Part
One
THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANATE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NATURE OF THE
NEW STRUCTURES IN INDIA
(Riazul
Islam)
Background
Under the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmud and later the Ghurid Mu ¯cizz al-D¯ın, during the period lasting from the death of Harsha (646–7) to the Turk invasions of northern India, the socio-political configuration was dominated by a number of factors which help to explain the rapidity of the Muslim conquest. First, the feudal-like system clearly favoured the rulers and the ruling classes at the expense of the peasantry. Second, the Rajputs – mostly of for eign origin, but gradually absorbed into the fighting caste of the Hindus – who emerged as a political force after the fall of the Prat¯ıharas, had a passion for war and often went to ¯ war to enhance their prestige. The Rajput political structure, feudal and hierarchic in char acter and lacking a strong central force, encouraged fissiparous tendencies. The Rajputs’ narrow vision, even narrower loyalties, and endless and purposeless internecine fighting, contributed to the military and political particularism which prevented a collective response against foreign invasions during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Third, no strong cen tral authority for the entire subcontinent existed. The Rashtrak ¯ utas of the Deccan extended ¯ their authority to the north; the Prat¯ıharas, with Kanawj as their seat, from Panjab eastward; ¯ and the Palas from Bengal westward. This led to the formation of three large and separate ¯ kingdoms in the Deccan: one in the north, one in the east and one in the west. Much of their strength was wasted in mutual warfare. The predecessors of the Prat¯ıharas, the Gur- ¯ jaras who had ruled over Panjab and Marwar, are given credit for stalling the Arab east ward expansion from Sind. The Prat¯ıhara dominance of northern India, which had acted ¯ as a shield against external aggression during the major part of the ninth and tenth cen turies, now disintegrated, leaving India exposed to foreign invasions. After the Ghaznavid and, especially, the Ghurid invasions (see above, Chapters 5 and 8), Islam spread from its foothold in the extreme north-west of the subcontinent into much wider regions.
Qutb ud-Din Aibak (1206–10)
Mucizz
al-D¯ın Ghur¯ ¯ı’s leading slave generals succeeded him: Yildiz at Ghazna, Qutb
al D¯ın Aybak at Lahore and Qabacha at Uchch. Aybak was undoubtedly the late
sultan’s most ¯ trusted lieutenant and thus his main successor in India. But
his four years of stewardship of the Ghurid Indian dominions were marked by his
struggles against Yildiz, the Turkish ruler of Ghazna; against Qabacha, who
controlled Sind and Multan; and against the rebellious ¯ Hindu Rajahs, who
wanted to throw off the Muslim yoke. Aybak’s accidental death during a game of
polo in 1210 ended a promising career, but his role as lieutenant during Mucizz
al-D¯ın’s life, and later as his successor, entitles him to an important place
in the formative history of the Delhi Sultanate.
Shams
al-Dın Iltutmish (1210–36)
Iltutmish
ascended the throne of Delhi in difficult and markedly uncertain circumstances.
The defiant attitudes of the senior slave generals like Qabacha and Yildiz, the
revival of ¯ resistance among the Hindu ruling classes, and above all, the
threat from the growing power of the Chinggisid Mongols across the North-West
Frontier, posed great challenges. The Khaljis in Bengal and Bihar withdrew
their allegiance. Iltutmish displayed great intrepidity in the face of all
these difficulties and showed a shrewd sense of strategy and timing in tackling
the various problems. He humbled the hostile Turkish generals; overcame Hindu
resistance; re-established his authority in the eastern provinces; and, through
a combination of strategy and luck, succeeded in saving his kingdom from the
Mongol onslaught.
Iltutmish,
the first sovereign ruler of Delhi, is rightly considered the founder of the
Sultanate of Delhi. He is given credit for creating durable foundations,
organizing the administration and evolving statesmanlike basic political
policies. In 1229 al-Mustansir, the cAbbasid caliph of Baghdad, conferred a
mandate of authority on Iltutmish; this was an event of considerable
significance, for it made the Sultanate of Delhi a legally and morally
recognized state in orthodox Muslim eyes. Himself a man of piety and learning,
Iltutmish maintained cordial relations with the culama’¯ and the mashayikh ¯
(Sufi leaders and saints), thereby achieving acceptability and legitimacy for
his new sultanate.
None
of Iltutmish’s five successors – two sons, one daughter and two grandsons who
followed each other in quick succession – proved to be capable leaders. The
Mongols kept pressing on the frontier and both Lahore and Multan were subjected
to raids and spoliation.
Provincial
governors found an opportunity to extend their autonomy and the Hindu rulers,
in particular the Rajputs, showed signs of disaffection.
Nasir
al-D ın Mahmud (1246–66) and Ghiyath al-D ın Balban (Ulugh Khan)
(1266–87)
One
of the notable developments in the post-Iltutmish period is the emergence of a
group of nobles – all slaves of Iltutmish – called the Ghulam¯ an-i Chihilg ¯
an¯ ¯ı (possibly meaning ‘the slave commanders who each commanded forty
slaves’), who attained a dominant position in the court. For thirty years the
‘Forty’ held the royal power in commission and reduced the sultan to a
figurehead. Among the powerful ‘Forty’, the dominant figure of Ghiyath ¯
al-D¯ın Balban emerged. He had gained considerable power even before the
accession of Sultan Nasir al-D ¯ ¯ın Mahmud, the last ruler of the line of
Iltutmish. Shortly after N ¯ asir al- ¯ D¯ın’s accession, Balban, now called
na’ib-i mamlakat ¯ (viceroy), in effect assumed power as regent, reducing the
sultan to a titular ruler. During the two decades that he was at the helm as
na’ib-i mamlakat ¯ , Balban tried to stem the rot that had set in during the
decade of anarchy (1236–46).
Having
served the sultanate at all levels, Balban had an intimate knowledge of the man
ner in which it functioned and its sources of strength and weakness. He was
thus able to identify its core problem. He believed that the weakness of the
crown lay at the root of all the maladies of the state. His ideas on monarchy,
government and religion, expressed in his speeches to his sons and nobles, are
sometimes labelled his ‘political theory’. The various elements of his
thinking, though not elaborate or comprehensive enough to be con sidered a
theory, are nevertheless coherent. Balban displayed great vigour and
ruthlessness in crushing political rivals and rebels and punishing refractory
governors and local chiefs. The ordinary people, in general, were not affected.
With his blind belief in the supreme value of nasab (good birth), however,
Balban would not employ men of ordinary birth in the army and the
administration.
REORGANIZATION
OF THE ARMY
The
government depended essentially on force, or the threat of force, in order to
preserve its authority. Thus it was natural for the army to receive the utmost
attention. With a view to improving its efficacy as a striking force, Balban
gave high priority to the reorganization and expansion of the army. There is
also an indication that Balban endeavoured to change the payment of the
soldiers’ salaries from iqta¯cs (assignments of land; what in later, Mughal
times were to be called jag¯ ¯ırs) to cash payments.
The
decades following the end of Iltutmish’s reign saw a marked increase in Mongol
pressure on the western frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate. The governors of
these regions, ill-supported by the central government, were helpless in the
face of Mongol inroads. By the time that Balban came to the throne, large parts
of Sind and Panjab were under Mongol occupation. With his reorganized army,
Balban made the defence of the frontiers a prior ity, his contribution here
being twofold. First, he cleared Sind of the Mongol adventurers, recovered
Lahore and Multan and built a special force to protect the frontiers. Thus he
held a firm line against the Mongols. Second, following a realistic defence
policy, he compro mised by holding a line between the Beas and the Ravi rivers,
leaving large parts of western Panjab in Mongol hands. During Balban’s reign,
the Mongols never attempted to proceed beyond the Ravi and the security of
Delhi and the central provinces was never under threat.
The
end of Turkish supremacy: The Khalji revolution
Balban
was succeeded in 1287 by his grandson Kay Qubad, who took the title of Mu ¯cizz
al D¯ın. This young, handsome, pleasure-loving and inexperienced sultan paid
little attention to the administration and soon lost all control of the affairs
of state. The rising Khalji clan soon replaced the house of Balban, and Jalal
al-D ¯ ¯ın F¯ıruz Khalj ¯ ¯ı, an old officer of Sultan Balban, ascended the
throne of Delhi. The Khaljis, too, it is now fairly certain, were originally of
Turkish origin, but were Iranized because of their long stay in the steppelands
of Afghanistan. (The Turks did not consider the Khaljis their peers.) The fact
that the Khaljis did not demonstrate any racial élitism of their own enabled
them to build a wider political and social base for their ‘new monarchy’. The
change in the social base of power was so pronounced as to justify the term
‘Khalji revolution’.
Jalal
al-D ın Fıruz Khalj ı (1290–6) and cAla’ al-Dın Khaljı (1296–1316)
Jalal
al-D ¯ ¯ın F¯ıruz Khalj ¯ ¯ı ’s six-year reign was marked by incompetence and
pusillanim ity. His lenience towards robbers and rebels, his half-hearted fight
against the invading Mongols, and his failure to seize the prestigious
Ranthambor fortress from the Rajputs, marked him as a ruler unsuited to the
times. His ambitious nephew and son-in-law cAlı Garshasp showed little
compunction in disposing of his uncle and ascended the throne as cAla’ al-D ın Khaljı.
To
understand fully the reign of cAla ’ al-D ¯ ¯ın, one should look back at the
thirteenth cen tury and take note of the salient socio-economic trends. The
striking motif is the continuity of the institutions. Not only were the
conventional Indian methods of revenue-collection (mainly a simple
produce-sharing system) largely left unchanged by the new rulers, but even the
collection agents, the ra’¯ıs (chief), the chaudkr¯ıs (heads of parganas,
groups of villages) and the patwar¯ ¯ıs (village accountants), were mostly
retained. The new rulers who had taken over the immense lands were short of
manpower and in need of funds; thus they adopted the methods most likely to
ensure rapid success. The state’s demand for revenue was deliberately kept at a
low rate – one-fifth of the produce – and the countryside was largely left
undisturbed.
Forewarned
by a number of rebellions early in his reign, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın took prompt mea
sures to forestall further trouble. First, in order to keep himself posted of
all important occurrences in the capital and the provinces, he strengthened the
d¯ıwan-i bar ¯ ¯ıd (intel ligence department). Next, acting on the idea that
‘wealth and rebellion are twins’, he adopted measures to extract as much wealth
as possible from his subjects. From the rural chiefs he demanded full taxes,
while for the peasants the state demand for revenue was increased. Finally, in
order to keep the nobles from uniting against him, he issued strict orders
forbidding them to assemble or intermarry without royal permission.
In
the military sphere, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s achievements fall into two categories:
the war against the invading Mongols and the conquest of the unsubdued Indian
territories. During the thirteenth century, the Mongols were so powerful that
even a strong ruler like Bal ban had to adopt a defensive policy and accept a
frontier line that was not particularly favourable. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın faced two
Mongol attacks on Delhi, including a siege of the city; but on both occasions
the Mongols retreated. Other Mongol invasions directed at Panjab and the Ganges
valley were also defeated. Hence by the end of the first decade of his rule, he
had ensured protection from external aggression for his dominion. The death in
1306 of Duwa Khan, the Chaghatayid ruler of Transoxania and the main
inspiration behind these invasions, may have also contributed to the decrease
of Mongol pressure on India.
cAla’
al-D ın’s twenty-year reign entailed ceaseless military activity in India.
The result ing acquisitions can be classed under three headings: areas
recovered, territories freshly conquered and annexed, and states subdued but
not annexed. The most noteworthy recov ered areas were Jaysalmir, Ranthambor
and Malwa. The most substantial and significant newly conquered territory was
Gujarat, for its annexation brought the sultanate a province rich in natural
resources as well as the benefits of extensive maritime trade. Chitor, too, was
conquered and annexed, but after a short period was placed under a loyal Rajput
dynast. The states subdued but not annexed include the three kingdoms of the
Deccan and southern India: Deogir ruled by the Yadavas; Telingana ruled by the
Ganapatis; and Dwarsamudra ¯ ruled by the Hoysalas. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s main
goals regarding these rich kingdoms were to obtain as much tribute as possible
and to secure their submission to Delhi’s suzerainty.
Otherwise,
the Rajahs were left free to manage their internal affairs. The general Malik
Kaf¯ ur, who was thrice sent to subdue the three kingdoms, met with unqualified
success ¯ and cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s policy of establishing imperial hegemony,
rather than direct rule, over the distant Deccan proved eminently successful.
There is no adequate explanation as to why cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın made no attempt to
conquer and annex Bengal, which was still ruled by Balban’s descendants; but
for a reign of twenty years, his military achievements were substantial.
A
factor of paramount importance in cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s far-reaching conquests and
his suc cess in dealing with the problem of the Mongols was the quality and
size of his army. First of all, he did not suffer from the constraints which
Balban had imposed in order to limit the strength of the cadre of commanders.
Talent and loyalty were the only criteria by which cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın judged the
men of the armed forces. He increased the strength of the main wing of the
army, the cavalry, to 475,000 well-equipped troops who were paid directly from
the treasury. Furthermore, he made the rules of annual muster more strin gent,
thereby ensuring the preparedness of the troops. However, the expense of the
salaries for an army with such a large cavalry element would soon have
exhausted the treasury. To overcome this problem, cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın introduced
price controls to ensure that a soldier could live reasonably well on a lower
scale of pay.
cAla’
al-D ¯ ¯ın was the first sultan to give serious thought to the reorganization of
the revenue system. While devising a plan, he kept in mind the following
well-considered objectives: to maximize the government’s revenue, to equalize
the burden of taxation on the various sectors of the rural population, and to
minimize the dangers of a rebellion by the nobles and of rural discontent. He
also introduced the rule of measurement of land (which of course was familiar
in India); this largely replaced the rule of sharing thepro duce, known for
many centuries as bata’¯ ¯ı. Being a realist, he did not impose the rule of
measurement on the entire realm, but only on a well-defined and carefully
chosen core of the sultanate. Clearly, a fixed and stable rule of measurement
was in the government’s interests as it helped to ensure a stable level of revenue.
Bata’¯ ¯ı, on the other hand, favoured the peasants, for under it they paid in
proportion to what they produced. By shifting to the land-measurement method,
the sultan increased the pressure on the peasants to pro duce more.
Furthermore, he increased the rate of the state’s demand to 50 per cent of the
calculated produce, thereby more than doubling the rate (compared to 20 per
cent under Iltutmish and later F¯ıruz Sh ¯ ah Tughluq). However, he also made
provisions for revenue ¯ exemptions in cases of crop failure resulting from
natural calamities. Firmly insisting on the principle that ‘the burden of the
strong shall not fall on the weak’, he lightened the tax burden on the
peasants. In effect, he forced the superior rural classes (variously called kut,
¯ muqaddam and chaudhr¯ı) to pay their taxes themselves rather than pass the
burden on to the peasantry. He also abolished all the tax exemptions that they
had previously enjoyed. As a result, they were no longer in a position to
oppress the peasantry at will. Thus although the peasants lost under cAla’ al-D
¯ ¯ın, they also gained some advantages. The evidence is the fact that, during
the two decades of the sultan’s reign, no rebellion occurred in the rural
areas.
cAla’
al-D ¯ ¯ın’s strong rule alone cannot, however, account for the absence of
articulated discontent, but recorded cases of harsh treatment and punishment
under his administration mostly refer to urban political rebels and corrupt
administrators, and not to rural mal contents. In any case, the peasants were
left enough of their produce to enable them to survive from one year to the
next. The muqtacs (executive heads of provinces responsible for the collection
of revenues) and the staff of the d¯ıwan-i wiz ¯ arat ¯ (revenue department)
were, if found guilty of laxity or dishonesty in the fulfilment of their
duties, treated with marked severity; even governors were not spared physical
beatings. As a result, first, the collections became effective and regular;
second, the lag between collections and deposits was reduced; and third, the
village people were saved from the extortions of the revenue staff.
IQTAcS (ASSIGNMENTS OF LAND)
In
lieu of salary, an assignment of land, or iqta¯c(sometimes simply a portion of
the land revenue), was granted to state employees. It saved the administration
from having to keep ready cash for the monthly salary payments, and
substantially reduced the amount of paper work. The sultans of Delhi prior to
cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın had followed this convenient and simple method. Its main
disadvantage, however, was that it enabled the recipients of large iqta¯cs to
gain extensive personal influence and thus become an impediment to the
operation of state power. It also provided loopholes for recipients to enjoy
the benefits of the iqta¯cs without fulfilling their obligations. cAla’ al-D ¯
¯ın strongly disliked the system. Within five years of his accession, he issued
orders for the withdrawal of iqta¯cs, as well as other grants, and their inclusion
into khalisa ¯ (state-administered lands). This was a far-reaching change.
Financial benefits aside, it increased the authority wielded by the state over
the bureaucracy and the nobility. It seems, however, that the practice of
giving iqta¯cs was not completely abandoned, but was now restricted to special
cases in which the sultan wanted to empha size the executive authority of a
minister who had been entrusted with an important and difficult task.
MARKET-CONTROL
REGULATIONS
One
of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s most important measures – and one which has attracted a
great deal of attention – was the control of prices. It was introduced for the
purpose of employing a larger army on a lower scale of pay. Of all the
requisites of the troops, the most important single item was food. It therefore
constituted the first of the four sectors of price control. The prices of wheat
and other commodities were fixed and elaborate arrangements were made to ensure
adequate supplies in the markets and to maintain huge reserves. The other three
sectors of price control were: (a) horses, ponies, cattle and slaves; (b) cloth
and fruit; and (c) articles for domestic consumption and personal use.
The
prices of the various items in the four sectors were not changed during the
rest of the sultan’s reign. Aside from the firmness of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s
administration, other features supported the system. First, prices were only
fixed after very careful consideration and were generally reasonable. The price
of the most important item, wheat, was fixed at 7-1/2 j¯ıtals per man (1 man of
14 seers = approx. 13 kg). From the days of Balban to the reign of Firuz Sh ¯
ah Tughluq towards the end of the fourteenth century, the price of wheat
remained ¯ stable, ranging from 7 to 8 j¯ıtals per man (except during periods
of famine). Second, in another controlled sector, we learn that prices were so
fixed as to ensure a fair margin of profit for the producer/seller. Both these
features, namely the approximation of the fixed price to the normal price and the
allowance of profit to the producer, greatly contributed to the stability of
cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s market-control arrangements. In addition, the sultan took
care to ensure that the market was never short of supplies. During periods of
scarcity, rationing was enforced. Through these devices, prices were kept
steady at the fixed rate, even under famine conditions. cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın also
made sure to appoint men of honesty and impartiality to the hisba (market
control) staff. Apart from the troops stationed in Delhi, the main
beneficiaries of the system were men of modest income and of the lower salary
group in the capital. This explains the concentration within Delhi of a large
number of scholars, craftsmen and men of the various professions.
Income
levels among the ruling and scholarly élites
During
the initial phase of conquest, large areas and entire provinces were assigned
to the nobles, in order to collect revenue and consolidate the sultan’s hold on
the territory. The muqtacs (assignee-governors of these territories) tended to
wield a wide range of pow ers. Iltutmish rectified the situation by bringing
the provincial governors under the central authority and subjecting them to a
certain financial control. But in general, the nobles con tinued to enjoy the
benefits reaped from the iqta¯cs. Out of the revenues collected from the
territories assigned to him, the muqtac kept a portion for himself and his
household, used another portion towards maintaining his contingent of troops
and sent the balance (fawadil ¯ ) to the central exchequer. The muqtac’s
obligations included maintaining military contin gents and placing them at the
sultan’s service when needed. By the time of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı, the
muqtacs had been made fully accountable to the central revenue department, and
in general, the nobles were no longer given iqta¯cs but cash salaries.
Subsequently, under the Tughluqids (see Part Two below), the system of iqta¯cs
was revived, but some restrictions were introduced. The nobles lived in great
luxury and style. They comprised three main grades: the Khans, who were paid 1
lac of tankas, the Maliks, who were paid 50–60,000 tankas, and the amirs, who
received 30–40,000 tankas. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, even
soldiers (called iqta¯c-dars ¯ ) were given iqta¯cs; but when it was found that
they converted the land into milk (private property), the practice was gradu
ally discontinued. Payment to culama¯’ and mashayikh ¯ was made in various
forms: regular stipends, assignments of ‘dead land brought to life’,
assignments of cultivable land and assignments on the jizya (poll tax on
non-Muslims) of a particular locality. Land not given in assignment and
reserved for the state treasury was known as khalisa. ¯ Specific amounts of
land were assigned for the sultan’s personal and household needs, but were not
treated as royal property.
Agrarian
conditions in the fourteenth century
The
evolution of agrarian conditions during the thirteenth century and the agrarian
reforms of cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı have already been noted. Ghiyath al-D ¯ ¯ın
Tughluq (1320–5) reverted to the ‘produce-sharing’ method which, as noted
earlier, favoured the peasantry. He low ered the rate of state revenue demand
and abolished several agrarian excesses. He miti gated the harshness of cAla’
al-D ¯ ¯ın’s measures concerning the kuts ¯ , the muqaddams and the muqtacs.
His short reign probably brought considerable relief to the rural population.
The impact of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s (1325–51) experiments with the agrarian
econ omy, such as the sudden increase of the rate demanded in the Do’ab, the
rotation of crops and the granting of loans to the peasants, was lost in the
plethora of revolts; in the agrarian sector, as in other sectors, Muhammad b.
Tughluq left only confusion and anarchy. It took F¯ıruz Sh ¯ ah Tughluq
(1351–88) six years to survey the entire land and prepare new esti- ¯ mates of
revenue. He too decided to adhere to the ‘produce-sharing’ method. By making a
substantial addition to the water supply through canals and innumerable wells,
he made an enormous contribution to gardens and cultivable land and thus
ensured a substantial increase in the supply of cereals and fruit.
Firuz
Sh ¯ ah made extensive assignments to the nobility, officers, and men and
institutions ¯ of learning and piety; these inevitably diminished the khalisa ¯
lands, thereby weakening the state financially. The impression of overall
prosperity – in which the village peasants were also beneficiaries – is due to
the notable and sustained increase in production and to the long period of
general peace. At the same time, it was also a period of lax administration,
during which nobles and officers would misappropriate public funds, fail to pay
dues and thus become rich and powerful at the expense of the state.
The
political structure of the state
Dynastic
monarchy was a structure with which Indians had long been familiar. From 1210,
when the Delhi Sultanate was formally founded, the sultans steadily gathered
more and more powers; it can fairly be stated that a sultan was generally a
more powerful ruler than a Hindu ruler of earlier centuries. The process
reached its climax under cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalj¯ı, who effectively controlled
the empire and ran it as if it were a village. Muhammad b. Tughluq, however,
went too far and suffered a set-back.
The
sultan was assisted by a body of ministers who managed their respective depart
ments under royal orders. The most important departments were those of religion
and jus tice, of the army, of the intelligence service and the imperial post,
and of finance and revenue, which was looked after by the most important
minister, the vizier. For adminis trative purposes, the sultanate was divided
into provinces, with the executive head of each province serving as governor. His
powers were considerable, yet limited by the central government, especially in
financial matters. When the government at Delhi was weak, the governors,
especially those of the distant provinces, tended to assume more powers and run
their provinces autonomously; some were tempted to declare independence. Depend
ing upon the circumstances, a rebel governor might face the gallows or become
the founder of a new provincial dynasty.
Social
and economic developments in the fourteenth century: urbanization, crafts, etc.
The
trend towards urbanization, which had begun in the thirteenth century,
continued apace during the following century. Both the state chronicles and the
accounts of foreign visitors such as the Moroccan calim ¯ (scholar) and
traveller Ibn Battuta confirm this. Two interesting ¯ pieces of evidence are
the constantly increasing size of the congregational mosques and the
organization of regular transportation into the city of Delhi, with fixed
charges from and to various points; the latter indicate the growth in the size
of the city. Ibn Battuta declared ¯ that Delhi was the largest city not only in
India, but in the entire Islamic East. The increase in population and the
growth of a large number of cities led to the devel opment and diversification
of industries and crafts. Of particular importance were cotton fabrics, silken
stuffs, carpets, woollens, ironware, leatherware and sugar-making. Indian
hardware achieved great fame, producing damascened steel which had a worldwide
repu tation. Many other industries and crafts are mentioned in the context of
the royal workshops or of the taxes imposed on the industries. The scale of
diversification of food production can be grasped from Ibn Fadl Allah’s ¯
Masalik al-abs ¯ ar¯ , with its mention of 21 varieties of rice and 65
varieties of sweets. In trade and commerce, the most notable groups were the
karwaniy ¯ an (banj ¯ aras) ¯ , who distributed large quantities of grain all
over the land and are continually mentioned in chronicles and in Am¯ır Khusraw’s
historical mathnaw¯ıs. The merchants, especially the famous Multani merchants,
who were concerned with internal as well as foreign trade, also played an
important role. They organized the import of fine cloth for cAla’ al-D ¯ ¯ın’s
Saray-i cAdl market. The sahas ¯ (bankers), the Multani money lenders and the
sarrafs ¯ (money-changers) provided banking services which greatly facil itated
commercial transactions in the country. The increased pace of production led to
certain technological advances. The introduction of the cotton-carder’s bow and
the spin ning wheel, for example, contributed to the expansion of the textile
industry. The introduc tion of the true arch, dome and vault facilitated the
construction of large buildings; Diya’¯ al-D¯ın Baran¯ı mentions that cAla’
al-D ¯ ¯ın Khalja employed as many as 70,000 craftsmen ¯ for the construction
of his buildings.
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