreign travel accounts are replete with descriptions that corroborate these claims. For instance, a French traveler named Jean de Thevenot reported that Muharram commemorations in 1666-67’s Golconda were so wild that ‘violence was standard’ (Truschke, 2017). Hence, as mentioned above, these bans had nothing to do with the un-Islamic nature of such festivals. The second claim regarding a state-sponsored conversion under Aurangzeb isn’t historically correct because if any such policy was introduced by him, then any success in its achievement should have been recorded by the contemporary chroniclers of that time. The only occasional conversions that did take place were those of local zamindars or petty state employees who converted expecting preferential treatment or job positions, which were only restricted for Muslims such as that of a jizya tax collector (Truschke, 2017). Similarly, the claims regarding Aurangzeb’s ban on music throughout the empire have also been historically misunderstood. He only limited certain types of music within his own court, which was more a matter of personal renunciation because of his religious convictions and was not forced upon other connoisseurs (Brown, 2007: 102). It is reported that several prominent nobles of Aurangzeb actively patronized musicians and more musical treatises were composed in Aurangzeb’s period than in the period of his predecessors (Chettry, 2018: 49). As far as the composition of literary works such as poems is concerned, they were never banned during Aurangzeb’s period as he enjoyed satirical poetry (a popular genre at that time) in his court.
ABOLITION
OF JIZYA AND THE INSTANCES OF TEMPLE
DESECRATIONS UNDER AURANGZEB’S RULE
Before
we conclude our discussion on Aurangzeb, it is
important to analyze and challenge two specific claims that have been used by colonial and
nationalist Indian historians to
successfully paint Aurangzeb as a religious
bigot in popular memory. The first claim revolves around Aurangzeb’s policy to re-introduce
jizya in 1679, which was abolished by
his predecessor, Akbar. Aurangzeb, like
earlier Mughal rulers, clashed with the
Ulemas, especially in their role as qazis (Muslim judges) throughout his reign (Truschke, 2017). The
ulama were a key component in the
balance of Mughal power even during
Akbar’s reign, however, this did not mean that
they were above the emperor’s scrutiny as Akbar openly ridiculed the more uptight and critical
members of the ulama class. Aurangzeb
was no different than Akbar in this
regard and ensured the displacement (exile) of
certain problematic members of the ulama class, such as that of Shah Jehan’s chief qazi, Abdul Wahab.
However, when possible, Aurangzeb also
took a softer approach of placating the
ulama, especially by providing them with
income (Truschke, 2017: 74). Owing to this relationship between Aurangzeb and the Ulemas, historians
believe that the decision to re-impose
jizya was Aurangzeb’s attempt to improve
his reputation amongst the ulama class,
especially the ones who were suspicious of the
religious sincerity of kings. The money that was obtained as a part of jizya was deposited in a
separate account called the khazanah-i-jizya,
which was then given as a charity to the
members of the learned class and
theologians. The officials who were responsible for the collections of jizya and khazanah-i-jizya
were all staffed from the ulema class.
This system didn’t only appease these
Ulemas with a source of income but also aided
Aurangzeb in maintaining his public persona of a Mughal leader who ruled according to the teachings
of Sharia (Chettry, 2018: 49). The
second reason that is often cited by
historians for the re-imposition of jizya focuses on the political developments that were taking place
in 1679. Aurangzeb imposed jizya, a whole
22 years after he ascended the throne, which raises a significant question that if Aurangzeb was really concerned about
upholding the teachings of the Islamic
law, and then why did he not take this
decision earlier in his rule? Historians point out that during 1679, Aurangzeb was facing a
myriad of political problems, which
included the rebellious behavior of
Sikhs in areas around Punjab along with a
conflict with the Rathore that had only intensified over the years. Similarly, the Deccan region also
posed a significant challenge to
Aurangzeb's rule as the Marathas under
Shivaji would constantly harass the Mughal army
and encroach on the Mughal territories. Lastly, to make matters worse, Aurangzeb’s policy of shoring
up the Bijapur and Golconda state
against the Marathas severely backfired
as these states became more willing to
ally with Shivaji than with the Mughal state.
Therefore, in an attempt to gather the support of his Muslim subjects during such political
disruption, Aurangzeb strategically
reverted to the rhetoric of an orthodox
state by reimposing jizya (Chettry, 2018: 51).
This analysis of wider social and political contexts proves that Aurangzeb re-introduced jizya so
that he could appease the ulama class
and gather the support of their Muslim
followers as it was one of the major
political requirements of that time.
The
second claim that has been advanced by nationalist historians like Jadunath Sarkar and S.R.
Sharma to prove Aurangzeb’s bigotry and
anti-Hindi nature revolve around the instances
of temple desecrations. Aurangzeb’s
order to destroy the Vishvanatha Temple in
Benaras in 1669 and the Keshava Deva Temple in Mathura in 1670 are often presented as
evidence for such claims. Although, none
of these pieces of evidence is incorrect;
the underlying motivation for these events
have been largely misunderstood and require a wider contextual analysis. To start this analysis,
we need to understand that the events of
temple desecration were a very
politically motivated action in the context of pre modern India that had been
in practice even before the advent of
Islam into India. Royal Temples, in pre-modern
India, were highly charged political institutions as they were a visual expression of a king’s claims
to legitimate authority (Eaton, 2019:
39). These royal temples housed the
state deity’s image, usuallyin the form of a Siva or Vishnu, which expressed the sovereignty of
the king thereby allowing such temples
to serve as sites where kingship was
created, legitimized and often revitalized
(Chettry, 2018: 51). However, these magnificent and elaborate structures also held great risks
for their royal patrons as the enemy
kings who wanted to show their power
would primarily target the most visible sign of a king’s sovereignty - his temple (Eaton, 2019:
39). Keeping this historical context in
mind, it is important to understand that
Aurangzeb’s decision to desecrate
temples followed the same political tradition of pre modern India
whereby these Hindu temples were
considered as legitimate targets of punitive state action. Vishvanath Templehad been brought down due
to political concerns. Jai Singh, the
Rajput chieftain from Amer, was
suspected by Aurangzeb to have played a role
in the fleeing of Shivaji and his son Sambhaji from the Mughal court in 1666. Similarly, the Kesha
Dava Temple in Mathura was also
destroyed due to layered political
reasons as Mathura Brahmins were also suspected to have assisted Shivaji in his flight from
Agra. Moreover, the Jat uprising in the
region in 1669-70 had caused Mughal’s
heavy casualties thereby acting as another
immediate reason for Aurangzeb’s decision (Truschke, 2017). Throughout his reign, Aurangzeb’s
default policy was to ensure the
well-being of Hindu religious institutions
and places of worship. Aurangzeb, as
mentioned above, was highly derived by his notions of justice, which in most cases prompted him to
extend state security to Hindu Temples
and to provide his non Muslims subjects with enough freedom to exercise their own religion. However, it is also true that
state interests often constrained
religious freedom in Mughal India, and
Aurangzeb ensured that religious institutions and leaders considered to be immoral or seditious
faced the consequences of their actions.
In a wider context, there was no attempt
made by Aurangzeb to destroy Hindu
Temples on a large scale as he understood the extreme nature of temple destruction and so used it
sparingly (Truschke, 2017).
NATIONALIZATION
OF HISTORY IN MODERN-DAY INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
Since the establishment of the nation-states of India and Pakistan, the attempts to approach history on their own terms have further diminished whereby historical figures in Mughal India have been constantly misinterpreted to fit the wider nationalist narratives and to legitimize the existence of these nation-states. In recent decades, certain saffronist elements have effectively tried to 'communalize' history in India whereby historical facts have been deliberately misrepresented to create communal divisions within the population. Hindu nationalist organizations like RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh) and its political wing BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) have effectively exploited these communal divisions for their political advantage, which even allowed them to win the national elections in 2014 and 2019. Surprisingly, a major trend that can be noticed after this widespread acceptance of the Hindutva ideology by the masses concerns the treatment of the Mughal rulers. Mughal rulers like Akbar who were once hailed for their 'secular' approach by nationalist historians like Jawaharlal Nehru have been effectively compartmentalized in the same category as rulers like Aurangzeb. Instead of being depicted as opposites of each other and seen from the traditional distinctions of liberal vs conservative, the saffronization of history has conveniently placed both rulers in the same category whereby they are seen as any other Muslim king who sought to destroy the Hindu roots of Ancient India. Furthermore, in their attempt to ‘saffronize’ history, the fundamentalist BJP is not only trying to erase India’s Mughal legacy from its landscape but also from its history books. For Instance, in May of 2015, several street signs in New Delhi carrying Muslim names, including the Aurangzeb Road, which was named after the sixth Mughal Emperor, were painted black by mobs of Shiv Sena Hindustan, a right-wing Hindu organization (Ahmad, 2018). Later, in that year, the ruling BJP party officially changed the name of the Aurangzeb Road to APJ Abdul Kalam, who served as the 11th President of India from 2002 to 2007. However, critics claim that this change wasn’t necessarily done to honor the achievements of Mr. APJ Abdul Kalam as an ex-president, but rather to honor his support for the BJP party over the years. In October of 2018, the officials of the ruling BJP decided to change the names of the city Allahabad to Prayagrajas the city was founded by the Mughals. The decision to implement these orders even though this city was founded by none other than the hailed ‘secular’ ruler Akbar further proves that the mainstream representatives of Hindutva ideology have effectively vilified the entire Mughal past of India. This growing trend of changing names of cities, airports, and roads shows that the ruling BJP party is making consistent efforts to increase the prominence of Hindu symbols in India without realizing the long-term consequences that it might have for a nation that is as diverse as India.
The
attempts to saffronize education by the Modi
government
are evident from the implementation of
policies such as the National Education Policy (NEP) which was introduced in 2020 and has been the
first major make-over of India’s
educational policy since 1986 except for
a few modifications that took place in
1992. This new educational policy was presented as a reform that would make India ready for the
21st Century and in the words of
Narendra Modi make India ‘future ready’
(Athreya & Haaften, 2020). However, critics argue that this couldn’t be any further from the
truth as they claim that this policy is
yet another attempt by the BJP and its
ideological wing RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh) to relegate India to a mythical past of Hindu glory. Under this new education policy, a
significant emphasis has been given to
India’s ancient and modern history,
whilst ignoring the Medieval period as it
includes the Mughal Era. Recently, the BJP government even removed the works of renowned Nobel
Laureate Rabindranath Tagore and former
President Dr. S. Radhkrishnan from the
English syllabus of Classes 10 and 12 in
the states of Gujarat and Uttar Pradesh (Ruby,
2021). Moreover, the new history syllabus that was drafted by the University Grants Commission
(UGC) of India earlier in March is yet
another evidence of this process of
‘saffronisation’. Amongst the readings
suggested for papers, works by prominent historians such as Irfan Habib’s have been replaced by
the works of little-known authors - some
of whom are considered to be
‘pro-Sangh’. All of these numerous instances are evidence of the attempts in which the history
of India has been effectively
communalized.
In
Pakistan, a similar approach has been taken towards these two historical figures whereby their
actions have been effectively molded to
fit a certain nationalist narrative.
Just like in India, this narrative has been
widely spread through educational curriculums and state-approved history textbooks, and here
again, the two Mughal emperors Aurangzeb
and Akbar are portrayed as opposites of
each other. However, in Pakistan,
Aurangzeb has taken the image of an orthodox
and pious Muslim who sewed prayer caps and copied the Quran for his livelihood. Akbar, on the
other hand, is seen as ‘anti-Islamic’
for his attempts to combine the salient
features of Islam and Hinduism in his religious
philosophy of Din-i-Illahi. However, an important concern that should be pointed out with
the interpretation of Akbar’s new
religious policy is that it has been
significantly misunderstood in both India and Pakistan due to the ‘mischief’ of
historians and translators like Henry
Blochmann. Blochmann’s translation of
Ain-i-Akbari heavily relies on the accounts
of Abd al-Qadir Badayuni who had always been critical of Akbar’s administrative measures and
religious conduct. As a result, numerous
historians have paid scant attention to
Abul Fazl’s informative sections on
Akbar’s religious approach contained in his Akbar-Nama and Ain-i-Akbari (Ikram, 1964: 161-62).
Blochmann habitually converts the
expressions of iradatand muridi
(discipleship), used by Abul Fazl and Badayuni respectively, as ‘divine faith’ thereby
portraying a religious order (or even a
bond of loyalty) into a new religion
(Ikram, 1964: 161). Moreover, he also translates the expression ain-i-iradatgazinan, which
originally means ‘rules for the royal
disciples,’ as the ‘principles of divine
faith,’ and gives the subsection the heading
‘ordinances of the divine faith,’ although no such heading exists in the original text (Ikram, 1964:
161). These misinterpretations by
colonial historians have effectively led
masses on both sides of the border to not only
misunderstand Akbar’s Din-i-Illahi but also numerous other policies of the entire Mughal era. In
this regard, we can also see that most
of the misinterpreted works were a
product of India’s colonial era, which did not only help them to legitimize their presence in a Mughal
India but later also allowed the two
states of India and Pakistan to
legitimize their creation, especially on religious and communal grounds.
CONCLUSION
This
paper has made an attempt to show that historical figures like that of Akbar and Aurangzeb can
only be historically understood when we
are ready to know about them in their
own context. By deconstructing several
claims about these two Mughal figures that have
been ingrained in our social memory through botched colonial translations and narrative-based interpretations, this paper shows that when
analyzed from a wider perspective, these
figures appear in a different light.
When narratives are set aside and an
attempt is made to understand history for its own sake, the underlying motivations of historical
figures appear to be more humanistic. As
a concluding remark, one should always
keep the following words by EH Carr in
his mind while examining the historicity of any historical figure - “History consists of a corpus of
ascertained facts. The facts are
available to the historian in documents,
inscriptions, and so on, like fish in the fishmonger's slab. The historian collects them, takes them home,
and cooks and serves them in whatever
style appeals to him” (Carr, 1961:
9).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This
project would not have been possible without the support and guidance of many people. First
and foremost, I would like to thank Dr.
Aliya Iqbal Naqvi, for teaching South
Asian history in such a thought
provoking
manner and for encouraging me to write this
journal paper. If it were not for your classes, I would have never been able to critically analyze
the reigns of these two Mughal
Emperors.
I
would also like to express my gratitude to Ms. Maria Hassan Siddiqui for her constant support
throughout the whole drafting process
and for her invaluable editing
suggestions. Without her guidance, I would not have been able to get this paper published.
Finally,
I would like to thank Umema Aziz and
Muhammad Arsheel Rajafor for being the perfect mentors. They provided me with constant
suggestions regarding the content of my
paper and ensured that I got all the
technical details right.
There
are no external sources of funding to report.
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