By: minu jyotsna
Q.
“Warfare is a necessary but insufficient condition for state formation.”
Comment using examples from any
pre-modern state of your choice.
The chief foundations of all states, new as well as old or omposite, are good laws and good arms; and as there cannot be good laws where the state is not well armed, it follows that where they are well armed they have good laws.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince.1
Until
very recently, theorists on the topic of state formation have largely been
polarized into two schools: conflict
theorists, who emphasize the coercive role of the state in increasing and legitimating inequality, and integration
theorists, who point to the state's greater redistributive ability as its primary causal feature.2 As
Machiavelli astutely noted almost four centuries ago, both laws and arms make a good prince, and it
is impossible to have one without the other.
Therefore, I’d like to put forth the view point of Ronald Cohen that
warfare is surely a necessary but
insufficient condition for state formation, but this does not mean that warfare
is the prime mover in social evolution.
3 The causes and consequences of warfare are both varied and closely intertwined with social events in
societies. Warfare is neither indicative of
“coercion” or “integration, but requires that both factors operate
simultaneously. Surely we can accept
that war has serious influences on political leadership and social structure
without arguing that its presence
somehow determines the future of society. 4
The
above stated position can be evaluated by taking the case study of Mughal
Empire.
When
Akbar died in 1605, his legacy was a multi- regional empire, which, in the
course of his half century of rule, had
become a dominant power on the Indian subcontinent. Beginning in his adolescent years, Akbar directed a
continuing series of remarkable military campaigns in which Mughal armies won victory after
victory on the field of battle. No single kingdom or coalition of regional kingdoms could stand
against the Mughal armies. Each campaign, battle, and siege was a public event, widely reported
and discussed throughout the subcontinent.
Year after year, as Timurid armies proved invincible and as revolts and
resistance failed, Akbar’s reputation
soared.5Military power permitted him to impose a stringent degree of administrative control over each new
territory as it came into the empire- and to retain this control despite resistance. The Mughals
imposed a new level of public order on the
tumultuous society of India. He was indeed a superb military commander
in a generally bellicose society but it
wasn’t just warfare and expansion which held this empire together till 1707, there were other elements of political
chemistry i.e. an extreme systemisation of
administration, balanced and stacomposition of the ruling class and a
new theoretical basis for sovereignty.
6
Buoyed by conquest and plunder, Akbar and his advisers built a centralizing administration capable of steady expansion as new provinces were added to the empire. The Mughal emperor presided over a system that moved money, commodities, men and information freely throughout the empire.7 We see the example of such centralisation in his creation of mansab, classifying all individual officers into definite categories. Whereas before Akbar each appointment, promotion, fixation of pay, and obligation was in the case of higher officers a separate ad hoc arrangement, under Akbar every such action was reduced to a change in the mansab. Increase or diminution of pay and obligation followed a change in the mansab as a matter of course, under set regulations.8 According to Athar Ali, no analogous system of numbered ranks can be found in any Central Asian or Middle Eastern state-and certainly
not in the Timurid, the Uzbek, the Safavid, and the Ottoman Empires. The mansab system was a unique and, as far as centralization went an unrivalled device for organizing the ruling class. 9 We get the same sense of systematization in the development of jagir as the pure form of land-revenue assignment.10
Akbar's
division of his empire into subas, sarkars, and mahalls and his largely
successful attempts to make the entire
administrative structure of one suba into the exact replica of the other, with a chain of officers at various
levels ultimately controlled by the ministers at the centre, gave identity to Mughal
administrative institutions irrespective of the regions where they functioned.11
The
systematization continued under Akbar's successors. When new administrative categories were created, whether
duaspa-sihaspa ranks under Jahangir, or the month scale under Shah Jahan, they too appear, in the
ultimate analysis, to substitute general categories for individual exceptions. Even in the sphere
of land-revenue administration, where regional
differences were inevitable, the zabt system-the characteristic
institution of the Mughal revenue
administration-was extended to the Deccan by Murshid Quli Khan.12 Secondly,
Akbar fashioned new relationships between himself and his
military/administrative elite. In part,
Akbar succeeded by a careful balancing of old and new ethnic groups as he rapidly expanded his cadre of army commanders
and administrators to keep pace with the
speed of conquest.13
By series of symbolic acts Akbar built upon his personal appeal to establish an image or metaphor of the emperor’s person as an embodiment of the empire. To challenge or destroy the emperor’s person was to challenge or destroy the imperial system, for they were identical.
In
furthering this metaphor, Akbar (or his advisors) established a degree of
paramount spiritual authority for the
emperor unprecedented in previous Indo-Muslim experience. However, the system could only have succeeded
by transforming the values of high-status
warrior-aristocrats of diverse origins. The sense of honour for each
amir had to shift from personal,
lineage, or sectarian pride-that of the “free” warrior chief –to a more
impersonal, imperial pride-that of the
“slave” warrior-administrator. In this transformation the search for display of martial honour necessarily changed
from bardic or epic glory immortalizing feats
of victory or (defeat) in battle to chronicled fame testifying to
service of the empire and it’s master.
Honour in the latter case also became advancement, of the emperor. Honour found
in unconditional service and obedience
was a salient characteristic of the new role for an imperial commander. The sense of
discretionary personal honour of the warrior-aristocrat, leader of a lineage group or war band,
obviously did not disappear altogether, but its
subordination to less parochial concern within the imperial context was
generally assured. 14 The most critical step occurred when Akbar allowed the
position of chief minister or vakil to
lapse and gathered all executive power in his hands. 15 This was made
possible by a number of changes in the
theoretical basis of sovereignty. The first attempt towards this change
was attempted by Ala al–din khalji, by
it turned out to be unsuccessful.16 Humayun also made a concerted attempt at creating an imperial
cult modelled after the Sufi kingship of the Safavids of Iran. But failed as he did not had much to
his credit except a ruined reputation. Therefore, Akbar chose the sign- laden moment of Islamic
millennium to requite the wrongs inflicted by
the Safavids on his dynasty and redeem the sovereignty of Timur’s heirs
in India. 17At first Abu’l fazl repeats
the well-known theory of social contract to justify the sovereign absolute claims over the individual subject; this
theory’s claim lay in its secular character and its foundation on alleged social needs. It had
the further merit of being rational. But rationality was probably not deemed sufficient incentive
to the total obedience that the Mughal emperor
sought. 18
A
third element then entered; and that was religious. Ever since the Safavids had
successfully utilized their past as
religious leaders and based their sovereignty on their spiritual authority, the attractions of a similar position for
Sunni sovereigns were irresistible. The Ottomans ultimately purchased from existing claimants
the authority of the ‘Abbasid caliphate; but they were anticipated by Akbar, who, through the
mahzar of 1579, attempted to assume the
position of an interpreter of Islamic law and, in spheres where the
existing corpus was silent, of a
legislator. 19
Akbar's
attempt to establish such a position within the framework of Islam proved
abortive. Moreover, it did not solve the
problem of spiritual authority in relations with his non-Muslim subjects. It therefore gave way to a new
attempt in which it was claimed that the emperor enjoyed the position of a spiritual guide and
that this position derived not from any particular religion, but directly from
God. "Sovereignty is a ray of light from the Divine Sun", claims Abu '1-Fazl. As such men of all faiths were
beneficiaries of the Divine Light. 20
Akbar initiated the practice of jharoka darshan, a striking innovation
which nevertheless seemed in accordance
with Hindu tradition. To a more select circle of disciples, styled the iradat-gazinan by Abu '1-Fazl, Akbar was the
spiritual guide. Akbar's successors enlarged
this circle practically to include all their nobles; and it became a
convention for every high noble, whether
Muslim or Hindu, to address the Emperor as Pir-o murshid, and designate himself as his murid.21
It can be seen that, combined with the
tolerant religious policy of which Akbar was the author, the basing of political authority on
spiritual sanctity was an intelligent device to
strengthen the sovereign's position. Its logical implications lay,
however, not in secularism, but in an as
yet dormant and unelaborated concept of religious equality. Abu’1-Fazl's
claims for his master could only be
justified by the theories of Dara Shukoh. 22
Athar Ali also points out that certain tools of centralisation of
authority were a direct result of the development
in Europe. The development of rupee as the basic unit of currency which started under the Surs as a result of
debasement of coinage was finally achieved during Akbar’s period due to the heavy inflow of
silver from the New World. This led to successful functioning of commerce and credit and
therefore led to a creation of highly centralized administration.23
There
also emerged a challenge towards traditional knowledge system as Europe was
moving ahead in matters of science and
new discoveries. The reaction towards this development took several forms.
“On
one side was the rational approach of Abu 1-Fazl, who would point out that
zinc, as a separate metal (a recent
discovery in Asia), was not known to the ancients or would say that al-Ghazali spoke nonsense when he condemned
sciences that were not manifestly based upon
the Qur’an. Then there was Dara Shukoh and men of his stamp, who
rejected the traditional sciences, but
also rejected rationality, and sought to establish an obscurantist spiritual
dogma on the foundations of Comparative
Religion.
In
the previous (16th) century, the Mahdavi Movement had attained considerable
success; and it was certainly a
consciously "revisionist" doctrine.
All these were symptoms of a cleft in the hitherto solid structure of faith in the traditional cultural heritage of Islam. It was this void that was unconsciously sought to be filled by the special position of the Mughal emperor as a spiritual guide, and the self-conscious view of the Mughal Empire as a great new polity, essentially just and humane (to the individual members of the ruling class). Therefore according to Athar Ali, The Mughal Empire performed a dual ideological role. On the one hand, the need of an official theory of sovereignty, and of the specific role of Mughal polity, arose because of the undermining of The traditional ideological structure from tremors originating from the remote and largely unidentified developments of the early modern world; but, in its turn, the theory cemented and strengthened the traditional culture and made the Mughal Empire its upholder and protector”.24
Therefore, we see that warfare and conquest is not the only prime mover in evolution of a state. surely it was an important perquisite for the development of a medieval polity as is evident from the frequent warfare and focus on development of technology, i.e. after 1647 the presence of 200,000 horsemen under the imperial banner,40,000 infantry-men, using matchlock musket and cannons which gave the Mughal artillery an upper hand over competing powers. But the development of a systematised administration, balanced and stable composition of the ruling class and a new theoretical basis for sovereignty also played a major role in establishment of a centralised pre-modern state.
Notes
1RUKMANA,
“YARIF. ͞“TATE FORMATION: A HI“TORICAL “Y“TEM“ APPROACH.͟“CRIBD. APRIL, 03,
2015.
2RUKMANA,
“YARIF. ͞“TATE FORMATION: A HI“TORICAL “Y“TEM“ APPROACH.͟“CRIBD. APRIL, Ϭϯ, ϮϬϭ5.
3RUKMANA,
“YARIF. ͞“TATE FORMATION: A HI“TORICAL “Y“TEM“ APPROACH.͟“CRIBD. APRIL, Ϭϯ, ϮϬϭ5
4RUKMANA,
“YARIF. ͞“TATE FORMATION: A HI“TORICAL “Y“TEM“ APPROACH.͟“CRIBD. APRIL, Ϭϯ, ϮϬϭ5
5
RICHARDS, J F. THE MUGHAL EMPIRE: THE NEW EMPIRE.THE NEW CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
INDIA. 1990. PP 56.
6
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
7
RICHARDS, J F. THE MUGHAL EMPIRE: AUTOCRATIC CENTRALISM.THE NEW CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF INDIA. 1990. PP-59.
8
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
9
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
10
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
11
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
12
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
13
RICHARDS J.F, ED.ALAM, MUZAFFAR, SUBRAHMANYAN, SANJAY. THE MUGHAL STATE
1526-1750:͞THE FORMULATION OF IMPERIAL
AUTHORITY UNDER AKBAR AND JAHANGIR͟. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1998. PP-128-129.
14
RICHARDS J.F, ED.ALAM, MUZAFFAR, SUBRAHMANYAN, SANJAY. THE MUGHAL STATE
1526-1750: ͞THE FORMULATION OF IMPERIAL
AUTHORITY UNDER AKBAR AND JAHANGIR͟. OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS. 1998. PP-128-129.
15
RICHARDS, J F. THE MUGHAL EMPIRE: AUTOCRATIC CENTRALISM.THE NEW CAMBRIDGE
HISTORY OF INDIA. 1990. PP-58.
16
ANOOSHAHR, ALI. ͞MUGHAL HISTORIANS AND THE MEMORY OF ISLAMIC CONQUEST OF
INDIA͟.INDIAN ECONOMIC & SOCIAL
HISTORY REVIEW. 2006. PP-290.
17
MOIN, AZFAR, THE MILLENNIAL SOVEREIGN, 2016.PP-130.
18
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
19
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995.
20
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995
21
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995
22
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995
23
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995
24
KULKE, HERMAN. STATE IN INDIA 1000-ϭ7ϬϬ. OXFORD INDIA. ͞TOWARD“ AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE͟.
ALI, ATHAR, M. 1995