Click HERE for part 1 of this post
All
in all, Xavier’s mirror for princes was hardly the place for the Mughals to
find a discussion about the latest developments of Western political history
and thinking; it was unlikely, therefore, to act as a source of inspiration in
this domain. Besides, the scarcity of the surviving manuscripts as well as
their exclusively European location (see supra: n. 1) point to the rather
limited success of the A¯da¯b-us-salt.anat in India, particularly as compared
to the Samarat-ul-fala¯sifa. On the basis of the present survey, and pending
further research on the subject, it may therefore be safe to conclude that
early modern Europe was not among the role models the Mughals referred to in
matters of state building or technologies of governance. Why exactly such was
not the case is, however, a question that remains to be thoroughly examined.
3
Mughal India and Safavid Iran: Political Transfers in Muslim Asia
In
this respect, and in contrast to the situation described above, one stands on
firmer ground when moving into what I have called the Asian-Islamicate ecumene.
As indicated in the introduction, recent scholarship has called attention to
the circula tion of elites and their contribution to the dissemination of
political models within this space. If a number of studies have brought to
light interesting cases of sometimes multilateral ideological influences, fewer
have addressed the question of governmental technologies as part of
politico-cultural transfers. The second part of the present essay will focus on
such a case of transfer through the analysis of Mughal emulation of the Safavid
mercantilist policy inaugurated by Sha¯h Abba¯s I (ruled 1587–1629).5
Before
presenting the main characteristics of the latter, it is important to note the
existence among the Ta¯jik elites of Iran of a long tradition combining
political and commercial participation and embodied by the figure of the ta¯jir
(pl. tujja¯r) or merchant (Calmard 1988). From the fifteenth century onwards, a
number of them chose to settle in South and South-East Asia, sometimes
responding to the invita tion of newly-created dynasties. This holds
particularly true for the Deccan, where Bahmanid sultans (1387–1489) and their
successors in Bijapur, Ahmadnagar, and Golconda encouraged the migration of
Iranians to their territories and gave pride of place to individuals with dual
administrative and commercial expertise (Subrahmanyam 1992). For all that, it
was not to the Ta¯jik tujja¯r—among whom many Sayyids were also to be
found—that Sha¯h ʿAbba¯s turned for the implementa tion of his centralising
reforms, of which the new mercantilist orientation was only a part. On the
contrary, he treated them with greater hostility than his predecessors, being
suspicious of the socio-religious prestige of the Sayyids, and, more generally,
of their propensity to invest both in land property and in commercial
activities. The Safavid therefore chose to rely on two groups—a corps of slaves
and the Armenian merchant community—who were more amenable to his wishes than
the Ta¯jik merchant-administrators. The Armenian support was especially
important for the development of ʿAbba¯s’ new commercial policy which aimed
primarily at increas ing the silver reserves of the state.6In order to do so,
the monarch resorted to a number of measures, including an import-substitution
policy for cotton cloth, a ban on gold and silver exports, and, most famously,
the instauration of a state monopoly on silk exports (1619). Silk was Iran’s
most valuable export product and the newly created monopoly guaranteed the
state the major part of the benefits accruing from its trade by compelling
foreign merchants—mostly representatives of the East India Company (EIC) and the
Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC)—to deal exclusively with state-appointed
intermediaries. Besides, ʿAbba¯s worked hard to provide Iran with a commercial
outlet that would be safe from Ottoman and Portuguese appetites. To this end,
he simultaneously explored the possibilities offered by the Northern land route
(via Russia) and the Southern maritime axis (via the Persian Gulf). Thanks to
the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622, the latter solution
finally prevailed: the port of Bandar ʿAbba¯s was founded on the site of
ancient Gombroon and soon became a major commercial hub.
In
contrast to the mercantilist model elaborated by Sha¯h ʿAbba¯s, Mughal partici
pation in trade appears far more limited at first sight. Just as their Afghan
predecessors and their Uzbek and Safavid contemporaries, Akbar and Jaha¯ngı¯r
certainly considered the protection of merchants and the maintenance of a
decent road network a part of their kingly duty. Besides, trade represented a
significant source of income for the state, especially after the conquest of
the two maritime sultanates of Gujarat and Bengal in the 1570s, even though the
revenues deriving from this lagged behind those accruing from agricultural
production. Even so, beyond this traditional relationship of protection and
taxation, a number of elements point to the greater involvement of the Mughals
in commercial activities from the first quarter of the seventeenth century
onwards.
The
first element is undoubtedly the growing participation of the imperial family
and the Mughal elite in maritime trade. This is borne out by a series of
documents such as the registers of the Estado da I´ndia (Flores 2005: 261–264),
the correspon dence of English and Dutch merchants with the EIC and the VOC
(Chandra 1959: 93–94) and a collection of Mughal administrative papers
concerning the port of Surat (Hasan 1989–1990; Moosvi 1990). All testify to the
fact that Mughal monarchs and members of their family (including women) were
the owners of ships conveying their goods (textiles, indigo, tobacco) to the
great ports of the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and South-East Asia. As shown by
the nature of the evidence gathered here, the mercantilist evolution of the
dynasty failed, however, to be integrated on the ideological level. The same
holds true for administrative elites who, from the 1600s on, increasingly
engaged in sea trade. The more active among them were the officials posted in
the maritime provinces of the empire, such as Gujarat (Flores 2011; Hasan 2004:
31–51), along with the many Iranian migrants who gained predominance in the
Mughal nobility precisely around this time. Particularly significant is, in
this last respect, a remark by the Dutch factor Francisco Pelsaert, who blamed
the Iranians as much for trusting the higher levels of Mughal administration as
for their excessive intervention in the economy (Pelsaert 1957: 92).
The
successive stages of the Iranian rise to power in the Mughal state apparatus
are well known: initiated by Huma¯yu¯n (ruled 1530–1540; 1555–1556), vigorously
pursued by Akbar, the recruitment of Iranians further intensified in the time
of Jaha¯ngı¯r, during whose reign they achieved first rank in the nobility in
respect both to numbers and positions. Symbolised by the ascendancy of Nu¯r
Jaha¯n’s family (the favourite queen, herself of Iranian origin), the migration
flow continued unabated throughout the seventeenth century even though, from
the 1650s on, Iranians increasingly had to compete with other groups (Indian
Muslims, Ra¯jpu¯ts) for state patronage. In their attempt to explain Mughal
“Iranophily”, historians have generally emphasised the push factors lying
behind it, including Safavid religious intolerance and the limited career
prospects offered by Iran as compared to India. While it cannot be denied that
such factors did play a substantial role, this line of explanation is marred by
its portraying of the Mughals as totally passive in the process. As rightly
suggested by Sanjay Subrahmanyam (1992), the profile of those Iranians who
reached the highest levels of Mughal state apparatus, as well as the nature of
the positions they held, rather point to the fact that Indian monarchs valued
these individuals for very specific competences.
The
case of Nu¯r Jaha¯n’s family appears particularly significant in this respect
(Habib 1969). Of her grandfather Khwa¯ja Muh˙ammad Sharı¯f, a Ta¯jik from
Tehran, we know that he held an important position in the Safavid fiscal
administration under Sha¯h T˙ahma¯sp (ruled 1524–1576) and was associated with
the renowned and powerful family of A¯ qa¯ Muh˙ammad Dawatda¯r through
matrimonial alliance. His son Iʿtima¯d-ud-daula chose to settle in India, where
his expertise in fiscal matters enabled him to hold the combined offices of
wazı¯r and wakı¯l from 1611 until his death in 1621. These same competences
were transmitted to his son A¯s˙af Kha¯n who, like his father, is praised in
contemporary literature for his ability in the fiscal domain; more importantly,
he inherited from his father the position of wakı¯l, which he likewise held
until his death in 1641. As a matter of fact, statistical studies have shown
that the highest offices in Mughal fiscal administration became an Iranian
preserve from Jaha¯ngı¯r’s reign on (Ali 1985). A¯s˙af Kha¯n is also the first
member of
the
family whose commercial activities are known in detail, even though the profile
of Khwa¯ja Muh˙ammad Sharı¯f and his connections with A¯ qa¯ Muh˙ammad
Dawatda¯r leads one to believe that trade was already part of the portfolio of
familial activities back in Iran. Whatever the case may be, the family’s
involvement in commerce only grew stronger during the second half of the
seventeenth century, as shown by A¯s˙af Kha¯n’s and his son Shayista Kha¯n’s
strong participation in the trade of the Bay of Bengal (Prakash 1985).
Before
concluding on this point, it is worth pausing briefly to consider another
biography, whose complexity is all the more illuminating. Mı¯r Jumla
Is˙faha¯nı¯ hailed from one of the Sayyid clans of Ispahan, whose diversified
interests in land property, manufacturing, and commercial activities are
otherwise well known. He left Iran at the beginning of the seventeenth century
and settled in Golconda where, according to the memoirs of Jaha¯ngı¯r, he was,
for ten years, the factotum of Muh˙ammad Qulı¯ Qut˙b Sha¯h (ruled 1580–1612)
and the centre of the affairs of the state (Jaha¯ngı¯r 1999: 258). In 1613, his
falling out with the next sultan drove him out of Golconda, and it is only
after he had failed to attract the patronage of the neighbouring kingdom of Bijapur
that he resolved to go back to Iran. The reasons for this reluctance are made
clear by the treatment he received at the court of Sha¯h ʿAbba¯s. After having
tried for a while to exchange a part of the immense wealth he had acquired in
India (through his fiscal duties and his likely participation in the lucrative
trade of Masulipatnam) for a high position in Safavid administra tion, Mı¯r
Jumla understood that the Sha¯h would concede no political participation to him
and, in 1618, he therefore decided to leave yet again for the subcontinent
(Bhakkarı¯ 2003: 72). At the Mughal court, the Mı¯r actually obtained what the
Safavid had denied him and henceforth held a series of high positions in the
imperial administration until his death in 1637 (Ali 1985: 128, 141). The case
of Mı¯r Jumla Is˙faha¯nı¯ vividly illustrates how the Iranian
merchant-administrators were pushed into the background in Safavid times,
driving many of them on to the road to India as a result. Besides, his
successful career under Jaha¯ngı¯r and Sha¯h Jaha¯n demonstrates the degree to
which the Mughals valued the Iranian elites, who combined administrative and
commercial expertise. That men such as Mı¯r Jumla, Iʿtima¯d-ud-daula, and so
many others were also natural vehicles for the diffusion of Sha¯h ʿAbba¯s’ new
commercial policy in Mughal territories is beyond doubt. The growing
participation of the imperial family and the Mughal elite in maritime trade and
the Iranian hegemony in the politico-economic sphere are not, however, the only
elements hinting at the Mughals’ attraction towards state mercantilism. It is
also borne out by some specific directions of Mughal expansion, as well as by
the hardening of the dynasty’s attitude toward European trade companies.
Contrary
to received wisdom, Jaha¯ngı¯r’s reign did not coincide with the com plete
cessation of the conquest process (re)initiated by Akbar: the new monarch
succeeded in subjecting Ra¯jpu¯t Mewar, kept the Deccani sultanates under
continu ous pressure, and, more importantly for the present purpose, pursued
Mughal expansion into the southern and eastern fringes of Bengal. The main
motivation behind this last operation was essentially commercial, the Mughals
aiming at seizing Bengal’s two principal ports—Hughli to the west and Chittagong
to the east—which were then under the control of Portuguese merchants and the
Magh dynasty of Arakan, respectively. It is true that nothing came of these
expeditions at the time. However, Jaha¯ngı¯r’s efforts were continued by his
successors and finally proved successful; Hughli and Chittagong fell to the
Mughals in 1632 and 1666 respectively, henceforth providing the dynasty with
privileged access to the Bay of Bengal and its lucrative trade.
Jaha¯ngı¯r
not only pursued an aggressive policy on the eastern margins of the empire, he
also took a harder line on the European presence on the western coast. The
first open conflict broke out in 1613 with the seizure and destruction by the
Portuguese of a ship from Surat that was bringing a valuable cargo back from
Jeddah, a cargo in which the emperor’s mother had an important interest (Flores
2005: 251–261). The scale of Jaha¯ngı¯r’s reaction—all the Europeans living in
the empire were put under arrest and had their goods seized—shows that the
Mughals were less and less ready to accept European control of sea trade, and
indicates, by the same token, their growing interest in this activity. A period
of “contained conflict” succeeded the crisis of 1613–1615, which lasted until
the end of the reign and saw the Portuguese progressively lose ground against
the Mughals’ increasing pressure. In this respect, Jaha¯ngı¯r’s 1617–1618 trip
to Gujarat appears particularly significant, because of its likely connection
with the new commercial policy that was taking shape at the time. During his
short stay in Cambay, the monarch actually publicised his willingness to
promote traffic between the western coast of the empire and the Red Sea, and to
turn Cambay into the most attractive harbour of the whole western Indian Ocean,
thanks to the fiscal reforms he intended to introduce there. That he took the
opportunity during his stay in Gujarat to assign the government of the province
to his son Sha¯h Jaha¯n is also no coincidence: he thereby made sure that
imperial authority would be felt more strongly in the future, especially
vis-a`-vis the Europeans (Jaha¯ngı¯r 1999: 241, 244).
In this, as in many other cases, Sha¯h Jaha¯n proved to be an excellent choice. The prince was himself actively involved in Gujara¯tı¯ trade, and Portuguese archives indicate that he indeed took a harder line against the Estado da I´ndia (Flores 2005: 262–264). The Portuguese were not, however, the only Westerners to feel the bitter taste of his formidable gift for negotiation, his dealings with the English factors of Surat testifying to his expert use of the carrot and stick method (Faruqui 2002: 187–189). With the support of his father, Sha¯h Jaha¯n succeeded in establishing, within the context of Gujarat, a steadfast commercial policy whose aim was to develop Mughal interests in international trade, liberate them from Portuguese control and, more generally, to protect them from European appetites. In many respects, the government of the richest province of the empire may thus be said to have been the laboratory where the prince elaborated and put to the test the mercantilist policy he was to develop as king. For, of all Mughal monarchs, Sha¯h Jaha¯n was certainly the one most deeply involved in maritime trade. Besides, Iranians continued to be massively recruited under his rule and to trust the higher levels of the fiscal apparatus. Last but not least, Mughal mercantilist tendencies grew even stronger at his instigation, as shown, for instance, by the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hughli in 1632, or the attempts to institute royal monopolies on commodities such as indigo, lime, or saltpetre (Chandra 1959: 94–95).
The
commercial policy of the dynasty was not, however, the only sphere to bear the
imprint of the processes of competition and imitation that informed the
relations of Mughal India with the contemporary polities of Muslim Asia
throughout the early modern period. Reciprocal influences were also of
tremendous importance where state ideology was concerned. As has been argued
elsewhere (e.g. Lefe`vre 2010; Moin 2010), this holds particularly true for
Mughals and Safavids during the seventeenth century, but other examples are not
hard to find. To cite but one, Paul Wormser (2009) has recently built on the
earlier insight of Denys Lombard to demonstrate how the sultans of Aceh
successively turned to Ottoman and Mughal models to legitimise their power and
elaborate a sophisticated royal ideology. As far as political ideas and
instruments are concerned, there is, then, no denying that the transfers that
took place within the Asian-Islamicate ecumene far exceeded the exchanges
between Europe and Muslim Asia in early modern times. This is, of course, in
sharp contrast with the situation that was to prevail with the advent of
European domination in the region from the eighteenth century on.
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Notes
C.
Lefe`vre (*)
Centre
d’E´tudes de l’Indes et de l’Asie du Sud, E´ cole des Hautes E´tudes en
Sciences Sociales, 190-198 avenue de France, 75244 Paris Cedex 13, France
e-mail:
co.lefevre@gmail.com
A.
Fl€uchter and S. Richter (eds.), Structures on the Move,
127
Transcultural
Research – Heidelberg Studies on Asia and Europe in a Global Context, DOI
10.1007/978-3-642-19288-3_7, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
128
C. Lefe`vre
1The
British Library has a nineteenth-century copy of the work of Satta¯r (hereafter
BL, MS. Or. 5893), which bears the slightly different title of
Samarat-ul-fala¯sifa or Evening story of the philosophers. Of the six other
known manuscripts of the text (sometime also entitled Ah.wa¯l-i Firangista¯n or
Events of the land of the Franks), three are preserved in India, two in the
United Kingdom, and one in Iran. The copy of the A¯da¯b-us-salt.anat preserved
in the School of Oriental and African Studies (hereafter SOAS, MS. 7030) dates
from 1609; the Casanatense Library of Rome holds the only other known copy,
which was similarly completed in 1609. For two recent overviews of these works,
see Alam and Subrahmanyam (2009: 472–475) and Sidarus (2010). I am grateful to
the latter for having given me access to his paper before publication.
2For
the origins of this scheme in Greek historiography, see Momigliano (1982).
3For
the pre-Islamic history of Spain as seen by Arab geographers and historians,
see Picard (2003).
4BL,
MS. 5893: 49–51. For a similar account by a fifteenth-century North African
geographer, who was himself relying on a number of predecessors such as
al-Idrı¯sı¯ (d. approx. 1165), see al H˙imyarı¯ (1938: 10–11, 157–159).
5For
an extended version of this point and a larger discussion of reciprocal Mughal
and Safavid influences, see Lefe`vre (2010).
6The
following presentation of ʿAbba¯s’s mercantilist policy is based on Matthee
(1999