Nur Jahan intended to place her favourite, Shahryar, on the throne either out of sheer spite for Shah Jahan, for whom she had developed an intense dislike, or because Shahryar promised to be a pliant tool who would allow her to keep the direction of affairs in her hands. Asaf Khan would not agree to this; he was equally in¬ terested in his own son-in-law, Shah Jahan, who was certainly the ablest, the most experienced and the most popular of all the sons and grandsons of Jahangir.
Since Shahryar had proceeded to Lahore at the time of Jahan¬ gir’s death, Asaf Khan, as a stop-gap arrangement, proclaimed Dawar Bakhsh, son of Khusrav, as emperor, and the khutba was read in Dawar’s name near Bhimbar. Shahryar assumed the royal title at Lahore; he seized upon the royal treasures which were there and secured troops and supporters by lavish expenditure of seventy lakhs of rupees within one week. When Dawar Bakhsh arrived near Lahore, he was met by the army of Shahryar. Shahryar was defeated; he fled into the city and was captured and blinded. Tahmurs and Hoshang, sons of Prince Daniyal, were also captured and put in confinement to preclude the possibility of a rising in their favour. Asaf Khan in the meantime had sent Banarsi, a trusted runner, to Shah Jahan and summoned him to the capital. When Shah Jahan was informed of the defeat of Shahryar, he wrote to Asaf Khan to “send out of the world” his rivals Dawar Bakhsh, Shahryar, Gurshasp, Tahmurs and Hoshang. The order was faithfully carried out.1
Shah Jahan ascended the throne on 24 February, 1628, and assumed the title of Abu-’l Muzaffar Shahbuddin Muhammad Sahib-i Kiran-i Sani. The coronation was celebrated by the usual round of lavish festivities and distribution of offices, titles and stipends. The reign which opened with the execution of Shah Jahan’s brothers and nephews was destined to close in circum¬ stances, similarly tragic, finally ending in the death and disgrace of Shah Jahan’s sons and grandsons. Muhammad Salih Kambu, the author of ‘Amal-i-Salih, justifies the execution of the princes in the following callous and unemotional manner: “It is entirely lawful for the great sovereigns to rid this mortal world of the existence of their brothers and other relations, whose total annihilation is conducive to the common good. . . ., and leaders, spiritual and tem¬ poral, justify the total eradication of rival claimants to the fortu¬ nate throne on grounds of expediency and the common welfare.’’
In the first year of his reign Shah Jahan had to face the rebel¬ lion of Jujhar Singh, son of Raja Bir Singh Deo, the Bundela chief who had risen to prominence in the reign of Jahangir and on whom that emperor had showered favours for the murder of Abu-’l-Fazl. The wealth and position which Bir Singh Deo had secured “without labour and without trouble” and the fact that he had his jagir in his own country, had made him restless and ambitious. His son Jujhar visited Shah Jahan at Agra and was confirmed in the rank of 4000 zat and 4000 sawar. But suspecting that an inquiry would be made into the unauthorised gains of his father, Jujhar secretly left Agra, and proceeding to Orcha, his stronghold, broke into open re¬ bellion. Mahabat Khan was sent against him and Jujhar, realising the futility of fighting against the imperial forces, submitted. He was pardoned and sent off on service to the Deccan. Jujhar, how¬ ever, had no intention of serving as a vassal of the Mughuls; he soon after attacked Bhlm Narain of Garha and compelled him. to surrender the fort of Chauragarh. Later on he put Bhim Narain to death and took possession of the fort with all the valuables it contained. On the complaint of Bhlm Narain’s son, the emperor sent Jujhar an order to surrender to the imperial officer the terri¬ tory he had acquired along with ten lakhs of rupees out of the spoils secured by him. Before this order could reach him, Jujhar had removed his family from Orcha to the fort of Dhamoni and had also directed his son, Bikramajit, to escape with his troops from the Balaghat, where he had gone in service with the Mughul army.
Prince Aurangzlb was put in nominal command of the army of 20,000 troops which was commissioned to reduce the rebels. Jujhar fled from Dhamoni to Chauragarh after blowing up the build¬ ings round the fort and garrisoning it with a small force of his followers. He was closely pursued by the Mughul army and, losing all hope of successfully holding his ground against the im¬ perial forces, he put most of the women to death and fled into the jungle, where he and his son were killed by the Gonds. A close search was made after Jujhar’s death for the treasures which he had buried in the forest or thrown into the wells; and in a very short time two million eight hundred thousand rupees of treasure were unearthed. “In all about ten million rupees were credited to the royal exchequer.” Besides these gains the chief zamindar of Gondwana consented to pay five lakhs of rupees in cash and goods to the imperial commanders. The fort of Jhansi was cap¬ tured soon after.
Though the rebellion of Jujhar, the Bundela chief, was sup¬ pressed, in 1639 Champat Rai of Mahoba began to make incursions into the Mughul territory and this made the road to the Deccan very insecure. ‘Abdullah Khan was sent against him. Champat Rai defied the Mughul forces for a long time. ‘Abdullah Khan was replaced by Bahadur Khan, and finally, through the intercession of Pahar Singh, son of Bir Singh Deo, Champat Rai offered his sub¬ mission.
Raja Basu of Mau Nurpur had served Jahangir faithfully and had received favours at his hands. His successor, Jagat Singh, had been similarly honoured and had been confirmed in his dignities by Shah Jahan. Jagat Singh served with distinction in Bangash and Kabul, but his son, Rajrup, began to show a refractory atti¬ tude. Jagat Singh, at his own request, was permitted to return home to bring his son back to the path of fealty. But Jagat Singh all along had been in sympathy with his son, and once back in the security of his own tribe, Jagat preferred rebellion to loyalty. A strong force was sent against him in 1641. He offered terms which were refused, and one of his forts being captured and another be¬ sieged, he was forced to submit. Dr. Banarsi Prasad Saksena has instituted a comparison between the rising of Bir Singh Bundela and Jagat Singh; this is neither fair to Jagat Singh nor true to facts. Jagat Singh deserved well of the Mughuls because of his past services, and important officers interceded with the emperor on his behalf. Bir Singh was an upstart who had attained to his rank as a reward for the murder of Abu-T-Fazl, and public opinion was generally against him. It was not mere cupidity but political and military considerations which impelled Shah Jahan to extirpate the house of Bir Singh, though the treatment meted out to the sur¬ vivors cannot be justified.2
The rebellion of Khan Jahan Lodi gave much more trouble to Shah Jahan than the Bundela rising. Khan Jahan had been sent to replace Mahabat Khan during the latter’s absence in the north to¬ wards the close of Jahangir’s reign. When Khan Jahian took over charge of the Deccan, he placated the Nizam Shah by surrendering the Balaghat to him for three hundred thousand rupees. On Jahangir’s death he wavered between Nur Jahan and Shah Jahan, and by his discourtesy to the messenger sent by Shah Jahan to secure his adherence, he gave the new emperor serious cause for resentment. Khan Jahan next moved from Burhanpur to Mandu and captured that fort; but he was deserted by his Rajput officers and made his submission to the emperor, who graciously pardoned him, confirmed him in the governorship of Berar and Khandesh, and commissioned him to proceed to the Deccan to recover the lost territories. But Khan Jahan prevaricated and was removed to Malwa. When later on Khan Jahan appeared at the court and re¬ ceived a very cold reception, he felt slighted and was also alarm¬ ed about his safety. Fearing that he would be arrested and dis¬ graced, and conscious of his own guilty conduct in the Deccan, he secretly escaped from Agra. His party was overtaken by the im¬ perial forces near Dholpur. The Afghans put up a stout fight, but they were outnumbered, lost courage, and fled from the field. Khan Jahan abandoned his entire camp and treasure, and crossing the Chambal with his two sons and four Afghan companions, he went to Gondwana and then, passing through Berar, entered the king¬ dom of Ahmadnagar. On reaching Daulatabad, he was well re¬ ceived by Murtaza II (Nizam Shah) who assigned him the pargana of Bir and advanced him money for his expenses. The presence of Khan Jahan in the Deccan gave new hope to Murtaza II and raised the fears of the Mughuls. Shah Jahian was fully alive to the danger, and, to avoid jealous conflicts between the imperial officers, he crossed the Narmada and decided to supervise the operations per¬ sonally. During the campaign that followed, the Afghans suffered heavily, though Mughul losses were equally great. Khan Jahan was driven from Bir. He fell back on Shivgaon and then pushed on to Daulatabad. The imperial armies ravaged the Nizam Khfan’s ter ritory. Famine stalked the land and Murtaza, disillusioned about Khan Jahan, gave him the cold shoulder. Khan Jahian left Daula¬ tabad with the intention of proceeding to the Punjab, but the im¬ perial officers were vigilant and pursued him ruthlessly till he was driven out of Malwa, and after very heavy losses fled towards the north-east and, after a hard fight, was compelled to fly to Kalin jar. He reached the river Sindh in utter misery, but, like a brave Afghan, he preferred death on the battlefield to rotting in prison or dangling from a scaffold. He turned back upon his pursuers and was overpowered and cut to pieces. His head was sent by 'Abdullah Khan to the court. For sixteen months Khan Jahan had held out to save his honour and his dignity. "His miscalculated action”, says Dr. Saksena, "not only brought ruin on himself, but accelerated the downfall of the declining, almost moribund, king¬ dom of Ahmadnagar.”
The Portuguese had secured the grant of the site of Hooghly in 15372a and soon raised a flourishing and well-defended port at the entrance of the commercial highway of Bengal. Helped by the dis¬ turbed political condition of Bengal and the weakness and cupidity of the Mughul governors, they "became a rich and affluent com¬ munity, enjoying almost independent jurisdiction.” They secured the seas in league with the pirates of Chittagong and plundered and devastated the neighbouring towns; and "often penetrating forty or fifty leagues up the country, they carried away the entire population of villages on market days and on occasions when the inhabitants were assembled for celebration of marriages or some festival. With piracy and brigandage they combined religious fanaticism of the worst sort, and came to be universally feared and despised.”
The Portuguese had been left alone by Jahangir. Shah Jahan, however, started a ruthless campaign against them. Not only had they not helped him when he had gone to Bengal as a rebel prince; they had cooperated with Parviz, and Manvel Tavers had played him false by seizing his boats and carrying away some of his female slaves. As Shah Jahan’s attention was occupied elsewhere, the retribution was delayed till 1632.
The struggle with the Portuguese was precipitated by two events. The first was the plunder of a village near Dacca in East Bengal (now called East Pakistan or Bangla Desh) and assault on a Mughul lady by a Portuguese from the Magh territory in Eastern Bengal. The second was the complaint made to Qasim Khan, the Governor of Dacca, by a Portuguese merchant at Satgaon named Afonso. The latter "who had made a claim to certain land in Hooghly, applied to Qasim Khan in 1632 and held out the promise of a rich booty if the settlement were taken, which would be an easy task.” Qasim Khan now formally proposed that the Portu guese should be suppressed and Shah Jahan sanctioned an expedi¬ tion against them. Qasim Khan planned the campaign carefully and with 600 boats, 1400 horsemen, 90 elephants and a large force of in¬ fantry blocked the passage to Hooghly, both by land and sea. An attempt to bring about an amicable settlement through the Fathers of the Society of Jesus failed. The Portuguese were unwilling to carry out the demands of the Mughul commander and decided to fight. The Mughuls failed to capture the fort by assault and the Portuguese held out till the arrival of Afonso, the Portuguese; but with the coming of Mughul reinforcements, further resistance be¬ came impossible and the Portuguese left Hooghly in a body by boats and the place was occupied by the Mughul forces. The Portuguese suffered heavy losses. Ten thousand persons lost their lives and 14,400 Indians from Hooghly and the neighbouring parganas were set free. Severe punishment was meted out to those taken as prison¬ ers; some were executed, others were imprisoned, and the rest were given the choice between death and conversion. Shah Jahan’s treatment was severe, but the Portuguese richly deserved their fate. Shah Jahan has been accused of religious fanaticism, but he had cogent political, military, humanitarian and economic reasons for the policy he followed in extirpating the Portuguese pirates in Bengal. The innocent inhabitants of Bengal had suffered no end of miseries at their hands. Bernier gives a bad certificate both to Portuguese priests and laymen.3
Among the minor annexations of this period, “Little Tibet” may be mentioned. Jahangir’s attempt to conquer it had failed. The ruler of “Little Tibet” had afforded asylum to the Chaks, the ori¬ ginal rulers of Kashmir. In 1634 Abdal, the ruler of Little Tibet, agreed to acknowledge the supremacy of the Mughuls and have the khutba read in Shah Jahan’s name. Four years later, he repudia¬ ted the treaty. When an army was sent against him, he submit¬ ted and paid an indemnity of one million rupees.
At the time of Shah Jahan’s accession Cooch Behar was ruled by Blr Narfayan, son of Parlkshit, and Kamrup was in the nominal charge of a Mughul officer, Shaikh Zahid. The Ahom ruler of Assam had continued to give offence to the empire by sheltering its runaway officers and subjects and by his interference in the domestic affairs of Kamrup. Blr Narayan began the fray. Aided by the Ahom king, he attacked Kamrup, occupied Hajo, its capital, and drove out the Mughuls. Then Islam Khan, the new governor, drove away Blr Narayan and regained the lost territory. The im¬ perial forces then pushed into Assam, occupied the strong Ahom outpost of Kajli, and advanced successfully up to Samdhara. Here the Mughuls met with a stout resistance. They were pushed back from the fort and defeated with heavy losses at Duminsila in Nov¬ ember, 1639. The fort of Kajli was lost. But both parties were anxious for peace and a treaty of friendship was concluded.
The petty chiefs of Jharkhand were very head-strong and re¬ bellious, and Shah Jahan ordered ‘Abdullah Khan to reduce their ring-leaders one by one. Pratap, the zamiiidar of Ujjainiya near Buxar, was the first to be dealt with. His fort of Bhojpur was re¬ duced after a siege of six months and he was captured and exe¬ cuted. Next, Bohra Lachman of Ratanpur was forced to surrender.
Raja Pratap of Palamau had become haughty and behaved dis¬ respectfully towards Shayista Khan, the new governor. When Shayista Khan reported the matter to the court, the emperor order¬ ed him to drive away Pratap and to “clear the country of the filth of his existence’’. In October, 1646, a large army was sent to Palamau; Pratap submitted after some desultory fighting, paid an indemnity, and was granted a mansdb.
Bhagirath Bhil and Marvi Gond rebelled one after another. Both chiefs were defeated and their fortresses were occupied. An attempt was made in 1635 to subdue Garhwal, but the imperial army met with a heavy disaster. In 1654, another attempt was made as a result of which the Raja of Kumaun submitted, and in 1659 Medhi Singh, son of the Raja of Sirinagar (Dehradun district) came and offered his submission. The tribes on the north-west frontier, in spite of the presence of Abdal and later on of his son, ‘Abdul Qadir, were generally peaceful.
Towards the end of Jahangir’s reign diplomatic relations with Persia had been broken owing to the occupation of Qandahar by the Persians; but the Shah seems to have been anxious to revive them. After Jahangir’s death, Shah Jahan sent an embassy to Shah Safi of Persia to offer condolence on the death of Shah ‘Abbas. Shah Jahan in his letter reminded him of the old friendship between the two dynasties and stated that the late Shah had treated him in the “days of his vicissitudes” as an uncle should treat a nephew. But in spite of the embassies, which were exchanged in a spirit of cordiality, Shah Jahan had his eyes on Qandahar and was actively plotting to profit by the unrest that followed the death of Shah ‘Abbas and the youth and inexperience of the new Shah.
The death of Shah ‘Abbas had, in fact, revived the hopes of vengeance which all anti-Persian rulers had been cherishing. An attempt was once more made to form an anti-Persian league, but Shah Jahan, like Akbar, flirted both with Persia and her enemies.
He was anxious to get back Qandahar, which had considerable strategic importance for the Sindh frontier of the Mughul empire and was the meeting ground of trade-routes. It was said that 14,000 caravans passed through Qandahar every year. He may also have considered himself honour-bound to recapture a place which had been lost through his negligence and ambition. Equally keen was his old hereditary ambition to occupy the ancestral lands of the Mughuls. In the beginning Shah Jahan wished to get back Qandahar by diplomatic efforts and to conserve his resources for the recovery of Transoxiana, with Persian co-operation if possible, and without it if necessary. It was not till he was disappointed in this direction that he openly approached Persia’s enemies with the proposal for an alliance. The Shah’s differences with the governor of Qandahar gave Shah Jahlan the wished-for opportunity.
‘Ali Mardan Khan, the Persian governor of Qandahar, had been in arrears with his revenues; he had naturally sought to taken ad¬ vantage of the disturbed state of the country. He was summoned by the Shah to appear at the court, but avoided doing so. On be¬ ing dismissed from office, ‘All Mardan sought the assistance from the Governor of Kabul and the commander of Ghazni. In 1638 he surrendered Qandahar to the Mughuls and received from Shah Jahan, as a reward for his treachery, one lakh of tankas for him¬ self and two lakhs for his brother and the officers of his army. Elaborate preparations were now made by Shah Jahan to hold the fort against the Persians. Bust and Zamindaar were also sub¬ dued. The Shah was too busy at the time in the west to take any effective measures for the recapture of Qandahar. In a letter to the Shah sent in 1638, Shah Jahan justified the occupation of Qan¬ dahar, apologised for any misunderstandings that may have been caused by his action, and advised the Shah to forget the incident. No diplomatic intercourse took place between the two empires till after the death of Shah Safi.
Shah Jahan later on sent an embassy to secure Persia’s neutra¬ lity for his projected Central Asian campaign. There was a strong anti-Mughul party at the Persian court, but the Shah also feared the Sunni powers of Central Asia and preferred to remain a silent observer. When Nazr Muhammad Khan escaped to Persia, Shah Jahan wrote to Shah ‘Abbas II explaining the causes which had led to the Mughul campaign and expressed the hope of ultimately con¬ quering Samarqand and Bukhara.
In December, 1648, the Shah turned towards Qandahar. Mughul prestige was then very low owing to the disastrous failure of the
Mughul military venture in Central Asia. The Shah also succeeded in securing Turkish neutrality during his eastern campaign. The Persian expedition started in winter as the Shah was aware of the unpopularity of a winter campaign amongst the Indian troops. The fort of Qandahar was occupied by the Persians in February, 1649. Shah Jahan sent three different expeditions against Qandahar in 1649, 1652 and 1653 but the Mughuls could not recapture the fort.
No diplomatic relations were maintained with Persia during the rest of Shah Jahan’s reign. At the outbreak of the war of succes¬ sion in 1658, Murad and Dara tried to enlist the support of the Shah, who actually moved his troops to Qandahar. But the success of Au rangzib was so rapid that the Shah had to withdraw his troops. The following comments on the Qandahar expeditions by Sir Jadu nath Sarkar are worthy of note: “These three futile sieges cost the Indian treasury over ten crores of rupees and ruined the Mughul prestige in the eyes of all Asia. The Persian king could rightly boast that the rulers of Delhi knew how to steal a fort by means of gold, but not how to conquer it by strength of arms. Throughout the rest of the reign, the rumour of a projected invasion from Persia used to throw the court of Delhi into the greatest alarm.” Mughul fai¬ lure against Qandahar is a sad commentary on the degeneration that had set in the Mughul army. Spoilt by a life of ease and luxury, and with its discipline undermined by the pettiness and the factious spirit of its commanders, the Mughul army had lost both strength and morale. Another cause of failure was the in¬ efficient and ineffective artillery of the Mughuls. Above all, the meddling of Shah Jahan and a divided command made the success¬ ful pursuit of the campaign an impossibility.4
Shah Jahan’s reign began with an unfortunate incident which openly disturbed Mughul relations with the rulers of Transoxiana, that had been amicable since the treaty of friendship between 'Abdullah and Akbar. Nazr Muhammad Khan, the restless brother of Imam Quli of Bukhara, who was governor of Balkh, attacked the province of Kabul. The Mughul troops offered a stout resistance, and on the approach of reinforcements Nazr Muhammad had to beat a hasty retreat. Imam Quli hastened to offer apologies for his bro¬ ther’s conduct in a letter to Shah Jahan. The latter sent Turbat Khan to Balkh in 1633 with a letter expressing regrets on the Khan’s having delivered an unwarranted attack on a Sunni power. Shah Jahan, however, thanked him for the offer of help against the Per¬ sians. The letter, was full of the sectarian bias which Shah Jahan was trying to exploit in support of his designs against Persia.
Shortly after ‘All Mardan’s surrender of Qandahar, Shah Jahan sent Prince Shuja‘ and Khan Dauran with a large body of troops to Kabul as a precautionary measure against a Persian attack. These movements frightened Nazr Muhammad Khan and he appealed for help to his brother, Imam QulL Central Asian historians insist that Shah Jahan intended to capture Balkh as he was aware of the hosti¬ lity between the two brothers, but Indian historians deny this charge. Shah Jahan, on receiving a protest from Imam Quli, wrote back to assure him of his peaceful intentions. “I had only come to Kabul for hunting”, he wrote, “but if my brothers do not like it, I will go back.”
Imam Quli, who had lost his eyesight, abdicated, and Nazr Mu¬ hammad proceeded to Bukhara. But the people of Bukhara detested Nazr and a rebellion and a civil war followed. Shah Jahan, taking advantage of this, captured Kahmard in 1645. Nazr, who was hard pressed by the rebels, applied to Shah Jahan for help. Prince Murad was sent to Balkh with a large army. The campaign opened well and Qunduz was captured in June, 1646. From there the imperial armies proceeded to Balkh. Nazr was alarmed; he snut himself up in the fort of Balkh and refused to meet Murad. But he ulti¬ mately fled to Persia and Balkh fell into the hands of the Mughuls.
Neither Murad nor the Indian troops took kindly to their new surroundings. Murad proved inefficient and was recalled by Shah Jahan. Governing these provinces was, in fact, more difficult than conquering them; and the task was rendered still more difficult by the mutual jealousies of the Mughul commanders, the inveterate and sullen hostility of the people to the new and foreign regime, the unpopularity of ‘All Mardan and the presence of the Hindus. Nazr returned with some Persian troops and concluded peace with Aurangzib who had replaced Murad. The Mughuls had to retire to India in October, 1647, and the army suffered heavily on the homeward march.
Thus ended the wild dream of the Mughul emperors for the re¬ conquest of their Central Asian homeland. It had brought nothing but disaster, famine and death both to the Indians and the Turanians. The losses of the empire could not be calculated in men and money alone. Its prestige in Central Asian affairs had vanished and the myth of its invincibility was shattered. The fear of a Mughul inva¬ sion of Turan, which had kept its rulers in wholesome fear, now completely disappeared. Shah ‘Abbas, as we have seen, took ad¬ vantage of the situation and captured Qandahar. A wave of unrest swept through Afghanistan, and the north-west tribesmen could not be easily kept in hand now. We need not be surprised that with the failure of the Balkh campaign and the loss of Qandahar, the power of the Mughul emperors began to dwindle in Afghanistan, and the tribes got an opportunity to foment dissensions and intri¬ gues for their own ends by playing off the Mughuls and the Per¬ sians against each other. The Abbdalis allied themselves with the Persians and the Ghilzais fell back on the Mughuls for support. This perpetual warfare encouraged the inherent lawless tendencies of the population, and “broke the thin web of administration, so ably cast by Akbar over Afghanistan.” The Central Asian venture also coincided with a nationalist revival in Afghanistan, and the country gradually slipped into anarchy and confusion, which even the strong hand of Aurangzib could not control. The healthy stream of the young Afghan recruits to the Mughul army also dried up; here¬ after, it could only make drafts for its shock battalion on the Muslim man-power of Northern India and the Rajputs.
This disastrous expedition also had other far-reaching results. The famine and plague which it left behind in Central Asia ruined the prosperity of the people and weakened the Government. The age-long trade and commerce between India and Bukhara and Sa marqand suffered disastrously. The occupation of Qandahar by the Persians and the virtual state of war that followed it during the reign of Aurangzib diverted trade and commerce from the northern passes to the ports of southern and western India to the great ad¬ vantage of the Europeans and a corresponding loss to the Mughul treasury.
With Shah Jahan’s accession to the throne, the Deccan policy of the Mughuls entered a new phase; it became more vigorous and purposeful. Apart from political differences, the Deccan rulers had pronounced Shiahite leanings and were suspected of allegiance to the Shiah rulers of Persia. The death of Malik ‘Ambar came as a blessing to the Mughuls. In 1630 his unworthy son, Fath Khan, the minister of Ahmadnagar, informed the Mughuls that in order to protect his own life he had placed his master, the Nizam Shah! king, in confinement. Shah Jahan in reply instructed him to “rid the world of such a worthless and wicked being.” Fath Khan com¬ plied with this order and then placed a ten-year old minor prince, named Husain Shah, on the throne. Shah Jahan next asked Asaf Khan to secure the submission of the Sultan of Bijapur, who had not so far acknowledged the imperial authority, and in case of non compliance, to conquer his kingdom. In 1631 Asaf laid siege to Bijapur but was compelled to raise it after twenty days for lack of provisions. The open country suffered terribly at the hands of the Mughuls.
The emperor left the Deccan for Agra on 14 April, 1632. Asaf was succeeded by Mahabat as the commander of the Deccan expedi¬ tion. Mahabat laid siege to the fortress of Daulatabad. Fath Khan began to waver in his allegiance to the Mughuls and tried to post¬ pone a decision. Finally the Khan Khanan won him over by a bribe of ten and a half lakhs and secured the surrender of the Dau¬ latabad fort (1633). The nominal young king, Husain Shah, was condemned to life-long imprisonment at Gwalior and the Nizam Shahl kingdom came to an end. The Mughuls, however, failed to take the fortress of Parenda and retreated to Burhanpur on account of the rains.
Shah Jahan’s imperialistic designs could not be satisfied with¬ out crushing Bijapur and Golconda. He called upon the rulers of these countries to acknowledge his suzerainty, to pay tribute as a mark of submission, and to abstain from interfering in the affairs of the now defunct kingdom of Ahmadnagar. Shah Jahan himself arrived at Daulatabad on 2 March, 1636, and collected an army of 50,000 men for attacking Bijapur and Golconda. Alarmed by these preparatory movements, 'Abdullah Qutb Shah of Golconda formally recognised the suzerainty of Shah Jahan. He promised to pay an annual tribute, to strike gold and silver coins in the em¬ peror’s name, and to have it read in the khutba (Friday sermon).
The king of Bijapur did not, however, come down so low and would not barter away his independence. Three imperial armies marched into his kingdom from three sides. But the Bijapuris fought with the valour of despair and ultimately, tired of war, both sides opened negotiations for peace, which was concluded on the following terms: ‘Adil Shah acknowledged the overlordship of the emperor and was allowed to retain his ancestral kingdom. He got fifty pargands yielding an annual income of eighty lakhs of rupees from the territory of the late Ahmadnagar kingdom. A sum of twenty lakhs of rupees in cash and kind was demanded from him as annual tribute, and he was required to abstain from molesting the kingdom of Golconda, which was now under imperial protection. Shahji Bhonsle was not to be allowed to hold any office in the Bija¬ pur State unless he surrendered the Nizam Shahl forts which he had occupied during the war.
The emperor set out for Mandu on 21 July, 1636; three days later he sent his eighteen-year old son Aurangzib as the Viceroy of the Deccan. The Mughul Deccan at this time consisted of the four provinces of Khandesh, Berar, Telingana and the recently annexed Nizam Shahi territory. The four provinces contained sixty-four hill forts and their total revenue was five crores of rupees. Thus the war of 1635-37 had “enriched the Mughul treasury with tri¬ bute amounting to two crores of rupees, and added to the empire a territory which, when cultivated, yielded a revenue of one crore.”
After one year’s successful government during which the terri¬ tory of Baglan and Shahji’s forts were acquired, Aurangzib return¬ ed to Agra in 1637. In 1644, he was dismissed from his post and deprived of his rank and jdglrs by the emperor. In 1653, Aurangzib was again sent across the Narmada as the Subadar of the Deccan. During the nine years following his dismissal in May, 1644, the ad¬ ministration of the Deccan had collapsed; the revenue had fallen to such an extent that they were not even sufficient for the normal expenditure of the Government, Aurangzib, on his return, was therefore faced with a serious financial situation. In order to meet the expenses of the administration he drew upon the cash reserves in the treasuries of the Deccan. He proposed to Shah Jahan that he and his higher officers should be assigned jdglrs in other provin¬ ces, and that the cash portion of his salary should be made a charge on the flourishing treasuries of Malwa and Surat. Shah Jahan ag¬ reed to the first proposal, but did not grant Aurangzlb’s request for monetary assistance. The jaglrddrs, whose lands were thus taken by Aurangzib, complained to Shah Jahan, who angrily wrote back to Aurangzib: “It is unworthy of a Mussalman and an act of injustice to take for yourself all the productive villages of a par gana and to assign to others only the less productive lands.”
After improving the finances to some extent Aurangzib devoted himself to promoting agriculture and to ameliorating the condition of the peasantry. In his measures in this direction, which have made his viceroyalty “memorable for ever in the history of land settlement in the Deccan,” he received valuable assistance from an able officer named Murshid Quli Khan, the Diwan of the “Balaghat.” Murshid Quli Khan divided the Deccan Province into two parts for fiscal purposes. Each part was to have its own Diwan. He extend¬ ed the system of Todar Mai to the Deccan and thus revived and revitalised the work of Malik ‘Ambar. The normal life of the vil¬ lages was restored by bringing together and rehabilitating the scat¬ tered ryots. A regular gradation of village and local officers was established. Amins were appointed to measure the land and to pre¬ pare a record of holdings, distinguishing arable from waste land. New muqaddams (headmen) were appointed in the villages to look after the interests of the peasants and to help in collecting the revenue. Advances in cash were given to the poorer ryots for the purchase of agricultural implements. In backward and thinly po¬ pulated areas Murshid Qull retained the system of fixed payment per plough; while in other places he introduced the system of batai (metaqar system) for which there were three rates. The system of assessment by jarib was also introduced and came to be known during generations as “the dhara of Murshid Qull Khan.”
After this Aurangzlb decided to crush the independence of Bi japur and Golconda. Their independence was more offensive to Mughul imperialism now than half a century earlier; and Aurangzlb, young and ambitious, wanted to pursue the imperial plans in the Deccan to their logical conclusion. The fact that the Deccan princes professed the Shiah creed and looked for patronage to th,e Shah of Persia rather than to the emperor of Hindusthan gave him the neces¬ sary public support. The tribute from the Sultan of Golconda had always been in arrears and Aurangzlb demanded a certain part of the Sultan’s kingdom in lieu of the arrears. The emperor also took offence at the conquest of Carnatic by the two kingdoms. A plausi¬ ble excuse for war was found in the Golconda king’s treatment of his officer, Mir Jumla, who sought and secured imperial protection with the help of Aurangzlb while his family was detained by the Golconda ruler.
Aurangzlb reported these matters to Shah Jahtan and solicited his permission for attacking Golconda. Shah Jahian reluctantly sanctioned the invasion in case Muhammad Amin, son of Mir Jumla, was still detained by Golconda. Aurangzlb declared war on Gol¬ conda without even giving Abu-’l-Hasan Qutb Shah time to consider Shah Jahan’s letter.
Prince Muhammad Sultan, son of Aurangzlb, entered Hydera¬ bad in January, 1656. Abu-’l-Hasan shut himself up in the fort of Golconda and Aurangzlb laid siege to it, fully determined to reduce the fort and to annex the kingdom. Abu-’l-Hasan, in despair, ap¬ pealed to Shah Jahan, who adopted a more accommodating attitude under the influence of Dlara and Jahanara Begam. Aurangzlb, much against his wishes, was ordered to raise the siege and to evacuate the occupied territories. He had no alternative but to comply and raised the siege of Golconda on 9 April, 1656. A peace was im¬ mediately concluded. Prince Muhammad was married by proxy to Abu-’l-Hasan’s daughter; Abu-’l-Hasan swore on the Qur’an to obey the emperor and received in return a letter of pardon from Shah Jahan along with rich robes of honour. Aurangzlb remitted ten lakhs out of the twenty-five lakhs of indemnity money, but the Sul tan had to cede the district of Ramglr. Mir Jumla was taken into im¬ perial service and appointed prime minister in place of Sa‘d-ullah Khan.
The conquest of Bijiapur next engaged Aurangzlb’s attention. Muhammad ‘Adil Shah of Bijapur died on 16 November, 1656, and was succeeded by his son, a youth of eighteen years. Aurangz'lb solicited Shah Jahan’s permission for invading the kingdom on the ground that the new king was not the son of the dead ruler but a boy of obscure origin. The emperor granted him full powers to “settle the affairs of Bijapur in any way he thought fit.” But Shah Jahan had merely suggested an invasion of Bijapur while Aurangzib was bent upon annexing the whole territory. Sir J. N. Sarkar has rightly remarked that the war thus sanctioned was wholly unright¬ eous. Bijapur was not a vassal State; and the Mughul emperor had no legal right either to confirm or to question the succession of the Bijapur king. The true reason for Mughul interference was the helplessness of its boy-king and the discord among his officers.
Mir Jumla and Aurangzib laid siege to Bidar. It was bravely defended, but submitted in April, 1657. The city of Kalyani was then besieged by the Mughuls in May, 1657. A heroic defence was offered by Dilawar Khan, but he was at last compelled to capitulate. With Bidar and Kalyani in Mughul hands, the way was open for an attack on Bijapur itself. At this favourable moment, when the prize was nearly in Aurangzlb’s hands, Shah Jahan sent an order for the cessation of hostilities. The Bijapur agents had intrigued at the Delhi Court, and Dara, who was jealous of his brother’s success, brought about a change in the emperor’s mind. His untimely in¬ tervention checked the Mughul advance, and peace was concluded in 1657. The Bijapur Sultan surrendered Bidar, Kalyani and Pa renda, and agreed to pay an indemnity of one and a half crores, of which Shah Jahan subsequently remitted half a crore.
The disorders following the illness of Shah Jahan and the war of succession saved the Deccan for the time being from the onslaught of the Mughuls. For about twenty years after his succession Aurangzlb’s attention was concentrated on other affairs and the Dec can Sultanates were left alone to heal, as best they could, the wounds of the late war. But their recovery was slow and only partial. The rising power of the Marathas and the growing demoralisation and corruption of the officers of the two kingdoms made the process of recovery difficult. It is hard to say how Aurangzlb’s plan of annexing the two States would have affected the growth of Maratha power or contributed to the stabilisation of Mughul rule in the Deccan. That Shah Jahan’s action in calling a halt to Aurangzlb’s mi¬ litary campaign was inopportune and unwise, no one will deny.
Orthodox Muslim religious opinion, which began to take shape from the time of Jahangir, as is shown for example by the writings of the Mujaddid Alf-i Sani and ‘Abdul Haque Muhaddis-i Dehlavi, coloured the attitude of Shah Jahan towards his non-Muslim sub¬ jects in general and his personal religious views in particular. As an orthodox Muslim he did much to restore the position of the Mu salmans in the body politic. Shah Jahan never gave up the basic policy of toleration and forbearance, which had stood the test of time. In his reign, some contemporary Muslim writers declare, the arrogance and boldness of the Hindus increased and in several places mosques were converted into temples and Muslims were converted to Hinduism; and there was a challenge even to the representation of M.usalmans in the services, particularly in the revenue depart¬ ment. This awakened the fears of the Musalmans and Muslim pub¬ lic opinion was organised by Muslim divines. Shah Jahan was unable to resist the pressure of Muslim opinion or the influence of the divines. The rising tide of Maratha militant movement also alarmed Shah Jahan and his officers. In religious matters he was more uncompromising than Akbar or Jahangir and his policy was comparatively more straight, firm, and bold than that of his prede¬ cessors. The deep conflict between the Ahl-i-Shariat or the ortho¬ dox and the followers of the mystic philosophy or the Ahle-Tariqat was demonstrated towards the end of his life over the question of succession, and was typified in the opposite personalities of Dara Shukoh and Aurangzib.5
Shah Jahan’s education had been carried on under liberal tea¬ chers of the Sufi (mystic) school, but later on, he became more or¬ thodox and less tolerant. He married no Hindu princess and was thus free from what Sharma calls “the mellowing influence” of the harem, an influence which had softened the fibre of the Mughuls and had made them complaisant and dependent on the Indian elements in the population. Shah Jahan, like Firuz Shiah, started his reform of Muslim society by eradicating un-Islamic practices. The sijda or prostration to the emperor was abolished and the zamiribos (kissing the ground) form of salutation was introduced. This, too, was later replaced by chahar tasleem (four salutations). This reorganisation of the Court ceremonial was intended to give it a Muslim atmos¬ phere, and Muslim festivals were more regularly celebrated. Alms were distributed during the months of Rajab, Shaaban and Rabi‘u-1- awwal. Offerings were sent to Mecca under a Mir Hajj. In his letter to the ruler of Golconda, Shah Jahan spoke of himself as the leader of the Sunnis and the destroyer of all those who did not con¬ form to his ideas of Islam. He also suppressed heretical practices among the Afghans. But some of the older practices were preserved as being expedient and less harmful. The jharoka ceremony was continued, the tula, dan was observed, and astrologers were main¬ tained at the court. Painting was patronised, but the wearing of the imperial likeness in the turban was discontinued.
It has been affirmed that Shah Jahian ordered that only Mus¬ lims were to be recruited to the public services. This is not correct. In the tenth year of his reign, the percentage of Hindu Mansabdars was 16 as against 12 in the time of Jahangir. It was destined to rise still higher, but towards the end of the reign the percentage of Hindu Mansabdars, which had at one time touched 38, began to de¬ cline, first on account of the Maratha wars and, secondly, owing to the clamour of the Musalmans.
Shah Jahan did not reimpose the jizya but he revived the pil¬ grim-tax for a short while. He forbade the completion of certain temples and prevented the building of new temples. This policy was also reviewed later on. Certain temples were destroyed, but this was due to local prejudices and to the fact that some of them were utilised against the State. Prohibition of conversion to Hin¬ duism and Christianity was justified as a defensive measure; inqui¬ ries made in Bhambar, an adjoining area, revealed that 4,000 Mus¬ lim women had been converted to Hinduism. Laws against blas¬ phemy were made more stringent. On the whole, Shah Jahan was more anxious than his predecessors to uphold Muslim religion and to exalt Muslim society, but his orthodoxy was neither militant nor narrow-minded. He tried to hold the balance between the policy initiated by Akbar, on the one hand, and the demands of the fana¬ tical and orthodox Muslim divines, on the other.6
Shah Jahan’s last years were embittered by the war of succes¬ sion among his four sons, and he dragged on his life in captivity for seven and a half years after Aurangzlb’s accession. No sons of the same father and mother could have been more unlike each other in temperament, in outlook on life, in manners and in morals, than the four sons of Shah Jahan. None of the great Mughul emperors attained to such grandeur and success as Shah Jahan,7 and none was destined to greater humiliation and suffering at the end of his reign.
Dara, the eldest son, was most favoured by his father. He was 43 years of age when the war of succession started. Of comely ap¬ pearance and dignified deportment, courteous in conversation and extremely liberal, he was steeped in Muslim mysticism and Hindu pantheism. His father had bestowed on him the unprecedented military rank of 60,000 zat, the command being greater than “even the combined commands of all the younger brothers.” He had been allowed to rule his province as a viceroy through his agents, and the highest honours were showered not only on him but also on his sons and adherents. As a consequence, Dana never acquired expe¬ rience in the art of administration or of war. He established no contacts with the people or the nobility, and in the hour of trial he was deserted by the officers who mattered. Both Manucci and Ber¬ nier refer to Dam’s irascibility, stubbornness and vanity. He enter¬ tained, says Bernier, “too exalted an opinion of himself, and be¬ lieved he could accomplish everything by the powers of his own mind.” The jealousy of Darn’s brothers and the fear they enter¬ tained of him are voiced by the contemporary historian ‘Aqil Khan Razi. “Dam Shukoh was appointed by Shah Jahan as his heir apparent. His Highness, on account of his arrogance and pride.... began to suppose, in fact to believe, that he was, by right and here¬ ditary claim, the ruler of the extensive empire of Hindustan. . .and he made it his object to put an end to the existence of his brothers, who were co-heirs and partners in the kingdom and throne.”8 Flat¬ tery had made him vain; prosperity tended to make him ease-loving, and owing to the partiality shown to him by his father he became arrogant and over-confident.
Shah Jahan fell ill with strangury in September, 1657. Des¬ pairing of his life, the emperor made his last will and commended Dam as his heir apparent to the care of his officers. The news of his illness, which was at first kept a secret, reached the three bro¬ thers in their respective provinces—Shuja* in Bengal, Aurangzlb in the Deccan and Murad in Gujarat. Shah Jahan recovered slightly in November, but this made no difference to the march of events.
Of the three princes, Shuja4 was the first to crown himself and to march towards Delhi from Bengal. Murad followed suit in De¬ cember, and formed an alliance with Aurangzlb, who was more cautious in his moves. Sulaiman Shukoh, the eldest son of Darn, was sent with Raja Jay Singh against Shuja4; two other armies were also despatched, one to oppose Aurangzlb, and the other to oust Murad from Gujarat.
Murad was a vain, pleasure-loving, and indolent prince who cared more for “the nourishment of the body” than for active life of the battlefield or diligent application to duty. He started his new career by killing 4Ali Naql, his revenue minister, and sacking the city of Surat in order to equip himself for the forthcoming strug¬ gle for the throne. After entering into a treaty of alliance with Aurangzlb by which Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, Sindh and one third of the war booty were promised to him, Murad started from
Ahmadabad on 7 March, 1658, and joined Aurangzlb at DIpalpur on 24 April.
Aurangzlb had from the beginning been very cool and cautious, and had no intention of rebelling against his father. But the con¬ duct of Dara and the hasty action of his other two brothers left him no alternative but to enter the arena and make a bid for the supreme power.9
Jasvant Singh, who had been sent south by Shah Jahan and Dara, was encamped at Dharmat, fourteen miles south-west of Uj jain. Here, on 5 May, the rival armies came face to face. In the fierce battle that followed, Aurangzlb won a decisive victory by his superior generalship and an efficient and scientific combina¬ tion of artillery and cavalry. It was the omen of his irresistible march to power.
On the day following the battle the Princes reached Ujjain. They then marched on to Gwalior where they arrived in June. Here they learnt that Dara had personally moved to Dholpur and obtained command over all the ferries of the river Chambal. Aurang zib, with the help of a local zamindar, found a little-used ford at Bhanduli, 40 miles east of Dholpur; he crossed the river without any opposition and started on the road to Agra. Dara, foiled in his de¬ sign of preventing his rivals from crossing the Chambal, had no alternative but to fall back. The two armies came face to face with one another at Samogarh, eight miles east of Agra fort. Dara was advised not to risk a personal defeat by taking charge of the army command, but he paid no heed to the advice. The battle com¬ menced about noon on 8 June, 1658, in the fearful heat of the Indian sun. Dara’s Rajput officers fought with undaunted courage and near¬ ly carried the day; but the faulty tactics of Dara, the indiscipline of his army, and his bad generalship brought a final and irretrievable disaster to the imperial army. Dara lost nearly 10,000 soldiers, in¬ numerable horses and elephants, and 19 Muslim and Rajput officers of the highest rank. Beaten and humbled, he escaped to Agra where he arrived at 9 p. m. and shut himself up in his house. When summoned by Shah Jahan to see him, the heart-broken prince de¬ clined. “I cannot show my face to your Majesty in my present wretch¬ ed plight”, he replied; “permit me to go away with your farewell blessing on the long journey that is before me.”
Daria left Agra for Delhi and the victors soon after arrived and encamped in the garden of Nur Manzil outside Agra. Shah Jahan opened the gates of the Agra fort after a siege of three days, Aurang zib took possession of it, and then set out in pursuit of Dara. By the time he reached Mathura, he found that the pretensions of Mu¬ rad had grown so high that, if unpunished, he would jeopardise Aurangzib’s chances of success. Murad was arrested and sent to Salimgarh; later on, he was confined as' a State-prisoner in the fort of Gwalior. After three years’ captivity Murad was tried for the murder of ‘All Naql on a complaint by his son and beheaded in the fort of Gwalior.
Dara had marched on to Lahore when he heard of the capture of Agra by Aurangzlb. There he assembled an army of 20,000 men and sent out parties to guard the ferries of the Sutlej. Aurangzib sent an officer eastward to capture Allahabad and another to the Punjab, while he himself stayed in Delhi for three weeks to organize the administration. He was formally crowned emperor at Delhi on 31 July, 1658.
The Mughul empire reached its greatest prosperity in the reign of Shah Jahan. “The means employed by Shah Jahan in these happy years”, the author of Lubbut Tawarikh says, “to protect and nourish his people, his knowledge of what made for their welfare, his administration by honest and intelligent officers, the auditing of accounts, his care of the crown-lands and their tenants and encou¬ ragement of agriculture and the collection of revenue, together with his punishment and admonition of evil-doers, oppressors and mal¬ contents—all tended to the prosperity of the empire.” Muslim writers hold him up as an ideal Muslim monarch, and call him the pillar of the Shar’iyat, “the defender of religion, and the restorer of the waning fortunes of Islam.” But contemporary European travel¬ lers, though testifying to the extent and the prosperity of his em¬ pire, “depict him as a despicable creature whose only concern in life was how to indulge in his bestial sensuality and monstrous wicked¬ ness.” Elphinstone describes the age of Shah Jahan as “the most prosperous ever known to India. . . .together with a larger share of good government than often falls to the lot of Asiatic nations.” V. A. Smith is extremely critical and unfair in his indictment of Shah Jahan. “In affairs of state”, he says, “Shah Jahan was cruel, treacherous and unscrupulous. He had little skill as a military leader.... His justice was merely the savage, unfeeling ferocity of the ordinary Asiatic despot, exercised without respect for persons and without the slightest tincture of compassion.”
These deprecating remarks do scant justice to Shah Jahan’s qualities of head and heart.10 Whatever his weaknesses as a prince, he proved a firm and capable ruler, who (so Bernier tells us) “reign¬ ed not so much as a king over his subjects but rather as a father over his family and children.” As emperor he led a strenuous life; this is proved by the minute details of his daily routine recorded in con¬ temporary Persian accounts. He personally supervised the minutest details of the administration and appointed men of the highest abi¬ lity and uprightness of character as his ministers. The military campaigns were organised and the details were worked out by him personally with care and assiduity. Many abuses in the mansabdari and revenue system were removed by him, and never was security of life and property greater, nor justice more quick and fair, than in Shah Jahan’s reign. A loving father, a doting husband, a loyal friend, a capable ruler and wise statesman, Shah Jahan deserved a better end. He was harsh and vindictive to his enemies, but kind and generous to his friends. He punished the unruly and recalci¬ trant with severity, amounting to cruelty, but he was affable, kind and forgiving to those who sought his friendship or forgiveness. His supreme endeavour was to eradicate lawlessness and rebellion, to guarantee security of life and property to his subjects, and to promote their material and moral welfare. Orthodox as a Musal man and anxious to fortify and strengthen the Muslim millat, he was never unfair to, or unmindful of, the interests of his non-Muslim subjects.11 He loved pomp and show and considerably increased the royal retinue, the State-establishments and the magnificence of the court. The Peacock Throne, the Taj Mahal, the Agra Fort and nu¬ merous other works of architecture and art testify to his wealth as well as his aesthetic sense. He was an excellent calligraphist. His patronage of men of letters and of artisans and craftsmen was in keeping with the traditions of his family. Poets, philosophers, scho¬ lars, artisans—all flocked to his court and received his favours. He recognised merit and rewarded it generously. Poetry, music, painting, dancing, astronomy, mathematics and medicine flourished under the generous and intelligent patronage of the emperor. He was fond of Hindu music and patronised Hindu poets like Sundar Das, Chintamani and Kavindra Acharya. Amongst the royal musicians were Lai Khan, son-in-law of the famous Tan Sen, Jagannath, who receiv¬ ed the title of Mahia-Kavi-Rai, Sukh Sen and Sur Sen. Shah Jahan’s solicitude for the welfare of his subjects showed itself best in measures for famine relief in Gujarat, Kashmir and the Punjab. Soup kit¬ chen and aim-homes were established in Burhanpur, Ahmadahad and Surat. At Burhanpur Rs. 5,000 were distributed amongst the poor every Monday. Taxes amounting to 70 lakhs were remitted. In Kashmir, Rs. 1,00,000 were distributed amongst the poor besides the provision of Rs. 200 worth of cooked food daily. Ten free kitchens were established in the Punjab. His treatment of his rivals at the time of his accession, as we have seen, is a great blot on his charac¬ ter; his aggressive wars were a great drain on the imperial treasury. Rut in the features of Shah Jahan the Mughul artists have succeed¬ ed in expressing that calmness and grandeur which so forcibly strikes us in the Taj Mahal, the greatest Indian architectural achieve¬ ment of all times.
Appendix
1. This is in accordance with the testimony of the Indian authors. There is, however, a story, recorded by some European travellers and in the annals of Persia, that Dawar Bakhsh was not actually killed but managed to escape by substituting another man in his place. For details, Cf. B. P. Saksena, History of Sharjahan of Delhi, p. 62, f.n. 88 (Editor).
2. Op. cit. pp. 102-3. It is, however, difficult to justify the author’s comment and observations for distinguishing the nature of the two rebellions.
2a. The date is given as c. 1579 by V. A. Smitr, Oxford History of India, (1919), p. 395.
3. For a more detailed account and a less favourable view of Shah Jahan’s con¬ duct, cf. CHI, IV, pp. 190-192. The passage quoted is in p. 191.
4. For a detailed and critical discussion of the causes of the Mughul failure against Qandahar, cf. Saksena, op. cit. p. 235.
5. The view that Shah Jahan ‘‘never gave up the basic policy of toleration and forbearance” is belied by the author’s own statements that follow. Further, this discussion, on the basis of which the author makes the categorical statement, in the last para of this chapter, that Shah Jahan “was never unfair to, or unmindful of, the interests of his non-Muslim subjects”, is de¬ finitely opposed to well-authenticated facts if we remember, as we should, that the liberty to follow his own religion was regarded by every Hindu as his chief ‘interest’, more highly valued than any other privilege. The following passage in Dr. Saksena’s book (every statement of which is substantiated by reference to authorities in the footnotes) is more in accordance with known historical facts:
“The practice of desecrating and destroying Hindu temples, though it was revived in the reign of Jahangir, became systematic under Shah Jahan. He first ordered, in January 1633, the demolition of the newly built temples in his whole Empire, especially at Benares, and this order was (in September October) followed by a total prohibition for the erecting of new temples or
the repairing of old ones.
“Further, systematic efforts were made at the instance of the Emperor to convert the Hindus both by persuasion and bv force. The former included tempting offers of service and rewards. Shah Mir Lahauri and Muhibb ‘All Sindhl were especially commissioned with this work of proselytisation. They presented new converts to the Emperor, who conferred on them titles and distinctions, or assigned special allowance to them. The Hindus were strictly forbidden to influence or dissuade their relations from turning Musalman. Two cases of conversion among the nobility are worth notice....
“There are two instances on record in which government officials were transferred or dismissed on account of their religious convictions (concrete instances given)(Saksena, op. cit. pp. 293-5).
To the above statement may be added the fact that a pilgrim tax was imposed on the Hindus (Manrique’s account, Vol. II. p. 147). (Editor).
6. The whole of this paragraph is a special pleading in favour of Shah Jahan unsupported by facts and arguments. For example, no evidence is cited to prove that the Hindu temples were destroyed because “some of them were utilised against the State.” Again, one fails to understand how prohibition of conversion to Hinduism and Christianity may be justified as a defensive mea¬ sure. The last two sentences of this para are somewhat self-contradictory, and, in any case, do not deserve serious consideration from the point of view of the justification of Shah Jahan’s religious policy.
7. This is true only in respect of the artistic achievements.
8. No evidence is cited to prove that it was a deliberate policy of Dara to kill his brothers, nor is it easy to understand how ‘they were co-heirs and part¬ ners in the kingdom.’
9. It is, at best, a gratuitous assumption. Sir Jadunath Sarkar does not take such a view in his monumental work on Aurangzlb.
10. For a moderate and reasonable view between these two extremes, cf. Saksena, op. cit., pp. 296 ff.
11. Cf. foot-note 5 above.
1V.B.—The Editor alone is responsible for all the above foot-notes [Ed.*]. 219