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Exploring the Origins and Impact of the Thirteenth Century Delhi Sultanate Establishment and Structural Transformations in India/ PART 1

Part One

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANATE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NATURE OF THE NEW STRUCTURES IN INDIA

(Riazul Islam)

Background

Under the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud and later the Ghurid Mu ¯cizz al-D¯ın, during the period lasting from the death of Harsha (646–7) to the Turk invasions of northern India, the socio-political configuration was dominated by a number of factors which help to explain the rapidity of the Muslim conquest. First, the feudal-like system clearly favoured the rulers and the ruling classes at the expense of the peasantry. Second, the Rajputs – mostly of for eign origin, but gradually absorbed into the fighting caste of the Hindus – who emerged as a political force after the fall of the Prat¯ıharas, had a passion for war and often went to ¯ war to enhance their prestige. The Rajput political structure, feudal and hierarchic in char acter and lacking a strong central force, encouraged fissiparous tendencies. The Rajputs’ narrow vision, even narrower loyalties, and endless and purposeless internecine fighting, contributed to the military and political particularism which prevented a collective response against foreign invasions during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Third, no strong cen tral authority for the entire subcontinent existed. The Rashtrak ¯ utas of the Deccan extended ¯ their authority to the north; the Prat¯ıharas, with Kanawj as their seat, from Panjab eastward; ¯ and the Palas from Bengal westward. This led to the formation of three large and separate ¯ kingdoms in the Deccan: one in the north, one in the east and one in the west. Much of their strength was wasted in mutual warfare. The predecessors of the Prat¯ıharas, the Gur- ¯ jaras who had ruled over Panjab and Marwar, are given credit for stalling the Arab east ward expansion from Sind. The Prat¯ıhara dominance of northern India, which had acted ¯ as a shield against external aggression during the major part of the ninth and tenth cen turies, now disintegrated, leaving India exposed to foreign invasions. After the Ghaznavid and, especially, the Ghurid invasions (see above, Chapters 5 and 8), Islam spread from its foothold in the extreme north-west of the subcontinent into much wider regions.


Qutb ud-Din Aibak  (1206–10)

Mucizz al-D¯ın Ghur¯ ¯ı’s leading slave generals succeeded him: Yildiz at Ghazna, Qutb al D¯ın Aybak at Lahore and Qabacha at Uchch. Aybak was undoubtedly the late sultan’s most ¯ trusted lieutenant and thus his main successor in India. But his four years of stewardship of the Ghurid Indian dominions were marked by his struggles against Yildiz, the Turkish ruler of Ghazna; against Qabacha, who controlled Sind and Multan; and against the rebellious ¯ Hindu Rajahs, who wanted to throw off the Muslim yoke. Aybak’s accidental death during a game of polo in 1210 ended a promising career, but his role as lieutenant during Mucizz al-D¯ın’s life, and later as his successor, entitles him to an important place in the formative history of the Delhi Sultanate.

Shams al-Dın Iltutmish (1210–36)

Iltutmish ascended the throne of Delhi in difficult and markedly uncertain circumstances. The defiant attitudes of the senior slave generals like Qabacha and Yildiz, the revival of ¯ resistance among the Hindu ruling classes, and above all, the threat from the growing power of the Chinggisid Mongols across the North-West Frontier, posed great challenges. The Khaljis in Bengal and Bihar withdrew their allegiance. Iltutmish displayed great intrepidity in the face of all these difficulties and showed a shrewd sense of strategy and timing in tackling the various problems. He humbled the hostile Turkish generals; overcame Hindu resistance; re-established his authority in the eastern provinces; and, through a combination of strategy and luck, succeeded in saving his kingdom from the Mongol onslaught.

Iltutmish, the first sovereign ruler of Delhi, is rightly considered the founder of the Sultanate of Delhi. He is given credit for creating durable foundations, organizing the administration and evolving statesmanlike basic political policies. In 1229 al-Mustansir, the cAbbasid caliph of Baghdad, conferred a mandate of authority on Iltutmish; this was an event of considerable significance, for it made the Sultanate of Delhi a legally and morally recognized state in orthodox Muslim eyes. Himself a man of piety and learning, Iltutmish maintained cordial relations with the culama’¯ and the mashayikh ¯ (Sufi leaders and saints), thereby achieving acceptability and legitimacy for his new sultanate.

None of Iltutmish’s five successors – two sons, one daughter and two grandsons who followed each other in quick succession – proved to be capable leaders. The Mongols kept pressing on the frontier and both Lahore and Multan were subjected to raids and spoliation.

Provincial governors found an opportunity to extend their autonomy and the Hindu rulers, in particular the Rajputs, showed signs of disaffection.

Nasir al-D ın Mahmud (1246–66) and Ghiyath al-D ın Balban (Ulugh Khan) (1266–87) 

One of the notable developments in the post-Iltutmish period is the emergence of a group of nobles – all slaves of Iltutmish – called the Ghulam¯ an-i Chihilg ¯ an¯ ¯ı (possibly meaning ‘the slave commanders who each commanded forty slaves’), who attained a dominant position in the court. For thirty years the ‘Forty’ held the royal power in commission and reduced the sultan to a figurehead. Among the powerful ‘Forty’, the dominant figure of Ghiyath ¯ al-D¯ın Balban emerged. He had gained considerable power even before the accession of Sultan Nasir al-D ¯ ¯ın Mahmud, the last ruler of the line of Iltutmish. Shortly after N ¯ asir al- ¯ D¯ın’s accession, Balban, now called na’ib-i mamlakat ¯ (viceroy), in effect assumed power as regent, reducing the sultan to a titular ruler. During the two decades that he was at the helm as na’ib-i mamlakat ¯ , Balban tried to stem the rot that had set in during the decade of anarchy (1236–46).

Having served the sultanate at all levels, Balban had an intimate knowledge of the man ner in which it functioned and its sources of strength and weakness. He was thus able to identify its core problem. He believed that the weakness of the crown lay at the root of all the maladies of the state. His ideas on monarchy, government and religion, expressed in his speeches to his sons and nobles, are sometimes labelled his ‘political theory’. The various elements of his thinking, though not elaborate or comprehensive enough to be con sidered a theory, are nevertheless coherent. Balban displayed great vigour and ruthlessness in crushing political rivals and rebels and punishing refractory governors and local chiefs. The ordinary people, in general, were not affected. With his blind belief in the supreme value of nasab (good birth), however, Balban would not employ men of ordinary birth in the army and the administration.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

The government depended essentially on force, or the threat of force, in order to preserve its authority. Thus it was natural for the army to receive the utmost attention. With a view to improving its efficacy as a striking force, Balban gave high priority to the reorganization and expansion of the army. There is also an indication that Balban endeavoured to change the payment of the soldiers’ salaries from iqta¯cs (assignments of land; what in later, Mughal times were to be called jag¯ ¯ırs) to cash payments.

The decades following the end of Iltutmish’s reign saw a marked increase in Mongol pressure on the western frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate. The governors of these regions, ill-supported by the central government, were helpless in the face of Mongol inroads. By the time that Balban came to the throne, large parts of Sind and Panjab were under Mongol occupation. With his reorganized army, Balban made the defence of the frontiers a prior ity, his contribution here being twofold. First, he cleared Sind of the Mongol adventurers, recovered Lahore and Multan and built a special force to protect the frontiers. Thus he held a firm line against the Mongols. Second, following a realistic defence policy, he compro mised by holding a line between the Beas and the Ravi rivers, leaving large parts of western Panjab in Mongol hands. During Balban’s reign, the Mongols never attempted to proceed beyond the Ravi and the security of Delhi and the central provinces was never under threat.

The end of Turkish supremacy: The Khalji revolution

Balban was succeeded in 1287 by his grandson Kay Qubad, who took the title of Mu ¯cizz al D¯ın. This young, handsome, pleasure-loving and inexperienced sultan paid little attention to the administration and soon lost all control of the affairs of state. The rising Khalji clan soon replaced the house of Balban, and Jalal al-D ¯ ¯ın F¯ıruz Khalj ¯ ¯ı, an old officer of Sultan Balban, ascended the throne of Delhi. The Khaljis, too, it is now fairly certain, were originally of Turkish origin, but were Iranized because of their long stay in the steppelands of Afghanistan. (The Turks did not consider the Khaljis their peers.) The fact that the Khaljis did not demonstrate any racial élitism of their own enabled them to build a wider political and social base for their ‘new monarchy’. The change in the social base of power was so pronounced as to justify the term ‘Khalji revolution’.

Jalal al-D ın Fıruz Khalj ı (1290–6) and cAla’ al-Dın Khaljı (1296–1316)

Jalal al-D ¯ ¯ın F¯ıruz Khalj ¯ ¯ı ’s six-year reign was marked by incompetence and pusillanim ity. His lenience towards robbers and rebels, his half-hearted fight against the invading Mongols, and his failure to seize the prestigious Ranthambor fortress from the Rajputs, marked him as a ruler unsuited to the times. His ambitious nephew and son-in-law cAlı Garshasp showed little compunction in disposing of his uncle and ascended the throne as  cAla’ al-D ın Khaljı.

To understand fully the reign of cAla ’ al-D ¯ ¯ın, one should look back at the thirteenth cen tury and take note of the salient socio-economic trends. The striking motif is the continuity of the institutions. Not only were the conventional Indian methods of revenue-collection (mainly a simple produce-sharing system) largely left unchanged by the new rulers, but even the collection agents, the ra’¯ıs (chief), the chaudkr¯ıs (heads of parganas, groups of villages) and the patwar¯ ¯ıs (village accountants), were mostly retained. The new rulers who had taken over the immense lands were short of manpower and in need of funds; thus they adopted the methods most likely to ensure rapid success. The state’s demand for revenue was deliberately kept at a low rate – one-fifth of the produce – and the countryside was largely left undisturbed.

Forewarned by a number of rebellions early in his reign, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın took prompt mea sures to forestall further trouble. First, in order to keep himself posted of all important occurrences in the capital and the provinces, he strengthened the d¯ıwan-i bar ¯ ¯ıd (intel ligence department). Next, acting on the idea that ‘wealth and rebellion are twins’, he adopted measures to extract as much wealth as possible from his subjects. From the rural chiefs he demanded full taxes, while for the peasants the state demand for revenue was increased. Finally, in order to keep the nobles from uniting against him, he issued strict orders forbidding them to assemble or intermarry without royal permission.

In the military sphere, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s achievements fall into two categories: the war against the invading Mongols and the conquest of the unsubdued Indian territories. During the thirteenth century, the Mongols were so powerful that even a strong ruler like Bal ban had to adopt a defensive policy and accept a frontier line that was not particularly favourable. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın faced two Mongol attacks on Delhi, including a siege of the city; but on both occasions the Mongols retreated. Other Mongol invasions directed at Panjab and the Ganges valley were also defeated. Hence by the end of the first decade of his rule, he had ensured protection from external aggression for his dominion. The death in 1306 of Duwa Khan, the Chaghatayid ruler of Transoxania and the main inspiration behind these invasions, may have also contributed to the decrease of Mongol pressure on India.

cAla’ al-D ın’s twenty-year reign entailed ceaseless military activity in India. The result ing acquisitions can be classed under three headings: areas recovered, territories freshly conquered and annexed, and states subdued but not annexed. The most noteworthy recov ered areas were Jaysalmir, Ranthambor and Malwa. The most substantial and significant newly conquered territory was Gujarat, for its annexation brought the sultanate a province rich in natural resources as well as the benefits of extensive maritime trade. Chitor, too, was conquered and annexed, but after a short period was placed under a loyal Rajput dynast. The states subdued but not annexed include the three kingdoms of the Deccan and southern India: Deogir ruled by the Yadavas; Telingana ruled by the Ganapatis; and Dwarsamudra ¯ ruled by the Hoysalas. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s main goals regarding these rich kingdoms were to obtain as much tribute as possible and to secure their submission to Delhi’s suzerainty.

Otherwise, the Rajahs were left free to manage their internal affairs. The general Malik Kaf¯ ur, who was thrice sent to subdue the three kingdoms, met with unqualified success ¯ and cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s policy of establishing imperial hegemony, rather than direct rule, over the distant Deccan proved eminently successful. There is no adequate explanation as to why cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın made no attempt to conquer and annex Bengal, which was still ruled by Balban’s descendants; but for a reign of twenty years, his military achievements were substantial.

A factor of paramount importance in cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s far-reaching conquests and his suc cess in dealing with the problem of the Mongols was the quality and size of his army. First of all, he did not suffer from the constraints which Balban had imposed in order to limit the strength of the cadre of commanders. Talent and loyalty were the only criteria by which cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın judged the men of the armed forces. He increased the strength of the main wing of the army, the cavalry, to 475,000 well-equipped troops who were paid directly from the treasury. Furthermore, he made the rules of annual muster more strin gent, thereby ensuring the preparedness of the troops. However, the expense of the salaries for an army with such a large cavalry element would soon have exhausted the treasury. To overcome this problem, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın introduced price controls to ensure that a soldier could live reasonably well on a lower scale of pay.

cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın was the first sultan to give serious thought to the reorganization of the revenue system. While devising a plan, he kept in mind the following well-considered objectives: to maximize the government’s revenue, to equalize the burden of taxation on the various sectors of the rural population, and to minimize the dangers of a rebellion by the nobles and of rural discontent. He also introduced the rule of measurement of land (which of course was familiar in India); this largely replaced the rule of sharing thepro duce, known for many centuries as bata’¯ ¯ı. Being a realist, he did not impose the rule of measurement on the entire realm, but only on a well-defined and carefully chosen core of the sultanate. Clearly, a fixed and stable rule of measurement was in the government’s interests as it helped to ensure a stable level of revenue. Bata’¯ ¯ı, on the other hand, favoured the peasants, for under it they paid in proportion to what they produced. By shifting to the land-measurement method, the sultan increased the pressure on the peasants to pro duce more. Furthermore, he increased the rate of the state’s demand to 50 per cent of the calculated produce, thereby more than doubling the rate (compared to 20 per cent under Iltutmish and later F¯ıruz Sh ¯ ah Tughluq). However, he also made provisions for revenue ¯ exemptions in cases of crop failure resulting from natural calamities. Firmly insisting on the principle that ‘the burden of the strong shall not fall on the weak’, he lightened the tax burden on the peasants. In effect, he forced the superior rural classes (variously called kut, ¯ muqaddam and chaudhr¯ı) to pay their taxes themselves rather than pass the burden on to the peasantry. He also abolished all the tax exemptions that they had previously enjoyed. As a result, they were no longer in a position to oppress the peasantry at will. Thus although the peasants lost under cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın, they also gained some advantages. The evidence is the fact that, during the two decades of the sultan’s reign, no rebellion occurred in the rural areas.

cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s strong rule alone cannot, however, account for the absence of articulated discontent, but recorded cases of harsh treatment and punishment under his administration mostly refer to urban political rebels and corrupt administrators, and not to rural mal contents. In any case, the peasants were left enough of their produce to enable them to survive from one year to the next. The muqtacs (executive heads of provinces responsible for the collection of revenues) and the staff of the d¯ıwan-i wiz ¯ arat ¯ (revenue department) were, if found guilty of laxity or dishonesty in the fulfilment of their duties, treated with marked severity; even governors were not spared physical beatings. As a result, first, the collections became effective and regular; second, the lag between collections and deposits was reduced; and third, the village people were saved from the extortions of the revenue staff.

IQTAcS (ASSIGNMENTS OF LAND)

In lieu of salary, an assignment of land, or iqta¯c(sometimes simply a portion of the land revenue), was granted to state employees. It saved the administration from having to keep ready cash for the monthly salary payments, and substantially reduced the amount of paper work. The sultans of Delhi prior to cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın had followed this convenient and simple method. Its main disadvantage, however, was that it enabled the recipients of large iqta¯cs to gain extensive personal influence and thus become an impediment to the operation of state power. It also provided loopholes for recipients to enjoy the benefits of the iqta¯cs without fulfilling their obligations. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın strongly disliked the system. Within five years of his accession, he issued orders for the withdrawal of iqta¯cs, as well as other grants, and their inclusion into khalisa ¯ (state-administered lands). This was a far-reaching change. Financial benefits aside, it increased the authority wielded by the state over the bureaucracy and the nobility. It seems, however, that the practice of giving iqta¯cs was not completely abandoned, but was now restricted to special cases in which the sultan wanted to empha size the executive authority of a minister who had been entrusted with an important and difficult task.

MARKET-CONTROL REGULATIONS

One of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s most important measures – and one which has attracted a great deal of attention – was the control of prices. It was introduced for the purpose of employing a larger army on a lower scale of pay. Of all the requisites of the troops, the most important single item was food. It therefore constituted the first of the four sectors of price control. The prices of wheat and other commodities were fixed and elaborate arrangements were made to ensure adequate supplies in the markets and to maintain huge reserves. The other three sectors of price control were: (a) horses, ponies, cattle and slaves; (b) cloth and fruit; and (c) articles for domestic consumption and personal use.

The prices of the various items in the four sectors were not changed during the rest of the sultan’s reign. Aside from the firmness of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s administration, other features supported the system. First, prices were only fixed after very careful consideration and were generally reasonable. The price of the most important item, wheat, was fixed at 7-1/2 j¯ıtals per man (1 man of 14 seers = approx. 13 kg). From the days of Balban to the reign of Firuz Sh ¯ ah Tughluq towards the end of the fourteenth century, the price of wheat remained ¯ stable, ranging from 7 to 8 j¯ıtals per man (except during periods of famine). Second, in another controlled sector, we learn that prices were so fixed as to ensure a fair margin of profit for the producer/seller. Both these features, namely the approximation of the fixed price to the normal price and the allowance of profit to the producer, greatly contributed to the stability of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s market-control arrangements. In addition, the sultan took care to ensure that the market was never short of supplies. During periods of scarcity, rationing was enforced. Through these devices, prices were kept steady at the fixed rate, even under famine conditions. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın also made sure to appoint men of honesty and impartiality to the hisba (market control) staff. Apart from the troops stationed in Delhi, the main beneficiaries of the system were men of modest income and of the lower salary group in the capital. This explains the concentration within Delhi of a large number of scholars, craftsmen and men of the various professions.

Income levels among the ruling and scholarly élites

During the initial phase of conquest, large areas and entire provinces were assigned to the nobles, in order to collect revenue and consolidate the sultan’s hold on the territory. The muqtacs (assignee-governors of these territories) tended to wield a wide range of pow ers. Iltutmish rectified the situation by bringing the provincial governors under the central authority and subjecting them to a certain financial control. But in general, the nobles con tinued to enjoy the benefits reaped from the iqta¯cs. Out of the revenues collected from the territories assigned to him, the muqtac kept a portion for himself and his household, used another portion towards maintaining his contingent of troops and sent the balance (fawadil ¯ ) to the central exchequer. The muqtac’s obligations included maintaining military contin gents and placing them at the sultan’s service when needed. By the time of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı, the muqtacs had been made fully accountable to the central revenue department, and in general, the nobles were no longer given iqta¯cs but cash salaries. Subsequently, under the Tughluqids (see Part Two below), the system of iqta¯cs was revived, but some restrictions were introduced. The nobles lived in great luxury and style. They comprised three main grades: the Khans, who were paid 1 lac of tankas, the Maliks, who were paid 50–60,000 tankas, and the amirs, who received 30–40,000 tankas. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, even soldiers (called iqta¯c-dars ¯ ) were given iqta¯cs; but when it was found that they converted the land into milk (private property), the practice was gradu ally discontinued. Payment to culama¯’ and mashayikh ¯ was made in various forms: regular stipends, assignments of ‘dead land brought to life’, assignments of cultivable land and assignments on the jizya (poll tax on non-Muslims) of a particular locality. Land not given in assignment and reserved for the state treasury was known as khalisa. ¯ Specific amounts of land were assigned for the sultan’s personal and household needs, but were not treated as royal property.

Agrarian conditions in the fourteenth century

The evolution of agrarian conditions during the thirteenth century and the agrarian reforms of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı have already been noted. Ghiyath al-D ¯ ¯ın Tughluq (1320–5) reverted to the ‘produce-sharing’ method which, as noted earlier, favoured the peasantry. He low ered the rate of state revenue demand and abolished several agrarian excesses. He miti gated the harshness of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s measures concerning the kuts ¯ , the muqaddams and the muqtacs. His short reign probably brought considerable relief to the rural population. The impact of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s (1325–51) experiments with the agrarian econ omy, such as the sudden increase of the rate demanded in the Do’ab, the rotation of crops and the granting of loans to the peasants, was lost in the plethora of revolts; in the agrarian sector, as in other sectors, Muhammad b. Tughluq left only confusion and anarchy. It took F¯ıruz Sh ¯ ah Tughluq (1351–88) six years to survey the entire land and prepare new esti- ¯ mates of revenue. He too decided to adhere to the ‘produce-sharing’ method. By making a substantial addition to the water supply through canals and innumerable wells, he made an enormous contribution to gardens and cultivable land and thus ensured a substantial increase in the supply of cereals and fruit.

Firuz Sh ¯ ah made extensive assignments to the nobility, officers, and men and institutions ¯ of learning and piety; these inevitably diminished the khalisa ¯ lands, thereby weakening the state financially. The impression of overall prosperity – in which the village peasants were also beneficiaries – is due to the notable and sustained increase in production and to the long period of general peace. At the same time, it was also a period of lax administration, during which nobles and officers would misappropriate public funds, fail to pay dues and thus become rich and powerful at the expense of the state.

The political structure of the state

Dynastic monarchy was a structure with which Indians had long been familiar. From 1210, when the Delhi Sultanate was formally founded, the sultans steadily gathered more and more powers; it can fairly be stated that a sultan was generally a more powerful ruler than a Hindu ruler of earlier centuries. The process reached its climax under cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı, who effectively controlled the empire and ran it as if it were a village. Muhammad b. Tughluq, however, went too far and suffered a set-back.

The sultan was assisted by a body of ministers who managed their respective depart ments under royal orders. The most important departments were those of religion and jus tice, of the army, of the intelligence service and the imperial post, and of finance and revenue, which was looked after by the most important minister, the vizier. For adminis trative purposes, the sultanate was divided into provinces, with the executive head of each province serving as governor. His powers were considerable, yet limited by the central government, especially in financial matters. When the government at Delhi was weak, the governors, especially those of the distant provinces, tended to assume more powers and run their provinces autonomously; some were tempted to declare independence. Depend ing upon the circumstances, a rebel governor might face the gallows or become the founder of a new provincial dynasty.

Social and economic developments in the fourteenth century: urbanization, crafts, etc.

The trend towards urbanization, which had begun in the thirteenth century, continued apace during the following century. Both the state chronicles and the accounts of foreign visitors such as the Moroccan calim ¯ (scholar) and traveller Ibn Battuta confirm this. Two interesting ¯ pieces of evidence are the constantly increasing size of the congregational mosques and the organization of regular transportation into the city of Delhi, with fixed charges from and to various points; the latter indicate the growth in the size of the city. Ibn Battuta declared ¯ that Delhi was the largest city not only in India, but in the entire Islamic East. The increase in population and the growth of a large number of cities led to the devel opment and diversification of industries and crafts. Of particular importance were cotton fabrics, silken stuffs, carpets, woollens, ironware, leatherware and sugar-making. Indian hardware achieved great fame, producing damascened steel which had a worldwide repu tation. Many other industries and crafts are mentioned in the context of the royal workshops or of the taxes imposed on the industries. The scale of diversification of food production can be grasped from Ibn Fadl Allah’s ¯ Masalik al-abs ¯ ar¯ , with its mention of 21 varieties of rice and 65 varieties of sweets. In trade and commerce, the most notable groups were the karwaniy ¯ an (banj ¯ aras) ¯ , who distributed large quantities of grain all over the land and are continually mentioned in chronicles and in Am¯ır Khusraw’s historical mathnaw¯ıs. The merchants, especially the famous Multani merchants, who were concerned with internal as well as foreign trade, also played an important role. They organized the import of fine cloth for cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s Saray-i cAdl market. The sahas ¯ (bankers), the Multani money lenders and the sarrafs ¯ (money-changers) provided banking services which greatly facil itated commercial transactions in the country. The increased pace of production led to certain technological advances. The introduction of the cotton-carder’s bow and the spin ning wheel, for example, contributed to the expansion of the textile industry. The introduc tion of the true arch, dome and vault facilitated the construction of large buildings; Diya’¯ al-D¯ın Baran¯ı mentions that cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalja employed as many as 70,000 craftsmen ¯ for the construction of his buildings.

click here  for part 2 of this article


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