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Unravelling the Myth: Exploring State and Religion under Aurangzeb

By: Aniket Tathagata Chettry* 

Assistant Professor, Department of History, Siliguri College, India 

Submission: July 26, 2018; Published: August 30, 2018 

*Corresponding author: Aniket Tathagata Chettry, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Siliguri College, India,  Tel: 8637806065/ 7838058033; Email :  

 Introduction 

Aurangzeb ascended the Mughal throne in 1658 after having  emerged victorious in a bloody succession war against his  brothers and having imprisoned his father-the erstwhile Sultan  Shahjahan. For the next forty-nine years Aurangzeb ruled the  Mughal empire, a period during which the empire reached its  territorial zenith extending far south into the rich fertile valleys  of the Karnataka region and even penetrating eastwards into the  heart of the territories ruled over by the Ahom rulers. By the  time Aurangzeb died in 1707, the Mughal empire ruled over a  population that was double the size of contemporary Europe,  had an army that counted among the largest in Asia and Mughal  landholdings reached an all-time high [4,5]. However, the legacy  of Aurangzeb till date is primarily that of a bigoted ruler whose  bigotry was considered responsible for undermining the all embracive social order so painstakingly established by Akbar and  maintained by the likes of Jahangir and Shahjahan. Aurangzeb’s  zeal for Islamic orthodoxy is understood to have inaugurated  a period of tyrannical oppression of the Hindu subjects of the  Mughal empire; this discontentment of the Hindus expressing  itself through a series of ‘Hindu’ rebellions like those of the Jats,  Satnamis, Marathas, Rathores to name a few. While one does not  deny the presence of these rebellions during Aurangzeb’s reign,  what appears to be more problematic is the simplified argument  inherent in labeling these actions in terms of a mere religious  binary explained by ‘righteous Hindus’ revolting against an ‘evil  Muslim’ ruler [6].  

A look at a few basic questions can problematize this  otherwise straight forward proposition around the assessment  of Aurangzeb as a ruler: Were those who were rebelling resorting  to such means to safeguard the religious rights of ‘Hindus’ as a  group or were there other more political and economic reasons  behind these uprisings? Could it be said that all Rajputs or all  Marathas sided with the Rathores or with Shivaji when they  rose against Aurangzeb? If there were also considerable number  of Marathas and Rajputs who fought on the side of Aurangzeb  during these very clashes, how does one explain the good  Hindu- bad Muslim divide? Was a policy like temple desecration  that is often used to indicate Aurangzeb’s deep-seated religious  orthodoxy [7], really a pervasive policy applied by Aurabgzeb  to all temples throughout his empire? If not, on what basis  were temples destroyed? Were policies of Aurangzeb like the  extremely unpopular idea of levying jizyah motivated by his zeal  for restoring the position of Islam in the subcontinent or were  there deeper motivations that prompted such acts? 

Thus, posing such questions and trying to find their answers  is extremely crucial in reaching a more nuanced understanding  of Aurangzeb, his piety and his politics [8,9]. This paper would  try to investigate some of these questions and through them  reassess the complex socio-political challenges that Aurangzeb  faced in his rule and the way he responded to these challenges.  An evaluation of these challenges and responses is expected  to also put into perspective the debate regarding whether  Aurangzeb was indeed a religious bigot or was there more to his  statecraft than a mere love for Islamic orthodoxy. 

The Piety and Politics of Aurangzeb 

In the eighth year of his reign Aurangzeb constrained  festivities on occasion of Nauroz, the persian new year.  Subsequently, from 1668 onwards, Aurangzeb is attributed with  having issued a series of decrees which included withdrawal  of imperial patronage from certain practices like official  history writing and music. Additionally, it is also believed that  Aurangzeb ceased appearing for jharokha darshans, and even  stopped the practice of tuladan [10,11]. In his personal life,  Aurangzeb was more pious than his predecessors who abstained  from all forms of alcohol and opium, prayed regularly and sewed  prayer-caps and copyied the Quran by hand in his free time.  All these contributed in creating an aura around Aurangzeb as  a puritan and an Islamic bigot who strove to establish a socio religious order based on the principles of Islamic orthodoxy  with no place for anything non-permissible to the Islamic order.  However, before accepting such an assessment of Aurangzeb as  an orthodox it is important to pay closer attention to each of  these actions that are attributed to Aurangzeb.  

While it is true that he did try to constraint festivities of  Nauroz, it had nothing to do with the un-Islamic character  of this festival. Rather, Aurangzeb issued such a command  primarily because he viewed such festivals as a threat to public  order. Hence, not just Nauroz, Aurangzeb even tried to curb the  festivities associated with Diwali, Holi, Muharram and even  those associated with the major Muslim festivals of EId-ul-Fitr  and Eid-ul-Adha. To a certain extent Aurangeb’s fears were not  completely unwarranted as festivals in India did have a tendency  of becoming law and order issues. Foreign travel accounts are  replete with incidents of violence on festivals like Muharram  and Holi. Keeping in mind public safety, Aurangzeb issued  such orders though it must be kept in mind that there was no  general order for banning these festivals and there are several  evidences which testify the celebration of festivals like Holi,  Diwali and Eid. Similarly, there was no overall ban imposed on  music either [12,13]. Rather Catherine Butler Brown suggests  that the ‘ban’ if at all was primarily in the form of prohibition of  music in the presence of the emperor himself. This was more a  matter of personal renunciation and was not forced upon other  connoisseurs.  

Therefore, one finds several prominent nobles of Aurangzeb  actively encouraging and patronizing musicians and singers at  this period. Infact, more musical treatises were composed in the  period of Aurangzeb than in the period of his predecessors and  Brown suggests that Aurangzeb himself encouraged theoretical  discourses on music. Regarding literature too, it must be kept in  mind that Aurangzeb was too well read to condemn literature  or poetry in general [14]. His letters frequently bore references  to the likes of Sadi, Hafiz, Rumi and others. As late as 1675,  Aurangzeb presided over the compilation of a legal compendium  

known as Fatwa-i-Alamgiri. He supported a huge imperial  library and frequently donated huge sums for the preservation  of manuscripts. Thus, it is unlikely such a person would ban  literature. What seems more plausible is a withdrawal of  imperial patronage to the qasidagos or panegyrists. However,  patronage and encouragement of all sorts of poets continued  amongst princes and nobles of the court [15].  

It is imperative to keep in mind that Aurangzeb legitimized  his political claim on grounds of his adherence to orthodox Islam.  In one of his letters to his imprisoned father, Aurangzeb presents  himself as having taken up the burden of kingship for ‘restoring  peace and the rule of Islam’. Similarly, Aurangzeb brought about  the execution of Dara Shukoh on grounds of his purported  heresy. Thus, for Aurangzeb, in the first part of his reign it  was essential to demonstrate to the world his commitment to  the Islamic strictures to maintain his political authority which  relied on his adherence to the precepts of Islam. The various  proclamations attributed to Aurangzeb thus needs to be placed  within this context as part of his efforts to show that his kingship  was strictly in conformity to the Islamic principles he upheld.  This does not however mean that the celebration of festivals or  the practicing of music or the tradition of literature disappeared  from Mughal India. Rather, as discussed above all these cultural  forms continued to flourish throughout Mughal India giving the  impression that these prohibitions were only a part of his public  persona that he maintained but was not enforced upon others.  

Statecraft and Aurangzeb: Exploring Aurangzeb’s  Religious Rhetoric considering his Statecraft 

One of Aurangzeb’s most debated and controversial policy  was his imposition of the jizyah in 1679. Examining the logic  behind this action Saqi Mustaid Khan argues that Aurangzeb’s  desire to uphold the laws of sharia and thereby suppress  the infidels forced him to pass an injunction allowing for the  imposition of jizyah. Saqi Mustaid Khan was supported by Ali  Muhammad Khan and Iswardas who agree with him but also  emphasise on the role of the ulema. According to them, the ulema  realizing Aurangzeb’s zeal for upholding the rules of the Sharia  represented to him that the levying of the jizyah on the infidels  was compulsory according to the sharia. These arguments  emphasize on Aurangzeb’s regard for Islamic tenets and his  deference to the ulema as the main causes behind the imposition  of jizyah. The jizyah was primarily a tax that was levied on the  non-Muslim populace.  

In Aurangzeb’s reign, the money obtained from jizyah was  deposited in a separate treasury called the ‘ khazanah-i-jizyah’.  The proceeds from this was to be given as charity to members  of the learned class and to theologians. The officials who were  charged with the responsibility of looking after this treasury  were all staffed from the ulema class. For Aurangzeb who sought  a public persona of one who ruled according to the injunctions  of the sharia, the imposition of jizyah provided an ideal 

In Aurangzeb’s reign, the money obtained from jizyah was  deposited in a separate treasury called the ‘ khazanah-i-jizyah’.  The proceeds from this was to be given as charity to members  of the learned class and to theologians. The officials who were  charged with the responsibility of looking after this treasury  were all staffed from the ulema class. For Aurangzeb who sought  a public persona of one who ruled according to the injunctions  of the sharia, the imposition of jizyah provided an ideal  opportunity to validate such claims. Furthermore, the levying of  jizyah and keeping the proceeds in the hands of the theological  classes has also forced historians to suggest that Aurangzeb  had a high regard for the ulema whom he constantly appeased.  However, the jizyah issue merits two important questions [16].  Firstly, did Aurangzeb’s public acts like the imposition of jizyah  imply a close relationship between the emperor and the ulema?  Secondly, did Aurangzeb’s constant need to portray himself as  a ruler whose social order was based on upholding the laws of  sharia ensure his violation of the Akbarid social order based on  ideas of sulh-i-kul? 

In Islamic conception of the state, the ulema, umrah and the  sultan were the three pillars of the state. However, Akbar barring  the early years of his reign never allowed the members of the  ulema to dictate affairs of the state. His aim was to reduce the  power of the ulema and the mahzarnama of 1579 is often seen  as a landmark step in curbing the ulema. The ulema had a very  narrow perception of the state where the state would be guided  by the interests of the Islamic community with the non-believers  being constantly suppressed. Akbar on the other hand never  wanted the state to be confined to the precepts of a religion [17].  For him, justice was the cornerstone of the social organization  which could only be achieved by maintaining the balance among  diverse interest groups and only then could the society strive  towards a state of perfection. 

On the other hand, as this paper has already mentioned  Aurangzeb’s claim to power relied on his adherence to the  Islamic principles, so it is but natural to assume that Aurangzeb  would give much more prominence to the ulema in matters of  governance. The imposition of jizyah and the privileges accorded  to the Islamic clerical classes in collection of jizyah can easily be  proofs of the deferential attitude that the emperor had towards  the ulema. However, such an assumption would be far from  the actual reality of Aurangzeb’s attitude to the ulema [18]. A  cursory glance at Aurangzeb’s policies make it very clear that he  did not like the interference of the ulema in matters of statecraft.  For instance, the ulema was always critical of the assimilation of  Hindus to high ranks with the Mughal administration and they  were the most vocal opponents of the Mughal policy of entering  matrimonial alliances with the Rajputs.  

Aurangzeb’s ascension did not change this trend of increasing  Hindu participation in Mughal administration despite repeated  protestations from the ulema class. Under Akbar, Hindus  constituted 22.5% of all Mughal nobles. In the first twenty years  of Aurangzeb’s rule this remained at a steady 21.6%. Between  1679-1707 Aurangzeb increased Hindu participation at the elite  levels of the Mughal state by nearly 50%, with Hindus occupying  31.6% of the nobility. This ‘Hindu’ section included large  number of Rajputs, Marathas as well as other caste and sectarian  groups. Not only were they appointed within the administration,  but they were also given high mansabs. Marathas like Kanhoji  Deccani and Yashwant Rao enjoyed a mansab of 5000 and 4000  respectively. Later when Shivaji’s son Shahu was imprisoned by  the Mughals, he was given a mansab of 7000.  

Rajputs from different clans also enjoyed high mansabs. The  likes of Jaswant Singh of Marwar and Jai Singh of Amber enjoyed  mansabs of 7000 while Raj Singh of Mewar had a rank of 6000.  Even the Iranis despite mainly belonging to Shia sect did well  under Aurangzeb. Between 1658-1678, 23 Iranis held the rank  of 5000 and above. Though between 1678-1709, their number  had come down to 14 Iranis enjoying a rank of 5000 and above,  only 6 Turanis held a similar rank in this period. Aurangzeb’s  attitude to administration becomes evident from his reply to  a petition drafted by a Muslim from Bukhara who had entered  Mughal service. He had requested the withdrawal of Persians  from high positions as they were Shias and not Sunni. To this  Aurangzeb’s reply was that religion should be kept away from  worldly affairs and administration should be vested in men of  ability irrespective of their religious affiliations. Thus, this shows  that in matters of state craft Aurangzeb did not depart from  established Mughal practices and if the views of the ulema were  clashing with his views of statecraft, he always gave precedence  to the latter over the former.  

Similarly, Aurangzeb like his predecessors liked interacting  with learned divines of various denominations. He was known  for having discourses with the Bairagi saint Mangaldas Maharaj  whom he also gave large grants and his visiting of the tombs  of famous Sufi saints is also well known. In 1686-87 on way to  annexing the Golconda state, Aurangzeb spent a week in the  mausoleum of the famous Sufi saint Gesu Daraz. Even in his  patronage, Aurangzeb was fairly catholic. Aurangzeb renewed  the land grants of several temples at Mathura, Allahabad,  Brindavan and elsewhere. In 1687, the emperor gave land to  Ramjivan Gosain to build houses for ‘pious Brahmins and fakirs’.  In 1691, he conferred eight villages and substantial tax-free  land to support the Balaji temple. In 1698, he granted lland to  a Brahmin named Rang Bhatt in Khandesh. Aurangzeb enacted  similar policies towards the Jains as well granting land at  Shatrunjaya, Girnar and Mount Abu in the late 1650s. In 1681, he  donated land for a Jain monastery to a Jain monk named Lal Vijay.  As late as 1703, he issued orders to stop people from harassing  the Jain religious leader Jina Chandra Suri. He also gave lavish  gifts to the Sikh gurudwara at Dehradun. 

 These are only a few examples, but they indicate that  despite Aurangzeb’s claims of being the protector of Islam and  implementing the Sharia in matters of state, as far as functioning  of the government is concerned Aurangzeb did not deviate from  the established Mughal traditions of governance [19]. He kept  relying on an ethnically, linguistically and religiously diverse  nobility for the smooth functioning of his administration. People  were still given the freedom to practice and preach the religion of their choice. One does not hear of any state-sponsored  conversion drives being initiated by Aurangzeb. Occasional cases  of conversion did take place, but such converts were mostly small  Zamindars or petty state employees who converted expecting  preferential treatment after their conversion. Aurangzeb  was liberal in matters of providing endowments to religious 

institutions and most religious groups enjoyed the munificence  of the emperor. He also frequently interacted with members of  other religious beliefs. 

 The ulema would not have enjoyed many of these measures  as these policies would have been contradictory to their narrow  Sunni-oriented sharia-based view of the state but the fact that  these practices continued till the time of Aurangzeb’s death  indicate that the ulema were not policy makers and that the  emperor rarely sought their advice in state matters. Aurangzeb’s  relation with the ulema was often shaped by his political  requirements. When Aurangzeb’s vision of state clashed with  the ideas of the clerical class, Aurangzeb did not hesitate in  suppressing the interests of the ulema. This is extremely clear  from Aurangzeb’s decision to conquer Golconda and Bijapur  [20]. The theological elements in the emperor’s camp were not  impressed by the decision as is evident from the refusal of the  Shaikh-ul-Islam to give a fatwa to the campaign who felt the  decision to wage war against a fellow Muslim ruler is unlawful.  However, Aurangzeb was not swayed, and he carried out his  campaign despite the opposition of the ulema.  

Similarly, when Aurangzeb felt his political interests required  appeasing the ulema, he did, as is evident from the imposition  of the jizyah. The fact that the jizyah was imposed in 1679- 22  years after Aurangzeb ascended the throne has been pointed by  many historians as indicative of the fact that it had to do less  with the emperor’s desire to upholding the shariah than with  political requirements of the period [21-23]. 1679 was the time  when Aurangzeb was facing a myriad of problems: the Sikhs had  become rebellious in areas around Punjab while the conflict with  the Rathore showed no signs of abating and had only intensified  in the years leading upto the levying of the jizyah. Siimilarly, the  region of Deccan posed a challenge to Aurangzeb as well with  the Marathas under Shivaji constantly harassing Mughal forces  and encroaching upon Mughal territories. To make matters  worse, Aurangzeb’s policy of shoring up the Bijapur or Golconda  state against the Marathas had also failed with these states more  willing to ally with Shivaji than with the expansionist Mughal  state. In such a situation, to mobilize Muslim support behind him  Aurangzeb felt the need for reverting to a rhetoric of an orthodox  state and what better way to signify this than by reimposing  jizyah. He was aware such a step would please the ulema as well  and the decision to staff the administration of the khazanah-i jizyah with members of this class was simply another step of  appeasing the ulema. He hoped that the clerical class would help  him in rallying Muslim popular support behind him.  

Thus, what our discussion so far clearly establishes is that  Aurangzeb was aware of the Mughal traditions of administration  and governance that had been put in place by his predecessors  and he was not keen on deviating from them. However, his  religious rhetoric was often determined by political exigencies  and by doing so he ended up giving a religious undertone to his  politicking. His commitment to upholding Islamic principles was  primarily a means to legitimize his precarious political position  

that had become evident post his actions of imprisoning his  father and executing his brothers. It was as part of his efforts  to reinforce that his kingship conformed to orthodox Islamic  principles of statecraft that one finds him publicizing his acts  of banning music, literature and other un-Islamic practices like  celebration of nauroz, tuladan, jharokha darshan. However, this  paper has already shed light on the limited nature of most of  these prohibitions thereby demonstrating their inefficacy in the  wider social arena. Even the policy of imposing jizyah which held  within it the promise of reverting to a more orthodox setup was  a step primarily taken to mobilize support in order to meet the  political challenges that Aurangzeb faced. Interestingly, despite  the imposition of jizyah, Aurangzeb did not bring about any  radical change in the functioning of the state.  

The ulema gained no considerable say in workings of  the state and neither did Aurangzeb give up his policies of  assimilating non-Muslims in his administration or providing  financial support to non- Muslim religious institutions and  individuals. There was no state sponsored drive to bring about  mass conversions nor do we have any evidence pointing to a  ‘Hindu genocide’. All these indicate that Aurangzeb’s religious  rhetoric was more motivated by realpolitik than from a genuine  need to exercise and implement the rules of the sharia in society.  Nowhere does this become clearer than in Aurangzeb’s policies  of selective temple desecration. 

Aurangzeb and his Policies of ‘Selective’ Temple  Desecration 

Historians of the likes of Jadunath Sarkar and S.R. Sharma  have used the notion of temple desecration to vilify Aurangzeb.  According to them, Aurangzeb’s bigotry and anti-Hindu nature  expressed itself in ‘wanton acts of temple desecration’. They  pointed out his destruction of the Keshavnath temple in Mathura,  Vishwanath temple in Benares and the destruction of temples  throughout Rajputana as evidences of such wanton acts. While  none of these evidences are incorrect but what such arguments  lack is a proper contextualization of these actions. Richard Eaton  is his very influential article on ‘temple desecration and Indo Muslim states’ very rightly argued that the notion of temple  desecration was a very politically motivated action in the context  of pre-modern India, prevalent from even before the advent of  Islam into India.  

The political role played by temples in consolidating  political authority is well known to most scholars of South Asian  history. Royal temples housing the state deity often referred  to as kuladavata expressed the sovereignty of the king thereby  allowing such temples to serve as sites where kingship was  created, legitimized and often revitalized. Given this political  connection between temple, deity and kings scholars like  Richard Davis and Richard Eaton have demonstrated numerous  instances of temple desecration seen through early medieval  Indian history occurring during times of inter-dynastic conflicts.  In 642 A.D, the pallava king Narasimhavarman attacked the Chalukyas and destroyed their royal temple looting their state  deity from their capital. Such actions of destroying royal temples  and looting the central deity were carried out with the explicit  aim of detaching a vanquished king from the most visible sign  of his former legitimacy. Thus, the act of temple desecration was  well established within the Indian political rhetoric. During the  period of the Turkish conquest, they replicated these political  patterns and traditions. Unfortunately, we have not been able  to determine the exact number of temples destroyed by the  Turkish forces as records left, if any have often not survived.  Furthermore, the eagerness of court chroniclers to portray their  patrons as ideal Muslim kings often resulted in actions of temple  destruction being attributed to kings even where there were no  such actions performed. 

 Based on epigraphic and literary evidences, Eaton identifies  eighty instances of temples desecration spanning over five  centuries (1192-1729), most of which were along a moving  military frontier carried out by the state to denounce the  legitimacy of vanquished local ruling houses. For instance, as  the Mughal state annexed new territories, temple desecration  accompanied these new conquests as is evident in Assam where  the Mughal defeat of the Ahoms was followed by destruction  of the chief temples patronized by the Ahom rulers. Such a  theoretical understanding of temple desecration does not deny  the destruction of temples but places it within a much larger  tradition associated with political needs of states, rather than as  an ideological weapon for suppressing the Hindus. From Akbar’s  period the Mughals saw temples as part of state property and  took steps to protect them, renovate them and even patronize  them. These policies continued with Aurangzeb who as has been  documented earlier patronized temples and their functionaries.  A farman from 1659 to officials in Banaras instructed them to  protect Hindu temples and their functionaries and prevent any  unlawful harassment of them so that they could continue praying  for the continuation of the Empire. But then were there temples  that Aurangzeb destroyed and if yes, why? 

While it is true that Aurangzeb did destroy temples like the  famed Vishwanath temple at Benares and the Keshavnath temple  at Mathura, there was no instruction given regarding the general  desecration of all temples throughout the empire. The temples  that however still faced the wrath of the emperor suffered such a  fate primarily because of the close linkages that existed between  temples and temporal authority in pre-modern India. Following  the treaty of Purandhar, Jai Singh the Rajput chieftain from Amer  made great efforts to bring about an alliance between Aurangzeb  and Shivaji. The subsequent visit of Shivaji to the emperor’s  court and the resultant conflict between which saw Shivaji  imprisoned is by now a very popular tale that needs to recount.  Shivaji’s later escape from prison is an equally well-known  incident. However, Aurangzeb suspected Jai Singh’s complicity  in Shivaji’s escape. Subsequently, the Vishwanath temple built  by Jai Singh was destroyed by Aurangzeb as a punishment for  Jai Singh’s alleged complicity in Shivaji’s escape. The year 1670  

witnessed a revolt among the Jats of Mathura. Once, Aurangzeb  had captured and punished the ring leaders, he ordered the  destruction of the Keshavnath Temple. Similarly, several  temples throughout Marwar and Mewar were destroyed when  Aurangzeb was suppressing the violent Rajput rebellion that  had broken out in these two regions. Interestingly Aurangzeb  was not the only Mughal Emperor to resort to such tactics. When  Shahjahan was suppressing the Bundela rebellion, he destroyed  the great temple at Orchha that was patronized by the rebel  Jhujjar Singh Bundela. What these incidents demonstrate is that  when non-Muslim subjects of the Mughal emperors engaged  in open rebellion, the state resorted to principles of ‘selective’  temple desecration, targeting particularly those temples that  were clearly associated with the rebel groups or individuals.  Therefore, selective temple desecration appears to be a potent  political action that Mughal emperors including Aurangzeb  adopted to denounce the very legitimacy of those who posed  a threat to the Mughal political order. The political nature of  these acts of temple desecration becomes all the moreclear  when we examine Aurangzeb’s attitude in the Deccan. Having  annexed Bijapur and Golconda in 1687, Aurangzeb’s desire was  to expand further south and bring under imperial control the  vast country that extended upto Jinji. This region was populated  with a number of Hindu chieftains and Zamindars. To appease  these groups, one finds Aurangzeb never resorting to acts of  temple desecration even when Hindu rajas of the region like Pam  Nayak. The Nayaks of Madurai and Jinji opposed the Mughals.  This indicates that temple desecration was a very political act,  resorted to or desisted from as and when it suited the political  requirements of Aurangzeb. To confuse this to be an expression  of his faith would be a historical anachronism.  

Thus, to conclude this paper attempts to examine the politics  and piety of Aurangzeb. Though several of his actions including  the imposition of jizyah, the desecration of temple, banning  of music have all been interpreted as part of his attempts to  organize a state based on Islamic tenets where a conscious  policy was followed to alienate Hindus, this paper tries to  show that it is important to contextualize such action before  drawing inferences. This paper attempts to explore the politics  that prompted actions like levying jizyah or following a policy  of selective desecration of temples and it is argued that in most  instances it was out of Aurangzeb’s need to maintain his political  authority or mobilize a certain section of the population that  he resorted to such activities. Thus, while the paper does not  deny the historical facts around the impostion of jizyah or the  destruction of temples, it presses for a closer scrutiny of these  actions to see whether indeed it was the piety of Aurangzeb that  was manifesting itself through such acts or was it simply the  realpolitik that motivated such actions. 

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