Their finest hour
Ratna Singh (1528-1531)
Mahdrdnd Sanga had seven sons (by different wives), four of whom had predeceased him and his eldest surviving son, Ratna Singh, succeeded to the throne (1528). But before his death Mahdrdnd Sanga had promised Karmavati, the step-mother of Ratna Singh, the fort of Ranthambhor to her sons, Vikramaditya and Uday Singh, and she took possession of that fort in the name of her minor sons, with her brother Surya Mai of Hada (or Hara) clan as their guardian. She also took away with her the golden crown and belt which the Mahdrdnd had taken from the Sultan of Malwa.
Soon after his accession, Ratna Singh demanded the golden crown and the belt and also requested Karmavati and her sons to return to Chitor. She refused to do either and opened negotiations with Babur.1 She offered Blabur Ranthambhor and the golden crown and belt in exchange of Bayana and agreed to accept his overlord ship. Later on Babur records that he agreed to help Vikramaditya to gain his father’s kingdom.2
These negotiations led to no other result than to increase the hostility between Ratna Singh and Surya Mai. But other events de¬ manded his attention.
Chand Khan, the brother of Sultan Bahadur of Gujarat, was given asylum at Malwa, and Sultan Mahmud of Malwa refused to surrender him to Bahadur. He worsened his position by attacking Mewar at this time to regain some territories lost to Malwa during Mahdrdnd Sanga’s time. Ratna Singh had little difficulty in throw¬ ing out the invaders, after which he invaded Malwa and reached Sarangpur. In the meantime, Sultan Bahadur of Gujarat had started his campaign against Malwa and opened negotiations with the Mahd¬ rdnd. Later, the Mahdrdnd visited Bahadur’s camp and received from the latter “thirty elephants, many horses and one thousand five hundred dresses of gold brocade.”3 Thereupon the Mahdrdnd re¬ turned to Mewar, leaving some of his officers and soldiers with Baha¬ dur, to help him against Sultan Mahmud of Malwa.
But the trouble with Surya Mai, the guardian of Ratna Singh’s step-brothers, increased, and ultimately the latter began to hatch plans to murder him.4 He is said to have invited Surya Mai to a hunt near Bundi. One day they went out for pig-sticking with a few attendants. Suddenly Ratna Singh attacked Surya Mai and in the scuffle that followed both of them died (1531).
Vikramaditya (1531-1536)
After Ratna Singh’s death, his step-brother Vikramaditya as¬ cended the throne of Mewar. He is described in all the Rajasthan chronicles and traditions as a stupid young man, who replaced body¬ guards with wrestlers, and so insulted the nobles that they left the court in disgust. The tales of his stupidity may be exaggerated, but his ineptitude soon showed itself with fateful consequences for Mewar.
Sultan Bahadur of Gujarat, determined to punish Silahdi for having Muslim women in his seraglio, invested the fort of Raisen.5 When their condition became precarious, Silahdi’s son Bhupat went to Mewar for help and Vikramaditya advanced with a large force. Bahadur Shah first sent a force under two officers to contain the Rand, but later thought his presence absolutely necessary and left Raisen and joined his force which was opposing Vikramaditya. Vikramaditya seems to have taken alarm, and sent two persons to Bahadur’s court, ostensibly to parley, but in reality to find out the Muslim strength. On their reporting that the Gujarat army was greatly superior, Vikramaditya lost heart and immediately fled to Chitor. He was closely pursued by the Gujarat army, but Bahadur decided to capture Raisen first, which he did soon after. Chanderl, Bhllsa, Gagraun and other places fell to Bahadur after the conquest of Raisen, while Vikramaditya allowed his army to be immobilized in the fort of Chitor. All this time Bahadur was actively preparing for the siege of Chitor by collecting troops, arms, artillery and am¬ munition.
Bahadur sent an advance army under his officers (1532) and when this advance force arrived at Mandasor, they were met by Vikramaditya’s envoys, who agreed to cede to Bahadur whatever the Rdnd held of Malwa and further stipulated that “whatever tribute may be imposed on him he will pay; whatever duty is imposed on him he will perform, and he acknowledges himself a subject of the Sultan, and will never be disobedient.”6
In the meantime, stung by Vikramaditya’s insult, some of his nobles, headed by Medini Riai of Chanderl and Narsing Dev (a nephew of Mdhdvdnd Sanga) had joined Bahadur, and the latter, apprised of the division among the Mewlar nobles and remembering the Rand’s attempts to help the besieged garrison of Raisen, refused to accept the terms7 and ordered his general to advance. This he did, ex¬ pecting an attack by the Rand,8 but he was allowed to invest Chitor without any opposition (1533). Soon the Muslims carried forays near the fort and captured two of its outer gates. In vain did Karmavatl send envoys to Humlayun for help.
Ultimately, in desperation, Karmavatl, who had saved Bahadur’s life when as a prince he was in exile at Mewar, appealed to him, promising to cede the conquered districts of Malwa, and surrender the golden crown and belt of Malwa kings, and give him ten ele¬ phants and 100 horses and one hundred lakhs of tankahs.9 Bahadur accepted these terms and returned to Gujarat (24 March, 1533) which had during his absence been invaded by Nizam Shiah.
Peace between Mewar and Gujarat was, however, short, as faced with a hostile Mughul power, Bahadur felt the urgency of possessing the strong fort of Chitor, or at least to crush the power of Mewar to such an extent that there could be no combination of Mughuls and Sisodias against him. Thus he sent a strong force under Tatar Khan Lodi (a grandson of Sikandar Lodi) and others towards Agra and the Punjab and himself proceeded to invest Chitor. The energetic measures adopted by Humayun foiled Bahadur’s ambitious plans. Humayun moved through Malwa to Sarang pur, capturing on his way the fort of Raisen. At this point Bahadur took counsel of his officers as to whether to raise the siege of Chitor and face Humayun, or continue the siege. His counsellors correct¬ ly advised him to concentrate his energies on capturing Chitor, as Humayun was not likely to attack him while he was fighting a ‘holy war’ against the infidels. This prediction proved remarkably accurate, and Humayun, after advancing up to Gwalior, calmly awaited there the result of the grim tragedy that was unfolding at Chitor, for reasons discussed in the next chapter.
The Rajput soldiers were not prepared for the second siege of Chitor. The nobles, alienated by the buffoonery of Vikramaditya, had retired to their fiefs. So when the news of the Gujarat army’s advance towards Chitor came, the fort was hardly in a state of de¬ fence. In this grave predicament, the Queen-mother issued a stir¬ ring appeal to the nobles. “Up to now Chitor has remained in the possession of the Sisodias”, Karmavatl wrote to the nobles, “but now it seems the day of her destruction has arrived. I am handing over this fort to you, preserve it if you can, deliver it if you must. Remember, even if your king is worthless, the destruction of the royal dynasty can only bring disgrace to you.”10
The nobles gallantly responded to this call. They found, how¬ ever, that the provisions could not last for more than a few months, and a council of war decided to defend the fort to the last, but to remove Vikramaditya and his younger brother Uday Singh to Bundi.
This flight of Vikramaditya from the besieged fort has been a matter of reproach but there is no doubt that the decision to re¬ move him to a place of safety was the correct one. Chitor was doomed, and if he had died sword in hand, in a final sortie, the Sisodias would have for ever perished as the Chahamana Hammir of Ranthambhor. Indeed, one of the fatal defects in Hindu defence had been up to now their suicidal reliance on the so-called impreg¬ nable strongholds. As Klauswitz remarked, a besieged garrison is as helpless as a marooned man-of-war. This dictum was fully rea¬ lized later by Mahdrdnd Pratap, who never allowed the mobility of his action to be impeded by the fear of losing a fortress. For the present, the Mewar nobles stuck to their ancient military tradition, but forbore from sacrificing the life of the king and the next heir, around whom alone, in case of defeat, the nation could rally again.11
The rest of the story can be briefly told. Bahadur’s artillery, directed probably by Turkish gunners, breached part of the bastion.
The garrison defended bravely, but when they found all further re¬ sistance helpless, the women under Rani Karmavati performed the jauhar and the soldiers rushed out of the fort and died fighting to a man (1535).
Chitor thus fell to Bahadur, but it is significant that the Muslim historians do not speak of his capturing any spoils. Possibly the treasures had been removed from the fort when Vikramaditya left it. However, soon Bahadur had to flee before the advancing Mughul army, and the Sisodias recaptured Chitor, and Vikrama¬ ditya returned to his capital.
However, Vikramaditya had learnt nothing, and while the nobles were alarmed at his conduct of government, he took into his confidence, Vanavir, the natural son of Mahardna Sanga’s eldest brother Prithvlraj. He had been banished from Mewar by Maha rand Sanga and had taken refuge at Gujarat, but now finding the time propitious returned to Chitor. Soon he gained the confidence and favour of Vikramaditya and one day finding an opportunity murdered him (1536).
Vanavir next went to the room of prince Uday Singh to murder the last rightful claimant to the throne. But here he was foiled by the devotion of a woman whose name has become a byword for loyalty. Uday Singh, at this time a boy of fourteen, was under the care of his childhood nurse Panna. As soon as Pannia came to learn of Vikramaditya’s murder, she managed to send Uday Singh out of the fort and placed on the bed her son who was of the same age. Soon after, the regicide entered the room, sword in hand, and asked Panna where Uday Singh was. Silently she pointed at the bed on which her son was sleeping, and Vanavir murdered the boy. Panna then left Chitor and took Uday Singh to Kumbhalmer.
Vanavir (1536-1540)
Vanavir’s usurpation lasted for about four years (1536-40). The Rajasthan chronicles are silent about his achievements, if in¬ deed he had had any to his credit. His heinous deed and low origin must have made him odious to the proud nobles, and ultimately trouble broke out due to his crude insistence in proclaiming his equality with the high-born nobles by attempting to force them to eat the left-over food from his plate (uchchishta).
During this time, Pannia had enlisted several nobles to Uday Singh’s cause, and arranged his marriage with the daughter of Akhairaj. This added to Uday Singh’s prestige and gave a lie to Vanavir’s propaganda that he was not the real prince. Uday Singh then issued an appeal for help and soon not only the nobles of Mewar, but some other chieftains, too, joined under his banner.
Vanavlr sent an army to stop Uday Singh’s progress. At a battle fought near Maholi, this army was routed, and Uday Singh proceeded towards Chitor, which surrendered after a brief resist¬ ance. There are conflicting reports about Vanavir’s end; according to some sources he died fighting, while others relate that he escaped into obscurity (1540).12
Uday Singh (1540-1572)
The early years of Uday Singh’s reign were spent in fruitless wars with Maldev of Marwar. This struggle between Mewiar and Marwar may have been caused by an attempt to establish ultimate authority in Rajasthan, but the events which led to these wars were as petty as the battles were futile.
Rao Maldev of Marwar wanted to marry his beautiful sister-in law, but her father objected and had her married to Uday Singh. A war followed in which Maldev was defeated.
However, Mewar and Marwar soon after had to face a formid¬ able foe, Sher Shah. He first defeated Maldev, and then turned to¬ wards Chitor. While he was a few miles from Chitor, Uday Singh sent him the keys of the fort as a token of humble submission. This satisfied Sher Shah, who left Mewar in virtual possession of the MahdrdndP
Uday Singh’s next war also concerned a woman. After Sher Shah’s death, his governor of Mewat, Haji Khan, driven away by the Mughuls, found refuge at Ajmer, where he was attacked by Maldev. He appealed for help to Uday Singh who immediately responded, and rescued Haji Khan. Uday Singh, however, then demanded his price, which was the favourite mistress of the fugitive Afghan. He refused to surrender her, and made a bold stand with his few thou¬ sand followers, and defeated Uday Singh.
In spite of these seemingly stupid warfares, Uday Singh did turn his attention to establishing a second capital, and to excavating a lake which still bears his name. He had apparently understood the danger of staking the fortunes of his country on the defence of a fortress, which could not be defended in the face of a determined foe.
In the meantime, Akbar had ascended the throne (1556). Six years later, he married the daughter of Raja Bharmal of Amber and his grandson, Man Singh, joined the Mughul army. Thus began a memorable policy as a result of which pilgrim tax on the Hindus was abolished in 1563 and the hated jizya in 1564. This undoubtedly ameliorated the condition of the Hindus within the empire, and won him the friendship, esteem and devotion of many Hindu chiefs of Rajasthan. But Akbar, unlike Sher Shah, aimed at the complete subversion of the independence of Rajasthan.14
Abu-’l-Fazl’s narration of the causes which led to the Mewar campaign are too naive and may be rejected.t5 It is definite, how¬ ever, that Akbar started on his famous campaign in 1567, and on October 23 of the same year formed his camp near Udaipur. With¬ in a month the investment of Chitor was complete.
According to Kaviraj Shyamaldas, when Uday Singh received the news of Akbar’s approaching invasion, he called a council of war. The nobles pointed out the condition of the army, which had not yet recovered from the Gujarat wars, and was not in a condition to fight the Mughuls. They, therefore, advised the Mahardna to take refuge, along with the princes, in the hills, leaving a garrison at Chitor. After some discussion, Uday Singh accepted the advice of his councillors, and leaving 8000 soldiers to guard Chitor, left for the hills, and ultimately reached Rajpipla, the capital of the Guhilots of Rewakanta.16 Akbar sent Husain Qull Khan to capture the Mahardna, but he failed.17
It was found impossible to capture Chitor by assaults which were repulsed with heavy losses; so Akbar raised batteries and laid mines to breach the walls.
However, “on Tuesday, February 23, 1568, Akbar noticed at the breach a person wearing a chiefs cuirass who was busy direct¬ ing the defence.” Akbar aimed at him and his shot struck the chief, who was Jaimal, the commander of the garrison.
According to the Muslim historians, Jaimal died and the other officers, despairing of success, had their women and children per¬ form the right of jauhar, and opened the gates of the fort the next morning and died fighting.18 According to Kaviraj Shyamaldas, however, Jaimal was wounded in the leg, and called a council of war. He explained to them that the stores were exhausted, so it was preferable for the women and children to perform the jauhar and the men to fall on the enemy and die fighting.19 Most pro¬ bably, the provisions in the fort were exhausted, the Mughul pre¬ parations were almost complete, and on the top came Jaimal’s acci¬ dent. All these factors seem to have influenced the decision of the besieged generals.
During the night the women and children performed the jauhar rites. Akbar saw the flame which was explained to him by Bhag wan Das, who warned that the Rajputs would open the gates and launch a final assault the next morning. So the Mughul army was alerted, and the next morning as the Rajputs opened the gates ot the fort, the Mughuls rushed in.
Then followed a short but ferocious fighting till all the Rajput soldiers fell sword in hand (25 February, 1568). Akbar then gave the order for the mass execution of 30,000 non-combatants, for which all modern historians have condemned him. According to Kaviraj Shyamaldas, however, out of 40,000 peasants who were in the fort, 39,000 had died fighting, and Akbar ordered the remain¬ ing 1000 to be executed.20
Akbar’s Chitor campaign has been made memorable by Col. Tod’s vividly imaginative description and its results have been un¬ duly exaggerated. It is therefore necessary to remember that Akbar’s primary aim was to force the Mahdrdnd into submission. Capture of Chitor was a means to achieve this end, but though he captured the fort, he failed in his main objective. Indirectly, how¬ ever, he profited largely by the display of Mughul power. Ran thambhor capitulated next year (1569), and in 1570 Bikaner and Jaisalmer entered into matrimonial alliance with Akbar.21 Thus the fabric of unity imposed on Rajasthan by Kumbha and Sanga, shattered at Khanua, disappeared for ever. Henceforth their proud descendants would struggle valiantly, but alone, not only against the Mughuls but also against the Rajputs. This is the measure of the greatness of two men—Akbar, who could transform the poli¬ tical situation in Rajasthan so that soon, in the words of his cour¬ tier Badauni, a Hindu would wield the sword of Islam,22 and Pratap, undaunted by the odds against him, would carry on the struggle.
Uday Singh survived the fall of Chitor by four years. He lived mostly at Kumbhalmer, and it was remarkable that Akbar never attempted to conquer the stronghold till much later. He died on 28 February, 1572.
It is difficult to form a proper estimate of Uday Singh’s cha¬ racter. The historians of his country, the bards of Rajasthan, used to singing the valorous exploits of the warrior chieftains, had con¬ tempt for this man, whom fate had taught from early childhood that sometimes survival is as important as fighting, and under cer¬ tain circumstances it can only be achieved by flight. Naturally he suffers in comparison with his great father and greater son, but this man, who by no account was a hero, refused to surrender to the Mughuls, while the other chiefs of Rajasthan were sending their daughters to the Mughul harem.23
Pratap Singh (1572-1597)
Uday Singh left twenty wives and twenty-five sons, of whom the eldest was Pratap Singh. Before his death, however, he nomi¬ nated his ninth son Jagmal as his successor. Jagmal actually as¬ cended the throne while Pratap and the other nobles went to per¬ form the funeral rites of the deceased monarch.24 On their return, however, the nobles forced Jagmal to abdicate and offered the throne to the rightful successor, Pratap Singh, and he accepted it. Jagmal went to Ajmer, joined Akbar, and received a portion of Sirohi, but later died fighting with its rightful chieftain.
Mahdrdnd Pratap Singh ascended the throne on 1 March, 1572, and the famous battle of Haldighiat was fought in June, 1576. We do not know what measures he adopted to meet the Mughul menace during these four years of real peace which he was to enjoy as a king. If, however, his later operations are any indication, he uti¬ lized this period to consolidate his regime and prepare for the in¬ evitable struggle. We have therefore to anticipate the future events in order to form an idea of his activities during this period.
The Mewar army at the battle of Haldlighat was quite formid¬ able and in every way a match for the Mughul army. Evidently long time must have been spent to raise and equip this army, and get the support of Afghans like Hakim Sur Pathan, who fought for Mewar at Haldfghat. But even more important was gaining the support of the Bhils, who from now on steadfastly helped the Mahardnds of Mewar, and made possible the guerilla warfare after the battle of Haldighat.25 This broad imaginative policy not only served the cause of Mewar’s independence, but made its young king a real national leader. One can only imagine the flush of enthusiasm among the Bhils when for the first time they were recognized as fighting partners by the proud ruling Kshatriyas.
During this period the Mahdrdnd was *also planning the war against the Mughuls. It is remarkable that after the battle of Haldi¬ ghat, Man Singh could find no trace of the Mahdrdnd, his family or his nobles. Actually when Man Singh reached Gogunda, Mahd rdnd’s temporary capital, the day after the battle, the town was deserted, and soon the supply of the Mughul army was cut off and the soldiers had to subsist mainly on fruits. It is no doubt possible that from the battlefield the Mahdrdnd had rushed to Gogunda, col¬ lected his family, found out an inaccessible hide-out, and then collected his men and begun to harass the Mughul army. It is, how¬ ever, not unlikely that the Mahardna had carefully planned his course of action in case he lost the battle of Haldlghat. That is, he had learnt not to stake a kingdom on the outcome of a single battle, and this alone can satisfactorily explain the reason of his leaving the field before the battle was over at Haldlghat.26
Another point is the Mahdrana s consolidation of his financial resources. Tod has given wide currency to the story that after the battle of Haldlghat, he was fleeing from one place of concealment to another in conditions of abject poverty. MM. Ojha has shown that these stories are myths. Not only the Mahardna but Amar also had enough financial resources to continue the struggle till 1614. It is remarkable indeed, as MM. Ojha points out, that though Chitor was occupied by Bahadur and later by Akbar, no Muslim historian describes any treasure having fallen into their hands. The obvious inference is that Uday Singh had secreted the wealth accumulated by Kumbha and Sanga and the Mahardna made judicial use of it.27
It may thus be concluded, that from 1572 to 1576, the Mahd rdnd attempted to consolidate his position, marshal his resources, build an army and make adequate arrangements for defence in case the Mughuls defeated his field force. As long as Akbar sent him diplomatic missions, he behaved with them correctly, but refused to surrender any of his sovereign rights.28 Akbar therefore decided to declare war against him, and selected Man Singh as the command¬ ing general.29
The battle of Haldlghat was fought on 21 June, 1576. The Mahardna had originally taken his position in the ghati which could be reached by a narrow and rugged path about a mile and a half long. Man Singh waited for him in the plain below, and in the morning of 21 June the Mahardna came out and attacked the Mughul army. As Man Singh had arranged his army in battle array, it is evident that the Mahdrdnd’s attack had lost the element of surprise. Still, in the first flush of attack, his army practically broke through the Mughul army, but the rout was stopped by Man Singh and a few intrepid officers. There was a personal encounter between the Mahardna and Man Singh. But while Man Singh, on an elephant, ducked and avoided the Mahardna s javelin, Pratap’s famous horse, Chetak, which had placed its forelegs on Man Singh’s elephant was struck by the sword which the huge beast carried in its trunk. Chetak immediately turned and fled, and with his last breath car¬ ried his master out of danger.
The Mahdmnd’s army seems to have followed him, but we do not hear of captives. The total number of dead was, according to Badauni, five hundred, of whom 120 were Muslims and the rest Hindus. As considerable number of Hindus fought on the Mughul side, it would appear that the casualties on each side were almost equal.
The day was so hot that pursuit of the Mewar army was im¬ possible. Next day Mian Singh occupied Gogunda, the Mahamna’s temporary capital. The town had already been evacuated, still about twenty soldiers who had been left to guard the palace and the temple died fighting to satisfy their honour. “The Amirs, as security against a night-attack on the part of the Rana, barricaded the streets and drew a trench and a wall of such a height that horse¬ men could not leap over it, round the city of Kokandah, and then settled down quietly.’’30 But the danger to the Mughul army came from another side. The Malndrdnd cut all supplies to Gogunda, and soon they were reduced to living on meat and mangoes.
Akbar was not satisfied with the results of the battle. He was vexed with Man Singh for “having abandoned the pursuit of the Rana, and so allowing him to remain alive.’’31 Later (September, 1576) when “news arrived of the distressed state of the army of Kokandah (Gogunda), the emperor sent for Man Singh, Asaf Khan and QazI Khan, to come alone from that place and on account of certain faults which they had committed, he excluded Man Singh and Asaf Khan (who were associated in treachery) for some time from the court.”32
Though Man Singh was restored to favour, the condition in Mewar being far from satisfactory, Akbar himself left for Gogunda from Ajmer on 11 October, 1576, with a large army.33 But before he left, “the roads of ingress and egress from the Rana’s country were closed.”34 The Maharand retired before the Mughul army in¬ to the hills and Qutb-ud-din Khan, Raja Bhagwan Das, Man Singh and other imperial officers were sent in pursuit to capture him. As Narayan Das of Idar had joined the Malndrdnd, another army was sent against him. idar was occupied after a stubborn fight.35
Akbar himself came to Mohi (near Nathdwara) and appointed officers to guard that place and Madariya (near Chitor). “Similar¬ ly, brave men were appointed to other places in order that when¬ ever that wicked strife-monger (Rana Partab) should come out of the ravines of disgrace, he might suffer retribution.”36 But the army which was sent against the Mahdrdna was unsuccessful, and its two commanders, namely, Qutb-ud-din Khan and Raja Bhagwan Das returned to Akbar who was at this time in Udaipur. They were at first censured but later pardoned,37 and soon after another force was despatched to Gogunda under Bhagwan Das, Man Singh, Mirza Khan (the future Khan Khanan) and others. Presumably the Mahdrdnd had recaptured Gogunda. However, Abu-’l-Fazl adds: “By the great attention of the Shahinshah that country was cleared from the thorn-brake of rebellion, and adorned by just sub¬ jects.”38 But from subsequent events it appears that this expedi¬ tion, though it may have cleared the Gogunda region for the time being, had produced little effect on the adversary.
Apparently, after occupying the Gogunda region the comman¬ ders returned to the court but Akbar could not be satisfied so long as the Mahdrdnd was not captured or killed. So in March, 1578,39 he sent another army under the overall command of Shahbaz Khan, Mir Bakshi, to capture the fort of Kumbhalgarh, where the Mahd¬ rdnd was living at the time. Shahbaz Khan sent back to court Raja Bhagwan Das and Man Singh, and unexpectedly arrived near the fort,40 and occupied Kelwara, a town about three miles from Kumbhalgarh and at the foot of the mountain. According to Abu-’l-Fazl, “a large gun inside the fort burst, and the harvest of his (Mahdrdnd9s) equipment was reduced to ashes.”40* The fort fell on 4 April, 1578, and even he describes the gallant fight put up by the Rajputs. But the Mahdrdnd had already left the fort. Next day Shahbaz Khan captured Gogunda and at midnight Udaipur. Apparently, these places were not defended.41
Shahbaz Khan returned a few months later but was again sent with several other officers and “much treasure” against the Mahd¬ rdnd who, as Abu-’l-Fazl puts it, “had raised the head of turbu¬ lence.”42 From this campaign Shahbaz Khan returned after March, 15,81, and apparently reported that the Mahdrdnd9s power had been crushed for ever.43
By the end of 1584, however, the Mahdrdnd had succeeded in regaining his lost territories to such an extent that another expedi¬ tion had to be sent under Raja Jagannath.44 Abu-’l-Fazl’s descrip¬ tion of this campaign is more vague than usual, but from his state¬ ment that, “though there was no victory, yet the oppressed were relieved,” it is permissible to conclude that some relief was given to the scattered Mughul garrisons, but the Mahdrdnas activities could not be curbed. Late in 1585, Jagannath attempted to sur¬ prise the Mahdrdnd, but the latter got timely information, and when Jagannath reached his residence, he found it empty. But Abu-’l Fazl, curiously enough, remarks: “From foresight they (the raid¬ ing party) did not judge it proper to return by the same way, and so proceeded towards Gujarat.”45 This indicates that the mountain passes and roads were under Mahdrdnd’s control to such an extent as to strike terror in the Mughul army.
This was practically the last expedition undertaken during Akbar’s reign against the Mahdrdnd.
The most powerful monarch of the world relentlessly attempted to destroy one man, and he braved all adversities to emerge trium¬ phant. It is related in the Rajasthan chronicles that the Mahdrdnd adopted extreme measures to deny the Mughuls all forms of provi¬ sions. Death was the penalty for anyone who cultivated land for supplying the Mughul army. The result of this order was that the peasants left Mewar, and the Mughul garrisons had to get their provisions from Ajmer. It is related that a Mughul garrison com¬ mander induced a peasant to grow some vegetables for him. At night the Mahdrdnd went there and executed the man.46 The Raja¬ sthan chronicles also tell of many exploits of the Mahdrdnd and his officers. Of these the most notable was 25 lacs of rupees and 20,000 ashrafis looted from Malwa 47 On another occasion, Prince Amar Singh attacked a Mughul camp and captured the wife of the Khan Khanan, but after treating her with due honour returned her to her husband.48
These incidents are not corroborated by any Mughul source, which is not surprising. Nor do the Mughul historians give any account of the Mahdrdnd’s activities for gradually extirpating the Mughul garrisons, and freeing his country from the invaders, so that before his death, all Mewar except Ajmer, Chitor and Mandal garh was in his hands. But the country was devastated, first, by a decade of constant fighting and deliberate destruction by the Mughul army, and secondly by the Mahdrdnd’s stern order, according to the Rajput chronicles, for not cultivating the land. We may also imagine that a large number of people died of hunger, malnutrition and disease, and many peasants must have left MewSr and settled in peaceful neighbouring countries. These effects were felt keenly in the next reign.
It is related that one day while hunting, the Mahdrdnd struck his own bow and was wounded. This wound proved to be fatal, and he died on 11 Mdgh Shukla, 1653 V.S. (29 January, 1597), at the age of fifty-eight.49
Thus died the greatest hero of medieval India, the bravest of the brave whose sturdy frame was exhausted by almost two de¬ cades of constant fighting. We may here quote V. Smith’s fitting epitome of his reign: “The emperor desired the death of the Rana and the absorption of his territory in the imperial dominions. The Rana, while fully prepared to sacrifice his life if necessary, was re¬ solved that his blood should never be contaminated by intermixture with that of the foreigner, and that his country should remain a land of freemen. After much tribulation he succeeded, and Akbar failed.”50
Amar Singh (1597-1620)
Mahardna Pratap had eleven queens and seventeen sons, of whom the eldest, Amar Singh, succeeded him. His was a proud legacy, but beset with innumerable difficulties. He had to fight the Mughuls and at the same time maintain a machinery of admi¬ nistration which alone could provide him the means to prosecute the struggle for freedom. Ultimately he had to compromise, but that does not tarnish his honour.
Amar Singh began his reign by introducing certain necessary administrative reforms mainly intended to strengthen his hands against too powerful nobles.51 But soon he had to face the enemy. Akbar sent an army under Prince Salim and Man Singh in 1600.52 But Salim failed to accomplish anything, due, possibly, as Abu-’l Fazl remarks, to his indolence. Soon after, Salim rebelled, and after his reconciliation with Akbar he was again entrusted with the conquest of Mewar. In October, 1603,53 on the Dussera day, Akbar sent him off from Agra at the head of a well-equipped army. But arriving near Fathpur Sikri, Salim began to send demands for more troops and equipments, and ultimately gave up the venture. Thus we see that Akbar did not give up the idea of the destruction of the Mahardna from any chivalrous motive, but because of commit¬ ments elsewhere and the failure of his son. Still he made one more attempt to crush his old enemy. Towards the end of his reign, he invested Sagar, a son of Mahardna Uday Singh, with the title of Rand and designed to set him on the throne of Chitor.54 Akbar was actually preparing to send a force under Khusrav to instal Sagar, but before this could be done, he died.55
For reasons not difficult to guess, Jahangir, immediately after his accession, sent his son Parviz to conquer Mewar. Parvlz, who had with him 20,000 horse, was aided by several experienced com¬ manders such as Asaf Khan and others, and Sagar, the pretender, also accompanied him. Jahangir’s instructions to Parviz were: “If the Rana himself, and his eldest son who is called Karan, should come to wait upon you (Parviz) and proffer service and obedience, you should not do any injury to his territory.”56 It is interesting to note here, that three cousins of Man Singh and grandsons of Bhagwan Das, at this time were plotting to join Amar, but their plans leaked and Jahangir ordered them to be arrested. All of them died resisting arrest.57
Some time in March, 1606, came the news that Parvlz had suc¬ ceeded in dislodging Amar from Mandal.58 But then Khusrav’s re¬ bellion broke out and Jahangir ordered Parvlz to return to the capi¬ tal leaving the direction of the campaign in the hands of officers.59 However, before Jahangir’s letter of recall had reached Parvlz, Amar opened negotiations on the basis that instead of himself and his eldest son Kama, one of his younger sons should wait upon Parvlz, and due to the exigencies of the situation Parvlz agreed, and brought Bagha Singh, a younger son of Amar, with him and presented him to Jahangir at Lahore.60 However, nothing seems to have come out of Bagha Singh’s visit for, soon after, Jahangir ap¬ pointed Mu‘izz-ul-Mulk bakshi of the army against the Mahardna and sent him there.61
Nothing, however, came out of these expeditions. According to the Rajasthan chronicles, Parvlz had set up Sagar at Chitor as the Rana, but he could attract only a few followers, and ultimately had to leave Chitor ignominiously.62 So in 1608, Jahangir selected Mahabat, one of the most famous Mughul generals, to lead an ex¬ pedition against the Mahardna. Mahabat had under him 12,000 horse, 500 ahdis, 2000 musketeers, with an artillery of 70 to 80 guns mounted on elephants and camels. Two million rupees were order¬ ed to be sent with this army.63 Mahabat’s rank was also raised and he was honoured with a robe of honour, a horse, a special ele¬ phant and a jewelled sword.64
Evidently, Mahabat Khan’s campaign was unsuccessful, and he was recalled in March, 1609, and 'Abdullah Khan, who was exalted with the title of “FIruz-jang” sent in his place.65 The Rajasthan sources claim that a night attack took Mahabat Khan completely by surprise and he had to flee leaving his camp and equipment which were looted by the Mewar soldiers.66
‘Abdullah opened his campaign with some initial success, and occupied Chavand and Merpur.67 His rank was raised to 5000 personal.68 He was, however, sent as governor of Gujarat in 1611 and at his request Raja Basu was appointed to the command of the Mughul army in Rajasthan. But apparently he also did not meet with any striking success.69 He was recalled and Khan A‘zam Mlrza ‘Aziz Koka sent in 1613 to replace him.
Khan A‘zam apparently felt the need of assistance, so at his instance Jahangir sent Khurram with 12,000 horse to take the nominal command against the Mahdrdnd and himself advanced to Ajmer to “defeat and beat back the rebel Rana Amar Singh.”70 Soon, however, the old courtier fell out with Khurram, and Jahangir’s remonstrations being of no avail, Khan Azam was recalled and Khurram left in charge of the operations. Some time before March, 1614, Khurram obtained some notable success against the Mahd¬ rdnd and sent Jahangir seventeen captured elephants including one called “ ‘Alam-guman, of which the Rana was very fond.”71
About Khurram’s campaign, Jahangir writes: “My son of lofty fortune, Sultan Khurram, by dint of placing a great many posts, especially in some places where most people said it was im¬ possible to place them on account of the badness of the air and water and the wild nature of the localities, and by dint of moving the royal forces one after another in pursuit, without regard to the heat or excessive rain, and making prisoners of the families of the inhabitants of that region, brought matters with the Rana to such a pass that it became clear to him that if this should happen to him again he must either fly the country or be made prisoner.”72
From the Rajasthan chronicles it is learnt that the condition of the Mewar army was desperate. All provisions and sources of supply were exhausted, and there was even a shortage of weapons. For food they mostly had to depend on fruits. But what hurt them most was, as Jahangir relates, Khurram’s inhuman practice of making prisoners of the women and children. Shyamaldas relates that one day the nobles represented to the crown-prince, Kama, that they had been fighting for forty-seven years, under hard con¬ ditions. Now they were without food, dress or even weapons, and the Mughuls were capturing their children and forcing them to be¬ come dancing girls or slaves. They were prepared to die; each family had lost at least four members in the war; still they would fight, but it seemed to them that even their death could not pre¬ vent their family honour from being stained; it was therefore pre¬ ferable to come to some arrangement with the Mughuls, on the basis of Kama’s personal submission to the Mughul Emperor. As in the Mewar order of precedence, the crown-prince occupies a position lower than that of the chief nobles, such submission would not be too dishonourable. Kama agreed with the nobles, but ac¬ cording to Shyamaldas, he was afraid that Amar would not enter¬ tain any proposal of initiating peace talks. So it was decided to send two nobles, namely, Subhakarna and Jhala Haridas to Khur¬ ram without the knowledge of the Mahardnd.131
Khurram immediately sent the two Mewar envoys to Ajmer with his personal dhvdn, Mulla Shukra-Ullah and his major-domo, Sundardas, who, after the treaty with the Mahdrdnd was concluded, were honoured with the title of Afzal Khan and Ray Rayan. Jahangir readily ratified the terms and issued a farmdn with the mark of his palm.74 Khurram sent the farmdn to Amar, and according to Shyamaldas it was at this time that he came to learn that the nobles headed by Kama had been negotiating with the Mughuls. The Mahdrdnd at last realized the realities of the situation and accepted the terms.75
On 18 February, 1614, Amar with some of his nobles visited Khurram and gave him a large ruby and seven elephants.76 Khur¬ ram, in return, gave him a “superb dress of honour, a jewelled sword, a horse with a jewelled saddle, and a private elephant with silver housings,” and the Mahdrdnd’s hundred nobles who had accompanied him received one hundred robes of honour, fifty horses and twelve jewelled daggers.77 After Amar had left, Prince Kama arrived at Khurram’s camp, and received various presents. The same day Khurram and Kama started for Ajmer.
Jahangir received Kama as gracefully as possible, and tried to soothe his feelings by heaping on him all kinds of presents. Hardly a day passed when he did not give the Prince some present as a token of his favour.78 Kama even had the unique honour of being present in the “darbar in the female apartments” when Nur Jahan presented him a rich dress of honour, a jewelled sword, a horse and saddle, and an elephant.79 In addition to what Khurram and Nur Jahan gave him, Kama received from Jahangir cash and jewel¬ lery worth 200,000 rupees, besides 110 horses, five elephants and ten Arabian hunting dogs.80 After Kama left, his son Jagat Singh, then a boy of twelve, came to represent him while Jahangir was still in Ajmer, and Jahangir had to be satisfied with that.81
Shyamaldas compares the Mughul-Mewar war with the Anglo Afghan war, and in many respects the comparison is an apt one. The Mahdrdnd regained the whole of Mewar, parts of which ever since the days of Uday Singh had been under the Mughuls. The only restriction to his sovereignty was that the fort of Chitor could not be repaired. The obligation on the Mahdrdnd’s part was to send a contingent of troops, but it was sent on rare occasions. Mahdrdnd Pratap had fought for independence; his son retained the substance of independence by sacrificing some of its external attri¬ butes. In exchange, he gained the much-needed peace to restore the country to the level of civilized existence and gather strength for Mahdrdnd Raj Singh to fight against Aurangzlb. It has some¬ times been questioned whether Mahdrdnd Pratap would have accepted this treaty; it is equally open to question as to whether Akbar would ever have offered such terms. As Shyamaldas remarks, the land between Chitor and Udaipur was soaked with the blood of Mewar and Mughul heroes. Both sides were eager to come to terms, and the treaty does honour to both the parties who can claim to have displayed statesmanship of the highest order.
The remaining years of Amar Singh’s reign were uneventful. It is said that he felt the insult of accepting a Mughul farmdn so keenly, that he retired to his private chamber, leaving the adminis¬ tration in the hands of the heir-apparent, Kama. He died on 26 January, 1620.82
Kama Singh (1620-1628)
Kama was in charge of the administration during his father’s reign when it had been his endeavour to resettle the villages and set up again the regular administrative machinery by appointing local officials. He also took in hand the reconstruction of palaces and temples. In short, his entire energy was applied to improving the condition of war-devastated Mewar, and in this he was highly successful.
His relations with the Mughul court continued to be normal till the outbreak of Khurram’s rebellion in 1622. It appears that his brother Bhlm Singh, who was possibly serving under Khurram in the Deccan, joined the Prince at the outbreak of the rebellion.83 Bhlm Singh was one of the chief lieutenants of Khurram during the rebellion. He captured Patna and later died fighting gallantly at the battle of Jaunpur.84
After his defeat at the battle fought near Bilochpur (1623), Khurram entered Rajasthan and plundered Amber. His subsequent movement till he reached Mandu is not recorded by any Muslim historian, but the Rajasthan chronicles record that Kama granted him asylum at Udaipur, where he stayed for about four months.85
After Jahangir’s death, Shah Jahan returned to Agra via Gogunda where he met Kama and valuable gifts were exchanged (1 January, 1628). As usual, Shah Jahan’s gifts were costly. The Mahardnd’s younger brother, Arjun Singh, accompanied Shah Jahan to Agra. A few months later Kama died (March, 1628).
Jagat Singh86 (1628-1652)
We do not know Kama’s motive in helping the rebel Khurram. However, with the accession of his son Jagat Singh a change is perceptible in the policy of Mewar. Jagat Singh started his reign by interfering energetically in the affairs of Deolia, with the result that Shah Jahan ultimately intervened and restored it to its rightful owner. Jagat Singh then sent an expedition to Dungarpur which sacked the capital. He also sent forces to bring Sirohi and Bianswara under his control. To please Shah Jahan he sent him a mission with some presents, and this seems to have served its purpose. But under the terms of the treaty he had to maintain 1000 troops with the Mughul army, and this he did after several reminders. However, in direct contravention of the terms of the treaty he began to repair the fort of Chitor. Thus it appears that Mewar was again preparing to renew the struggle.
Jagat Singh is famous in the annals of Rajasthan for his charity and building activities. He died on 10 April, 1652.
Raj Singh (1652-1680)
Mahamna Raj Singh succeeded his father, Jagat Singh, in 1652 at the age of twenty-three. He was duly recognized by Shiah Jahan but very soon friction arose over the repair of Chitor fort. As has been stated above, Jagat Singh had started the repair work which was taken up after his death by Raj Singh. Possibly both Jagat Singh and Raj Singh counted on the gratitude of Shah Jahan, but the emperor of Delhi was quite a different man from the fugitive prince. He left Delhi on 24 September, 1654, to visit Ajmer, and from there sent Sa’dullah Khan with an army of 30,000 troops to Chitor, and ordered Shayista Khan to be ready to come to Mewar in case of necessity, and Aurangzlb to post his son Muhammad with 1000 soldiers at Mandasor. But Raj Singh submitted, and Sa’dullah Khan completed the destruction of Chitor’s fortifications without any opposition.87 In the meantime, Raj Singh sought the protec¬ tion of Dara, who was possibly instrumental in inducing Shah Jahan to send to Mewar a Brahmin envoy called Chandra Bhan.88 It appears from Chandra Bhan’s reports to Shah Jahan that the Mahardna’s faults had been to have repaired Chitor, to have appointed in Mewar service persons who had left the imperial service without permission, and to have failed to maintain at full strength the contingent of 1000 soldiers which under the treaty Mewar had to supply to the imperial army. The result of Chandra Bhan’s diplo¬ matic mission was that the Mahdrdnd sent his eldest son, aged about six years, to wait on Shah Jahlan. Shah Jahan gave the young prince the usual presents and named him Saubhagya Singh, but took away from Mewar certain districts and attached these to Ajmer.89
Raj Singh could not forget this disgrace which at that time he was unable to wipe off. But his opportunity came a few years later when Shah Jahan fell ill (6 September, 1657) and his sons rebelled. On the Dussera day (18 October, 1657) the Mahdrdnd began to pre¬ pare his army, and in November, advancing from Udaipur, sacked Khairabad, and imposed levies on Mandal, Pur, Banera, Shahpur and several other places which were included in the Mughul dominion.90
Soon after, the rebel Aurangzlb started a correspondence with the Mahdrdnd, and seems to have received his tacit support in ex¬ change for a promise to restore to Mewar the four districts which Shah Jahan had taken away from him.91 When Aurangzlb occupied Agra after the battle of Samogarh, the Mahdrdnd sent his son Sultan Singh,92 to wait on him. Aurangzlb received the prince very graciously and gave him the usual presents, but what is more im¬ portant he issued a farmdn bestowing on the Mahdrdnd the districts of Badnaur, Mandalgarh, Dungarpur, Banswara, Basabar and Gyaspur. The Mahdrdnds rank was also raised to 6000 of which 1000 personal was also do aspa and se aspa,93 Soon Dara pathetically appealed in vain to the Mahdrdnd for help.94
But an incident happened (1660) within a few years of the accession of Aurangzlb which changed the relation between the two. Princess Charumatl of Kishangarh, also known as Rupamatl, was be¬ trothed by her brother to Aurangzlb. She, however, hated the idea of marrying a Muslim and wrote to Raj Singh to rescue her. Ac¬ cordingly Raj Singh came with his army, and forced her brother to marry her to him. Aurangzlb’s reaction to this was to detach Gyaspur and Basabar from Mewar and assign them to Raval Hari Singh of Deolia. The Mahdrdnd appealed against this decision, but it had no effect.95 It is apparent that Raj Singh accepted the deci¬ sion of Aurangzlb, and this incident did not lead to any conflict as is sometimes supposed, but this took place in consequence of Aurangzib’s attitude towards Marwar.
II. MARWAR
After the death of Maharaja Jasvant Singh in December, 1678, Aurangzlb appointed Muslim officers to administer Marwar and on 9 January, 1679, himself set out for Ajmer to supervise the annexa¬ tion of the Rathor State. High officials were sent to capture the treasures of the late Maharaja and destroy the temples. No resist¬ ance was offered to these acts of vandalism, possibly because the Rathor officers who were capable of defending their country were serving with their king in Jamrud and were at this time escorting two of Jasvant’s widows, who were enceinte at the time of his death. The two queens gave birth to two posthumous sons at Lahore, and the news reached Aurangzlb on 26 February, 1679. The Rathor ministers pleaded in vain for the recognition of the succes¬ sion of Jasvant’s new born son Ajit, to his father’s dominion, the other son having died a few days after birth. Aurangzlb paid no heed to these appeals, but having completed the arrangements for the occupation of Marwar returned from Ajmer to Delhi on 12 April, 1679, and on that day reimposed the jizya on the Hindus after a century of abeyance.96 On 26 May, in return for a succession fee of 36 lakhs of rupees Indra Singh, a grand-nephew of Jasvant, was invested as the Raja of Jodhpur, but the Mughul administrators and generals were retained there.
In the meantime, the faithful Rathors brought their infant king and his mother to Delhi (June, 1679) and represented his cause to Aurangzlb. Aurangzlb ordered the infant Ajit to be brought up in his harem with a promise that he would be admitted to the Mughul peerage when he came of age, and, according to one contemporary historian, offered the throne to Ajit on condition that he became a Muslim.97
The Rathors, who claimed to be the descendants of the great Rashtrakutas, were seized with consternation, but it was in this hour of peril that they proved their noble descent. Fortunately they were guided by a brave hero of sturdy spirit, namely Durga Das, son of Jasvant’s minister Askaran. With the chivalry and courage of his ancestors he added a genius for organisation and statecraft worthy of a Mughul minister. He saw through Aurang zlb’s wretched diplomatic promise, and begged for delay promising to present Ajit to the court when he came of age. Soon Aurangzlb lost patience and on 15 July sent the Provost of Delhi and the Captain of the imperial guards to seize the queens and Ajit and lodge them in the prison of Nurgarh.
But the astute Durga Das was ready. The Mughul comman¬ ders, who had the wisdom not to provoke the impetuous Rajputs, first tried to persuade them to deliver their queens and Ajit peace¬ fully. This having been answered with a sharp volley of musket fire, the Mughuls also opened fire in self .defence. Then Durga Das’s plan—hatched in secret and almost incredible in character—was put into operation and took the Muslims by surprise.
Suddenly a gate of the mansion opened and Raghunath Bhatti, with one hundred troopers, rushed out in a wild “death-defying” charge, before which the Muslims quailed. Seizing the oppor tunity, Durga Das with the rest of his followers and the queens in male attire, slipped out of the mansion and took the road to Jodhpur. For an hour and a half, Raghunath dyed the streets of Delhi with blood, but at last he fell with all his comrades. Then the Mughuls set out in pursuit but in the meantime the fugitives had covered nine miles, when the Mughuls overtook them. Then Ranchhor Das Jodha turned round to check the pursuers with a small band of troopers. And they too resisted the Muslims to the last man. The Mughuls then took up the pursuit again and this time, while the rest continued their journey towards Jodhpur, Durga Das turned round with fifty troopers and fought till all but seven of them died. It was almost evening and at last the tired Mughuls gave up the pur¬ suit and wearily made their way back to Delhi, while Durga Das and his comrades safely carried the royal party to their destination.98
But, as has been related above, Jodhpur was under the effec¬ tive control of the Mughuls, so Durga Das turned to the only power —Mewar—which could come to their aid.
Mewar and the Mughuls
During this period, Raj Singh, who was busy in developing his country, tried to maintain cordial relations with Aurangzib. While Aurangzib was grabbing Jodhpur, the Maharana did not protest. On his way back from Ajmer, Aurangzib sent a jarman on 23 March, 1679, asking Raj Singh to send his son to the court.99 Accordingly, prince Jay Singh was sent to Delhi where he was received by Aurangzib in the usual manner (11 April, 1679). In the meantime, however, Aurangzib had imposed the jizya and soon after demand¬ ed the Mahdrdnd to impose it in Mewar.100
The only path of duty open to a Rajput was, however, shown by Aurangzib himself. He had given a foretaste of his religious bigotry and fanaticism by breaking some of the most famous temples of Rajasthan and then carrying the images to Delhi where they were placed before the mosques as steps so that they might be trod¬ den by the faithful.101 Mewar had not yet been invaded by the Muslims, but the annexation of Marwar would enable the Muslims to outflank the country and enable them to enter Mewar through the Aravalll passes. Indeed, the Maharana seems to have envisaged some danger and closed the Deobari pass with huge walls and por¬ tals as early as 1674.102
Last Muslim Invasion oj Rajasthan
The Rathors on arrival at Jodhpur began their struggle to throw out the Muslim invaders, which lasted till the death of Aurangzib (1707), with varying success on either side. It is not possible to give here the details of this heroic struggle, and only the main points may be noted.
With the arrival of Durga Das, Marwar burst into flames. Aurangzib realized that his hope of ruling Marwar with the supine Indra Singh as the nominal king under a Mughul faujdar was no longer possible. So he dethroned Indra Singh, recalled the faujdar, Tahir Khan, in disgrace, and set up a milkman’s son as the real Ajit in Delhi.
After completing his political preparations, Aurangzib sent Sarbuland Khan with a large army (17 August, 1679) and himself followed a fortnight later to exercise the overall command from Ajmer. Unfortunately, the Muslims were not the only enemy of the Rathors. Fissiparous tendencies developed inside Marwar, and the Gurjara-Pratiharas, the ancient enemy of the Rashtrakutas, took this opportunity to recover their ancestral stronghold of Mandor. It was later recaptured by the Rathors.
But the Mughul invasion backed by resources of the vast em¬ pire could not be checked. The great battle of this war took place near the Lake Pushkar, where the Mairta Rathors tried to bar the advance of Mughul troops and save the Varaha temple. After three days of continuous fighting, mounds of dead bodies remained to proclaim the valour of the Hindu heroes who had died to the last man to save the temple (19 August). Thereafter, no more pitched battle was fought. Guerilla warfare began.
Soon the pretence of ruling Marwar in the name of the im¬ postor was given up and the State was divided into regular admi¬ nistrative units, each under a Mughul faujdar, and prince Akbar was ordered to put down the resistance. This he attempted to do by advancing from Ajmer towards Mairta, which route even today is marked by the cenotaphs of Rathor soldiers, a mute reminder that they were not overawed by the overwhelming odds against them. “As the cloud pours water upon the earth, so did Aurangzib pour his barbarians over the land. . . .Jodhpur fell and was pillaged; and all the great towns in the plains of Mairta, Didwana and Rohit, shared a similar fate. The emblems of religion were trampled under foot, the temples thrown down and mosques erected on their sites.”103
Aurangzib then turned to Mewar which indeed had become the Rathor base of operations. He wrote three letters to the Mahdrdna reminding him of their past good relations, upbraiding him for shel tering Ajit and threatening him with dire consequences if he con¬ tinued to support the Jodhpur prince. The Mahdrdnd sent polite but firm replies that the terror of Muslim invasion would not force him to swerve from his path of duty.104
Aurangzib realized that to crush the determined Sisodia-Rathor opposition, quick and decisive action was necessary. So he called his son Mu‘azzam from the Deccan, and Muhammad A‘zam from Bengal, his other son Akbar being already with him. Tahavvur Khan, the governor of Ajmer, Hasan ‘All Khan, the governor of Ratanpur, and Muhammad Amir Khan, the governor of Ahmedabad, were given subsidiary commands to open the mountain passes and maintain the lines of communications.
The Mahardnd on his part took up his position on the crest of the Aravallls ready to pounce on the Mughuls whenever he thought fit. The rough circle formed by the massed hills of Mewar, stretch¬ ing from Udaipur westwards to Kumbhalmer, and from the Rajsamu dra lake southwards to Salumbra, formed a vast natural fort with three gates, opening east, north and west through which the defen¬ ders could sally out and fall upon any isolated enemy outpost or detachment. In short, the Mughul army was stretched along a long arc of which the Mahardnd occupied the short base. To reach him it was necessary to break through the three passes of Udaipur, Raj samudra and Deobari. The Mughul armies of Mewar and Marwar were divided by the Aravallls, and as the passes were controlled by the Sisodias the Mughuls had to make a long and toilsome detour in transferring troops from Chitor to Marwar. Thus, while Aurangzib attempted to crush the enemy under the weight of his superior num¬ ber and artillery, the Mahdrdnd took the fullest advantage of the terrain and adopted a strategy which enabled a small number of de¬ termined men to hold out against heavy odds. As we shall see later, the Mughul soldiers, always ready to fight in the open, would refuse to enter the defiles and narrow passes of the Aravalll. The Mahdrdnd also evacuated all the big cities and as much of the plains as possible.
Aurangzib struck the first blow. He left Ajmer on 30 November, 1679, and met with little effective opposition. The deserted pass of Deobari was occupied on 4 January, 1680, and soon after he entered the empty city of Udaipur. He systematically destroyed the country¬ side and broke the temples.
A detachment under Hasan ‘All Khan was sent into the hills to trace the Mahdrdnd. For some time this detachment was lost, but ultimately traced and reinforced. They succeeded in inflicting a defeat on the Mahdrdnd, and capturing his camp and property. In the meantime, Chitor was occupied, and Aurangzib visited it at the end of February, destroying sixty-three temples there. His task thus finished, Aurangzib returned to Ajmer on 22 March, leaving Akbar in charge at Chitor, satisfied, like the Mughul commanders before him, that with the capture of the cities, and establishment of some isolated Mughul garrisons, the enemy resistance would come to an end. It just began.
With the departure of Aurangzib, the Mahdrdnd launched his attack. The isolated Mughul outposts, always a source of weakness, were so harassed that the Mughul officers refused to command them. The Mughul supply trains and escorts also were attacked so success¬ fully that soon the Mughul soldiers refused to enter any pass. Heavier attacks were also launched, including a serious reverse suffered by Akbar at Chitor. At the same time raids were carried into the neighbouring Mughul provinces of Malwa and Gujarat. The invad¬ ing army of Gujarat under prince Bhlm Singh liberated Idar,; and plundered Vadnagar, Vishalnagar and some other rich cities of Gujarat including Ahmadabad, collecting much booty. In revenge for breaking the temples, Bhlm Singh destroyed one big and thirty small mosques.105
Aurangzib recognized that his plan of defeating the enemy by holding on to strategic points and devastating his country had failed. He was particularly disappointed by the reverses which Akbar suffer¬ ed at Chitor, so the latter was transferred to Marwar and a new plan adopted. Prince A‘zam, who had replaced Akbar at Chitor was ordered to advance by way of the Deobarl pass and Udaipur—Prince Mu‘azzam from the north by way of Rajsamudra, and Akbar from the west through the Deobarl pass. It was expected that the con¬ certed action would drive the Mahdrdnd out of his mountain strong¬ hold and eventually lead to his capture. However A‘zam and Mu‘azzam failed to achieve their objective (July, 1680).
Akbar, goaded by Aurangzib, made progress slowly and at a heavy loss. Now the Mahdrdnd and Durga Das adopted new tactics. Akbar’s second in command, Tahavvur Khan, had been ordered by Aurangzib to win over as many Sisodia and Rathor nobles as possi¬ ble. Thus he came into contact with them and formed with them •
a plot to declare Akbar the emperor of India, and soon the Prince was won over. Aurangzib also seems to have opened peace pro¬ posals,106 but while these negotiations were proceeding Mahdrdnd Raj Singh died on 1 November, 1680,107 and was succeeded by his son Jay Singh.
Jay Singh (1680-1698)
The death of Raj Singh temporarily stopped the negotiations, but soon after it was taken up. On 11 January, 1681, Akbar joined the Sisodias and the Rathors, and issued a manifesto deposing his father and crowning himself emperor. The next day he started for Ajmer to wrest the Mughul crown from Aurangzib.
If this foolish and indolent prince had not delayed on his way to Ajmer in merry-making, the history of India might have been different. For, when the news of Akbar’s rebellion reached Aurang¬ zib at Ajmer, he had only a few soldiers with him. But every day’s delay afforded him time to bring in reinforcements.
It took Akbar a fortnight to cover 120 miles that separated him from his father. Even so, before he could take any decisive action his hopes were foiled by an astute trick. Tahavvur Khan’s father in-law wrote him a letter that if he came over to Aurangzib he would be pardoned, otherwise his women would be publicly outraged and his sons sold for the price of dogs. This unnerved Akbar’s chief commander and he secretly left the camp and reached the Mughul camp where he was soon murdered. In the meantime, a letter addressed to Akbar by Aurangzib was made to fall in Durga Das’s hands in which Aurangzib thanked the prince for bringing the Raj¬ puts to their doom and gave him further instructions for the next day’s battle so that the destruction of the Rajputs might be complete. Durga Das went to find out the truth from Akbar but learnt that he was asleep. He next sent men to call Tahavvur Khan, but dis¬ covered that he had left for the imperial camp. This confirmed their suspicion and the Rajputs in a body rode off.
Durga Das, under the circumstances, was quite justified in leav¬ ing Akbar to his fate. But the next morning when the prince woke up he found himself left with a few hundred followers. He there¬ fore turned round and followed Durga Das, with whom he was able to establish contact after about a day. Durga Das also had by that time realized the trick that had been played on them and was re¬ turning to protect Akbar, for Durga Das’s honour demanded that Akbar should be saved at all costs. Akbar first went to Mewar, but the MaharcLnd refused to grant him asylum,108 so Durga Das most chivalrously agreed to escort him to the only court in India which could afford him protection—that is Shambhuji’s. After many hair¬ breadth escapes from the Mughuls, Durga Das conducted Akbar to Maharashtra, and there this gallant man stayed till 1687 to help the cause of the Mughul prince.
Though Akbar’s adventure had failed, in a sense it helped the Rajputs. Aurangzlb’s attention was diverted towards the south, and he was forced to come to terms with Mewar.
Mewar ends the war
While Akbar was proceeding against Aurangzib, a contingent of the Mewar army under Dayal Das advanced to attack prince A‘zam’s army. Dayal Das was defeated and forced to flee after killing his wife, lest she should be captured by the Mughuls.109
This action took place in the first week of February, 1681, and shortly A‘zam sent the Sisodia prince Shyam Singh, son of prince Garib Das and grandson of Mahdrdnd Kama, to open negotiations with Mewar.110 He advised the Mahamnd to conclude peace as Aurang¬ zib was most likely to offer favourable terms now in view of Akbar’s rebellion and the approaching rainy season. Jay Singh, therefore, sent some of his nobles to Ajmer, and by 23 February, the negotia¬ tions had so far progressed that Aurangzib sent a conciliatory far man to Jay Singh, accepting his peace offer, and directing him to visit Prince A‘zam, thus fulfilling the terms of the treaty entered into by Khurram.111
According to Shyamaldas, it was at this time, that Akbar was cornered by the pursuing Mughul forces and A‘zam wrote a letter to Jay Singh asking him to arrest Akbar, and if possible to kill him. Therefore Jay Singh decided not to permit Akbar to enter Mewar as stated above.
The terms of the treaty were soon arranged and were as follows:112
1. The Mahdrdnd would cede to Aurangzib the pargands of Mandal, Pur and Bednor in lieu of the jizya demanded from his kingdom.
2. The Mughuls would withdraw from Mewar and the condi¬ tion obtaining at the time of invasion was to be restored. 3. The Mahdrdnd was not to recruit any Rathor or deserter from the Mughul army.
4. Ajit would be recognized as vassal Raj'a and mansahddr when he came of age.
The treaty was concluded between Jay Singh and Prince Mu¬ hammad A‘zam on 24 June, 1681, with the usual pomp and ex¬ change of presents, and soon after Aurangzfb sent to the Mahdrdnd the customary robe of condolence for his father’s death Thus the war in Mewar ended but the war in Marwar continued for another three decades which will be described in a subsequent section.
Sir Jadunath Sarkar has stigmatized Jay Singh for his “signal incapacity” and the lack of military skill and the organizing genius of his great father. But Sir Jadunath also writes that “the Rajput war was a drawn game so far as actual fighting was concerned, but its material consequences were disastrous to the Maharana’s sub¬ jects. They retained their independence among the sterile crags of the Aravallis, but their cornfields in the plains below were ravaged by the enemy. They could stave off defeat but not starvation. The Mughals, on the other hand, might fail to penetrate into the hills of Kamalmer; their outposts might be surprised and convoys cut off oc¬ casionally but they held the low country and received supplies from all parts of the empire.”113
It seems that because Mewar had surrendered three districts in lieu of jizya, the Mahardnd refused to send the 1000 troopers which was Mewar’s contribution to the Mughul army. There is a letter in the Udaipur archives dated 7 August, 1684, in which Prince Muham¬ mad A‘zam informs the Mahardnd that he will get back the districts
which had been forfeited on account of the jizya if he immediately sent 1000 horse to the south.114 It appears, however, that nothing came out of this arrangement, and Pur, Mandal and Bednor were not restored to the Mahardnd,115 possibly because the Mahardnd had not sent the contingent. In 1690, the Mahardnd entered into a new arrangement under which he agreed to pay one lakh of rupees as jizya and receive back Pur and Bednor and his mansab was to be increased by one thousand.116
With the conclusion of peace, Jay Singh turned his attention to the administration of the country and to several irrigation projects, of which the most important was lake Jaysamudra, said to be one of the largest artificial lakes in the world.
The last years of his reign were clouded by the rebellion of his eldest son Amar Singh, and he had to enlist the help of Durga Das and the Rathors to recover his kingdom. The nobles, however, were able to effect a rapprochement between the father and the son, but the latter had to be granted a considerable independent jdgir (1692).
Jay Singh died on 9 October, 1698, and was succeeded by his son Amar Singh II, whose history really belongs to the period covered in the next volume.
Marwar and the Mughuls
In the previous section it has been related that Mewar entered into treaty relation with the Mughuls in 1681, but this did not end the war in Marwar. For though there was a clause in the above mentioned treaty under which Ajit was to be recognized as the vassal chieftain when he came of age, for the present Aurangzib persisted in ruling Marwar through his own Muslim officers. The people of Marwar refused to accept their rule, resulting in continued warfare for practically three decades (1681-1707).
The history of this warfare can be conveniently divided into four periods, namely (i) from 1681 to 1687, during which period Durga Das was in the Deccan; (ii) from 1687 to 1696 during which period Durga Das and Ajit were fighting against the Mughuls; (iii) from 1696 to 1701, a period of truce; (iv) from 1701 to 1707, renewal of the struggle and final liberation of Marwar.
(i) 1681-1687
Durga Das, as has been stated, felt it to be his duty to escort prince Akbar to a place of safety. As Shambhuji was the only king who could shelter Akbar, Durga Das and a band of Rathors escorted the prince to Maharashtra, eluding his pursuers with great skill. Though many Rathors returned to Marwar, Durga Das felt honour bound to guide and help the unlucky prince, and stayed with him till the latter, despairing of Maratha help, left for Persia in February, 1687. Soon after Durga Das returned to Marwar.
During this period, the Rathor nobles without any central authority had been fighting the Mughuls whenever and wherever possible. They were joined in 1681 by Mahakam Singh of Mairta who left the Mughul service to join the national struggle, and the Bhati tribe of Jaisalmer in 1682. The result of this sporadic but continuous warfare is graphically described by a bard: ‘‘An hour before sunset every gate of Maru was shut. The Muslims held the strongholds, but the plains obeyed Ajit. . . .The roads were now im¬ passable.”
(ii) 1687-96
Durga Das, as stated above, returned to Mlarwar in 1687 and was joined by Hada Durjan Sal, the foremost noble of Bund!. To¬ gether they slaughtered or drove away most of the Mughul garri¬ sons in Marwar and carried their raid into the imperial territory menacing even Delhi. However, they declined any engagement with the regular army that was sent against them from Delhi, and returned to Marwar via Sirhind. Near Mandal, Durjan Sal died in action, and Durga Das returned to Marwar, probably after sacking Mandal, Pur and Malpura.
In 1690, Durga Das signally defeated the governor of Ajmer and rendered Marwar so unsafe that Shuja‘at Khan, the governor of Gujarat (to which province Marwar was now attached), had to take personal charge of affairs in Jodhpur. He took reconciliatory mea¬ sures, granting land to some Rathor nobles and thus winning them over—while strong forces were sent to check the activities of Durga Dias. It was, however, impossible to guard adequately the route over which trade passed from Gujarat to North India through M3ar war. So Shuja'at Khan first tried to come to an understanding with the Rathors by paying them one-fourth of the imperial customs dues on all merchandise, and later attempted to divert the trade through peaceful Mewjar.117
In 1691, the Mughuls gained some respite as Durga Das and his Rathors went to help Maharund Jay Singh suppress the rebellion of his son, and in 1692 the Mughuls themselves began overtures for peace for the return of Prince Akbar’s children (a son and a daughter) whom he had left at Marwar. But nothing came out of these negotiations as Aurangzlb refused to yield to any of Durga Das’s demands. So in 1693 the war began again and Ajit guided by Durga Das began to cause disturbance,118 but Shuja‘at Khan, aided by other Mughul officers, forced Ajit and Durga Das to flee back to the hills.
This was the last Mughul victory in Marwar. The situation in the Deccan had become desperate and there was no chance of send¬ ing fresh troops to the north. Secondly, Aurangzib became extreme¬ ly anxious to get back his grand-daughter, Safiyat-un-nisa, and nego
tiations for this purpose began in 1694. The niggardliness and ob¬ stinacy of old Aurangzlb protracted the negotiations till 1696, when Durga Das sent her to Aurangzlb unconditionally. When the young princess arrived, Aurangzib immediately thought of making arrange¬ ments for teaching her Islamic scriptures, but she informed him, that that part of her education had been carefully attended to by Durga Das, who had secured for this purpose a Muslim woman from Ajmer, and that she (the princess) knew the Quran by heart.
Nothing could please Aurangzib more, who in a rare moment of generosity, wanted to grant whatever Durga Das demanded. So it was arranged by the intermediary, iswardas Nagar, the historian, that Durga Das should get a mansab and a money allowance, to which the emperor readily agreed, provided he brought back Akbar’s son, Buland Akhtar.
The negotiations, however, dragged for another two years as Aurangzlb refused to accede to Durga Das’s demand for restoring Jodhpur to Ajit. Aurangzlb’s idea was to purchase Durga Das by the offer of a rich mansab and money, but the honest Rathor spurned all proposals which involved the betrayal of the cause of his master’s heir.
Unfortunately, however, Ajit longed for peace. In 1696, he had married the niece of Mahdrdnd Jay Singh and now he became eager for a settled home and income. So in 1698, Durga Das agreed to surrender Akbar’s son, Buland Akhtar, in consideration of Ajit’s receiving the pargands of Jhalor, Sanchor and Siwanla as his jagir and a mansab in the imperial army.
Durga Das, in accordance with the terms of the treaty, escorted Buland Akhtar to the court at Islampur on the Bhima. After the prince had been presented to his grandfather, Durga Das was called. As he was about to enter the audience hall, he was ordered to be ushered in unarmed like a prisoner. Without a moment’s hesitation, the great soldier unsheathed his sword and the grand Mughul per¬ mitted him to enter fully armed. Only, as he approached Aurang¬ zlb’s throne a minister tied his wrist with a silk handkerchief, a theatrical gesture indicating captivity, and led him to the throne. The Emperor “graciously ordered Durga Das’s arms to be untied, appointed him a commander of 3,000 horse (nominal rank), pre¬ sented him with a jewelled dagger, a gold pendant (padak) and a string of pearls, and advanced him one lakh of Rupees from the imperial treasury.”119
(hi) 1696-1701
This was a period of comparative quiet during which Durga Das joined the Mughul service, and in order to keep him out of Mewar, Aurangzlb posted him as the faujddr of Patan, that is Anahilapataka, the former capital of the Chaulukyas. In October, 1700, Ajit peti¬ tioned the Emperor for some cash or jagir, in exchange for which he offered to come to the court. But he never came to the court, pro¬ bably suspecting treachery though repeatedly summoned to do so.
As will now appear, Ajit and Durga Das, who also kept himself away from the court, had good grounds for their suspicion. After the death of Shuja‘at Khan (9 July, 1701), Aurangzlb sent his son Muhammad A‘zam as the Governor of Gujarat with instructions to send Durga Das to the court, and, if he refused, to kill him. Accord¬ ingly, A‘zam summoned Durga Das to Ahmadabad which the latter obeyed and A‘zam made preparations for murdering him on his arrival to pay the customary respects. It so happened that the day fixed for the interview was a dvddasv, and Durga Das had fasted the day before. So he wanted to go to the prince after taking his meals, but the latter, impatient of delay, began to send him messengers in succession, bidding him to come. This put the wary soldier on the alert and without breaking his fast, he set fire to his camp and equipage and left for Marwar.
A force was immediately sent to overtake Durga Das. As this body drew near, his grandson begged his permission to fight an action to stop the pursuers and receive his first battle scars. Probably the gallant boy wanted to emulate his grandfather’s famous rear guard action near Delhi. He succeeded in stopping the pursuers at the cost of his life.
(iv) 1701-1707
On arrival at Marwar, Durga Das joined Ajit and the struggle began again. But this time Marwar was exhausted, many Rathor nobles took service under the Mahdrdnd of Mewar and some even with the Mughuls, and above all, difference broke out between Durga Das and Ajit who had no further use for his loyal servant. This shows not only Ajit’s stupidity, but the degeneration of the Rajasthan princes, who were no match for the Mughuls. Aurangzib took the fullest advantage of the situation and when in November, 1705, Durga Das, unable to maintain himself in barren independence, made his submission, Aurangzib promptly restored him his old mansab and post in Gujarat.
However, Durga Das never forgot his life’s cause. Next year (1706) the Marathias inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mughuls in Gujarat, and Ajit renewed the struggle for independence. Durga Das again left the Mughuls and joined Ajit.
Aurangzib took the usual measure for suppressing the Rathors, and while scattered actions were being fought in that unhappy country he breathed his last on 3 March, 1707. This happy news reached Ajit on 17 March, and he immediately took the road to Jodhpur. He expelled the Mughul commandant of the garrison and took possession of the city from which the Muslims fled in all direc¬ tions in Hindu garb. “The fort of Jodhpur was purified with Ganges water and tulsl leaves”.1120 Ajit Singh sat on his ancestral throne and Durga Das’s life-task was crowned with success.
III. MAHARASHTRA AFTER SHIVAJI (1680-1707) Shambhuji (1680-1689)
The death of Shivaji (1680) was followed by internal dissen¬ sions in the newly created Maratha State. He had not named any successor and his eldest son, Shambhuji, aged 23 years, was the natural choice. But, as mentioned above (pp. 273-4), his licentious character, and particularly his defection to the Mughuls, irritated his father who virtually kept him a prisoner in the fort of Pan hala. On the other hand, the only alternative to Shambhuji was Rajaram, son of queen Soyra Bai, a boy of ten, whose accession would mean a long regency of his mother, who did not possess the requisite qualification for the task. But as the two highest minis¬ ters of Shivaji, namely Moropant Pingle, the Peshwd, (Prime Minister) and Annaji Datto, the Surnis, (Finance Minister), both supported Soyra Bai, she had not probably much difficulty in con¬ vincing most of the generals and ministers, present at the capital, that the accession of Shambhuji would mean a great disaster to the State. So Rajiaram was proclaimed king and crowned at Raigarh on 21 April, 1680. It was, however, soon apparent that the people in general and the army outside the capital did not like this change in the normal order of succession. Apart from this, there was per¬ haps a far more serious—one might say ominous—cause for the split in public opinion in regard to the succession. This has been sum¬
med up by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in the following words: “The council of regency as constituted at Raigarh meant Brahman rule, and the commander-in-chief (a Maratha by caste) was not prepared to take his orders from a priestly Mayor of the Palace, any more than another Sendpati of the Maratha realm, Khande Rao Dhabare, was fifty years later.”121 In any case, ShambhujTs supporters, particularly soldiers, daily increased in number and he made him¬ self free by killing the Killdhddr of Panhala. He not only made himself master of Panhala but consolidated his possession of the South Maratha country and South Konkan and openly declared himself King. In the meanwhile the two ministers, mentioned above, who supported the cause of Rajaram, had advanced towards Panhala to check him. They were disheartened to hear of the rapid success of Shambhuji and hesitated to attack him. But at the end of May, Sendpati Iiambir Rao Mohite, who was near Panhala and had joined Shambhuji, arrested the two great ministers, Annaji and Moropant and took them as captives to Shambhuji. “There all the army chiefs assembled and recognized Shambhuji as their king.”122 The Peshwa recanted and Shambhuji took him into favour, while Annaji was thrown into prison. Shambhuji then advanced with 5,000 soldiers, which increased to 20,000 during the march, and entered Raigarh without any opposition (18 June, 1680). He treat¬ ed Rajaram with kindness and acted for the first few days with “combined vigour and thoughtfulness”.123 He formally ascended the throne on 20 July, 1680, and his coronation ceremony was per¬ formed with great splendour on 16 January, 1681.
Shambhuji enjoyed a fairly long respite from the attack of his great enemy, the Mughuls, for, as mentioned above,124 Aurangzib had then concentrated “all the military resources of the Mughul empire” in Mewar. The Mughul army in the Deccan continued the campaign in a somewhat leisurely fashion and Shambhuji showed a great deal of activity during the first three or four years of his reign. This is all the more remarkable as the new king had to face a lot of troubles at home caused by dissensions in his own family and the Government at Raigarh.
As mentioned above, Shambhuji had imprisoned AnnajI Datto, one of the chief conspirators who planned to oust him from the throne. But he not only released the traitor, but also appointed him Account¬ ant-General, a post second only in importance to that of the Peshwa. But, far from appreciating the generosity of the king, AnnajI lost no time in hatching a conspiracy with Soyra Bai and some other leading men to murder Shambhuji by poisoning his food. There is also a story to the effect that the conspirators approached the Mughul prince Akbar who, as mentioned above, fled from Rajputana and was given asylum by the Maratha king. But, so the story runs, Akbar not only refused to join, but informed Shambhuji about it. Whatever we may think of this story, there is no doubt that there was such a nefarious plot but it was detected in time and Shambhuji took terrible vengeance upon the conspirators. Eight ringleaders were trampled under feet of the elephants and twenty more were sentenced to death. Opinions differ regarding the fate of the prime mover Soyra Bai. She was “charged with having poisoned her hus¬ band (a year and a half earlier), and was put to a painful death, through poison (according to the Bombay factory report) or by star¬ vation (according to Chitnis)”.125 All these took place in October, 1681, and were followed by terrible persecution of the Shirkes, the family of Soyra Bai’s father. “Their property was seized, many of their members were killed, and the rest fled to Mughal territory, en¬ tered the imperial army, and tried to carry on their blood-feud with him (Shambhuji) to the end of his days.”126
All this was merely a foretaste of what happened almost throughout the reign of Shambhuji. This was largely due to the character and personality of the new king. His terrible vengeance on the partisans of Rajaram alienated the old officers of the State and “his rudeness, caprice and violence of spirit made even the highest of his officers feel insecure and unhappy in his service.” The in¬ evitable consequence was that conspiracies, desertions of officers and rebellion of vassals became almost a permanent feature during his whole reign.
ShambhujI did not trust, far less love, anybody, nor was he trusted and loved by any of his officers. There was only one excep¬ tion, a learned Brahman from U.P., generally known by his title Kavi-Kalash (Pinnacle of Poets), who proved to be a devoted ser¬ vant. He had gained the love, esteem and confidence of ShambhujI to such an extent that gradually he monopolised all the powers of government and was referred to as the “chiefest minister of State”. Though opinions differ, we may generally accept the view that the king became a roi faineant, blindly following the advice of this up¬ start minister and “devoting all his time to wine and women, with fitful outbursts of martial vigour.”127 The evidence of this martial vigour was shown by minor clashes with the Mughul troops and also by surprise raids into the territory occupied by the Mughuls in the Deccan.
The most notable of these surprise raids was that against Bur hanpur, the capital of Khandesh, at the end of January, 1681. As this serves as a typical example of the Maratha raid in future ex¬ tending as far as Bengal, more than seventy years later, it may be described in some detail. “The surprise was so complete that none could conceal or remove a penny worth of property or save his wife and children. The smoke of the burning houses first informed the governor of the enemy’s presence, but he was powerless to do any¬ thing and merely shut himself up in the fort. Lakhs of rupees worth of booty was taken in every pura (ward, seventeen of which, besides a rich suburb, were plundered). Many respectable men slew their wives and daughters and then fell desperately fighting the brigands, rather than see their family honour outraged. . . . For three days the Marathas looted the suburbs to their hearts’ content, without the least interruption and dug up the floor of every house, thus discovering the buried treasure of many generations past. . . . They carried off nothing but gold, silver and gems, and left the streets littered with the metal and China ware, clothing and spices which they had at first seized.”128
Similar raids against many other places were attempted, and though many of them were unsuccessful, they created terror and panic as may be gathered from the following description of the people of Aurangabad on the report of the approach of the Mara thas: “All houses were closed, the men sitting armed and tremb¬ ling and the women weeping within doors. The streets and bazars were entirely deserted/’129 But the timely arrival of the Mughul army saved the town. These descriptions are echoed in the Maha rdshtra-PurdV'Ci, a contemporary account of the raids of the Bargis (Maratha raiders) in Bengal during the rule of Alivardi Khan (1740-56).
While these raids and minor clashes with the Mughul troops were going on, the arrival of the fugitive Mughul prince Akbar130 and the protection given to him by Shambhuji (1681) opened a vista of romantic military enterprises of both against the Mughul Emperor Aurangzlb, including a plan to install Akbar on the Mughul throne after removing his father. But though ail these grandiose plans came to nothing, Akbar’s presence in Maharashtra had one important effect on the history of the Deccan. For it was the immediate cause of the arrival of Aurangzlb in the Deccan and his stay there till his death, with fatal consequences to the fortunes of Bijapur, Golconda, and, to some extent, also of the Marathas. These have been des¬ cribed in Chapter X and need not be repeated. The Mughul Em¬ peror started with an elaborate plan to conquer Maharashtra but, for reasons stated above, he could not achieve any substantial gain even after a year of his arrival.
In the meanwhile, Shambhuji undertook several military ex¬ peditions. The first was directed against the Siddis of Janjira. The enmity between the Marathas and the Siddis dates back to 1679 when Shivaji fortified the island of Khanderi and defeated the com¬ bined English and Siddi fleet that wanted to capture it. When Shambhuji ascended the throne the Maratha fleet consisted of 60 ships carrying 5,000 soldiers on board, and the number had in¬ creased to 135 (120 gallivats and 15 ghurabs) by May, 1682. To¬ wards the end of 1681 the Siddi fleet ravaged a large tract of terri¬ tory near Chaul and Shambhuji arrived with 20,000 men and a vast train of cannon to the coast opposite Janjira. From a hill he bom¬ barded that island continuously for 30 days and all the fortifications were razed to the ground. But as the Maratha fleet was no match for that of the Siddis the Maratha army could not cross the channel, 800 yds. broad and 30 yds. deep. So Shambhuji intended to fill up the channel with stones (according to some authorities with timber and bags of cotton). He employed 50,000 men for the purpose, but before the work was completed the Mughul invasion of Northern Konkan and capture of Kalian about the end of January, 1682, forced him to retire to Raigarh, leaving only 10,000 men to continue the siege. As the siege continued without any tangible success, the Maratha troops were carried in boats and made an assault on Janjira, but they had to retire with heavy loss (July, 1682). On 4 October, the Maratha navy of 30 gallivats was defeated by the Siddi squa¬ dron of 16 vessels, 8 miles south of Kolaba Point, while another Maratha squadron of 80 gallivats lay hiding and did not dare come to the assistance of the former. These clearly testify to the hope¬ less inferiority of the Marathas to the Siddis as a naval power.
Shambhuji next launched an attack against the Portuguese on the ground that they had helped the Mughuls against the Marathas in various ways, which was undoubtedly a fact. Shortly after the Mughuls retired from North Konkan, Shambhuji advanced with 1,000 horse and 2,000 foot and burnt Tarapur and all other towns from Daman to Bassein. But he failed in his attempts to take Chaul and other forts of the Portuguese, though he gained some success in the Portuguese territory on the coast to the north of Bombay. The Viceroy of Goa laid siege to the fortified town of Phonda, a Maratha possession, 10 miles south-south-east of Goa in October. But though considerable damage was done to the fort, the Portu¬ guese failed to take it and had to retreat with heavy loss. Over¬ joyed at this success Shambhuji next planned to seize the city of Goa and advanced with 7,000 cavalry and 15,000 infantry. He cap¬ tured the island of Santo Estevao, two miles north-east of Goa (14 November), inflicting heavy losses on the relieving force under the command of the Viceroy in person. The Marathia force also cap¬ tured Salsette, immediately to the south of Goa and the Peninsula of Bardes, north of Goa. But they were trapped into the small island of Kumbarju, immediately to the east of Goa, for as soon as the tide set in, the Portuguese flotilla occupied the two wide streams en¬ closing the island, and on the remaining side there was a heavy bombardment from the fort of Goa. Only “few of the 7,000 Mara¬ tha troops escaped alive.”131 On 5 January, 1684, the Mughul forces under Prince Shah ‘Alam which came to the assistance of the Por¬ tuguese occupied Bicholim, an important town of Shambhuji, and three days later a very powerful Mughul fleet reached the harbour of Goa. The disaster at Kumbarju and the news of the approach of Shah ‘Alam induced Shambhuji to retire to Raigarh, leaving the Mughul prince Akbar who had accompanied him and the minister Kavi-Kalash to negotiate a peace with the Portuguese. A peace was concluded on 20 January, 1684, on condition of the mutual restitu¬ tion of all conquests, and the Portuguese agreeing not to allow Mughul ships to pass within gunshot of their forts. But this treaty, forced on Shambhuji by his fear, was not ratified by him and hostili¬ ties continued till a peace, or rather truce, was patched up in October. “But languid hostilities with the Portuguese continued till the end of Shambhujfs reign.”132
Reference has been made above to the grandiose schemes plan¬ ned by Shambhuji and the Mughul prince Akbar. But instead of making preparations for a grand expedition against the Mughul Em¬ peror, Shambhuji had merely frittered his energy and resources by fights with the Siddis and the Portuguese. Between September, 1682, and the end of 1685, Shambhuji and Akbar discussed plans of invading Northern India through Surat with Akbar at the head of the expedition, but nothing came out of all these. The fact is that while the object of Akbar was to gain the throne of Delhi, Sham¬ bhuji, perhaps rightly, did not like the idea of invading North India in the company of Akbar while Aurangzlb was still in the Deccan with a mighty force. For there was the great risk that the Mughul emperor would conquer Maharashtra during his absence. In any case, Akbar gradually realized that Shambhuji did not sincerely desire to help him; so he decided to leave Maharashtra and actual¬ ly embarked for the purpose, but both Durga Das and Kavi-Kalash assured him that Shambhuji would keep his word and help him to defeat the army of the emperor (November, 1683). So Akbar gave up the idea of leaving Maharashtra, and there are reasons to believe that some serious efforts were made to help him. There was a rumour in September and November, 1684, that Akbar and Sham¬ bhuji would attack Surat. But nothing happened. In October, 1685, a body of rebels, about 4,000 in number, seized Broach and proclaimed Akbar emperor; but the move ultimately failed. In June, 1686, taking advantage of the absence of Aurangzlb and major part of his forces in Bijapur, Akbar made an attempt to seize Ahmad nagar and then march to Northern India to join the Rajputs; but it failed. There were rumours about other attempts of that kind, but nothing came out of these. At long last, the disillusioned Mughul Prince Akbar left for Persia in February, 1687.
In the meantime, the Mughul forces made great headway, and, as has already been mentioned, even two wives and one daughter of Shambhuji were captured by the Mughuls. According to the re¬ ports of the Dutch fathers, supported by Manucci, Shambhuji!, after his return from the Goa expedition, gave himself to pleasure and instead of guiding the military campaigns spent his time in wine and women. Manucci further states that “ShambhujI’s victories were not the fruit of his own labour, but were due to his officers.”133 When Aurangzlb was fully occupied in his campaign against Bijapur and Golconda, ShambhujI neither helped them in the larger in¬ terests of the Deccan as a whole, nor utilized the opportunity to im¬ prove his own position by any well-conceived plan. The Maratha forces were, as usual, engaged in making plundering raids in various directions, but these did him no good. The fact is that all the old and experienced officers had been removed from the court for one reason or another,134 and he had no competent agent to manage the distant parts of his dominions. Kavi-Kalash was the only capable minister, but being a northerner he was not liked by the Marathas. The situation was rendered worse by conspiracies, one after another, followed by the execution or imprisonment of important Maratha generals and ministers.135 Even Madras Karnatak passed out of the control of ShambhujI, for his brother-in-law ruled practically as an independent ruler with the title of Maharaja. The English factory records refer to the economic ruin of Maharashtra, the corruption of officers and the chaos and confusion caused by constant rebellions. The records ascribe the ruin of trade and industry to the misrule of ShambhujI and his absorption in pleasure.136 After the conspiracies in 1680, 1681, and 1684, the Shirke family whose defection has been noted above (p. 360) rose against ShambhujI in October, 1688, and attacked Kavi-Kalash. ShambhujI defeated the rebels and arrested many leading people, including ministers, on mere suspicion of com¬ plicity.137 On his way back to Raigarh he halted at Sangameshwar. How he was captured there (1 February, 1689) and put to death after prolonged torture on 11 March has been described above (pp. 288-9). It was a great tragedy, but just on the eve of his execu¬ tion he gave evidence of manliness which he did not show in life. The cruel murder of ShambhujI by Aurangzlb undoubtedly evokes our pity, but ShambhujTs life and reign hardly deserve our sympathy.
Rajardm (1689-1700)
At the time of Shambhujl’s death, his son Shahuv being a minor, Rajaram, the younger son of ShivlajI, who was kept in prison by ShambhujI, was proclaimed king by the ministers and crowned at Raigarh without any opposition on 8 (or 9) February, 1689.138 The military campaigns during his reign, both Mughul and Maratha, have been briefly described above (pp. 293 ff.) and need not be nar¬ rated in detail, but a few general features of the Maratha tactics may be stressed.
When Raigarh was besieged by the Mughul army on 25 March, 1689, Yesu Bai, the widowed queen of ShambhujI, infused courage and enthusiasm among the disheartened people by brave words and suggested a new tactics which was followed till the end. This may be summed up as follows:
1. That the members of the royal family, including the king, and important leaders should not all be concentrated in one place, even at the strongly fortified capital, Raigarh, but should scatter themselves in different quarters of the kingdom, so that the fall of one fort would not jeopardise the fate of the whole Government and people.
2. Able military generals, including those who were unjustly kept in prison and set at liberty in the new regime, should be in¬ spired by a sense of duty to their motherland and a spirit of supreme self-sacrifice, and carry on unceasing guerilla warfare or surprise raids on different Mughul posts, and harass the Mughul forces in every way.139
In accordance with this policy, Rajaram himself left Raigarh with his family and, moving from one place to another such as Pratap garh and Panhala, ultimately reached Gingee. “Some of the other leaders, Ramchandra Pant Amatya, Pralhad Niraji and Shankaraji Malhar Sachiv, also left Raigarh and in mutual consultation from different places commenced an unprecedented campaign of fire, plunder and brigandage into the Mughul territory, using a network of spies to obtain information of the enemy’s movements.”140 Two young chieftains, Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav, particularly distinguished themselves and almost created havoc in the Mughul camps. On one occasion they even stealthily approached the im¬ perial tent and cut down the supporting ropes so that the whole tent came down and crushed the inmates. Aurangzib himself was saved by the lucky chance that he spent that night in his daughter’s camp. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has paid glowing, but well-deserved, tributes to these two heroes in the following words:
“In the long history of his struggle with the Marathas after the sun of Maratha royalty had set in, the red cloud of Shambhuji’s blood and the people’s war had begun. Santaji Ghorpade and Dhanaji Jadhav were the two stars of dazzling brilliancy which filled the Deccan firmament for nearly a decade, and paralyzed the alien in¬ vader.”141 Words like these from one who is not easily carried by emotion are very high praises indeed.
Rajaram’s flight to Gingee gives one more evidence of the great political foresight of Shivaji. By a wonderful prescience he had felt the necessity of establishing a long line of fortified possessions from Maharashtra to distant Tanjore, via Bangalore, Vellore and Gingee, so as to form a new line of defence which he might utilize to his advantage if occasion or necessity arose. In the dire neces¬ sity caused by all-round Mughul efforts to crush the Marathas by simultaneous invasions from different sides, it proved to be a god¬ send and when Rajaram found it impossible to hold Panhala against the Mughul attack, he fled to Gingee “after undergoing many perils and hair-breadth escapes from the Mughal pursuers on the way.”142 After the romantic adventure of more than a month and a half’s journey he at last settled in Gingee, far away from Maharashtra, in November, 1689, and was joined by his ministers and other officials. Henceforth, Gingee became the seat of the royal court and centre of Maratha activity against the Mughuls. According to contemporary account, “the Chiefs of the Karnatak lands hailed Rajaram as an uncommon hero and made his cause their own. They brought him presents of money, provisions and materials and having been actuated with a spirit of vengeance against Muslims, offer¬ ed every kind of service to the Maratha king.”143 The neighbouring city of Tanjore was the capital of a Maratha State ruled by a cousin of Rajaram. In Gingee the king administered the affairs of State with the help of his Council of eight ministers, a system established by Shivaji, to which he added a ninth called the Pratinidhi, a post specially created for Pralhad Niraji who had rendered most valu¬ able service. As could be expected, Gingee was besieged by the Mughuls, but it was captured only after 8 years, on 7 February, 1698. Rajaram had left the place in preceding December and fixed his capital at Satara in October, 1698.
The Marathas were inspired by high hopes during this long and arduous campaign. The Maratha documents clearly state that the aim of this war was not only freedom of Maharashtra but “includ¬ ed even the conquest of Delhi, so as to make the whole sub-conti¬ nent of India safe for the Hindu religion.”144 This laudable object was constantly preached to wean away many Maratha Chiefs who had accepted service under the Mughuls. A stirring appeal was issued by Rajaram from Gingee on 22 March, 1690, of which an ex¬ tract is quoted below:
“We have enlisted on arrival in the Karnatak forty thousand cavalry and a lac and a quarter of infantry. The local Palegars and fighting elements are fast rallying to the Maratha standard.... You must now put forth the sacrifice required on behalf of our religion. . . .Aurangzeb has wronged you by threatening to convert you to his religion. He has already converted (names follow) .... He also entertains further deep-rooted motives of a sinister nature against our nation, of which you must beware. The Nimbalkars and the Mianes have already deserted him and his ranks are being rapidly thinned. God is helping us. We are sure to succeed.”145 Many documents of this nature reflect the spirit of the people and there cannot be any doubt that during the last one or two decades of the seventeenth century Aurangzib was faced with what may be truly described as a national war. “Animated by a desire to avenge their wrongs, the Maratha bands spread over the vast territories from Khandesh to the south coast, over Gujarat, Baglan, Gondvan, and the Karnatak, devastating Mughal stations, destroying their armies, exacting tribute, plundering Mughal treasures, animals and stocks of camp equipage.”146 Aurangzib began to realize that while he could easily win a battle over the Marathas, it was very difficult for him, even with his vast resources, to cope with their guerilla tactics, particularly as they were very familiar with the lay¬ out and communications of the country, had the active and enthu¬ siastic support of the people wherever they went and were inured to hardships, bad weather and simple food.
Moreover, Aurangzib’s shrewd attempts to win over the Mara¬ thas by temptations of all kinds, though at first successful to a cer¬ tain extent, gradually failed, as stern measures were taken to punish the wives, children and even other relations of the deserters, and the traitors to the cause of the Marathas, if caught, were terribly persecuted. The justice or morality of the steps taken may be questioned, but they proved successful to a very large extent.
The guerilla warfare, which was the main cause of Aurangzib’s discomfiture in the long run, in spite of brilliant victories against Maratha troops in battle, became the typical method of Maratha aggressive warfare for more than a century and a half and led them to success after success all over India till their dream of establish¬ ing a Hindu Pad PddshaM was almost on the point of being realized. Though the beginnings of this type of warfare may be traced back to the days of Shivaji, it was fully developed in the last stages of the Mughul campaign in Maharashtra, particularly during the reign of Rajaram. It has been described as follows by Chitnis in his Rajaram’s Life in the following words:
“The Mughal forces are huge in numbers, standing firm only in open ground. The Marathas on the other hand suddenly erupt at one place today and tomorrow elsewhere some fifty miles away. Then they come round again and execute unexpected raids, making only a show of a fight, plunder and fly away. They fall upon for¬ aging parties, attack weakly held Mughal posts, capture strategic points and thus inspire confidence among their followers. They devastate Mughal territory from the river Godavari to Bhaganagar (Hyderabad), carrying away pack animals, horses and elephants, create confusion among the enemy, and remain concealed in un¬ frequented thickets widely apart and make a sudden dash upon the Mughal armies proceeding towards Jinji (Gingee), occasionally en¬ gaging in an open encounter and anyhow preventing them from reaching their destination. The Emperor (Aurangzlb) found him¬ self nonplussed how to overcome these pests. They seemed to be ubiquitous and illusive like the wind. When the attacking Mughal forces had gone back, the scattered Marathas, like water parted by the oar, closed again and resumed their attack as before.”147 Things came to such a pass that sometimes the Mughul commanders would rather bribe the Marathas than fight them.
Santaji Ghorpade, the Sendpati, mentioned above, was reputed to be a “perfect master of guerilla warfare” and the fame of his wonderful achievements reverberated throughout Maharashtra. But, unfortunately, his biting tongue and boastful demeanour not only irritated his colleagues but even his superiors including Raja ram. The climax was reached when in the course of an altercation with his King, Rajaram, he bluntly told him: “Your position is all due to me. I can make and unmake Chhatrapati.” This was too much even for the mild king. He dismissed Santaji and appointed Dhanaji as Sendpati in his place. This led to a quarrel between these two; from words they came to blows; and there was a free fight between them in June, 1696, in which Dhanaji was defeated and one of his prominent partisans was taken prisoner and trampled to death under the feet of an elephant. This unfortunate episode need not be pursued further and described in detail. Suffice it to say that Rajaram issued orders to capture Santaji, who fled from place to place, fought with the royal force, was defeated and ulti¬ mately killed under circumstances not exactly known.148
But this tragic incident did not affect the guerilla warfare of the Marathas against the Mughuls. After the fall of Gingee Raja¬ ram came back and, as Raigarh was in the Mughul possession, esta¬ blished his seat of Government at Satara (1698). The war against the Mughuls was carried on with full vigour by several young Maratha leaders who were destined to win name and fame in future. In a letter dated 22 December, 1699, Rajaram writes: “We have launched the full force of our armies against the Emperor.... led a furious attack upon the imperial camp . . . captured the Emperor’s own daughter; fell upon a convoy of ten thousand pack animals carry¬ ing supplies.... The enemy has lost all courage, and can make no effect against fort Satara. We now take no account of this powerful emperor whom, God willing, we shall soon put to rout.”149
Subsequent events proved that Rajaram’s boast was not without justification. But, unfortunately, he was not destined to witness the final triumph. He died shortly afterwards on 2 March, 1700, at the age of thirty. Rajaram’s reign was an eventful one, paving the way for the future greatness of the Marathas. But the credit for this must be given not so much to the king as to his wise counsellors and brave generals. According to Sardesai, “he possessed no dash or initiative, nor did he evince any personal valour.. . . There is not a single occasion recorded in his life on which Rajaram showed per¬ sonal daring or capacity for government. ... His mind and body were both weak, due possibly to dissipation and the use of opium to which he is said to have been addicted. His virtue was of a nega¬ tive kind, non-interference.”150
One significant innovation in military administration made by Rajaram was big with future consequences. He introduced the system of granting lands to military commanders in lieu of cash money which was definitely opposed to the policy initiated by Shivaji and hitherto pursued. Its origin may, perhaps, be traced to the policy of Aurangzib to make grants of lands to the Maratha leaders to induce them to join the Mughuls. As a counterpoise the Maratha Government probably felt it necessary to offer similar inducements. So they encouraged the Maratha leaders to conquer lands from the Mughuls by holding out the promise that the lands so acquired would be their hereditary property. Perhaps want of funds to pro¬ vide for the expenses of the Maratha generals was an additional ground for such promise. For it is known that the leaders of Maratha troops borrowed money on the mortgage of their prospec¬ tive conquests, and it is very natural that the hope of acquiring hereditary property would add zeal and ardour to their military en¬ terprises. But whatever may be the origin of the new policy, there is hardly any doubt that it led to the great Maratha houses like those of Sindhia and Holkar, which led to the rapid extension of the Maratha dominions in future, and at the same time it was the main cause of the disintegration of the Maratha Empire.
But all these were in the womb of futurity when Rajaram died and, as stated above (p. 296), was succeeded by his son, four years old, bearing the proud name of his illustrious grandfather, Shivaji (III). It did not mean, at least theoretically, the deliberate exclu¬ sion of Shahu, the son of ShambhujI, for he was then in confinement in the Mughul camp. Tara Bai, the mother of the infant king, was a very capable administrator and “for a time inspired greater vigour and enthusiasm among the whole Maratha nation than her husband had done.”151 All the generals and leaders rallied round her and the war against the Mughuls was carried on as before. “Tara Bai exhi¬ bited wonderful powers of organization and inspired one and all with a sense of devotion to the national service.”152 She managed the State with singular ability, a fact testified to even by Muslim writers. She herself guided the military operations moving to different forts and directing operations. To her belongs, to a large extent, the credit of the triumphant emergence of the Marathas from the great fight with the Mughuls which practically terminated with the death of Aurangzlb in 1707.
IV THE JATS
1. Origin and Early History
The Jats are a hardy tribe, pre-eminently agricultural, and well known for their valour, indefatigable energy, martial spirit and un¬ tiring perseverance. They are mostly tall, with fair complexion, dark eyes, long head, and “narrow and prominent but not very long” nose.153 “The region mainly occupied by them may be roughly de¬ fined as bounded on the north by the lower ranges of the Himalayas, on the west by the Indus, on the south by a line drawn from Haidara bad (Sindh) to Ajmir and thence to Bhopal, and on the east by the Ganges.”154
The tribal feeling is very strong among them and although all of them do not belong to the same religious fraternity but prefer dif¬ ferent religions, viz, Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam, they cling tena¬ ciously to their “tribal name as a proud heritage, and with it the tradition of Kinship.”155 Another important trait of their character is strong individualism. “The Jat is, of all the Punjab races, the most impatient of the tribal or communal control and the one which asserts the freedom of the individual most strongly... .He is inde¬ pendent and he is self-willed, but he is reasonable, and peaceably inclined if,left alone.”156
The system of caste distinction is not in vogue in the Jat society, and so all the Jats are on a footing of equality in so far as their social status is concerned. In their rural organisation they prefer election of headmen to succession by hereditary right. The origin of the Jats, like that of the Rajputs, has been a subject of keen con¬ troversy. Some regard them as descendants of the nomadic Scythian hordes of Central Asia who invaded India through the north-western passes like the Sakas and the Hunas and settled in India. The close resemblance of the name alone is perhaps responsible for the theory that their forefathers were the nomadic Getae of the Oxus region. On the other hand, similarity of physical features, language and, to a certain extent, of religious and social institutions, lends support to the theory of Aryan origin of the Jats, and eminent authorities like Dr. Trumpp, Beames, Sir Herbert Risley and Dr. Qanungo are in favour of it on most or all of these scientific grounds. It is on the whole more reasonable to regard the Jats as Aryan settlers in India and not foreign invaders of a subsequent age like the Sakas and the Hunas.157
The Jats claim that they are descendants of the ancient Yadavas. The Bharatpur princes, for example, regard themselves as of the same race as the Yadavas.158 But we need not attach much historical value to such traditions, unsupported by positive evidence.
From the scanty information which we derive from different sources it does not appear that the Jats played any significant role in the history of India prior to the reign of Aurangzlb, although stray incidents of their undaunted valour are referred to at different times.
In the third decade of the eleventh century they were bold enough to attack the army of Sultan Mahmud of Ghazni on his re¬ turn journey from Somnath. It was to punish them that in the autumn of A.D. 1026 he undertook his seventeenth expedition to India. Both Nizam-ud-din Ahmad and Firishta say that he marched to Multan with a large force, and on his arrival there, he constructed a fleet of fourteen hundred boats, each of which was furnished with iron spikes, projecting from the prow and sides. There were twenty archers in each boat, with bows and arrows, grenades, and naphtha. On receipt of information of this armament, the Jats sent their families, together with their valuable articles, into the neighbouring islands, and, with a flotilla of four thousand boats according to some, and eight thousand according to others, met the enemies. A serious naval engagement followed in which they (the Jats) were defeated, and almost all of them were either drowned or slain, and their women and children made captives.159
After the fall of Prithvlraj in the second battle of Tarain in A.D. 1192, the Jats of Hariyana, under their leader Jatwan, invaded Hansi and compelled its Muslim governor to take shelter in the fortress. Qutb-ud-dln marched post-haste to his relief, and, on his approach the Jat leader raised the siege and met him in an engage¬ ment in which, after a bloody contest, Jatwan was defeated and killed.160
Later on, references are found about their predatory habits in different places and in different times. Their activities seemed to have been kept in check to a great extent during the strong admi¬ nistration of the Surs and the Mughuls. As in the case of the Sikhs,161 so in the case of the Jats, the bigotry of Aurangzib and the conse¬ quent disabilities, humiliations and sufferings of the Hindus ex¬ cited the Jats and caused great discontent among them.
The Mughul government had been following a policy “which left behind it a legacy of undying hatred.102 One faujdar of Mathu¬ ra, Murshid Quli Khan Turkman (who died in 1638) had offended the Jats by abduction of women from the villages and religious gatherings at Govardhan on the birth day of &n Krishna/63 Abdun Nabi Khan, another faujdar of Mathura (August, 1660—May, 1669) “built a Jama Masjid in the heart of the city of Mathura (1661- 1662) on the ruins of a Hindu temple. Later, in 1666, he forcibly removed the carved stone railing presented by Dara Shukoh to Keshab Rai’s temple.’'164* All these at last goaded the Jats to break out into open rebellion.
2. Revolt
(a) Gokla
In 1669, the Jat peasants rose under their leader Gokla, the Zamindar of Tilpat. Abdun Nabi, who opposed them, was slain in the action. The rebels then sacked the pargand of Saidabad, and disorder and confusion followed in the neighbouring district of Agra also. Aurangzib dispatched a powerful army under Radandaz Khan to suppress them, but it was of no avail, and the situation became so critical that the emperor himself had to proceed to the disturbed area. With undaunted courage, Gokla assembled twenty thousand men, met the imperialists at a place twenty miles off from Tilpat and fought against them most heroically, but his men were no match for the disciplined and well-equipped Mughul army led by Hasan ‘All Khan, the faujdar of Mathura. Being defeated in the sanguinary battle, Gokla fled to Tilpat which was then besieged by the imperialists and it fell after three days. The imperialists lost 4,000 men while Gokla lost 5,000. Seven thousand Jats, in¬ cluding the leader Gokla and his family, were made prisoners. Gokla was eventually slain at Agra, and the members of his family con¬ verted to Islam.165
(b) Rdjdrdm
But the spirit which Gokla had infused into his men did not die with him, and after several years, other capable leaders step ped into his place. They were Rajaram, son of Rhajja Singh, Chief of Sinsani, and Ram Chehra, Chief of Sogor.1'66 They gave military training to the Jat peasants, equipped them with fire-arms, and gave them the semblance of an organized and regular army. They also built several small forts (garhi) in the midst of deep forests and erected mud walls around them for defence against artillery. These forts served as refuges in times of necessity, bases for mili¬ tary operations and places for storage of their booty. The road from Delhi to Agra and Dholpur, and thence via Malwa to the Dec can lay through the Jat country, and the Jats carried on plundering raids on this highway and the suburbs of Agra. The emperor’s long stay in the Deccan and consequent military weakness in Nor¬ thern India had encouraged them to plunder the ill-guarded rich convoys passing through their country. Safi Khan, the governor of Agra, was unable to check the lawless activities of Rajaram who had closed the roads to traffic, sacked many villages, and proceeded towards Sikandra, but Mir Abu-1-Fazl, the faujddr of the place, succeeded in driving him back only after a stiff fight, thus saving the tomb of Akbar from being plundered.167
Rajaram became more daring and attacked Aghar Khan, the great Tunani warrior, near Dholpur, while on his way from Kabul to Bijapur, and not only carried off a booty consisting of carts, horses and women but also slew the Khan with his son-in-law and eighty followers, when he was pursuing the raiders (1687).168 Mir Ibrahim, entitled Mahabat Khan, was also attacked, near Sikandra, on his way to the Punjab, but the raiders were driven back after a hard contest. After this, Rajaram sacked the tomb of Akbar, and damaging the building, carried away carpets, lamps, precious stones, and gold and silver vessels, etc. (1688).169
Highly perturbed at the atrocious deeds of the Jats, Aurangzib sent his grandson, Bidar Bakht, to take charge of the military ope¬ rations against them. Although the prince was a lad of seventeen only, he proved worthy of the charge imposed on him, and tried his best to improve the situation. An internecine war was then going on between the Shekhawat and Chauhan clans of Rajputs in which the Shekhawat clan secured the support of the Mughul faujddr of Mewat, and the Chauhan clan that of Rajaram. When a severe bat¬ tle was going on between the contending parties, the Jat leader was killed by a Mughul musketeer (July, 1688).170
Bidar Bakht then besieged the fort of Sinsani but the Jats haras¬ sed the Mughuls in every possible manner, by cutting off their food and water supplies and making incessant night attacks in their camps. In spite of these hardships, the Mughuls continued their siege operations with great tenacity, and at last captured the fori (1690).171 Bishun Singh Kachhwa, Raja of Ambar (Jaipur), who had been appointed faujddr of Mathura with special duty of sup¬ pressing the Jats, surprised the fort of Sogor when its gate was found open to receive its supply of grain (21 May, 1691).m
Thus fell the two important strongholds of the Jats, and their power was humbled for the time being but not crushed permanently. They remained quiet for some years till another formidable man arose to lead them.
(c) Churaman
This was Churaman (1695-1721), the son of Bhajja Singh and younger brother of Rajaram. Churaman started his career as a free¬ booter, and, within a short time, brought under his leadership one thousand infantry and five hundred horsemen. At first, he used to plunder wayfarers and merchant caravans, but, later on, when his strength increased, he sacked pargands also. He built a place of refuge in the midst of a thick forest about forty-eight Kos from Agra and dug a deep moat around this refuge which was gradually made into a mud fort, subsequently known as Bharatpur.173
‘‘Being more enterprising than those who had preceded him, he not only increased the number of his soldiers, but also strengthen¬ ed them by the addition of fusiliers (musketeers) and a troop of cavalry, whom he shortly afterwards set on foot and having robbed many of the ministers of the Court on the road, he attacked the royal wardrobe and the revenue sent from the provinces.”174
He re-occupied Sinsah! from the imperialists but could not re¬ tain it long and lost it again in October, 1705.
He had great capacity for organization and was a practical poli¬ tician, who made “clever use of opportunities”, whenever possible. Many of his activities and the full development of his power were seen after the death of Aurangzib when the disturbed political condi¬ tions in the Mughul Empire due to the wars of succession among the sons of this emperor, and then among the descendants of Bahadur Shah, afforded him suitable opportunities to achieve his objective.
The history of Churaman after the death of Aurangzib will be treated in Vol. VIII.
V. THE BUNDELAS
1. Early History
The origin of the Bundela clan is extremely obscure. They themselves claim to be a branch of the Gaharwar clan and to have migrated from the country round Banaras. It is said that one So han Pal came down to the Western part of the region, which later came to be called Bundelkhand, and about A.D. 1292 he managed to establish a small independent principality there. In the begin¬ ning of the sixteenth century A.D., one Rudra Pratap, ninth in de¬ scent from Sohan Pal, rose to eminence, and in 1531 founded the town of Orchha and made it his capital. All the existing Bundela ruling families are the direct descendants of Rudra Pratap.
The Bundelas as a race possess sturdy physique and indomit¬ able courage. The environs of their new surroundings greatly en¬ couraged and fostered their restless spirit of adventure and enter¬ prise. Bundelkhand was an absolutely wild tract and especially difficult of access in the rainy season. Its dense forests, the rapid streams and the steep hills shielded them from all outside invaders.
When Akbar ascended the Mughul throne, Rudra Pratap’s se¬ cond son, Madhukar Shah, was ruling at Orchha. Under his leader¬ ship the Bundelas gathered strength, extended their territories and were forged into a formidable force. All this raised Madhukar Shah’s political importance. After repeated Mughul expeditions he was forced into submission in 1578, but even later, more than one expedition had to be sent to keep him under check.
2. Blr Singh Bundela
Madhukar Shah’s reckless adventurous spirit was inherited by his second son, Bir Singh, who took up the life of a freebooter soon after his father’s death in 1592. Later, when Prince Salim re¬ volted against his father and set up his own Court at Allahabad, Blr Singh took up service with him. Later, in 1602, at the instiga¬ tion of Salim, Bir Singh intercepted Abu-’l-Fazl, then returning to Agra from the Deccan, and murdered him near Antri (about 16 miles south of Gwalior). The Mughul forces relentlessly pursued Bir Singh for this outrage during next three years but without any success. On Akbar’s death, however, when Salim ascended the throne as Jahangir, fortune smiled on Bir Singh, who was duly rewarded with 3-hdzdri mansab. Two years later Bir Singh was made the ruler of Orchha State, thus replacing his elder brother, Raja Rom Chandra (also known as Ram Shah), who had to rest con¬ tented with the small principality of Chanderi.
Blr Singh was a great favourite of Jahangir and hence ‘he acquired such power as scarcely any other of the Rajas of India attained to.’ The Bundela power reached its zenith under him. He grew in wealth and power, and in later days when the imperial administration grew slack, he extended his own territories and brought under his rule vast neighbouring fertile tracts and even levied contributions from the neighbouring princes. He was a great builder as well. The palace-fortress and temple at Orchha and the magnificent palace at Datia were all built by him, and are most note¬ worthy as marking a definite stage in the evolution of mixed Hindu Mughul architecture with peculiar elaborations characteristic of the local style. Blr Singh was permitted by Jahangir to build a temple in Mathura at a cost of 33 lakhs of rupees, which was later turned into a mosque by Aurangzlb. Blr Singh was a great patron of Hindi poetry; the great Hindi poet, Keshav, was a jewel of his Court.
Blr Singh’s reign, glorious as it was, left behind a legacy of bitter family feuds, which more than once threatened the very exist¬ ence of the premier Bundela State of Orchha. The descendants of the displaced ruler, Rajia Ram Chandra, and the other branches of the Orchha family formed an opposition group against Blr Singh and his successors, and whenever any opportunity presented itself they asserted their own independence and cut themselves off from the parent State. Thus, the independent principalities of Chanderi, Datia and others ceased to follow the lead of the rulers of Orchha, and when occasion demanded they did not even hesitate to assist the Mughul forces in invading Orchha State.
3. Jujhar Singh
On Blr Singh’s death in 1627, his eldest son, Jujhar Singh, succeeded him. He went down to Agra and paid homage to the new Emperor Shah Jahan. He was confirmed in his rank and jdgir but soon after he left the capital without permission and began to prepare for his own independence at Orchha. In 1629 more than one imperial force began to close down on Orchha from different sides. Irich was attacked and taken. Any further opposition seemed useless and Jujhar Singh was forced into submission. He agreed to pay a large tribute and to send down a contingent of his force on service with the imperial army in the Deccan.
But Jujhar Singh could not long remain quiet. In 1634, he took the old Gond capital, Chauragarh, slew its Raja, Prem Nia rayan, and seized his treasures. Shah Jahan sent three armies to invade Bundelkhand from three different sides, wth Prince Aurang¬ zib as their nominal supreme commander. Devi Singh Bundela, the great-grandson of Raja Ram Chandra, who was offered the throne of Orchha, most readily assisted the imperial armies in this inva¬ sion. Thereupon, Jujhar Singh lost heart and removed his family from Orchha, which was stormed and taken by the Mughul troops in October, 1635. Jujhar Singh fled to Dhamuni and thence across the Narmada to Chauragarh. Mughul forces pursued him even further through the Gond country of Deogarh and Chanda. Jujhar Singh and his son Bikramajit were finally surprised by the Gonds when asleep in the jungles and done to death in December, 1635.
4. Champat Rai Bundeld
Devi Singh was installed as the ruler of Orchha (October, 1635), but the nobles of the Bundelas refused to bow to the traitor. They now rallied round Champat Rai Bundela of Mahoba, the great grandson of Udayajit, the third son of Rudra Pratiap. Champat Rai had ail along been a close associate of Raja BIr Singh Dev and had earned the reputation of being a brave fighter and courageous leader of men. He had developed his small jtigir into a principality of his own and had extended the bounds of its territories into eastern Rundeikhand at the expense of the Rajias who were still ruling there. He delighted in opposing the Mughul forces and fought both times on the side of Jujhar Singh, but he did not follow him in his flight. He crowned Jujhar Singh’s infant son, Prithviraj, and raided the territories of Orchha. In the meanwhile, as Devi Singh had failed to restore peace and order in the Orchha State, it wras taken out of his control and he reverted to his principality of Chanderi. Orchha continued to be without any ruler for the next six years.
All efforts of the various successive Mughul officers to restore peace and order in Bundelkhand failed. The boy-ruler, Prithviraj, was captured (April, 1640) and lodged in State prison at Gwalior, but Champat Rai had escaped and was still at large. At last in May, 1642, Raja Pahar Singh Bundela, the younger brother of Jujhar Singh, who had all along loyally served the Mughul empire, was appointed the ruler of Orchha. Within a month Champat Rai sub¬ mitted to him and entered into his service with the approval of the Emperor. Peace and order was thus restored in Bundelkhand.
But the good relations thus established between Pahar Singh and Champat Rai did not last long. Champat Rai left Pahar Singh, took up service with Dara, and accompanied him to the third siege of Qandahar. Bitter animosity now prevailed between Pahar Singh and Champat Rai, and the former managed to bring Champat Rai into disfavour with Dara. Pahar Singh died soon after (1654), but Champat. Rai had his vengeance on Dara four years later when he showed to Aurangzlb an obscure and out-of-the way, but a safe ford of the Chambal for his forces to cross it (May, 1658). Champat Rai fought for Aurangzlb in the battle of Samogarh and continued to be on his side till the advance of Shuja4 towards Khajuha, when he deserted from the army of Aurangzlb and returned home to take up his old game of robbery. He made extensive raids and rendered the Malwa roads extremely unsafe. He robbed the territories of other Bundela Chiefs also as freely as the Mughul dominions. But this could not continue long and in February, 1659, Aurangzlb sent a Mughul force under Subhakaran Bundela against him, which was further reinforced some time later by Raja Devi Singh Bundela and other troops from Malwa. Champat Rai now became anxious to make peace, but all his overtures were turned down. He moved from one place to another, seeking shelter, but was relentlessly pursued and even his one-time friends and re¬ latives declined to give him refuge. Most of the local Bundela Chieftains, too, joined in this hunt. Finally, about the middle of October, 1661, he ended his life by committing suicide.
5. Chhatra Sal: his career up to 1707 A.D.
Thus perished Champat Rai, but his fourth son, Chhatra Sal, who had accompanied his father in his last flight, escaped his father’s enemies. A few years later, at the request of Mirza Raja Jai Singh, he was enlisted in the Mughul army and accompanied him to the Deccan. lie fought well in the Purandhar campaign (1665) and the invasion of Deogarh (1667). But Chhatra Sal did not feel happy while serving the Mughuls. He longed for a life of adventure and independence like that of Shivaji; hence he visited Shivaji and sought to enter his service (1670). Shivaji, however, advised him to return to his own country and promote local risings against Aurangzlb so as to distract the Mughul forces. Chhatra Sal’s efforts to win over loyal but experienced Bundela leaders, like Subhakaran, to join him in his plan for a national rising against the Mughul Empire, failed. All the enthusiasm and efforts of Chhatra Sal would have ended in nothing, had Aurangzlb not unwittingly come to his help by launch¬ ing at this very moment upon the policy of temple-destruction which aroused universal indignation among the Hindus, and those of Bun delkhand and Malwa prepared to defend the places of their religious worship. Hence, when Chhatra Sal appeared in their midst to op¬ pose the Mughul empire, he was hailed as the champion of Hindu faith and Bundela liberty. The rebels elected him as their king. Memories of Champat Rai were once again revived and the hopes of gains from plunder soon gathered round Chhatra Sal vast hordes of Bundelas and discontented Afghans who had settled down in these parts.
Chhatra Sal’s earlier raids were mostly directed against the Dhamuni district and the rich city of Sironj. The Mughul officers in charge of these places were unable to successfully resist Chhatra Sal. Many petty chiefs now joined Chhatra Sal and like the Mara thas he levied chauth and spared the places that paid it to him. As Aurangzlb became more and more deeply entangled in the Dec can, Chhatra Sal took fullest advantage of the opportunity. He captured Kalinjar and Dhamuni and even looted Bhilsa. The range of his raids now extended up to Malwa. In 1699, however, Chhatra Sal had to face a temporary reverse at the hands of Sher Afghan, the faujddr of Ranod, but a year later, in the return fight, Sher Afghan was killed and there was none left in these parts of the country who would dare oppose Chhatra Sal. Finally, in 1705, Firuz Jang induced Aurangzlb to make peace with this irrepressible Bundela. Chhatra Sal was granted 4-hdzdrl Mansab and he visited the emperor in the Deccan. He stayed there in peace till the death of Aurangzlb, when he returned to Buldelkhand.
6. Bundelkhand in A.D. 1707
Since the time of Akbar, Bundelkhand had been included in the suba of Allahabad. The position had remained unchanged even in 1707. At this time, however, Bundelkhand itself was roughly divided into two main political units, eastern and western. In eastern Bundelkhand, Chhatra Sal had carved out a big kingdom for himself. The long period of his continued opposition to the Mughul rule ended in 1705, and now there followed a period of about fifteen years during which Chhatra Sal fully co-operated with the Mughul Empire. In western Bundelkhand there were two large Bundela States, Orchha and Datia, which had remained undisturbed for the last fifty years, save what depredations Chhatra Sal or his associates committed there during their innumerable raids. Raja Udaut Singh was then ruling over Orchha and he continued to guide its destinies for another thirty years. Datia State once formed part of the Orchha State, but it had lately emerged as a separate State, mainly due to the continued loyal brilliant services of its two suc¬ cessive rulers, Rao Subhakaran and his son Rao Dalpat. Dalpat, however, was killed in the battle of Jajau, and for once in 1707 Datia was threatened with internal strife due to disputed succes¬ sion. Again, there was the petty State of Chanderi ruled over by the descendants of Raja Devi Singh, who was installed as the ruler of Orchha in 1735. There were also numerous other small jdgirs and zamindaris interspersed with the imperial lands, which only added to the difficulties and disorders of the province.
APPENDIX
AKBAR’S MEWAR POLICY
If one may use a modern term, Akbar opened his “peace offen¬ sive” against the Rajasthan States in 1562, when he married the daughter of Raja Bharmal of Ambar. Abu-l-Fazl writes that Bhar mal offered his daughter (AN, tr. II, 243), but it is more probable that he was induced to do so and, in any case, there must have been exchange of diplomatic agents and views before the Raja offered his daughter to Akbar.
During the next five years Akbar was busy with subduing various rebellions, ,and consolidating his position; but during this period, too, he remitted the pilgrim tax in 1563 and the jizya in 1564 (AN, II, 295, 317). There was, however, no response from the Rajasthan princes to these generous moves. Ultimately he must have been persuaded that force of arms was necessary to subdue Rajasthan, and that if Mewar were conquered other States would submit peacefully. This calculation was not wrong, for after the fall of Chitor several important Rajput States submitted voluntarily to Akbar (AN, II, 518, 522). Still Mewar was not conquered.
For the next few years Akbar was busy elsewhere and could afford to ignore Uday Singh. However, Akbar re-opened his “peace offensive” against Rajasthan after crushing the Gujarat rebellion in 1573. Uday Singh had died the previous year, and Akbar pos¬ sibly expected his son to submit tamely. According to Abu-’l-Fazl, several officers including Man Singh, Jagannath and Gopal were ordered by Akbar to proceed from Gujarat to Dungarpur by way of Idar and from there to Agra. Abu-l-Fazl adds: “The Rana and other zamindars of the neighbourhood were to be treated with princely favours and to be brought to do homage, and the dis¬ obedient were to be punished.” (AN, tr. Ill, 48-9). Man Singh was opposed at Dungarpur, but he defeated the local army. He then went to Udaipur where he was by all accounts received cor¬ dially by Mahdrdnd Pratap. Abu-’l-Fazl states that the Mahdrdnd “put on the royal khilat”, but “owing to his evil nature he proceed¬ ed to make excuses (about not going to court) alleging that ‘his well-wishers would not suffer him to go.’ ” (AN, tr. Ill, 57). Raj¬ put chronicles are unanimous that Man Singh took umbrage at Pratap’s refusal to sit with him to dine. It is not difficult to re¬ concile the two versions, but the main point is that both the Mughul and Mewar versions agree that at first the Mahdrdnd received Mian Singh with at least outward show of cordiality, but refused to attend the Mughul court.
However, the Mahdrdna’s behaviour must have been such as to make Akbar believe that he could still be persuaded to accept his terms. So a few months after Man Singh’s mission, his father Raja Bhagwan Das, after subduing idar, came to Gogunda, the temporary capital of the Mahdrdnd. Abu-’l-Fazl writes that the Mahdrdnd expressed his contrition, and sent with Bhagwan Das his son (AN, tr. Ill, 93). In the previous paragraph (ibid, 92) Abu-’l-Fazl has mentioned that Bhagwan Das presented to Akbar “Umra, the son and heir of the Rana.” But this Umra or Amar was most probably the son of the Raja of Mar, whom Bhagwan Das had just defeated. Before we discuss this point, we shall only note another mission sent by Akbar to the Maharand.
Shortly after Bhagwan Das, Todar Mai also met the Maharand, but failed to accomplish anything. (AN, tr. Ill, 93). It is possible to conclude from Abu-’l-Fazl’s laconic reference to Todar Mai’s visit to the Maharand that the resources of diplomacy were exhausted and the issue could only be decided by war.
The point, however, to be considered is how far the Maharand was ready to accommodate the Mughul demand. Did he really send his son, Amar Singh, or agree to do so? The probability is against such a conclusion for the reasons given below.
In this connection Kaviraj Shyamaldas justly points out the following statement in Jahangir’s Memoirs:
“The real point was that as Rana Amar Singh and his father, proud in the strength of their hilly country and their abodes, had never seen or obeyed any of the kings of Hindustan, this should be brought about in my reign.” (Tuzuk, tr. I, 274). It is apparent, therefore, that Amar had never visited the Mughul court. Sir Thomas Roe, who was with Jahangir, when Kama, the son of Maharand Amar, came to the court also writes that this was the first time a descendant of Porus (i.e. Kama) visited the Mughul court. It is also to be noted that in 1614, peace was concluded by Prince Khurram with Maharand Amar Singh on practically identical terms, namely that he would send his son Kama to the Mughul court but would not attend himself, and Jahangir took it to be a great triumph, which indirectly shows that Maharand Pratiap never offered such terms.
There is another factor which has not yet been noticed by any historian. Maharand Praiap had an unusually huge elephant call¬ ed Ramparsad, which was captured by the Mughul army during the battle of' Haldlghat, and brought to Akbar by the historian Badaunl. In this connection Badaunl writes: “....I came back to Fathpur with news of victory and brought with me the well-known elephant (the subject of dispute) from Rana Kika” (Badaunl, tr. II, 234-35). A little later, Badaunl again states: “Then the Amirs wished to send to the Emperor the elephant named Ram-parsad which had come into their hands with the spoil (and which His Imperial High¬ ness had several times demanded of the Rana and he, unfortunately for him, had declined to surrender it)....,” Badaunl tr. II, 241. It is evident from Badaunl that according to him the elephant was the cause of dispute. This may not be wholly true, but Abu-’l-Fazl corroborates Badaunl to some extent, for describing the battle of Haldlghat he states: “. .. .Ram Parshad. . . that noted elephant— which had often been a subject of conversation in the sacred assem¬ blies....” (AN, tr. Ill, 246) and among the booty brought by Badaunl, he specially mentions Ram Parshad (ibid, 247). By sacred assembly, Abu-’l-Fazl meant Akbar’s court. It is evident that the Mahdrdna had refused to surrender to Akbar an elephant, though Akbar’s weakness for elephants was quite well known. Is it likely that such an uncompromising man would agree to send his son to the Mughul court? We do not think so. Added to this is Abu-l-Fazl’s silence as to when Amar returned to his father. It seems to us, therefore, that Abu-’l-Fazl’s uncorroborated testimony that Pratap sent his eldest son to Akbar’s court is wrong.
1. Memoirs of Babur, pp. 612-13. Babur refers to Karmavati as Padmavatl. 2. Ibid., pp. 616-17.
3. Bayley, Gujarat^ p. 350. T';A. Ill, pt.i, 350; pt.ii, 610-11. An inscription mentioned by Ojha (History of Udaipur p. 291) records the repair of certain Jam temples at Satrunjaya by Ratna Singh’s minister Karma Singh with the help of a farmein of Bahadur. Ojha rightly points out that this farman must have been issued at the instance of Ratna Singh probably during these nego¬ tiations.
4. According to the Virvinod (II, 5) a Rajput tradition persists that Surya Mai, afraid of the growing tension with Ratna Singh, induced his sister Karma¬ vati to send a rdkhi to Humayun. But apparently nothing came out of this. 5. Bayley, Gujarat, 357.
6. Ibid., 370.
7. Ibid., Virvinod, II, 27.
8. “Tatar Khan expected that, as the Rana had a large force at his disposal, he would offer battle and oppose his advance, but no opposition was made.” Bayley, op. cit. 370.
9. Muhanote Nensi mentions (Khyat, Hindi tr. I, 54) that Vikramaditya’s brother Uday Singh was given to Bahadur as hostage. But not only no other Rajput source, but not even any Persian source, mentions this event. Further, Nensi’s statement that Bahadur’s intention was to convert Uday Singh and adopt him as his (Bahadur’s) successor seems to be quite improbable. Nensi further adds that Uday Singh, on learning of Bahadur’s intention, fled from his camp, which led Bahadur to besiege Chitor for a second time.
This may appear plausible, for Bahadur was offered practically the same terms which he ultimately obtained, before he opened the siege, and then suddenly returned, which apparently seems inexplicable. But Bahadur had good reasons to draw out of Chitor, as during his absence, Nizam Shah had invaded Gujarat.
For a discussion of Nensi’s story, see Ojha, History of Udaipur, I, 396, f .n. 3. Ojha also rejects Nensi’s story partly on the grounds mentioned above. For Bahadur’s personal obligation to Karmavati, see Bayley, op. cit., pp. 305, 372.
10. Virvinod, II, 29.
11. Bahadur committed the same mistake, when after the fall of Chitor, instead of attacking Humayun, he prepared a strong defensive position relying on his artillery to drive off Mughul attacks. As a result, soon he was reduced to such straits, that one night he had to flee from his camp, and his army, till then victorious, never recovered from this shock.
12. Virvinod, II, 63-64. Muhanote Nensi, Khyat, Hindi, tr. I, 57. Ojha, History of Udaipur, I, 404.
13. Abbas Sherwani, Tdrikh-i-Sher Shahi, HIED, IV, 406; Qanungo, Sher Shah, p. 332; Ojha op. cit., p. 406; G. N. Sharma, Mewar and the Mughul Emperors, p. 61. According to Sherwani, followed by Dr. Qanungo, Sher Shah left Mewar in charge of two Muslim officers. There is nothing how'ever to indi¬ cate that Uday Singh was driven out of Chitor. It is likely that these two officers were political agents. .
Though no chronicles record it, it is quite probable that Uday Singh had come to an understanding with Sher Shah before he sent him the key. Sher Shah’s fight with Maldev had been a very close affair, and he must have thought it politic to be a friend of Maldev’s enemy.
14. “In Rajputana Sher Shah made no attempt to uproot the local chiefs or to reduce them to thorough subjection as he had done in other parts of Hindusthan. He found the task dangerous as well as fruitless. He did not aim at the complete subversion of their independence”, K. R. Qanungo, Sher Shah, 333.
15. AN, Tr. II, 443-44; Ojha, op. cit., 412; V. Smith, Akbar the Great Mogul; 82; Sharma, op. cit. iBadaunl, tr. II, 48.
According to Abu-’l-Fazl, Akbar one day jestingly remarked to Sakta Singh, a son of Maharana Uday Singh, that though most of the chieftains of India had paid him respect, the Maharana had not done so, so he proposed to punish him. Thus alarmed, Sakta ran away without leave to warn his father. This enraged Akbar who determined to chastise the Maharana (AN, II, 442; 462). What Abu-TFazl overlooks is that up to 1567, the only State in Rajas¬ than which had paid homage to Akbar was Ambar.
Nizam-ud-din and BadaunI relate that Akbar was enraged at Uday Singh for his giving asylum to Baz Bahadur. This may have been a minor cause. What is surprising is first, that Akbar should have suddenly decided to attack Chitor, when from Uday Singh’s past records he could have expected a peace¬ ful surrender, and secondly that Uday Singh on his part should have contested the issue in 1567 instead of surrendering as he had done to Sher Shah in 1543. This indicates that surrendering to Siier Shah was a token surrender but Uday Singh realized that Akbar’s intentions were quite different. If we ignore Tod’s account of Uday Singh, which is usually accepted by modern historians, it would appear that instead of being a poltroon, Uday Singh was a cautious but determined man, without the dash and brilliant leadership of his illus¬ trious son, but not altogether an unworthy sire. What is overlooked in the general condemnation of Uday Singh for not sharing the fate of the besieged garrison at Chitor is that he never surrendered to the Mughuls as did most other chiefs of Rajasthan. It seems to us, that under the circumstances, his decision to quit Chitor was the correct one, and the fact that the fort heroically held out for some time shows that he had some power of organization. It may be recalled that Maharana Pratap left Kumbhalmer, almost under similar circumstances, but that does not reflect on his honour, and nobody would say of him as V. Smith, following Tod, says of Uday Singh that, “Udai Singh shamelessly abandoned the post of honour and hid himself in distant forests.” V. Smith, op. cit. 86.
16. Virvinod, II, 75, 83.
17. For reference, see Sharma, op. cit., p. 71.
18. AN', tr. II, 466-67, Smith, op. cit., 88. Sharma, op. cit., 76.
19. Virvinod, II, 80-81. Ojha (op. cit., 414-15) apparently follows Virvinod, though he does not refer to it. Sharma, however, contests Ojha’s view on the ground, that no other Rajput source mentions it, and that the Amara kavya vamsavali states that he died on the spot. The verse quoted by Dr. Sharma, however, is corrupt, (p. 76, f.n. 61) and according to his correction (p. 252) should read as follows:
Dillisa-samyukta-guti-prahasat Srx-Jaimalakhyo ravi-mandala mahat I Vibhidya paschat tridivam prayatah . .antahpure jvdlita eva tad bhataih II There is nothing in the verse to show that Jai Mai died on the spot; on
the other hand paschat tridivam praydtah indicates that though he was hurt by Akbar’s shot he died later.
Dr. Sharma’s other contention is that no other Rajput source corroborates MM. Ojha. Here he is wrong, for, as pointed out, MM. Ojha probably got his facts from the Virvinod. It should be noted that Kavlraj Shyamaldas knew the other version and in a footnote remarks that Abu-’l-Fazl being on the enemy side did not know the truth.
20. Virvinod, II, 82.
21. BadaunI, tr. II, 137, AN, II, 513-19; see also Ojha, History of Bikaner; I; 155-56.
22. BadaunI, tr. II, 239.
23. The Amarakavya, quoted by Shyamaldas, gives certain information about Uday Singh which, if true, would show that he enjoyed considerable local power, Virvinod II, 87. Shyamaldas’s evaluation of Uday Singh (Virvinod, II, 86) is far nearer the mark than Tod’s.
24. The custom in the Mewar royal family is that the successor to the throne does not attend the cremation of the deceased king, Ojha, op. cit., 423, f.n. 3. 25. Sharma (op. cit., 86, f.n., 14) points out that the State emblem “bears testi¬ mony to this day to the equal status given to the Bhils where both Pratap and a Bhil are standing on either side of Eklingji, the titular deity of Mewar.” 26. “On seeing this circumstance the Rana could no longer hold his ground but left the ranks and fled, and confusion fell on the army of the Rana.” BadaunI tr. II, 238.
27. Ojha, op. cit. 463-64; for a traditional account of Bhamashaha’s (Pratap’s Prime Minister) administration of the treasury, Virvinod, 251.
28. See Appendix.
29. AN, tr. HI, 236-37. Akbar gave Man Singh written instructions. For a des¬ cription of the battle of Haldighat, see AN, tr. Ill, 244-47; Badauni, tr. II, 233-44. V. Smith’s description of the actual battle is scanty (Smith, Akbar, the Great Mogul, 148-53) and he relies to some extent on Tod (Annals of Rajasthan, Routledge, 1914, I, 264-78) though he avoids Tod’s palpable mis¬ takes without pointing them out, as was done by Shyamaldas (Virvinod, H, 154-55). See also Ojha, op. cit., 429-43, for the traditional account of the battle and for a very interesting quotation (p. 441, f.n. 1) from the un¬ published Jagadis temple inscription; G. C. Sharma, op. cit., 91-106, gives the best account of the battle. He has consulted several unpublished Rajput chronicles and has discovered an interesting inscription, (p. 91, f.n., 18).
30. Badauni, tr. II, 240.
31. Badauni, tr. II, 241.
32. Badauni, tr. H, 247. Abu-’l-Fazl states: “The officers (i.e. Man Singh and Asaf Khan) from prudential motives did not go in quest of him, and on account of the difficulty in transporting provisions they came out of that stony land and reared the standards of victory in the open plain.” (AN, tr. Ill, 259-60). This indicates that Man Singh was forced to evacuate Gogunda. 33. AN, tr. Ill, 269.
34. AN, tr. Ill, 267.
35. AN, tr. Ill, 272.
36. AN, tr. Ill, 274.
37. AN, tr. Ill, 274-5.
38. AN, tr. Ill, 277.
39. Abu-’l-Fazl does not give the date of Shahbaz Khan’s appointment, AN, tr. Ill, 339. But it is apparent from p. 337 (ibid) that it could not have been long after 11 March, 1578. Sharma (op. cit. Ill) gives the date of Shahbaz Khan’s expedition as 15 October, 1577, which is evidently wrong; Sharma does not give any reference for this date.
40. Abu-’l-Fazl states that Bhagwan Das and Man Singh were sent back, “lest from their feelings as landholders there might be delay in inflicting retri¬ bution on that vain disturber (the Rana)”. AN, tr. Ill, 339. It appears that Man Singh was still under some suspicion. It is possible, as stated in the Tdrlkh-i-Nizami that he refused to devastate Mewar (Badauni, tr. II, 247, f.n. i). As we have seen, after the battle of Haldighat also Man Singh’s action or inaction gave rise to suspicion. AN, tr. Ill, 259-60.
40a. AN, tr. Ill, 340. The Maharand seems to have left the fort after this accident. 41. For an account of the besieged garrison, see, Virvinod II, 257; Ojha, op. cit., 447.
42. AN, tr. Ill, 355, 380. Shahbaz Khan, like other commanders before him, seems to have thought that with the capture of Kumbhalgarh, Udaipur, etc. his task was finished.
43. Abu-’l-Fazl writes: “Owing to his (Shahbaz Khan’s) energy and good Ser¬ vices, Rana Pertab became a desert-vagabond, and fell upon evil days. He thought every morning would be his last day, and blistered his feet with running about in terror.” AN, tr. Ill, 459-60.
44. AN, tr. Ill, 661.
45. AN, tr. Ill, 705-06.
46. Virvinod, II, 159.
47. Ibid, II, 157.
48. Amaresah Khdnkhana-daranam haranam vyadhat I
Suvdsinibat santoshya preshaydmdsa tain puna'll II
(Raj Prasasti, IV, v. 32. Virvinod, II, 588).
Kumarastv-Amaresa nama Mlechchhd-bhimdna
kshayakdri-dhamd
Jagrdha vai Serapuraj-javena sa
Khdna-khanasya-kalatram apa
(Amarakdvya Vamsdvali, f. 45 (b)«
Quoted from Sharma, op. cit., 115, f.n. 119. Sharma quotes another Rajasthani verse to the same effect.)
49. Ojha (op. cit. 467) accepts the same date as given in the Virvinod, (II, 164) but gives the Christian date as 19 January. The difference of ten days is probably due to Ojha’s converting it into N.S. The Maharand was born on Jyeshtha Sukla 13, 1493 V.S. 31 May, 1539).
50. V. Smith, Akbar the Great Mogul, 151.
51. For details, see, Sharma, op. cit., 123. Ojha, op. cit., 491, 506. 385
52. AN, tr. Ill, 1155. It is not possible to find out the date of this expedition but it was in the 45th regnal year which began on 11 March, 1600, ibid, 1233.
53. AN, tr. Ill, 1233-34.
54. For the reasons which led to Sagar’s joining the Mughuls, see, Virvinod, II, 219-21. Sagar is not mentioned in the AN, and it is possible that he came to Akbar’s notice after the 46th year of Akbar’s reign (1601), that is, the end of Abu-’l-Fazl’s Akbar-namd. Sagar however is several times mentioned in the Tuzuk, where he is referred to as Shankar.
55. Tuzuk, tr. by Rogers, I, 17.
56. Ibid, 26.
57. Ibid, 29.
58. Ibid, 50.
59. Ibid, 70, 73.
60. Ibid, 74, 90. Shyamaldas gives a detailed account of Parvlz’s campaign which, as he correctly states, is not to be found in Persian chronicles (Virvinod, II, 222-224). He states that Parvlz brought Bagha Singh to Jahangir (ibid, p. 223). Jahangir is silent about Bagha Singh’s subsequent fate. Ojha (op. cit. pp. 480-81) is somewhat wrong in stating that Bagha’s going to the Mughul court is not mentioned in any Mewar history, for the Virvinod, which Ojha has usually followed, definitely mentions him. Sharma (op. cit. 128) mentions that, Parviz, finding no hope of success, opened negotiations through Bagha Singh, but Sharma is silent about his coming to the Mughul court. Jahangir’s evidence on this point seems to be conclusive, but it also shows that Amar was not at this time prepared to accept Jahangir’s terms.
61. Tuzuk, tr. I, 76. At this time we find Rai Singh and his son Dilip rebelling in Nagor, and Jagannath Kachwa, who was operating against the Mahdrana sent to suppress this rebellion (ibid, 76); but Jahangir later pardoned them (ibid, 148).
62. Virvinod, II, 224 ff.
63. Tuzuk, tr. I, 146.
64. Ibid, 146-47.
65. Ibid, 155.
66. Virvinod, II, 225. It is stated that some Mewar soldiers entered the Mughul camp as fruit-sellers, really carrying rockets instead of fruits. At night, others, who were outside the camp, tied some lamp round the horns of buffalos and drove them towards the Mughul camp. This was the signal for firing the rockets near Mahabat’s tent. When he came out he saw the rockets and moving lights in the forest, and about 500 Mewar soldiers rushing in. He over¬ estimated their strength and ran away.
67. Madsir-ul-Umara, quoted by Sharma, op. cit., 130, f.n. 40-41. Virvinod, II, 225-7.
68. Jahangir states that ‘Abdullah pursued the Rana into the hills and when night came he (the Rana) escaped with difficulty with his life, Tuzuk, tr I, 157. 69. Later Jahangir sent to his aid Safdar Khan and Badi’uz-Zaman, T'uzuk tr. I.
pp. 200-201, 204-05. Shyamaldas records that in 1884 a priest called Sukhananda came from Nurpur (Raja Basu’s capital) who had with him a copper-plate grant of land to one Vyasa, chief priest of Raja Basu, by Maharana Amar Singh. Shyamaldas has reproduced this grant (Virvinod, II, 227-28). He also states that Amar gave an image of Krishna called Vrajaraj, which had been worshipped by MIrabai, to Raja Basu v/hich was still in the fort of Nurpur. If this grant is genuine, then it would appear that Amar had entered into some sort of arrangement with Raja Basu.
70. For reasons which led Jahangir to go to Ajmer, see, Tuzuk, tr. I, 249, 255; for sending Khurram, and the conduct of Khan A‘zam, ibid 257-58. During his stay at Ajmer, Jahangir broke the image of Varahavatara set up by Sagar, (ibid, 254), or Shankar as he habitually refers to him. This shows the little esteem which Jahangir had for Sagar. Jahangir also refers to him now, as one of his ‘high nobles’. This indicates that Sagar had by 1613 given up all pre¬ tences to the Mewar throne, or Jahangir, in order to arrive at a peace, had with¬ drawn Sagar, so that Amar need have no reason to complain on that account.
71. Tuzuk, tr. I, 259 260'. It should be noted that Jahangir not only recalled Khan A‘zam, but imprisoned him in Gwalior (ibid, 261). Later, one night he dreamt Akbar saying to him: “Baba, forgive for my sake the fault of ‘Aziz Khan, who is the Khan A‘zam.” (ibid, 269). Jahangir is unlikely to have taken the drastic step of imprisoning Akbar’s favourite foster-brother unless he was in¬ volved in something more serious than disagreement with Khurram. Khan A‘zam had been carrying on treasonable correspondence with the ruler of Khan desh during Akbar’s reign and the letters were discovered by Jahangir (ibid, 79-80), yet Jahangir took no step against him except exposing his perfidy. It is possible that goaded by the high-handedness of young Khurram, ‘Aziz Koka had started negotiations with the Maharand, and after his downfall when Khurram conducted the campaign vigorously it was decided to come to terms. 72. Tuzuk, tr. I, 273.
73. Shyamaldas began to write the Virvinod in 1879 (Virvinod, I, 184), but his present account is corroborated by the Amarakavya vamsavali written just after V.S. 1732 (A.D. 1675) quoted by Sharma, op. cit, 135, f.n. 57. Possibly Shyamaldas, who consulted all available records had seen the Amarakavya vamsavali. For the account of the surrender to the Mughuls, see, Virvinod, II, 235-36.
74. This farman was in Udaipur archives when Shyamaldas wrote his history. 75. Virvinod, II, 237.
76. Jahangir writes that the Maharand “fell at Khurram’s feet and asked forgive¬ ness for his faults.” (Tuzuk, tr. I, 276). But the author of the Iqbal-ndma (text III, 536) states: “I as a Bakshi was present on the occasion and, therefore, I could clearly see that the Rana was making low salutation.” quoted by Sharma, op. cit., 136.
Jahangir most probably got the report of this interview from Khurram, who left for Ajmer (where Jahangir was staying) with Kama on the afternoon of the day the Maharand visited him. Khurram naturally was anxious to bring this affair to a speedy termination which his grandfather had tried in vain, and therefore is quite likely to have impressed Jahangir by exaggerated accounts of Rand's humility.
77. Tuzuk, tr. I, 276.
78. “As it was necessary to win the heart of Kama, who was of a wild nature and had never seen assemblies and had lived among the hills, I every day showed him some fresh favour.” Tuzuk, tr. I, 277.
79. Ibid, 278. I think it is permissible to imagine that the Empress and the Mughul ladies were curious to see the scion of the house which had defied the Mughul arms for nearly half a century.
Jahangir’s gifts to Kama are too numerous to be mentioned in detail. But the eagerness of the Emperor to please the Prince is matched by his poetic imagination. He writes: “On the 8th I gave Kama the mansab of 5,000 personal and horse, and gave him a small rosary of pearls and emeralds with a ruby in the centre which in the language of the Hindus is called Smaran (Sanskrit for ‘remembrance’)”. Tuzuk, tr. I, 281. Jahangir had, a few days before, presented Kama with “a rosary of pearls of great value”, ibid, 278,
80. Ibid, 289, 293. Jahangir also gave him some shawls etc.
81. Ibid, 296.
82. He died on Wednesday, Magh, Sukla 2, 1676. V.S. Shyamaldas gave the date in Christian era as October 30, 1620, Virvinod II, 266. Ojha however gives the date as 26 January, 1620. Ojha, op. cit., I, 507.
83. B.P. Saxena, History of Shahfahdn of Delhi, 37. Saxena does not identify Bhlm with the Mewar Prince, but Shyamaldas states that he was the Son of Maharand Amar, Virvinod, 285.
84. Saxena, op. cit. 50, 52. For a detailed account of Bhlm’s activities from the Rajasthani chronicles see, Virvinod, II, 285-88.
85. Virvinod, II, 270-73, 589. Among other proofs Shyamaldas quotes a verse from the Rajasamudra Prasasti composed about 60 years after this incident which seems to be quite conclusive.
Dillisvara)-Jahangira tasya Khurrama-namakam I
Putram vimukhatdm prdptam sthapayitvd nija kshitau II
Jahdnglre divamyate sange bhrataram-Arjunam I
Datvd Dillisvaram chakre so’bhut Shdhijahdmbhidhah. II
86. For details of Jagat Singh’s reign, see, Virvinod, II, 315-327 and Ojha, op. cit., II, 511-31
87. B.P. Saxena: History of Shahjahan, 320.
88. Ojha, op. cit., II, 533-34. Chandra Bhan’s four letters in original Persian are reproduced in the Virvinod, II, 403-412.
89. Virvinod, II, 413-14.
91 Five letters from Aurangzlb are printed in the Virvinod, II, 415-424. The letters are not dated, but the last letter carries the news of victory of the battle of Dharmat (April 15, 1658). Aurangzlb evidently tried to enlist the help of the Mahdrdnd, but as the latter’s replies are not published, it is not possible to say what help Raj Singh rendered to Aurangzlb. It is evident from these letters that the Mewar contingent which was fighting in the Deccan (Sarkar, History of Aurangzlb, 1912 ed., I, p. 272) was with him during the war of succession.
92. Shah Jahan had named this prince Saubhagya Singh, but the Mahdrdnd did not like the name and changed it to Sultan Singh.
93. Virvinod, II, 425-431. Shyamaldas published these documents from the Udai¬ pur archives. Sir Jadunath Sarkar did not notice these in his History of Aurangzlb possibly because he had no access to the Virvinod, as, for unknown reasons, its circulation was prohibited till recently.
94. Ibid, 432-433.
95. Ibid, 437-443. Mahdrdnd’s appeal is also reproduced in which he admits having gone to Krishnagarh for marriage without permission but claims that a Rajput is free to marry any Rajput girl, though further details are not given. Ibid, 440. In the Raja-samudra-prasasti inscription, however, the allusion is quite clear.
sate saptadase purne varsha saptadase tatah
gatva Krishnagade divya mahatyd senaya yutah
Dilllsdrtham rakshita yd Rdjasimha naresvarah
Rdthoda Rupasimhasya putryah pdnigraham vyadhat
(Rajasamudra-prasasti VIII, vv. 29-30. Virvinod, II, p. 596-97). The Raja vilasa, a work composed during the life of Raj Singh gives the text of Charumati’s letter (quoted by Sharma, op. cit., 160, f.n. 30). It may be noted that Charumati’s sister was married to Mu’azzam.
96. For details of Aurangzlb’s Marwar policy and subsequent war with Marwar and Mewar, see Sarkar, History of Aurangzlb, III (1921 ed.), 322-373; B. N. Reu, Marwar kd Itihas, Ojha and Sharma, op. cit.,
97. Sarkar, op. cit., 330.
98. This account of escape is based on Sarkar. But Shyamaldas states that Durga Das fled away with the prince a day before the action took place (Virvinod, II, 828-29). This, however, does not seem to be probable, as after Ajit had been carried away, there would hardly be any reason for the Rathors to fight the Mughuls in Delhi. Shyamaldas also states that the other son of Jasvant Singh, named Dalathambhan, was brought to Delhi, and suggests as one of the possibilities that this child might have been brought up by Aurangzlb (ibid, 830). The difference between the two versions is due to the fact that Sir Jadunath based his account on Isvardas and rejected the evidence of the Ma'asir-i-'Alamgiri, while Shyamaldas relied exclusively on the latter work. For another version based on Rajasthani chronicles, see Reu, op. cit., 254.
99. This farman is given in the Virvinod, II, 885.
100. Raj Singh is supposed to have written a letter to Aurangzlb protesting against the imposition of the jizya. Sir Jadunath Sarkar examined the letter thoroughly and came to the conclusion that it was written by Shivaji, (Mo¬ dern Review, January, 1908, 21-23). Ojha, following Tod and Shyamaldas, was of the view that Raj Singh wrote the letter (Ojha, op. cit., 549-554). But Sharma (op. cit. 164) agrees with Sir Jadunath, and it also seems to us that the letter, which as usual was made current by Tod, could not have been written by Raj Singh.
101. Sir Jadunath in the History of Aurangzib, III, 339, stated that Ajitffe mother was a Mewar princess, and in the CHI, IV, 248, that she was Raj Singh’s niece. I cannot find this corroborated by any Rajasthani chronicle and B. N. Reu doubts it (Reu, Marwar Ka Itihas, I, 257, f.n. 3), but Tod calls her a ‘daughter of Mewar’, Annals, 1957 ed. I, 307.
102. It is usually assumed that the Mahaiand took this defensive measure when the Mughul invasion seemed imminent. But the inscription on the portal at Deobarl is, according to Sharma, dated V.S. 1731=A.D. 1674, Sharma, op. cit., 165. f.n. 50.
103. Quoted by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, op. cit., Ill, 336.
104. Rajavilds, X, vv 1-22, f.n 137-40 quoted by Sharma, op. cit., 169, f.n. 66-7. 105. Eka-maha-masidi-vikhandita laghu-masidi-trimsat I
Devalaya-patana-rushah prakdsita Bhlmasimha-vlrena II
Raja-samudra-prasasti XXII, v. 29.
The Raja-samudra-prasasti mentions the sack of Idar, Vadnagar and Ahma dabad. Sir Jadunath Sarkar, apparently on the basis of the Mirat-i-Ahmadl, mentions the sack of “Vadnagar, Visalnagar and some other rich cities of Gujarat.and the recovery of Idar”. (Sarkar, op. cit. V, 1952 ed., p. 353). But the Raja-samudra-prasasti, XXII v. 28, definitely mentions the sack of Idar, Vadnagar and Ahmadabad. We shall see later Durga Das and Durjan Sal Hada carrying a more daring raid into the heart of the Mughul empire. Therefore a lightning raid on Ahmadabad does not appear to be improbable. Sir Jadunath Sarkar was of the opinion that prince Bhlm’s raids took place after Akbar had rebelled (Sarkar, op. cit., Ill, 366). But these raids, as mentioned in the Raja-samudra-prasasti, took place during the life of Raj Singh, therefore before Akbar’s rebellion. It may be noted that this prasasti
is given in the Virvinod which was not available to Sir Jadunath. 106. Raja-samudra-prasasti, XXII, v. 46.
107. This is the date given by Sir Jadunath Sarkar (op. cit., Ill, 353) who has used O.S. throughout his work. Shyamaldas, probably using the N.S., gives the date as 3 November, 1680. The Indian date is Kdrtik, Sukla 19, 1737, V.S. (Virvinod, II, 473).
108. Sir Jadunath Sarkar (op. cit., Ill, 367) states that Maharand Jai Singh “wel¬ comed him with present and invited him to stay. But Udaipur was no more invulnerable to Mughul invasion than Jodhpur. Then Durga Das most chival¬ rously undertook to conduct Akbar to the Maratha court-”. Sir Jadunath Sarkar does not give any reference for this statement but most probably he was following Tod. I am relying here on Shyamaldas (Virvinod, II, 653) who states that though Akbar had at this time some Mewar nobles to protect him, Jay Singh wrote to them not to bring Akbar to Mewar on any account, as peace talks were going on, but to escort him south to ShambhujTis court. This appears more probable, for it is difficult to believe that Mewar could not give protection to Akbar, when it could do so to Ajit. Also, the Mughul had never been able to reach the place where the Maharand lived. Ojha (op. cit., II, 587) has followed Shyamaldas.
109. Virvinod, II, 650.
110. Sir Jadunath calls him “Shyam Singh of Bikaner'’ (Sarkar, op. cit., Ill, 370) but the Raja-samudra-prasasti, XXIII, v. 32 which we have followed here definitely identifies him.
Rdnd-sri'Karnasimhasya-dvitiyas-tanayahhali I
Garibadasas-tat-putrah Sydmasimha iha-gatah II
111. The farmdn is printed in the Virvinod, II, 651-52.
112. For conditions of the treaty, see, Sarkar, op. cit., Ill, 370 and V, 216 and Virvinod II, 661-63.
113. Sarkar, op. cit., Ill, 369-70.
114. A'zam’s letter is published in the Virvinod, II, 665-66. A‘zam wrote a similar letter dated 24 Sha’ban (the year is not given), Virvinod, II, 662. It appears that he was extremely eager to come to terms with Jay Singh and gain his support. There is an initialled but unsigned treaty in the Udaipur archives, which Shyamaldas ascribes to A‘zam. This Seems to be the terms A‘zam would have offered to the Maharand if he became emperor.
115. In 1683 Aurangzlb appointed Man Singh of Krishnagarh the faujdar of Pur, Mandal and Bednor, Virvinod II, 665.
116. This farmdn, apparently issued in response to a petition by the Maharand, was signed by Aurangzlb on 6 July, 1690, Virvinod II, 669-72. 117. Sarkar, op. cit., V, 221, 226 (1952 ed.).
118. According to the Khyat, Ajit was induced by the Marwar nobles to come out of his hiding place in 1687 at the age of eight, and take part in the struggle, even before Durga Das’s return from the Deccan, B. N. Reu, Marwar Kd Itihds, I, 278. This is partly corroborated by Shyamaldas who states that Ajit joined the army in 1687 at the age of eight, Virvinod II, 832. This ap¬ pears to be incredible unless one assumes Ajit to have been more precocious than even Babur. It is also stated in the Rajasthani chronicles that more than once there were differences of opinion between the child Ajit and Durga Das, which probably means that some nobles wanted to remove Durga Das from his position of authority. But as the same sources state that all Such differences were ultimately made up, it indicates that Durga Das was vindicated.
119. isvardas Nagar, Futuhdt-i-Alamglri, MsS, 167a-168b, tr. by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, op. cit., V. 231. For the account of Durga Das, Sir Jadunath relied exclusively on Isvardas, for he was a friend of Durga Das, had been a revenue collector at Jodhpur and had been entrusted by Shuja‘at Khan, the governor of Gujarat (under whom Isvardas Served) to act as the inter mediary between the Mughuls and Durga Das. In fact/, the Rajasthani chronicles, namely the Ajitodaya and Ajitagrantha written at a later date, and on which B.N. Reu relies for his Marwdr ka Itihas, give much less im¬ portance to Durga Das than is due to him.
120. Sarkar, op. cit., V, 236.
121. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, IV (1929), p. 27.
122. Ibid., p. 275,
123. Ibid., p. 276.
124. See Chapter VIII.
125. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 287-8.
126. Ibid., p. 288.
127. Ibid., p. 290.
128. Ibid., pp. 279-80.
129. Ibid., p. 282.
130. See Chapter VIII.
131. Sarkar, op. cit., p. 330.
132. Ibid., p. 334.
133. Ibid., p. 355.
134. For details, cf. ibid., p. 468.
135. For details, cf. ibid., pp. 343 ff., 471 ff.
136. ; Ibid., pp. 472-3.
137. Ibid., pp. 474-5.
138. According to J. N. Sarkar, Rajaram was crowned on 8 February (ibid., p. 48i), but according to G. S. Sardesai he was proclaimed king on 9 February; New History of the Marathas, Vol. I, p. 319.
139. Sardesai, op. cit., I, 320.
140. Ibid.
141. Ibid., p. 321.
142. Ibid., p. 324.
143. Ibid.
144. Ibid., p. 328.
145. Ibid., p. 329.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid., pp. 338-9.
148. For a detailed account, cf. ibid., pp. 337-9.
149. Ibid., pp. 341-2.
150. Ibid., pp. 342-3.
151. Ibid, p. 348.
152. Ibid.
153. Risley, People of India, p. 8.
154. K. R. Qanungo, History of the Jats, p. 1.
155. Ibid, p. 2.
156. Ibbetson, quoted in the Punjab Glossary, II. p. 366.
157. Qanungo, op. cit., pp. 6-9, 325; Elliot, Memoirs of the Races of North-Western Provinces of India, I, 135-137; Risley, op. cit., p. 6.
158. Growse, Mathura (1874), pp. 21-2.
159. Tabaqat-i-Akbari (Bibliotheca Indica), pp. 16-7; Firishta, Translated by Briggs, Vol. I, pp. 81-2; CHI, III. p. 26.
160. HIED, II. 218; CHI, III. 41; Qanungo, op. cit., p. 32.
161. See p. 310.
162. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, HI. 331.
163. Maasir-ul-umavd, III. 422; J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 331-32. 164. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., pp. 331-33.
165. Ibid, pp. 333-36.
166. Sinsanl and Sogor are situated, respectively, 16 and 4 miles from Bharatpur. 167. J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., Vol. V, pp. 296-7.
168. Isvardas, 164 b.
169. Ibid, 132 b. Manucci says, “They began their pillage by breaking in the great gates of bronze which it had, robbing the valuable precious stones and plates of gold and silver and destroying what they were not able to carry away. Dragging out the bones of Akbar, they threw them angrily into the fire and burnt them.” Manucci, II. 320.
170. Isvardas, 134 b; A.A., 311; J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., V. 299. 171. Isvardas, 136b-137a; M.A. 334.
172. Isvardas, 137 a and b; M.A. 340.
173. Imad-us-Sadat, 55.
174. Xavier Wendel, Fr. Ms. 41 as quoted in J. N. Sarkar, op. cit., V. 302. 390
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