I. Early History
The early history of Zahiir-ud-Din Muhammad Babur, which was a tissue of romantic successes and surprising reverses, belongs to Central Asia. The blood of two great conquerors flowed in his veins; he was fifth in descent from Timur, ‘the earth-shaker’, while through his mother he could trace his ancestry from Chingiz, the terrible.1 His mother, Qutluq Nigar Khanum, was the daughter of Yunus Khan who was descended from Chaghatai Khan, the second son of Chingiz Khan. On the death of Sultan Abu Sa‘id Mirza, a great-grandson of Timur and Babur’s grandfather, his extensive domi¬ nions covering Khurasan and Transoxiana were divided among his sons (1469). The fourth son, ‘Umar Shaikh Mirza, the father of Babur, obtained the kingdom of Farghana.2 Here the founder of the Mughul empire was born on 14 February, 1483, and inherited his father’s precarious throne at the tender age of eleven years and a few months. The petty kingdom of Farghana, that ‘weak child separated from the mother-empire’ of Timur, could hardly satisfy the ambition of the young prince whose dream was Samar qand, the proud capital of his great ancestor. After a hard struggle of three years against his cousin Baisunqur Mirza, he was able to capture it in November, 1497, after a siege of seven months; but he could not hold it for more than a hundred days, as he had to leave Samarqand for Farghana to quell a rebellion led by Auzun Hasan and Ahmad Tambal who acted in the name of his younger brother Jahangir Mirza. Babur failed and now lost both. He recovered Farghana in June, 1498, and won Samarqand for the second time in November, 1500, not from a Timurid rival but from Shaibani Khan, the chief of the Uzbegs. Babur then made peace with Jahangir Mirza by ceding parts of Farghana, but the latter ultimately occu¬ pied the whole of it. For the next twelve years the main episode in Babur’s life was his struggle with the Uzbegs. In May, 1501, he was badly defeated by Shaibani Khan at Sar-i-pul and forced to surrender Samarqand and give his eldest sister Khanzada Begam in marriage to the enemy. He was now once more a throneless wan¬ derer and retired to Tashkent under the shelter of his maternal uncle Sultan Mahmud Khan. With his two uncles, Mahmud Khan and Ahmad Khan, he made several attempts on Farghana. Ahmad Tambal, finding himself no match for such a Timurid-Mongol coali¬ tion, invited Shaibani Khan who ultimately inflicted a crushing de¬ feat upon the two Khans (the uncles of Babur) in the battle of Archiyan (June, 1503).
The battle of Archiyan moulded the future history of Babur: it gave a new orientation to his ambition and policy. He bade last farewell to the land of his birth and set out to try his fortune be¬ yond the Hindu Kush away from the grasp of his arch-enemy. He turned to Kabul which was captured in 1501 by Muqim the Arghun from its legal ruler ‘Abdur-Razzaq, son of Ulugh Beg, who had in¬ herited it from his father Sultan Abu Sa‘id. Babur’s army was now reinforced by the arrival of the Mongol deserters from the camp of Khusrav Shah who had been driven from Qunduz by Shaibani. Probably Babur won the Mongols over to his side, and had they not joined his standard, the conquest of Kabul might not have been possible. In October, 1504, he crossed the Hindu Kush and took Kabul from the Arghun usurper almost without any opposition.3
The bloodless conquest of Kabul was the turning-point in Babur’s career. He had now a place under the sun, a base from which he could turn his attention either west to Samarqand or east to Hindusthan. It was from Kabul that he first had the lure of the fertile plains of India, and the idea of conquering it seized his mind. This did not mean the abandonment of his ambitions in Central Asia. It was not by choice but by force of circumstances that the grandson of Abu Sa‘id laid the foundation of an empire in Hindusthan.
It was a few months after the conquest of Kabul that Babur made his first invasion into the territory of Hindusthan. In January, 1505, he set out by the Khyber Pass for Peshawar and in¬ stead of crossing the Indus marched on to Kohat. From Kohat he marched towards Bangash and finally reached the Indus at Tarbila.4 The raid, which was confined to fighting against the Afghan tribes and ravaging the banks of the Indus, lasted four months, and in May, 1505, Babur returned to Kabul by way of Ghazni.
The alarming growth of the power of Shaibani Khan, who had captured Khiva and was threatening Balkh, at last moved Sultan Husain Mlrza Baiqara, the renowned king of Herat, who called on the Timurid princes for a joint attack upon the Uzbeg enemy. Babur hastened from Kabul in response to the invitation, but on the way, at Kahmard, he received the report of Sultan Husain Mirza Baiqara’s death (5 May, 1506). Nevertheless he pushed on and after a march of eight hundred miles met on 26 October the two sons of the late sultan on the river Murghab and accompanied them to Herat; but in spite of the lavish offers of hospitality the fashionable and cultured princes did not make proper winter arrangements for his army, whereupon he left on 24 December for Kabul, undertaking a perilous journey through the snow-clad passes. On his return he put down a conspiracy of the Mongol troops to place his cousin Wais Mirza, son of Sultan Mahmud Mirza, on the throne. Shaibani Khan did not miss the golden opportunity of attacking Khurasan and took Herat in June, 1507.
The arch-enemy of Babur was now at the height of his power: he had humbled the Mongols as well as the Timurids. It was a critical juncture for the prince of Kabul, the only Timurid State that survived the fall of Herat. Babur, who was fully alive to the strategic importance of Qandahar, responded to the call of Shah Beg and Muqim Beg, the sons of Zu-’n-N'un Arghun, governor of Qanda¬ har under Sultan Husain Baiqara, for military aid against the Uzbegs. As he approached Qandahar, Babur found the Arghun princes hostile, but he took the city and put them to flight. He had soon to leave Qandahar as Shaibani Khan was hastening to¬ wards the city at the invitation of the fugitive Muqim. Babur deemed it expedient to keep himself away from the Uzbegs and diverted his energies to making a raid into Hindusthan. Shaibani came and took Qandahar, but left for the north on account of the rebellion of one of his chiefs. In September, 1507, Babur had set out for the Indus and, marching down the Kabul river, advanced as far as Mandrawar,5 but returned to Kabul on account of dis¬ agreement among his nobles according to Abu-’l-Fazl, but more probably due to the retirement of Shaibani. The raid of 1507, though barren, was very significant; it was symptomatic of the way in which Babur turned from the West to the East, from the arid steppes of Central Asia to the fertile plains of Hindusthan.
It was after the retirement of Shaibani from Qandahar and on his return to Kabul that Babur abandoned the title of Mirza (prince) and styled himself Padishah (emperor) and thus asserted the headship of the Timurids. The birth of his son Humayun gave the death-blow to the partisans of the house of Ulugh Mirza who organized a formidable rebellion in favour of ‘Abdur-Razzaq, but Babur gave them a severe defeat and put them to flight. The rest of the year 1508 and the whole of the next year he spent quietly in arranging the internal economy of his petty kingdom. r
In 1510 the perpetual menace to Babur by the ever-waxing power of Shaibani was suddenly removed. The latter came into conflict with Shah Isma‘11, the Safavi ruler of Iran, and was badly defeated. Shaibani was killed and his army was annihilated. This news raised high hopes in the mind of Babur. He could now ex¬ pect to recover his lost territories. Leaving Nasir Mlrza in charge of Kabul, he reached Qunduz in January, 1511. Here he received an embassy from the Safavi king, Shah Isma‘11 of Iran, who offered his friendship and sent back his sister Khanzada Begam who had fallen into the hands of the Persians. Babur sent Wais Mirza to Iran with congratulations, thanks and presents. The Shah agreed to help Babur on condition that he should read the Shah’s name in the khutba and stamp it on his coins together with those of the Twelve Imams.6
With Persian auxiliaries Babur took Bukhara; his cousin Haidar Mlrza had already driven the Uzbegs out of Farghana. The road to Samarqand now lay open and from Bukhara Babur marched direct to the capital of Timur and proclaimed himself king amidst popular rejoicings. His popularity soon waned in Sunni Samar¬ qand which bitterly disliked his concessions to Shihsm in his com¬ pact with the Shah. The Uzbegs under ‘Ubaid-ullah Khan, nephew of Shaibani, taking advantage of Shah Isma‘iTs preoccupation in the affairs of Azarbaijian and the growing coolness between him and Babur due to the latter’s failure to fully satisfy the Shah’s Shi‘ite zeal, attacked Bukhara. Babur thereupon marched against the Uzbegs but was defeated at Kul-i-Malik in the vicinity of Bukhara (May, 1512). Babur lost not only Bukhara but also Samarqand to the Uzbegs, and retired to Hissar (in Badakhshan). Shah Isma‘11 had meanwhile sent an army under Najm Beg to assist Babur against the Uzbegs.6a
The combined forces of N!ajm Beg and Babur marched towards Bukhara, taking Khuzar and Qarshi on the way. The Uzbegs had entrenched themselves in the fort of Ghazdawan which Najm Beg besieged. The garrison was well-provisioned against a long siege, while the Persian troops badly suffered from winter and scarcity. Najm Beg therefore decided to raise the siege and withdraw, as Babur and others advised him, but next day the Uzbeg army, great¬ ly reinforced, surprised the Persians. The Persian army was thrown into confusion and badly defeated and Najm Beg was slain (November, 1512). Babur, who was in command of the rear-guard, escaped to Hissar. Persian historians accuse Babur of treachery in the, battle), and his son Humayun, while at the Persian court, was taunted by reference to his father’s treachery at Ghazdawan. It is quite probable that Babur remained coldly neutral as he had no love lost for the Persian ally who had exacted too great a price for his help. From Hissar, where the Mongols had rebelled against him, Babur went to Qunduz, but as he had no hope of recovering Hissar, he crossed the Hindu Kush and returned to Kabul (1514).
Nasir MIrza, who had been left in charge of Kabul, was now appointed to Ghazni, but his death shortly after occasioned a revolt of local chiefs and Mongol troops, which Babur quelled. For the next four years, 1515-1518, the history of Babur is comparatively uneventful. He was now merely the chief of a petty kingdom. He realized at last that Central Asia was a lost field to him; he was no match for the Uzbegs, specially after Shah Ismahl’s tragic de¬ feat at Tabriz in August, 1514, at the hands of the Ottoman Turks, as there was now no prospect of Safavld-Tlmurid alliance against them. But he was too optimistic to despair, and too ambitious to remain inactive, and turned his eyes towards the East as a probable compensation for the lost dominions in the North. These quiet years were spent in preparation for that ultimate goal, in punitive expeditions around Kabul, as well as in organizing his army, for which he utilized the services of a Turk named Ustad ‘All Qull. The battle of Ghazdawan therefore finally moulded Babur’s destiny. Since the conquest of Kabul in 1504 the idea of the conquest of India had been in his mind, but after Ghazdawan the thought of carving a kingdom in India was forced on him. If the battle of Archiyan turned him from Farghana to Kabul, that of Ghazdawan turned him from Kabul to India. But for ShaibanI Khan and the Uzbegs, the founder of the Mughul empire in India might have died as a Tlmurid ruler of Samarqand.
II. Conquest of Hindusthdn
Both the great ancestors of Babur, Chingiz and Timur, had in¬ vaded India. The raid of Chingiz had touched only the fringe of the country, but the invasion of Timur caused wide-spread anarchy in Hindusthan, as the kingdom of Delhi had already become a shadow of its former self. The Sayyids were hardly the persons to cope with the prevailing anarchy and dislocation and gave way to the Lodls. The kingdom of the Lodls was a loose confederacy of semi-independent governorships held by the amirs, the leaders of the Afghan tribes, and the king ‘was no more conspicuous than a royal oakling in a forest of oaks’. The first two Lodls managed the turbulent nobles: Buhlul, by respecting the sentiments of the Afghans, wedded to the ideal of tribal polity, and Sikandar, by a policy of tempered firmness. But Ibrahim, who came to the throne in 1517, was ambitious, tactless, arrogant and impatient; he tried to play the monarch, even to those who detested monarchy. He thus alienated the sympathy of the Afghan nobles who raised the standard of rebellion. The Punjab and Jaunpur openly revolted and the Rajputs also defeated him.7
While the king of Kabul was preparing for the realization of his long-cherished dream of the conquest of Hindusthan, the Hin¬ dustan of Ibrahim Lodi offered him the most favourable circum¬ stances. Outside the Lodi kingdom there were the Muslim king¬ doms of Multan, Sind, Gujarat, Malwa, Khandesh, and Bengal in Northern India while in the Deccan the BahmanI empire had been split into five States, viz., Berar, Bldar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golconda. The notable Hindu States were Rajasthan and Orissa in the north and Vijayanagara in the south. The Muslim kingdoms were very weak because of their internal divisions and mutual jea¬ lousies. The Rajput confederacy led by Rana Sangram Sirhha of Mewar had grown to be a great political force, almost ready to make a bid for the Delhi empire. The great expansion of the king¬ dom of Vijayanagara under Krishna Deva Raya (1509-1530), who had humbled the power of Orissa, caused not a little anxiety to the Muslim powers of the Deccan. Such was the Indian scene when Babur seriously turned to invade the country.
Early in 1519 Babur made a sudden raid on Bajaur, besieged it, and stormed it after a spirited struggle. To strike terror into the heart of the Afghan tribes, he put the inhabitants to the sword, to which reference will be made later. At the same time, with a vie'w to conciliating them, he married the daughter of a Yusufzal chief. He crossed the Swat, and fording the Indus, made his way almost unopposed to the Jhelum. Most of the local chieftains and the fort of Bhera submitted. Babur regarded the Punjab as his own by hereditary right from Timur, who had conquered it, and instructed his troops not to do violence on the people or their flocks and crops. He sent an embassy to the court of Ibrahim Lodi ask¬ ing for the recognition of his claim to the Punjab, but his envoy Mulla Murshid was detained at Lahore by the governor of the Punjab, Daulat Khan, and the letter remained undelivered. Babur left Hindu Beg in charge of Bhera and came back to Kabul on 31 March, attacking and subduing the Gakkhars on the way. The ex¬ pedition bore no permanent result—it was rather a reconnoitreing raid; and no sooner had he left than his officer Hindu Beg was ex¬ pelled.
Babur himself states that from the year 925 A.H. (A.D. 1519) when he took Bajaur, to the year 932 A.H. (A.D. 1526), he led his army five times into Hindusthan. Babur thus regarded the expedition of early 1519 as his first Indian invasion. There is no dis¬ agreement about his fifth expedition which led to the battle of Panlpat, but we are not told which expeditions Babur regarded as second, third and fourth. Abu-T-Fazl regards the| raids of 1505 and 1507 as the first, and second and that of early 1519 as the third, but could not be definite regarding the fourth. If we take into con¬ sideration the earlier raids of 1505 and 1507, we find that Babur made altogether seven expeditions into Indian territory.
The same year, 1519, in September Babur crossed the Khyber and advanced as far as Peshawar, subduing the Yusufzai Afghans on the way. But he had to hasten back to Kabul on receipt of the report that the rujer of Kashghar was advancing on Badakhshan., This was Babur’s fourth raid into Hindusthan and most probably Babur regarded it as his second.8
In 1520 Babur made his fifth expedition (third according to Firishta and probably also to Babur) into Hindusthan. He march¬ ed out of Kabul through Bajaur, crossed the Indus and reached Bhera where he punished those who had revolted against him. Crossing the Jhelum he advanced on to Sialkot, which submitted, and then marched on Sayyidpur which offered resistance. Babur stormed it, put the inhabitants to the sword, and took the women and children into captivity. The expedition came to an abrupt end because Babur had to return to Kabul which was threatened by Shah Beg Arghun, ruler of Qandahar.
Babur realized the necessity of having Qandahar as a base be¬ fore he should lead his troops into Hindusthan. It would be al¬ most indispensable for a ruler of Kabul and the Indian kingdom as the first line of defence against the growing power of Safavi Persia. Qandahar was held by Zu-’n-Nun Beg Arghun on behalf of Sultan Husain Mirza Baiqara of Herat, but after the fall of Herat and Zu- ’n-Nun Beg’s death, his sons Muqim and Shah Beg secured indepen¬ dent possession of it. Already in 1517 Babur had made an unsuc¬ cessful attempt on it. On his return to Kabul from the Indian raid, he laid siege to Qandahar (1520) but could not take it. Next year also he made another unsuccessful siege. Shah Beg, as he failed to persuade Shah Isma‘Il to interfere against Babur, left Qandahar for Sind where he was able to carve out an independent kingdom. Babur accordingly marched to Qandahar, took it without any oppo¬ sition on 6 September, 1522,9 and left his younger son Mirza Kamran in charge. Garmsir also fell into the hands of Babur. Badakhshan, too, had come to his hands in 1520 on the death of his cousin Wais Mirza, when Babur, setting aside the claim of the former’s son Sulaiman Mirza, had appointed his own son Humayun to its government.
Babur was now free to turn his attention to Hindusthan. There the position of Ibrahim Lodi was growing more and more precarious on account of the revolt of his nobles and relations. The most serious enemies of the Sultan were ‘Alam Khan, his uncle, and Daulat Khan Lodi, viceroy of the Punjab, both of whom appealed to Babur for help. ‘Alam Khan, who had been living at the court of Sultan Muzaffar of Gujarat, went to Kabul and begged Babur to advance to the Punjab and place him on the throne of Delhi. Daulat Khan, apprehending that Sultan Ibrahim would soon deprive him of his position, sent messengers to Babur, offering to acknowledge him as his sovereign and asking his aid against Ibrahim. Babur respond¬ ed to Daulat Khan’s appeal and undertook his sixth invasion of Hindusthan (1524).10
Passing through the Khyber Pass and the Gakkhar country, Babur crossed the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab and advanced within ten miles of Lahore. There he was encountered by the Lodi army under Bihar Khan, Mubarak Khan and others. The Afghan army was defeated and Lahore fell into Babur’s hands. He then pushed on southwards to Dipalpur which he stormed. Here he was joined by Daulat Khan and his sons, Ghazi Khan and Dilawar Khan, who had been driven from Lahore. Babur gave Daulat Khan, Jul lundur and Sultanpur as assignments. This could hardly satisfy Daulat Khan who wanted a free hand in the Punjab. He had sought an ally but found a master, and along with his son, Ghazi Khan, left Babur in silent indignation and began to intrigue against him. Dilawar Khan, who remained loyal to Babur, was now given Sultanpur. To the pretender ‘Alam Khan, Babur gave Dipalpur. Babur was proceeding eastwards towards Sirhind but, considering his forces inadequate, retreated to Lahore and then returned to Kabul.
No sooner had Babur left than Daulat Khan came out of his re¬ treat, seized Sultanpur and drove ‘Alam Khan from Dipalpur. ‘Alam Khan, who still harped on his claim to the throne of Delhi, escaped to Kabul and offered Babur the formal cession of Lahore and the territory west of it on condition that Babur would place him on the Delhi throne. The king of Kabul accepted the offer and sent instructions to his generals in the Punjab to help ‘Alam Khan in his attack on Delhi. Babur could not accompany ‘Alam Khan to Hindusthan as he had to go to Balkh to the aid of Shah Isma‘il against the Uzbegs who had besieged it. ‘Alam Khan, after his re turn to India, abandoned the alliance with Babur and joined hands with Daulat Khan who offered him his help and allegiance. With the assistance of Daulat Khan and his son, Ghazi Khan, ‘Alam Khan marched on Delhi and surprised Ibrahim Lodi’s camp at night, but wTas ultimately routed. With his army dispersed, ‘Alam Khan made good his escape.
Babur meanwhile had driven the Uzbegs from Balkh and now turned his attention to Hindusthan. On 17 November, 1525, he set out on his last and most momentous Indian campaign. On the way he was joined by Humayun from Badakhshan and Khvaja Kilan from Ghazni. Whein he crossed the Indus on 16 December, the entire army amounted to twelve thousand men including non-com¬ batant camp followers. As Babur advanced towards Sialkot, Daulat Khan and Ghazi Khan, who were overrunning the Punjab, escaped to Milwat. Babur blockaded the strong fortress and forced Daulat Khan, who had girded himself with two swords as a challenge against the invader, to capitulate. Ghazi Khan fled, leaving his precious library to the enemy. Dilawar Khan proved faithless to¬ wards his father and again joined Babur. ‘Alam Khan Lodi also joined Babur in a forlorn condition and Babur considered it expe¬ dient to make political use of an Afghan pretender. Lahore and its dependent territories fell into Babur’s hands and the first stage of his campaign was brought to a close.
The road to Delhi now lay open. As Babur advanced towards his goal by way of Sirhind and Ambala, Sultan Ibrahim also advan¬ ced from Delhi with a big army to meet the invader. Two advance parties of the Afghans fell upon the Mughul army: the first under Hamid Khan, which came into contact with Babur’s right wing, was completely routed by Humayun, then only eighteen years old, in his ‘maiden battle’; the second under Daud Khan and Hatim Khan was similarly routed. Babur, having crossed the Sutlej near Hupar, proceeded to Ambala and from there two marches along the Yamuna brought him to the historic city of Panipat where he came within the sight of the enemy. Here Babur encamped and prepared him self for the battle.
Babur stationed the army in such a way that the town of PanL pat sheltered his extreme right while his left was protected by a ditch and an abatis. His centre was strengthened by a line of some seven hundred movable carts, tied together by ropes of raw hide, and between eviery two carts there were five or six breastworks for the protection of the match-lock-men and artillery-men. The line was not continuous but passages were provided wide enough for a hundred and fifty horsemen to march out abreast.10a
For eight days from 12 April to 19 April the two armies stood face to face. With a view to drawing the enemy into battle, Babur sent out four or five thousand men on 20 April to attempt a night surprise, and though it failed on account of the negligence of the troops, it had the desired effect of making the enemy move. On 21 April at dawn the Afghans were on the move in battle array. As Babur noticed it, he bade his men take their station and drew them up according to the traditional formation of the Turks and the Mon¬ gols.
Babur took his position in the centre. The right centre was led by Chan Timur Sultan and the left centre by the Chief Minister Mir 'Alt Khalifa. Humayuin, assisted by Khvaja Kilan, commanded the right wing and in charge of the left wing were Muhammad Sultan MIrza and Mahdl Khvaja. On the right and left extremities of the entire line there were two flying columns to wheel round on the enemy and take them in the flank and rear. The van was commanded by Khusrav Kukultash and Muhammad ‘All Jang, and the reserve by ‘Abd-ul-'AzIz, the Master of the Horse. Along the front of the entire line, protected by the palisade of carts and breastworks, were placed the artillery under Ustad ‘All on the right side and the musketeers under Mustafa on the left. From his key position in the; centre Babur could have a view of the activities of the entire army.
Ibrahim Lodi had with him a force of 100,000 men and 1,000 ele^ phants while Babur’s army was 24,000 strong.11 The Afghan army came straight on at a rapid march, and as they came near his de¬ fences, they hesitated and halted, but the ranks behind still pressed forward and caused great confusion among the whole force. Babur seized the opportunity and sent out his flanking columns to wheel round the Afghans and deliver a violent attack on their rear, while his right and left wings charged straight on. Babur sent timely re¬ inforcement to the left wing under Mahdl Khvaja which was hard pressed, as well as to the right wing which felt the brunt of the Afghan attack. From the centre Ustad ‘All with his artillery and Mustafa with his match-locks began their action. Ibrahim’s centre gave way and the Afghans, beset on all sides by arrows and fire and crowded into a narrow space with no room to use their arms, could neither advance nor retreat. The battle ended at noon when the Afghans were completely routed and took to flight, leaving some twenty thousand dead, including Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. The supe¬ rior generalship and strategy of Babur, the higher discipline and morale of his troops, and the discontent rampant among the Afghan troops were the secrets of his easy victory. The efficacy of Babur’s artillery at Rarilpat has been over-estimated; it seems Babur had only two guns and, even if he had more, it appears from his own descrip tion that he won at Panlpat a bow-man’s victory.12 The importance of the battle, great as it was, has also been exaggerated. It sealed the fate of the Lodi dynasty and marks the completion of the second stage of Babur’s conquest of India. It did nothing more; it could not finally decide the fate of Hindusthan.
From the field of Panlpat Babur marched to Delhi. On 27 April, 1526, the khutba was read in his name in the Jami‘ Mosque and the king of Kabul was hailed as the Emperor of Hindusthan.13 From Delhi Babur proceeded to Agra which Prince Humayun had already captured. Agra became Babur’s new Samar qand. Here Humayun presented him a big and precious diamond which he had received from the family of the late Raja Vikramajit of Gwalior as a mark of gratitude for his chivalrous treatment. This has been identified with the world-famous Koh-i-Nur-u Babur, however, affectionately returned it to his son as a gift.
Babur had won the throne of Delhi but not yet the empire of Hindusthan. The various Afghan leaders rose against the Mughul usurper from different centres: Sambhal, Bayana, Mewat, Dholpur, Gwalior, Raprl, Etawa15 and Kalpi. They found a pretender in Ibrahim Lodi’s brother, Mahmud Lodi. Nasir Khan Lohanll and Ma‘ruf Farmull still held Kanauj and the country beyond the Gahga (Ganges), and the Afghans in Bihar had set up Bihar Khan, son of Darya Khan, as their king. Besides, Babur experienced much diffi¬ culty in procuring provisions for his army on account of the hostility of the people, and his officers, weary of the oppressive summer of Hindusthan, murmured for the cool air of Kabul. Babur discouraged their timid conservatism and his eloquence hushed all dissentients; Khvaja Kilan, the only notable exception, was sent to Ghazni as its governor.
The Afghan chiefs now realized that, unlike Timur, Babur had come to conquer and not merely to raid, and many laid down their arms; among them were such notable; Afghan leaders as Shaikh Baya zld and Mahmud Khan Loharil. Babur had now two major enemies to face: the Afghans of the East who had set up Bihar Khan as their king, and the Rajputs in the south-west under Rana Sahgram Simha of Mewar. The Afghan menace seemed more imminent and Huma¬ yun was sent with an expeditionary force against them. In a bril¬ liant campaign Humayun took Jaunpur, Ghazlpur and Kalpi; and line was not continuous but passages were provided wide enough for a hundred and fifty horsemen to march out abreast.10a
For eight days from 12 April to 19 April the two armies stood face to face. With a view to drawing the enemy into battle, Babur sent out four or five thousand men on 20 April to attempt a night surprise, and though it failed on account of the negligence of the troops, it had the desired effect of making the enemy move. On 21 April at dawn the Afghans were on the move in battle array. As Babur noticed it, he bade his men take their station and drew them up according to the traditional formation of the Turks and the Mon¬ gols.
Babur took his position in the centre. The right centre was le;d by Chim Timur Sultan and the left centre by the Chief Minister Mir ‘All Khalifa. Humayuin, assisted by Khvaja Kilan, commanded the right wing and in charge of the left wing were Muhammad Sultan Mirza and Mahdi Khvaja. On the right and left extremities of the entire line there were two flying columns to wheel round on the enemy and take them in the flank and rear. The van was commanded by Khusrav Kukultash and Muhammad ‘All Jang, and the reserve by ‘Abd-ul-'Aziz, the Master of the Horse. Along the front of the entire line, protected by the palisade of carts and breastworks, were placed the artillery under Ustad ‘All on the right side and the musketeers under Mustafa on the left. From his key position in thei centre Babur could have a view of the activities of the entire army.
Ibrahim Lodi had with him a force of 100,000 men and 1,000 ele' phants while Babur’s army was 24,000 strong.11 The Afghan army came straight on at a rapid march, and as they came near his de¬ fences, they hesitated and halted, but the ranks behind still pressed forward and caused great confusion among the whole force. Babur seized the opportunity and sent out his flanking columns to wheel round the Afghans and deliver a violent attack on their rear, while his right and left wings charged straight on. Babur sent timely re¬ inforcement to the left wing under Mahdi Khvaja which was hard pressed, as well as to the right wing which felt the brunt of the Afghan attack. From the centre Ustad ‘All with his artillery and Mustafa with his match-locks began their action. Ibrahim’s centre gave way and the Afghans, beset on all sides by arrows and fire and crowded into a narrow space with no room to use their arms, could neither advance nor retreat. The battle ended at noon when the Afghans were completely routed and took to flight, leaving some twenty thousand dead, including Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. The supe¬ rior generalship and strategy of Babur, the higher discipline and morale of his troops, and the discontent rampant among the Afghan troops were the secrets of his easy victory. The efficacy of Babur’s artillery at Panlpat has been over-estimated; it seems Babur had only two guns and, even if he had more, it appears from his own descrip tion that he won at Panlpat a bow-man’s victory.12 The importance of the battle, great as it was, has also been exaggerated. It sealed the fate of the Lodi dynasty and marks the completion of the second stage of Babur’s conquest of India. It did nothing more; it could not finally decide the fate of Hindusthan.
From the field of Panlpat Babur marched to Delhi. On 27 April, 1526, the khutba was read in his name in the Jami‘ Mosque and the king of Kabul was hailed as the Emperor of Hindusthan.13 From Delhi Babur proceeded to Agra which Prince Humayun had already captured. Agra became Babur’s new Samar qand. Here Humayun presented him a big and precious diamond which he had rejceived from the family of the late Raja Vikramajit of Gwalior as a mark of gratitude for his chivalrous treatment. This has been identified with the world-famous Koh-i-Nur.14 Babur, however, affectionately returned it to his son as a gift.
Babur had won the throne of Delhi but not yet the empire of Hindusthan. The various Afghan leaders rose against the Mughul usurper from different centres: Sambhal, Bayana, Mewat, Dholpur, Gwalior, RaprI, Etiawa15 and Kalpi. They found a pretender in Ibrahim Lodi’s brother, Mahmud Lodi. Nasir Khan LohanJI and Ma‘ruf Farmull still held Kanauj and the country beyond the Ganga (Ganges), and the Afghans in Bihar had set up Bihar Khan, son of Darya Khan, as their king. Besides, Babur experienced much diffi¬ culty in procuring provisions for his army on account of the hostility of the people, and his officers, weary of the oppressive summer of Hindusthan, murmured for the cool air of Kabul. Babur discouraged their timid conservatism and his eloquence hushed all dissentients; Khvaja Kilan, the only notable exception, was sent to Ghazni as its governor.
The Afghan chiefs now realized that, unlike Timur, Babur had come to conquer and not merely to raid, and many laid down their arms; among them were such notable; Afghan leaders as Shaikh Bay^a zld and Mahmud Khan Loharil. Babur had now two major enemies to face: the Afghans of the East who had set up Bihar Khan as their king, and the Rajputs in the south-west under Rana Sangram Simha of Mewar. The Afghan menace seemed more imminent and Huma¬ yun was sent with an expeditionary force against them. In a bril¬ liant campaign Humayun took Jaunpur, Ghazlpur and Kalpi; and Gwalior was obtained by treachery. About this time (December, 1526) Babur narrowly escaped death from poison mixed with his food by Sultan Ibrahim’s mother through royal servants.
Babur now turned his attention to the arch-enemy, Rana San¬ gram Simha. This undisputed leader of the Rajput confederacy was an indefatigable fighter, with one arm and one eye lost and eighty scars in his body. He had sent a friendly embassy to Babur at Kabul and offered his help against Ibrahim, but the situation had now changed and Sangram Simha lost no time in declaring war against his rival for the mastery of Hindusthan. Babur declared his first jihad (holy war) against the ‘infidels’ and sent reinforcement to Bayana which had been besieged by the united forces of Hasan Khan of Mewat and Rana Sangram Simha. On 11 February, 1527, Babur himself marched against the enemy and encamped at Slkrl where he was joined by the garrison from Bayana. In some skir¬ mishes which followed, the Rajputs inflicted defeat upon his advance guard. RaprI and Chandwar16 fell into the hands of the Afghans; Sambhal and Kanauj were abandoned; Gwalior was besieged by the Hindus; and the Indians who had joined his ranks began to desert. It was at this critical juncture that Babur made the memorable renunciation of his besetting sin, wine, and restored the morale of his troops by a stirring oration.17 He then pushed on and met the enemy near Khanua, a village some thirty-seven miles west of Agra.
Here on 17 March, 1527, the battle took place.18 Babur em¬ ployed the sarnie tactics that he had employed at Panlpat. Along the front of the line were placed groups of carts, connected together by chains of iron and breastworks of wheeled woodien tripods fast¬ ened by ropes of hide, and behind them were the artillery and the match-locks. As at Panlpat, Babur himself commandied the centre. On the right of the centre was Chin Timur Sultan and the right wing was led by Humayun. The left wing was under the general com¬ mand of Khalifa who was assisted by Mahdl Khvaja and Muhammad Sultan Mlrza. Mustafa with his match-locks was posted in front of the right wing while Ustad ‘All with his ordnance stood in front of the centre. On the two extremities were the flanking columns (Tulghama). Of the numerical strength of Babur’s army there is no (estimate, and though the Mughul estimate of the Rajput army numbering 200,000 was exaggerated, there can be no doubt about their preponderating numerical superiority. According to Tod, the Rana could place himself at the head of seven Rajas, nine Raos’ one hundred and four chieftains, eighty thousand horsemen and five hundred war-elephants.19 Its accuracy may, however, be doubted.
The battle began about half-past nine in the morning with a magnificent charge by the Rajput left wing upon the Mughul right. The timely reinforcement under Chin Timur Sultan saved the hard pressed right of Babur. Mustafa brought forward his tripods and culverins and opened fire upon the assailants. With fresh reinforce¬ ments from the centre and Mustafa’s fire, the Mughul right repulsed the increasing attacks of the enemy and inflicted heavy losses upon them. The Rajputs now fiercely charged the Mughul left wing, but it stood fast while the flanking column wheeled round and fell upon the rear of the enemy. The Mughul artillery (match-locks and stone missiles discharged by ‘All Quit) began to rain death, but the Rajputs by the sheer weight of superior numbers maintained un¬ ceasing pressure. Babur had to send his reserve and then led his centre forward. The Rajputs then made the last desperate charge upon the Mughul right and left wings. In the evening, after ten hours’ hard contest, the Rajputs were completely routed, and the Rana, badly wounded, took to flight. The battle of Khanua is pro¬ bably even more important than the battle of Panipat; the one broke the unstable power of an Afghan dynasty, while the other shattered ‘India’s most splendid chivalry’, the powerful Rajput confederacy, which was making a bid for the mastery of Hindusthan. The battle of Khanua decided the issue in favour of Babur and marked the most important stage in his conquest of Hindusthan. Agra and not Kabul became henceforward the centre of his power.
Babur now assumed the title of ‘Ghazi’ and, with a view to reducing Mewat, marched into its capital, Alwar (7 April, 1527). Humayun was despatched to Badakhshan with a large force to keep his trans-Indian territory secure. Towards the end of the year Babur led his troops against Medini Rai, a Rajput chief of influence and king-maker in Malwa, who held the great fortress of Chanderi on the north-east of Malwa. He encamped before Chanderi on 21 January, 1528, and, after a week of fruitless negotiation for peace, besieged it on the 28th. After a desperate fight Babur took it next morning in spite of the heroic sacrifice of the garrison, which was almost tantamount to suicide.
On 2 February, 1528, Babur set out on an eastern campaign against the Afghans under Biban who had routed the Mughul army in Ajodhya and seized Lakhnau. Arriving at Kanauj, he crossed the Ganga (Ganges) in the middle of March by constructing a pon¬ toon bridge, defeated the Afghans, and hotly pursued them as far as Ajodhya. Biban escaped to Bengal, and Bayazid as well as Ma‘ruf also took to heels. But in the beginning of the next year Babur had to set out on his second great eastern campaign against a formid able coalition of the Afghan chiefs who had all rallied under Sultan Mahmud Lodi, the brother of Ibrahim Lodi, in Bihar, and gathered an army of 100,000 men. It was the last great stand of the Afghans against the Mughul usurper. In three months the Mughul army arrived at Chunar (April, 1529), when Mahmud, who was besieging it, took to flight. Sher Khan abandoned Banaras, several Afghan leaders surrendered to Babur, and Mahmud Lodi, finding himself deserted, sought refuge with the Bengal army which was massed on the frontier. Sultan Nusrat Shah of Bengal had only recently sent an envoy to Babur at Agra offering his submission, and Babur had no intention of invading his territory. Babur, however, was bent on chastising the Afghan rebels, and as he moved eastward, he found the Bengal troops standing in his way at the confluence of the Gahga (Ganges) and the Gogra. On 6 May, 1529, was fought the battle of Gogra, Babur’s third great battle in Hindusthan. He brilliantly forced the passage of the Gogra under heavy fire from the Bengal artillery, while ‘Askari, crossing at a different place, attacked the flank of the Bengal army. After a fierce struggle the enemy, at¬ tacked in front, rear and flank, broke and fled. The battle of Gogra is the supplement to the battles of Panlpat and Khanua; these three battles made Babur master of Northern India. The battle of Gogra frustrated the last stand of the Afghans. Ma‘ruf and several other Afghan chiefs joined him, while Biban, Bayazid and Mahmud Lodi retired. Jalal Khan, the late boy-king of Bihar, acknowledged Babur as overlord and a treaty of peace was concluded with Nusrat Shah, by which Babur’s sovereignty in Bihar was recognized. All seemed quiet in the eastern front. This was the last exploit of Babur’s stormy career.
Babur seemed to have never lost his trans-Indian ambition, the dream of Samarqand. The report of the battle of Jam (26 Sep¬ tember, 1528) in which Shah Tahmasp had inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Uzbegs revived it, and in his letter to Humayun, dated 13 November, 1528, Babur enjoined his son to undertake an ex¬ pedition against the Uzbegs in Hissar, Samarqand or Marv as might seem advisable. Humayun marched upon Samarqand and occupied Hissar, but he ultimately failed, when Shah Tahmasp left for the west against the Turks. Babur was highly displeased at the failure of his son. Probably with a view to remaining near his father whose health was failing, Humayun suddenly left Badakhshan and arrived at Agra on 27 June (1529). Sa‘id Khan, the ruler of Kashghar, marched on Badakhshan and besieged Qil‘a Zafar. Babur was highly displeased at his son’s conduct and sent Mirza Sulaiman to his father’s kingdom and compelled Sa‘Id Khan to recognize him as the prince ol Badakhshan.
Humayun retired to his Jaglr at Sambhal, but after six months fell seriously ill and was brought to Agra. The skill of the best physicians failed to cure him and Babur, in accordance with the suggestion of the saint Mir Abu Baqa to sacrifice the most precious thing in his possession, offered to sacrifice his life. He walked three times round his sick son and exclaimed that he had borne away the disease.20 Shortly after, Humayun recovered and Babur, whose health had already been failing, was taken ill, and this illness continued for two or three months. Mir Khalifa, who had a poor opinion of Humayun, made an attempt to place Mahdl Khvaja, Babur’s brother in-law, on the throne, but he revised his opinion on account of the arrogance of his nominee.21 Babur nominated Humayun as his suc¬ cessor, and a few days later, passed away on 30 December, 1530.
III. Personality of Babur
Inheriting, as a boy of eleven, but the shadow of a petty king¬ dom in Central Asia, Babur died at the age of forty-eight, master of extensive dominions, stretching from the Oxus in the West to Bihar in the east and the foot of the Himalayas in the north to Malwa and Rajasthan in the south. He could now compare him
self with the Sultan of Turkey and the Shah of Persia. His perma* nent place in history rests no doubt upon his conquests in Hindus than which paved the way for the foundation of an empire that excelled, in glory and greatness, the ephemeral structure of Chingiz as well as the ill-cemented empire of Timur whom he emulated. It is, however, in the military sense that Babur can be regarded as the founder of the Mughul empire in India. The monarchy of Babur’s ideal was ‘a divine inheritance’—the sacrosanct monarchy of Timur; the monarchy that he established in reality was a ‘human compro
mise’. He had neither the time to organize nor the genius for re¬ construction; he failed in the task of the re-creation of a new theory of kingship and the foundation of a stable, centralized polity for his far-flung empire. As in Kabul, so in India, the government that he set up was saifl (by the sword) and not qalarni (by the pen). A considerable part of the empire, about one-fifth, was held by old ‘zamlndars and rdis9 in full internal sovereignty. The territory directly under his authority he assigned to his great amirs who were responsible for the administration of the area under their control; the monarch had only nominal authority over local administration. In fact, Babur adopted the old obsolete administrative machinery of the Lodls. He was an organizer of victory but not an organizer of polity, great conqueror but no ‘architect of empire’. If he is ‘the link between Tamerlane and Akbar’, Babur in this respect seems rather nearer his famous ancestor than his truly great grandson.
Babur is one of the most fascinating characters of history. With iron nerves and robust optimism he combined the virtues of industry, daring and vigour. Love of action was the dominant note of his cha¬ racter: from the age of eleven he never observed the Ramzan twice in the same place. Intrepid as a soldier, a great strategist as a general, prompt to take advantage of the enemy’s weakness as a commander, he became an organizer of victory. He had little re¬ gard for the sanctity of human life: the massacre of Bajaur, the cold-blooded murder of prisoners, and the inhuman punishments which are referred to in his Memoirs only prove that he inherited the Mongol ferocity and Turkish savagery of his ancestors. Yet he was capable of generosity and chivalry on occasions. He posses¬ sed a joyous nature, strong affections, faculty of judging men and events, and a charming personality. He was fond of gardening and architecture, and proficient in music. He was an orthodox Sunni, though for political reasons he had to conform to some Shi‘ite rites. To compare Babur’s ‘moral courage’ in this respect with Akbar’s religious eclecticism is as inaccurate as it is unjust. Though not a zealous bigot like the Safavl Shahs of Persia, he could never dream of the sulh-i-kull (universal toleration) cult of his grandson. True to his age, he rejoiced in the glory of Jihad (holy war against in¬ fidels) and the majesty of the title of Ghcizi. To him Sunnism was the ‘pure faith’, Shiism ‘heresy’, and a Shiah was ‘a rank heretic’. With righteous satisfaction he justifies and records the cruel massacre of Bajaur because the victims were infidels.22 An incorrigible but re¬ pentant drunkard, he was keenly sensitive to the beauties of nature. His description of the flora and fauna of Hindusthan reveals his quickness of observation and his marvellous interest in natural his¬ tory. The sweeping condemnation of Hindusthan—its people as well as its culture—betrays as much his superficial acquaintance with, as his supreme contempt for, the land he conquered to stay in. His mind was as active as his body. In him were combined the vigour and stubbornness of the Mongol, the hardihood and capability of the Turk, and the culture and suavity of the Persian. He was a master of TurkI, his mother tongue, as well as Persian, the language of culture, the ‘French’ of Muslim Asia. His autobiography in TurkI is a permanent contribution to literature. He was a poet of no mean order in both the languages. He wrote a Diwdn in Turk! and a col¬ lection of Masnavis called the Mubayyin which is a treatise on Muslim law. He was the author of a TurkI treatise on prosody which was discovered in 1923 in a manuscript found in Paris.
Though he conquered Iiindusthan and laid the first stone of the splendid fabric of the Mughul empire, he had no love lost for the country. He sighed for the hills of Farghana, the blue domes and glittering minars of Samarqand, and the verdure and flowers of Kabul, where, by his own choice, he lies buried.23 The first Mughul emperor of India died, as he had lived, as a Central Asian.
APPENDIX
(Note hy the Editor on Foot-note 12 and the passage in p. 35 to which it relates)
The author of this chapter has challenged the generally accepted view about the size and nature of Babur’s artillery and the very important role it played in his victories at Panipat and Khanua. As this is a very important question, a more detailed discussion is necessary. So far as the general view is concerned, it would suffice to refer to Rushbrook Williams and Denison Ross, two of the latest writers on the subject, who had before them the English translation of the Bdburmama by A. S. Beveridge whom the author cites as his authority. The following sentences from the description of the bat¬ tle of Panipat in An Empire Builder of the 16th Century by L . F. Rushbrook Williams leave no doubt about his view that the artillery played a very great role—greater than bow and arrow—in Babur‘s victory at Panipat:
“The ordnance and match-locks poured in a withering fire from the centre” (p. 136). “Ustad ‘All and Mustafa (in charge of Babur’s artillery) rained death upon the crowded ranks, and the unfortunate Afghans fell by thousands beneath the swords and arrows of the Mughals....For some hours the slaughter continued”.“a total death-roll of some twenty thousand.a terrible testimony alike to the skill of the leader and to the deadliness of his scientific combination of cavalry and artillery” (p. 137).
As regards ‘Khanua’, Rushbrook Williams writes:
“Along the front of the line were the artillery-men and the musketeers, secure in the shelter of the chained wagons and of the tripod-like breastworks. Mustafa, with the match-locks and cul verins, was posted in advance of the right wing, while Ustad ‘All, with the heavy ordnance, held the ground in front of the centre.” (p. 149). “Mustafa, the artillery-man, trundled his culverins and his tripods into the open field, and from this position of advantage commenced a destructive fire with small-calibre ordnance and match¬ locks. Sc great was the effect that the morale of the discomfited Mughals was restored” (p. 153). “Thus supported, and aided in addition by Mustafa’s deadly firearms, the Mughal right beat off all attacks and inflicted severe losses upon the enemy.” (p. 154). “On the one hand the Mughal artillery caused fearful carnage in the crowded Rajput ranks, and on the other, the unceasing pressure of superior numbers reduced Babur’s men almost to their last gasp”.
(p. 154). (There was) “a clear passage; down the middle for Ustad ‘All’s ‘great balls’. Simultaneously, it would appear, a strong body of match-lock men was brought from the right wing, whose fire sup¬ plemented the efforts of Ustad ‘AIL This clever manoeuvre was crown¬ ed with success. The charge of the household troops forced back the Rajput centre, and the; firearms blasted a lane of death into the thick of the foe. The match-lock-men then advanced from behind the artillery, trundling their tripods in front of them, and the ground was quickly occupied by the Mughal infantry. The Padshah in person now ordered a general advance in the centre. The guns were moved forward, and Ustad‘AlI redoubled his activities. . . .On the; left, where the pressure was greatest, the Rajputs came within an ace of breaking through. But the advantage gained by their anta¬ gonists was too marked, and the toll taken by the artillery was too severe. Sullenly the Rajput chivalry ebbed back”, (pp. 154-5).
Denison Ross writes in the Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV. 1. Re. Pdnipat
“Between eve^y pair of guns there were six or seven movable breastworks (tura) for the protection of the matchlock men” (CHI. IV. 12). “At this juncture Babur ordered his gunners to open fire, and then the main attacking force of the Afghans found themselves exposed to arrows on either flank and to shot or bullets in front”, (p. 13).
2. Re. Khdnua
“The artillery line was commanded by. . . .Mustafa Rumi, the Turkish gunner, who brought forward the carts and guns.and broke the enemy’s ranks”.24 (CHI. 17).
These descriptions are based on Babur’s own account in his auto¬ biography, which is, of course, the most important and, in this case, the sole authority available to us. Unfortunately, a few crucial words in Turkish (the language in which the book is written) are obscure and have been differently interpreted by different scholars. Mrs. Beveridge, in her translation of the book, refers to the match¬ lock men and guns at PanJIpat, but in a foot-note states that Babur could not possibly have a large number of guns with him, and adds, “he can be read as indicating that he had two guns only” (pp. 468-9, f.n. 3). But her translation contains the following: “Ustad ‘Al'I quli made good discharge of firing! shots”, “Mustafa made excellent discharge of Zarb-zan shots.” In a foot-note she observes:
“The size of these artillery at this time is very uncertain. The word firing! is now (1826 A.D.) used in the Deccan for a swivel. At the present day, zarb-zan in common usage is a small species of swivel. Both words in Babur’s time appear to have been used for field cannon”, (pp. 473-4, f.n. 3).
As regards Khanua also we read in the translation of Beveridge:
“This Mustafa of Rumi had the carts brought forward and broke the ranks of pagans with match-lock and culverin”. Again in ornate language we are told that “the match-lock men poured a ruddy crepuscle of the blood of those ill-fated pagans.UstacTAlI-qulI did deeds of valour, discharging stones of such size. ..and, were such stones discharged against a hill, broad of base and high of sum¬ mit, it would become like carded wool. Such stones Ustad £Ali-quli discharged at the iron-clad fortress of the pagan ranks and by this discharge of stones, and abundance of culverins and match-locks (?) destroyed many of builded bodies of the pagans. The match-lock men of the royal centre, in obedience to orders, going from behind the carts into the midst of the battle; each one of them made many a pagan taste of the poison of death.” (pp. 570-71).
So it would appear that even according to this translation— which broadly justifies the accounts of Rushbrook Williams and Denison Ross—the role played by artillery, both match-lock and guns, was a very important one. Besides, the description is hardly compatible with the view that Babur had only two guns.
As regards the importance of the battle of Bampat, also, the view taken in this chapter differs from those of many, including Rush brook Williams, who observes about the battle of Panflpat that “from the political point of view it was eminently decisive.” (p. 137).
1. Babur never boasts of his Mongol ancestry; he invariably refers to the Mongols with supreme contempt, though he owed a great deal to them.
2. We accept the version of Babur. Khvand Amir, Bk III, Ch. iii, p. 192 and Firishta, Vol. I, p. 191 say that he was the sixth son of Abu Sa‘Id MIrza.
3. Muqlm Arghun married a daughter of Ulugh Beg.
4. In the sarkdr of Bhakkar under the suba of Multan, Jarrett, Aln-i-Akbarl, ii, p. 334.
5. On the Alingar river in Lamghan, Cf. Raverty, Notes on Afghanistan, p. 103.
6. Hablb-us-Siyar, Bk.,III, Ch. iv, p. 66; Tarlkh-i-‘Alamdrai ‘Abbasl, p. 30; Ahsan-ut-Tawdrlkh, p. 127. R.S. Poole, British Museum Catalogue of Coins of Persian Shahs, 1887, pp. XXIV et. seq.
6a. Some historians hold the view that Najm Beg was sent by the Shah to punish Babur for his failure to propagate Shiism in his territories (Mrs. Beveridge, Memoirs of Babur II. Transl. p. 359; Rushbrook Williams, Babur, pp. 1061—7), but this does not seem probable. In that case, the Persians would not have so strongly complained of Babur’s treachery in the battle of Ghazdawan. Out of political expediency the Shah could not have alienated Babur in the face of the grave Uzbeg menace.
7. Tod, Annals, Ed. by Crooke, Vol. I, p. 349. For details of Ibrahim’s reign, vide Chapter IX of Vol. VI of this series.
8. Firishta regards the two invasions of 925 A.H. (A.D. 1519) as the first and the second (Brigg’s Firishta, Vol. II, pp. 35-6).
9. Darmesteter—La grande inscription de Qandahar, Journal Asiatique, 1890, p. 210.
10.Fourth according to Firishta (Vol. II, pp. 37-8) and probably Babur as well. Abu-’l-Fazl also suggests that this was the fourth; he does not recognize the invasion of September, 1519, and that of 1520. A. N.: Eng. Trans., Vol. 1, pp. 234-40.
10a. Rushbrook Williams, p. 129.
11. Ahmad Yadgar puts the Afghan force at 50,000 cavalry and 2,000 elephants and the Mughul army at 24,000; A.S.B. text, p. 95. Babur, in his autobiography, estimates Ibrahim's army at 1 lakh horsemen and 1,000 elephants and his own army at 12,000 only, including non-combatants. It is not possible properly to ascertain the size of Babur’s artillery.
12. The wrong translation of the word araba as gun-carriages (but which really means baggage carts) has been responsible for the impression that Panlpat was a triumph of artillery. Vide A.S. Beveridge, Babur-ndma f.n. 3 pp. 468-9; Pdnipat by C. Collin Davies in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Vol. Ill, pp. 1025- 26. (Cf. Appendix by the Editor).
13. A. S. Beveridge, Babur-ndma, Vol. II, p. 476.
14. See Nature, 1890, 1891; The Imperial and Asiatic Quarterly Review, April, 1899, pp. 370-389.
15. 26° 58' N., 78° 36' E., 44 miles south-west of Mainpuri town.
16. Chandwar is an ancient place of considerable historical importance, standing on the left bank of the Yamuna at a distance of three miles south-west from Firuzabad (Agra Dt. Gazetteer, Allahabad, 1905).
17. While the naivete of his vow should not be doubted, it must be confessed that he broke it; vide Tarikh-i-Shdhi, p. 128. The statement of S. Lane Poole that ‘he never took wine again’ (Babur, p. 153) seems incorrect.
18. A. S. Beveridge, Babur-ndma, III, pp. 558, 563.
19. See Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthan, Ed. Crooke, Vol. 1, pp. 348-57 for the battle according to the Rajput version. (It is, however, interesting to record in this connection that the army of the Rana included twelve thousand horse led by Hasan Khan Mewatl and ten thousand horse led by Mahmud Khan, son of Sikandar Lodi, and the former died fighting (Babur, Memoirs, pp. 562, 573). This is, perhaps, the only instance known in Indian history of Muslim nobles fighting with an army under a Hindu king against the Muslims.) [Editor, whose attention was drawn to this passage by Dr. A. K. Majumdar].
20. Babur believed he had done so; it was generally believed at the time. A picture illustrating the incident occurs in Tarikh-i-Khdnddn-i-Timuriya, re¬ produced by A. S. Beveridge in the Humdyun-nama, p. 104.
21. Tabaqdt-t-Akbari, Eng. Trans. II, pp. 41-44.
22. The Bhopal document in which Babur prescribes for his son Humayun a policy of perfect toleration towards the Hindus and the Shiahs and even ad¬ vises him to refrain from cow slaughter seems to be spurious. For con¬ trary view see Dr. Syed Mahmud, The Indian Review, August, 1923, pp. 498-99.
23. He was buried at Agra where he died. Several years later his body was re¬ moved to its present grave at Kabul.
24. Sir Jadunath Sarkar also holds similar views. Cf. Military History of India, Calcutta, 1969; pp. 50-52.