JAHANGIR
Jahangir was born on Wednesday, 9 September, 1569,1 at Fathpur Slkrl. A child of many prayers,2 he was named Muham¬ mad Sultan Salim, though Akbar always, whether drunk or sober, addressed him as ‘Shaikhu Baba.’ His early education was en¬ trusted to a famous Muslim divine, Maulana Mir Kalan HarvI, and later to Shaikh Ahmad, the prince’s foster-father, and to Qutb-ud dln Muhammad Khan Atga. In 1582, Akbar put him in charge of the famous ‘Abdur Rahim Khan-Khanan, son of Bairam Khan. Jahangir acquired proficiency in Persian and Turkish and became an excellent calligraphist. He also showed considerable interest in history, geography, botany, zoology and art. As was customary with the Tlmurid princes of those days, Prince Salim was placed in nominal charge of large detachments of the army in the import¬ ant Kabul campaign of 1581, when he was only twelve years of age. In the following year, he was placed in nominal charge of the departments of justice and public celebrations.
At the age of fifteen, Salim was married to Man Bai, daughter of Raja Bhagawan Das of Amber. She died in 1604, to the utter grief of Salim, who recalls her “perfect intelligence” and “her excel¬ lences and goodness” with affection in his Memoirs.3
Salim’s relations with his father, who had always doted on him, were estranged when he came of age. His indecent eager¬ ness to grasp power, his jealousy of Abu-’l-Fazl and Akbar’s dislike of his excesses were primarily responsible for this. Reference has already been made in the preceding Chapter to Salim’s open revolt against his father, the murder of Abu-’l-Fazl at his instigation, court-conspiracy against him in favour of Khusrav’s succession, Salim’s reconciliation with Akbar and accession after the latter’s death. On his accession, Salim assumed the name Jahangir (Holder of the World) and the title of Nur-ud-dln (Light of the Faith).
Jahangir ascended the throne in the fort of Agra on 3 Nov¬ ember, 1605, at the age of thirty-six. His triumph over Khusrav and his partisans was not marred by any acts of retaliation. Friends and political opponents were all alike recipients of favours. BIr Singh Bundela, the murderer of Abu-’l-Fazl, was raised to the dignity of a commander of 3000. The sons and relatives of hispatron saint, Shaikh Salim ChishtI, were given ranks and offices beyond their hopes and abilities, and this caused much heart-burn¬ ing among the older officers. “Jahangir”, says Asad Beg, “began to win the hearts of all the people and officers, and to rearrange the withered world.”
One of Jahangir’s earliest orders, which he mentions with par¬ donable pride in his Memoirs, was the setting up of a chain of justice made of pure gold, thirty gaz long, with sixty bells upon it. One end was attached to a battlement of the fort of Agra and the other to a stone column on the bank of the river. Anyone who failed to secure justice might pull the end outside the fort in order to draw the attention of the Emperor so that the latter might re¬ dress his grievances. Later European writers speak of it as a piece of “silly make-believe” and doubt if it were ever used by a person in distress. • This criticism is not fair. The chain was a symbol of Jahangir’s determination to dispense justice fairly and firmly without fear or favour, and whatever his shortcomings may have been—and they were many—he remained true to his ideal of a justice-loving ruler. Asad Beg judiciously remarks: “For the consolation of the hearts of his people, he suspended the chain of justice and removed the rust of oppression from their hearts”. The chain of justice was an emblem of his accessibility and of his de¬ sire to redress wrongs.
Another of his important acts was the issuing of the Twelve Ordinances for the better government of the country. It is best to let Jahangir speak for himself.
“I also gave twelve orders to be observed as rules of conduct (dasturu-l-amal) in all my dominions—
“1. Forbidding the levy of cesses under the names of tamghd and mlr bahrl (river tolls), and other burdens which the jdglrddrs of every province and district had imposed for their own profit.
“2. On roads where thefts and robberies took place, which roads might be at a little distance from habitations, the jdglrddrs of the neighbourhood should build sard’is (public rest-houses), mos¬ ques, and dig wells, which might stimulate population, and people might settle down in those sard’is. If these should be near a Khdlisa estate (under direct State management), the administrator (muta saddi) of that place should execute the work.
“3. The bales of merchants should not be opened on the roads without informing them and obtaining their leave.
“4. In my dominions if anyone, whether unbeliever or Musal man, should die, his property and effects should be left for his heirs, and no one should interfere with them. If he should have no heir, they should appoint inspectors and separate guardians to guard the property, so that its value might be expended in lawful expenditure, such as the building of mosques and sard’is, the repair of broken bridges, and the digging of tanks and wells.
“5. They should not make wine or rice-spirit (darbahra) or any kind of intoxicating drug, or sell them; although I myself drink wine, and from the age of 18 years up till now, when I am 38, have persisted in it. When I first took a liking to drinking I sometimes took as many as twenty cups of double-distilled spirit; when by de¬ grees it acquired a great influence over me I endeavoured to lessen the quantity, and in the period of seven years I have brought my¬ self from fifteen cups to five or six. My times for drinking were varied; sometimes when three or four sidereal hours of the day re¬ mained I would begin to drink, and sometimes at night and partly by day. This went on till I was 30 years old. After that I took to drinking always at night. Now I drink only to digest my food.
“6. They should not take possession of any person’s house.
“7. I forbade cutting off the nose or ears of any person, and I myself made a vow by the throne of God that I would not ble¬ mish anyone by this punishment.
“8. I gave an order that the officials of the Crown lands and the jagirddrs should not forcibly take the ryots’ lands and cultivate them on their own account.
“9. A government collector or a jagirdar should not without permission intermarry with the people of the pargcffld in which he might be.
“10. They should found hospitals in the great cities, and ap¬ point physicians for the healing of the sick; whatever the expendi¬ ture might be, it should be given from the Khdlisa establishment.
“11. In accordance with the regulations of my revered father, I ordered that each year from the 18th of Rabtfu-l-awwal which is my birthday, for a number of days corresponding to the years of my life, they should not slaughter animals (for food). Two days in each week were also forbidden, one of them Thursday, the day of my accession, and the other Sunday, the day of my father’s birth. (He held this day in great esteem on this account, and because it was dedicated to the sun and also because it was the day on which Creation began. Therefore it was one of the days on which there was no killing in his dominions).
“12. I gave a general order that the offices and jagits of my father’s servants should remain as they were. Later, the mansabs (ranks or offices) were increased according to each one’s circum¬ stances by not less than 20 per cent, to 300 or 400 per cent. The subsistence money of the ahadls was increased by 50 per cent., and I raised the pay of all domestics by 20 per cent. I increased the allowances of all the veiled ladies of my father’s harem from 20 per cent, to 100 per cent, according to their condition and relation¬ ship. By one stroke of the pen I confirmed the subsistence lands of the holders of aimas (charity lands) within the dominions, who form the army of prayer, according to the deeds in their posses¬ sion. I gave an order to Mlran Sadr Jahan, who is one of the genuine Sayyids of India, and who for a long time held the high office of Sadr (ecclesiastical officer) under my father, that he should every day produce before me deserving people (worthy of charity). I released all criminals who had been confined and im¬ prisoned for a long time in the forts and prisons.”4
A careful analysis of these ordinances shows Jahangir’s genuine desire to ensure to his subjects freedom of person and security of life and property, and his solicitude for their material and moral welfare. The fact that these regulations did not in effect serve the purpose they were intended for, at least to the degree desired by Jahangir, does not detract from his honest and sincere desire to promote the happiness and prosperity of his subjects without dis¬ tinction of class or creed. The regulations are “remarkable for the humanity, justice and political sagacity which pervades them.”
The reign which opened with such promise was marred by the rebellion of Jahangir’s son, Khusrav. The attempt to place Khus rav on the throne failed; father and son were reconciled and Jahan¬ gir, either from policy or large-heartedness, restored his son to his former favour. Khusrav, whom Jerry describes as a “gentleman of a very lovely presence and fine courage” and of great personal charm and well-educated, was immature and inexperienced. The affection bestowed upon him by his father and grandfather and the people of the court and the camp had made him wilful and restive. The fact that he had nearly succeeded in displacing his father had roused his ambition and filled him with a grievance. Jahangir did all that was possible to set Khusrav’s mind at rest, but at the same time maintained a careful watch over his movements. Khusrav petulant and peevish, constantly brooding over the loss of a position for which he had neither the claim nor the talents, and encouraged by his companions who kept his resentment alive for their personal ends, escaped from Agra on 6 April, 1606. He made his way to the Punjab, raising troops on the way. The anxiety of Jahangir, when he heard of this, was genuine. “My distress arose”, he says, “from the thought that my son without any cause or reason had be¬ come my enemy, and that if I did not exert myself to capture him, dissatisfied and turbulent men would support him, or he would of his own accord go off to the Uzbeks or Kizilbashes (Persians) and thus dishonour would fall upon my throne.”43
Jahangir followed Khusrav in person. Khusrav had neither the capacity to organise a successful revolt nor moral and material sup¬ port of any influential party in the State. The people seem to have liked and loved him as a prince but had no desire to have him as their ruler.
When the prince reached Lahore, the governor closed the gates against him and resisted all the attempts of the rabble Khusrav had collected. Hearing that imperial reinforcements were coming, Khusrav raised the siege and tried to cross the Chenab. His army, ill led, ill equipped and ill organized, was defeated at Bhairowal. The prince tried to make a dash for Kabul, but the whole country was up against him. He was captured and conducted to Lahore, where he was presented before Jahangir in fetters.
Khusrav, trembling and weeping, wanted to fall on the feet of Jahangir, who sternly ordered him to stand in his place, and put him in confinement. He further directed a double row of stakes to be set up from the garden to the city and several hundred of the rebels were impaled thereon. Two leading rebels were punished more severely. Hasan Beg was sewn up in the fresh hide of an ox and ‘Abdur-Rahim in that of an ass. Others were let off with lighter punishments.
Arjun, the fifth Guru of the Sikhs, an innocent helper of Khusrav, was unwittingly drawn into the whirlpool of this palace intrigue. Khusrav on his way to Lahore had stayed at Taran Taran and was well received by the Guru who felt compassion for him and gave him Rs. 5,000. The Guru was at first fined by the Government, but as he refused to pay the fine, he was sentenced to death. The death of the Guru sowed the seeds of hatred be¬ tween the Sikhs and the Muslims which the passage of time did not diminish. The execution of the Guru was not an act of religious persecution, but it was politically unwise and the Mughuls paid a heavy penalty for it.5
Prince Khusrav was later ordered to be blinded, after an in¬ surrection was attempted in his favour. But Jahangir afterwards relented and, under the treatment of a Persian physician, Khusrav regained the sight of one eye.
Akbar had succeeded during his lifetime in coercing or cajol¬ ing the proud Rajput rulers into acknowledging the supremacy of the Mughuls. Rajput soldiers and statesmen had distinguished themselves by their reckless and romantic courage on many battle¬ fields, and by their wisdom and knowledge of the country and its people in the council-chamber. But the Rajput State of Mewar held aloof and continued to wage an unequal fight against superior Mughul organization and resources. The failure of Mughul mili¬ tary operations against Mewar towards the end of Akbar’s reign was in a large measure due to the half-hearted way in which Jahangir as Prince Salim had conducted the operations; his rebellion later called a halt to any further advance.
The first military expedition undertaken by Jahangir was against Rana Amar Singh of Mewar. An army of 20,000 horse was despatched under the command of Prince Parviz and Asaf Khan (Ja‘far Beg). A battle was fought at Dewar but its issue was doubtful as both sides claimed victory. The rebellion of Khusrav, which occurred during the course of this war, necessitated the with¬ drawal of the army.
A second expedition was sent in 1608 under the command of Mahabat Khan, but in spite of some initial success the Mughuls made no effective headway against the Rajputs. In 1609 Mahabat Khan was replaced by ‘Abdullah Khan, “a valiant soldier, a rash commander and a cruel and rebellious sort of man.” The war dragged on till ‘Abdullah Khan was sent as governor of Gujarat and the command given to Raja Basu. Jahangir was thoroughly dis¬ satisfied with the halting way in which the operations were being conducted and appointed Khan A‘zam ‘Aziz Kuka and Prince Khur ram to the command of the forces operating against Mewar. As was inevitable, Khurram and ‘Aziz Kuka quarrelled and the latter had to be recalled. The command then devolved on Prince Khurram who now carried on the operations in right earnest. Bit by bit, the country was devastated and the Rana’s supplies were cut off, while the net closed round him. The spirit of Rana Amar Singh was broken and he submitted in desperate straits. Jahangir ac¬ cepted the submission, graciously received Rana Amar Singh’s son, and restored Mewar, including Chitor, to the Rana but on the ex¬ press condition that Chitor was neither to be repaired nor re-forti fied. Jahangir was rightly very jubilant over the successful con¬ clusion of the long campaign which had taxed the resources of the empire to the utmost. His treatment of the fallen foe was both magnanimous and wise. Now that the hereditary enemy of the Mughul family had rendered submission, Jahangir could afford to be generous. He complacently closes his account of the campaign with the following remarks: “My lofty mind was always desirous, as far as possible, not to destroy the old families.”
Akbar had to put an end to his personal conduct of the Deccan campaign after the siege of Aslrgarh in 1601 on account of Salim’s rebellion. After Akbar’s return the campaigns were carried on in¬ differently and further advance and consolidation were rendered impossible by the senseless factiousness of Mughul officers. When Jahangir turned to the Deccan after his armies had been relieved from the Mewar campaign, he found himself faced with the famous Malik ‘Ambar, one of the ablest soldiers, administrators and states¬ men the Deccan has produced.
Malik ‘Ambar was an Abyssinian by birth. He had served for a long time under the Nizam Shahl rulers and by sheer ability and force of character had risen to the highest position in the kingdom. After the fall of Ahmadnagar he retired to Khirki with a scion of the reigning family, Murtaza Nizam Shah. His loyalty to the Nizam Shahl dynasty was equalled by his intense dislike of the Mughuls, and he devoted his energy to the difficult task of rebuild¬ ing the shattered administration of the Nizam Shah! kingdom. He raised a strong and well-disciplined army and organized the reve¬ nue system on the model of Raja Todar Mai’s settlement in the north. He was the first Deccan statesman to conceive the possibility of raising a people’s army out of the Maratha peasantry and to the “traditional mode of warfare (of the Mughuls) he opened a new system of tactics which was remarkably successful during his life¬ time.”
Malik ‘Ambar started by recovering some of the territories lost to the Mughuls in the time of Akbar. In 1608 Jahangir sent the Khan Khanan to the Deccan. The Khan having failed to compose the differences amongst the Mughul officers, Prince Parvlz was ap¬ pointed governor of Khandesh and Berar (1609). He had neither the talent nor the energy and inclination for strenuous military pursuits. Thomas Roe, who visited him there, has left a graphic account of the pomp and ceremony of the court of Parvlz. The Prince delighted in show but was slow in action. The campaign, which now assumed a defensive character, dragged on without much success from 1609 to 1615. The Khan Khanan, Khan Jahan Lodi, Khan Zaman, Man Singh and ‘Abdullah Khan were tried in turn. They failed and frittered away their energies in senseless recrimi¬ nation against each other to the advantage of the enemy. The Khan Khanan was again put in charge of the operations in 1612, and won some successes, but he was ultimately relieved of his command by Prince Khurram whose military fame, owing to the brilliant con¬ clusion of the Mewar expedition, was then at its height.
Prince Khurram reached Burhanpur in 1617 and Jahangir moved to Mandu at the same time. The presence of the Mughul prince in the Deccan with a superbly equipped army filled the Dec canis with dismay. The long and disastrous war had sapped the material resources of the Nizam Shah! kingdom, and when Khurram proposed peace on the payment of tribute and the restoration of the lost territory, the offer was readily accepted by ‘Ambar as well as the Bijapur ruler. The territory of Balaghat was ceded to the Mu ghuls and the keys of the forts of Ahmadnagar and other strong¬ holds were delivered. Khurram appointed his own officers to the recovered territory and retired to Mandu amidst great rejoicings and festivities. But all that Khurram had succeeded in doing was to patch up a peace with the recalcitrant forces of the Deccan king¬ doms. “Nothing could”, writes Beni Prasad, “conceal the stern rea¬ lity that the expenditure of millions of rupees and thousands of lives had not advanced the Mughal frontier a single mile beyond the limits of 1605.”5a
How temporary the peace was became evident when by 1620 the astute Malik ‘Ambar won back all that he had lost by the pre¬ vious treaty. In 1621, the relations between Bijapur and Ahmad¬ nagar became strained and both kingdoms sought the Mughul al¬ liance. The Mughuls closed in with the offer of Bijapur, and Malik ‘Ambar proceeded to harass the territories of that State. His death in 1626 at the age of eighty (lunar year) sealed the fate of Ahmad¬ nagar and opened up the Deccan to Mughul designs. Mu‘tamid Khan, otherwise very hostile to Malik ‘Ambar, has testified to his great qualities in the following oft-quoted words: “This ‘Ambar was a slave, but an able man. In warfare, in command, in sound judgement, and in administration he had no rival or equal. He well understood the predatory (Kazzdki) warfare, which in the language of the Dakhin is called bargi-giri. He kept down the turbulent spirits of that country, and maintained his exalted position to the end of his life, and closed his career in honour. History records no other instance of an Abyssinian slave arriving at such eminence.”6
One of the important military achievements of the Mughul armies under Jahangir was the capture of Kangra. The fort of Kangra, perched on the crest of a lofty hill, had long defied all earlier attempts against it. Tradition declares that it had been attacked no less than fifty-four times.
In 1615, Murtaza Khan and Suraj Mai were commissioned to capture the fort. Suraj Mai was accused of hampering the opera¬ tions and recalled. On the death of Murtaza Khan, Suraj Mai was again placed in command, but this time he broke into open revolt, allied himself with the hill chiefs, and plundered the imperial ter¬ ritory. Raja Bikramajit was next sent into the valley and he suc¬ ceeded in recovering the lost imperial prestige. The Raja of Chamba, who had helped Suraj Mai, submitted and Suraj Mai’s property was confiscated and given over to Jagat Singh. The siege of Kangra now began in right earnest, and, after a stout resistance of fourteen months, the garrison surrendered on 16 November, 1620. Jahangir visited the fort a year later with some Muslim divines, and to celebrate the occasion a mosque was built in the fortress.63
In 1611 Raja Kalyan, son of Raja Todar Mai, subdued Kharda in Orissa. The Raja submitted but rebelled in 1617, and his ter¬ ritory was finally annexed to the empire. In 1615, Khokhar was captured with its valuable diamond mines. In 1617, the Jam of Navanagar and Bahara, two Cutch chiefs, were subdued, and three years later Kishtwar, to the south of Kashmir, submitted to the Mughuls.
The Afghans had not been fully reconciled to the loss of their political power in India at the hands of the Mughuls. Though a rising of the Afghans on an all-India scale was out of the question, ambitious Afghan officers were constantly chafing against the Mu¬ ghul yoke. In 1599, ‘Usmain Khan had rebelled In Bengal, and though Man Singh put down the rising, the Afghans continued to give trouble in the earlier years of Jahangir’s reign. Frequent changes of provincial governors, the distance of Bengal from the capital, and the fact that Jahangir’s attention was diverted to more serious and larger issues nearer home were responsible for the easy and indifferent manner in which the Afghan rebels were treated. But on 1 April, 1612, Jahangir was informed of the victory against the Afghans and the death of the leader ‘Usman, “the last of the brave Afghans.”
Bengal, one of the most difficult provinces of India to conquer and consolidate, had taxed to the utmost the military power of Ak bar because of its distance from Delhi and the power of the irrecon cilable Afghan nobility, who, on being uprooted from the Gangetic plain, had found refuge there. In order to consolidate the newly conquered province Akbar had entered into a friendly alliance with Nara Narayan, the ruler of Cooch Behar, on the north-east of Bengal, in 1579. The domestic troubles of Cooch Behar led to its division into two States and weakened it considerably. Also the original friendly alliance soon became an instrument of imperial expansion in that region, and by 1596, Cooch Behar had become politically subject to the Mughuls. With the appointment of ‘Ala-ud-din Is¬ lam Khan as the governor of Bengal, a change came over the attitude of the Mughuls towards their erstwhile ally, the ruler of Cooch Behar, who was reduced to the position of a tributary vassal in 1609.
Lakshml Narayan of Cooch Behar* having lost his independence, turned to avenge his humiliation by inciting the Mughul governor against his turbulent cousin, King Parikshit of Kamrup. The Mu¬ ghul governor was not slow in taking advantage of his invitation and in 1613, after a nine months’ campaign, he succeeded in con¬ quering Kamrfup. Direct contact of the Mughuls with the Ahom kings of Assam began after the fall of the kingdom of Kamrup. Im¬ perialistic designs, border disputes and the desire of the Mughuls for active trade relations with Assam, which the latter did not encourage, ultimately led to the invasion of Assam.
At the end of the rainy season of 1615, a large Mughul force was sent under Sayyid Abu Bakr. The army moved to Kohata, the frontier town on the Bar Nadi, and halted there for reinforce¬ ments. The struggle opened with an attack on Kajali, the Ahom frontier post on the south-west, and the defeat of the Assamese. The Mughuls moved up to Saurdhara but, in spite of initial victo¬ ries, they could not retain the initiative. The Mughul army met with a serious defeat and the campaign closed ignominiously. The Ahom king retaliated by creating trouble in Kamrup and made the consolidation of the rule of the Mughuls difficult by inciting the local chiefs against them.
One of the most fascinating figures of Mughul India, around whom fact and fiction have woven a web of romance, was the famous Nur Jahan, whom Jahangir married in 1611 and who survived him by eighteen years. Mirza Ghiyas Beg, the father of Nur Jahan, be¬ longed to a noble family of Tehran, and his father had served as governor of Yazd under Shah Tahmasp. The family fell on evil days after the death of Ghiyas’s father, and Ghiyas Beg migrated to India in search of employment and fortune. On his way to India, near Qandahar, under very distressing circumstances, his daughter,
.Mihr-un-nisa, was born in 1577. Mlrza Ghiyas travelled to India and was presented by Malik Mas‘ud to Akbar at Fathpur Slkrl. Being a talented and experienced man, he soon rose in the estimation of the Emperor and was appointed dlwdn or superintendent of the house¬ hold. ‘‘He was considered’", says Mu‘tamid Khan, “exceedingly clever and skilful, both in writing and in transacting business. He had studied the old poets and had a nice appreciation of the mean¬ ing of words; . . . his generosity and beneficence to the poor was such that no one ever turned from his door disappointed. In taking bribes, however, he was very bold and daring.”6b
At the age of eighteen Mihr-un-nisa was married to ‘All Quli Beg Istajlu, better known as Sher Afgan (the tiger thrower), who had first served under Shah Ismafil II and had then come to India and taken service under Akbar. In the reign of Jahangir, ‘All Quli Beg received a suitable mansab, was styled Sher Afgan and given a jagir in Bengal. It was reported to Jahangir that Sher Afgan was insubordinate and disposed to rebellion. Qutb-ud-dln, who was sent to Bengal as governor in 1606, confirmed the reports of Sher Afgan’s disloyal intentions and was instructed to send him to the court. But Sher Afgan slew Qutb-ud-dln during an interview and was killed by the followers of Qutb-ud-dln. Mihr-un-nisa was sent to the capital and entrusted to the care of Jahangir’s mother. Ja¬ hangir has been accused of complicity in the murder of Sher Afgan, but there is no evidence in contemporary records to substantiate the charge. “A careful perusal of contemporary chronicles”, writes Dr. Ishwari Prasad, “leaves upon our minds the impression that the circumstances of Sher Afgan’s death are of a highly suspicious na¬ ture, although there is no conclusive evidence to prove that the emperor was guilty of the crime.”7 Four years after the death of her former husband, Mihr-un-nisa was married to Jahangir. She received the title of Nur Mahall and later on of Nur Jahan, by which title she is most popularly known. The young widow, whose charm of personality was indescribable, and who had profound attachment to Jahangir, soon gained ascendancy at the court. Her success raised her ambitions, and as her husband’s mental and physical powers declined, her influence and her active participation in State affairs increased. Mu‘tamid Khan’s plain account is both authentic and reliable: “All her relations and connexions were raised to honour and wealth. No grant of land was conferred upon any woman except under her seal. In addition to giving her the titles that other kings bestow, the Emperor granted Nur Jahan the rights of sovereignty and government. Sometimes she would sit in the bal¬ cony of her palace, while the nobles would present themselves, and listen to her dictates. Coin was struck in her name, with this super¬ scription: ‘By order of the King Jahangir, gold has a hundred splen¬ dours added to it by receiving the impression of the name of Nur Jahan, the Queen Begam.’ On all farmans also receiving the Im¬ perial signature, the name of ‘Nur Jahan, the Queen Begam’, was jointly attached. At last, her authority reached such a pass that the king was such only in name. Repeatedly he gave out that he had bestowed the sovereignty on Nur Jahan Begam and would say, “I require nothing beyond a sir of wine and half a sir of meat.” It is impossible to describe the beauty and wisdom of the Queen. In any matter that was presented to her, if a difficulty arose, she im¬ mediately solved it. Whoever threw himself upon her protection was preserved from tyranny and oppression; and if ever she leaiffit that any orphan girl was destitute and friendless, she would bring about her marriage, and give her a wedding portion. It is probable that during her reign no less than 500 orphan girls were thus mar¬ ried and portioned.”8
One immediate effect of Nur Jahan’s influence was the rapid promotion her brother (Asaf Khan) and father (Ftimiad-ud-daula) re¬ ceived. But both of them amply deserved the confidence which the emperor reposed in them by reason of their outstanding personal abilities. Even without Nur Jahan to help them, they would have pushed their way up. But Nur Jahan accelerated their promotion and the Mughuls gained greatly by the ability and the devotion of these two highly gifted and talented officers. In 1612, Arjumand Banu Begam, better known as Mumtaz Mahall, daughter of Asaf Khan, was married to Prince Khurram. “This marriage”, says Beni Prasad, “symbolised the alliance of Nur Jahan, Ftimad-ud-daula, and Asaf Khan with the heir-apparent. For the next ten years this clique of four supremely capable persons practically ruled the em¬ pire. What has been called Nur Jahan’s sway was really the sway of these four personages.”
Nur Jahan’s political career may be divided into two periods. From 1611 to 1622, she exercised on the whole a sobering and bene¬ ficent influence in politics. Her parents, who had seen the vicis¬ situdes of life, had a restraining influence on her. During this period, she worked in close collaboration with Prince Khurram whose cause she furthered. In 1620, Ladli Begam, Nur Jahan’s daughter by her former husband, was betrothed to prince Shahryar. This introduced an unbalancing factor in her relationship with Khurram. The latter had won a position for himself in the court and the camp; he no longer stood in need of the support of Nur Jahan, and in fact resented her interference. From 1622 Prince Khurram and Nur Jahan drifted apart. Jahangir fell more and more under the exclusive influence of Nur Jahan and the older nobility fretted and fumed at the power and influence of her family. Mahabat Khan had the courage to re¬ present to the emperor: “Has His Majesty read in any of the his¬ tories of ancient sovereigns that there was a king so subject to the will of his wife?” “But the influence of Nur Jahan,” the author of Intekhab-i-Jahangir Shah, regretfully declares, “had wrought so much upon his mind that if 200 men like Mahabat Khan had ad¬ vised him simultaneously to the same effect, their words would have made no permanent impression upon him.” Mahabat Khan favoured the cause of Prince Khurram who was feared as a rival by Nur Jahan and Prince Khusrav alike. Prince Khurram succeeded in getting the custody of this ill-fated prince, took him to the Deccan, and in January, 1622, Jahangir was informed from Burhanpur that Khusrav had died of colic. According to De Laet, Khusrav was murdered in his bedroom by one Raza, at the instance of Prince Khurram. Khusrav was hurriedly buried in Burhanpur, but later his mortal remains were transferred to Allahabad, and buried in a garden which came to be known as Khusrav-bagh.
Jahangir’s health was rapidly deteriorating and Nur Jahan and Khurram both looked about for allies. Khurram refused to be di¬ verted to the Qandahar campaign; he wished to be near the scene of action in case of his father’s death. He seized some of the jagirs of Nur Jahan and Prince Shahryar and, when his father reprimanded him and warned him of the consequences of his impudence, he turned a deaf ear. “He persisted in his perverse course”, Jahangir writes, “and, preferring the way of disobedience to the path of duty, took a decided step on the road to perdition by marching upon Agra.” Khurram hoped to capture Agra before it could be put in a state of preparation, but in this he did not succeed. He reached Fathpur and plundered the country. The rebels marched towards Delhi but were defeated near Balochpur in 1623. The Prince re¬ tired to Malwa and thence to the Deccan.
Failing to get help from Malik ‘Ambar, Khurram occupied Bi¬ har and captured Rohtas. But at Allahabad he found the imperial officers alert and went back to the Deccan. Finally, despairing of success, he wrote to his father begging forgiveness for his conduct. Jahangir accepted Khurram’s submission on condition of his sur¬ rendering the forts of Rohtas and Aslr and giving his two sons, Dara and Aurangzlb, as hostages. Khurram complied and proceed¬ ed to Nasik. The rebellion of Khurram had seriously affected the prestige of the empire, hampered the military operations for the recovery of Qandahar and wasted the resources of the State in men and money.
The humiliation of Khurram gave secret joy to Nur Jahan, but the prominent part played by Mahabat Khan in liquidating Khur ram’s rebellion and Mahabat’s alliance with Prince Parvlz was not to her liking. With the object of separating them, Mahabat Khan was ordered either to proceed to Bengal or to repair to the court. Various charges were brought against him. He was said to have realized large sums of money due to the State and also from the jagirs; he had not sent to the court the elephants obtained in Ben¬ gal; and, finally, he was guilty of contumacy in betrothing his daughter to the son of Khvaja Umar Naqshbandi, without the pre¬ vious permission of the emperor, who visited his wrath on the young man by openly disgracing him and seizing all that Mahabat Khan had given him.
Mahabat Khan obeyed the royal summons and came north from the Deccan with 4000 brave Rajputs personally attached to him. Jahangir was then on his way to Kabul and was encamped on the banks of the Jhelum. Asaf Khan, who was with the emperor, cros¬ sed over to the other side with the troops, women and children, but before the emperor could go across, Mahabat Khan captured the bridge and stationed 2000 of his Rajputs there, while he him¬ self proceeded to the royal camp and placed the emperor practi¬ cally under arrest. When Nur Jahan heard of it, she collected her officers, bitterly reproached her brother and attempted to cross the river. The attempt failed though Nur Jahan later succeeded in joining her husband in captivity. Asaf Khan fled and shut himself in the fort of Attock and later on submitted to Mahabat. Nur Jahan was now left entirely to her own resources, but she did not lose her nerves and continued “to work against Mahabat both in private and in public.” Mahabat Khan throughout behaved with courtesy to¬ wards the emperor. He had no backing except of his Rajputs and there was no prince of the royal blood in his hands at the time to serve as a trump card. Jahangir on the return journey from Kabul succeeded in going over to Rohtas and Mahabat Khan, whose tem¬ porary chagrin had forced him into the disloyal course, submitted.9 He was ordered to release Asaf Khan and to proceed against Prince Khurram, who had retired into Sindh and was again on the war path. Mahabat went and joined the Prince who later left for Nasik. Jahangir’s health was now completely shattered and while return¬ ing to Lahore he died on 7 November, 1627.
National and personal considerations had induced Akbar to cultivate relations of friendship with the Portuguese. But he does not appear to have gained much advantage from the courtesy shown to the Jesuit Fathers or the concessions granted to the Portu¬ guese. At one time Akbar wrote to 'Abdullah Khan Uzbeg that he intended to drive the Portuguese into the sea. After the capture of Aslrgarh, Akbar’s enthusiasm for them appears to have cooled but relations were not estranged. Jahangir desired to maintain friendly relations with them and he sent an embassy to Goa in 1607, and another in 1610. He was, however, thoroughly annoyed with the Portuguese when in 1613 they seized four imperial vessels near Surat. Failing to get satisfaction, Muqarrab Khan, the go¬ vernor of Surat was ordered to chastise the Portuguese. The Mughul commander wisely and skilfully managed to come to terms with Downton, the English sea-captain, so as to remedy his own naval impotence—the weakest point in the Mughul armour. This enabled the Mughul commander to inflict a naval defeat on the Portuguese. The privileges granted to the Portuguese were withdrawn, the churches at Agra and Lahore were forcibly closed and the Portu¬ guese living in the empire were arrested, wherever they could be found. The Jesuits, however, succeeded in restoring harmony in 1615.
Jahangir came into contact with the Jesuits during the lifetime of his father. He always treated the Jesuit Fathers with great cour¬ tesy and consideration and they held high hopes of his conversion to Christianity. But Jahangir was too good a Muslim and too proud a Mughul to accept baptism. It has been alleged that Jahangir’s conciliatory attitude was due to the hopes of Portuguese assistance in case his peaceful succession to the throne was contested. That he sided with the Fathers in their debates with the Muslim divines was due to the delight it gave him to see the mullahs, always rigid and self-opinionated, worsted in polemical disputes. The venera¬ tion he showed to the pictures of Jesus and Mary was due to his personal passion for works of art and to the average Muslim’s res¬ pect for Christ. He followed the policy of his father in contributing large sums for the erection of churches and showing general tole¬ ration for the Christian faith. At Agra about twenty baptisms took place in 1616, and he permitted the baptism of the sons of his bro¬ ther, Prince Daniyal, who after four years abjured the Christian faith. Father Xavier died in 1617, and Pinheiro in 1618. They were succeeded by Father R. Corsi and Joseph de Castro. The Jesuit mission now assumed the character and functions of an embassy aiming at outplaying the English and furthering the interests of the Portuguese at the court. But the Portuguese power1 was al¬ ready on the decline. They had lost the opportunity of establishing their authority and influence in the east owing to their arrogant con tempt for oriental people, while their pride and religious intole¬ rance made them feared and despised.
Captain Hawkins arrived at Surat in August 1608, with a letter from James I, King of England, and a present of 25,000 gold pieces. In spite of the opposition of the Jesuit Fathers, Hawkins was well received by Jahangir. He could speak Turkish and Persian and was in a better position to win over the Mughul emperor. His mission, however, was a failure and he left in 1611. Paul Canning appeared at the court in 1612 and was followed in 1615 by William Edwards. Both of them met with the same difficulties which Hawkins had to face. The most important and the best known English plenipoten¬ tiary who came to Jahangir’s court was Sir Thomas Roe, “a gentle¬ man of good education, a polished courtier, and a trained diploma¬ tist.” Well-qualified for the task assigned to him, which was the negotiation of a treaty giving security to English trade, Roe remain¬ ed in India for three years but did not succeed in achieving his ob¬ ject. His account of his mission and that of his Chaplain, Terry, constitute a very important source of information about the man¬ ners of the court and of the social and political conditions of the time.
Babur brought to India “an unfulfilled ambition” for conquer¬ ing the ancestral lands of the Tlmurids, and this ambition, coupled with the exigencies of the external defence, found expression in the Mughul policy towards the Persian empire and the Central Asian Princes. The danger of Uzbeg expansion towards India impelled the Mughuls to co-operate with the Persian empire, and frustrated the attempts of the Ottoman Sultans to draw them into a religious alliance of Sunni powers against the Shiahs of Persia. The Mu¬ ghuls, further, were estranged from the Uzbegs on account of the latter’s traditional hostility to the House of Timur and their con¬ stant propaganda against the Mughuls among the tribesmen of the north-west.
The relations of the Persians and the Mughuls were usually friendly. There were, however, two grounds of conflict—Qandahar was coveted by both owing to its strategic and commercial import¬ ance, and the Shiah States of the Deccan, with whom the Mughuls were often at war, were on good terms with Persia.
Jahangir’s reign opened with an unsuccessful attempt by the Persians to occupy Qandahar. That the attack was not wholly unexpected is evident from Jahangir’s remark: “It occurred to me that the death of His Majesty Akbar and the unreasonable outbreak of Khusrav might put an edge on their design, and that they mightattack Qandahar.” A semblance of friendship was maintained after this incident, as the Shah alleged that he had no knowledge of the affair and sent his officers to apologise for the indiscretion of his frontier governors. In April, 1611, the Shah sent a formal em¬ bassy and a letter which closed with the prayer “that the tree of hereditary friendship and assiduousness and the garden of intimacy and regard may acquire great splendour and greenness.” Jahangir sent an embassy in return in 1613, and several more embassies were exchanged. It is very difficult to determine the nature of the Shah’s diplomacy. He was very much interested in preserving the independence of his allies in the Deccan and he looked with jealousy at the rapid extension and growing prosperity of the Mug hul empire. The Deccan rebellion of 1621 might have been con¬ nected with the Shah’s attack on Qandahar a few months later, but Dr. Beni Prasad thinks this unlikely. The Shah could only assist his Deccan allies by creating diversions on the north-west frontier and by occupying Qandahar. He had received ambassa¬ dors from Kish and Makran and hoped some day to extend the boundary of his empire to the right bank of the Indus. It is a significant fact that the Nizam Shahi envoy, Jaish Khlan, was with the Shah during the siege of Qandahar. Certain entries in Jahangir’s Memoirs leave no doubt that he was aware of these intrigues. Although Jahangir talks a great deal about strengthening the forti¬ fications of Qandahar, little could be done owing to the attitude of Prince Khurram, and Qandahar fell after a feeble resistance in 1622. It has been suggested by Dr. Beni Prasad that Prince Khurram was in secret intrigue with the Shah. Khurram knew that with the loss of Qandahar Jahangir would be busy in suppressing the wave of unrest in Afghanistan and amongst the frontier tribes, and that this would leave him a comparatively open field in the south. This, of course, may be a mere conjecture; it is supported only by the evi¬ dence of one letter which Prince Khurram sent to the Shiah to seek his assistance. The Shah, who was anxious to maintain good relations with the Mughuls after the Qandahar affair, openly declin¬ ed to help Khurram and advised him to make peace with his father.
Jahangir was too indolent to follow an ambitious foreign policy in Central Asia. He did not maintain the usual relations with the rulers of Mawarun Nahr (Trans-Oxonia) probably on account of his desire to be more closely allied to Persia.
In 1621, the mother of the king of Bukhara sent a letter to Nur Jahan who replied to it and sent some Indian rarities as pre¬ sents. Shortly afterwards, a formal embassy arrived. During these years relations with Persia had become strained and Jahangir could only look to the Uzbeg ruler for support, who in turn hoped to humble Persia with the help of the Mughuls. But Jahangir’s death made further progress of the alliance impossible.
Akbar’s religious policy caused considerable stir amongst Mus¬ lims of all shades of opinion. Some saw in his new religion an at¬ tempt to deprive the Muslims of the dominant position they en¬ joyed in Indian society, while others thought it was a potential threat to the integrity of their creed and the solidarity of their millat (reli¬ gious community). In particular, the orthodox scholars (ulema) and the pietists saw in it a great danger to their religion. The ulema, consequently, protested against Akbar’s regulations, the most important among them being Mulla Yazdi, a Shiah divine, and Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind, popularly known as the Mujaddid Alf-i Sani. At the time of Jahangir’s accession Shaikh Farid, otherwise known as Nawab Murtaza Khan, played a very important part in making him promise to uphold the shar’iyat. In a letter written by the Shaikh of Sirhind to Nawab Murtaza Khan, the Shaikh con¬ gratulated him on the death of one (Akbar) who was antagonistic to Islam and the accession to the throne of the emperor of Islam (Jahangir). In the same letter he exhorted the Musalmans to as¬ sist the new emperor and to help him in making the laws of the shar’iyat current in the country and in strengthening Islam. This help was to be rendered by all means available, by words and by actions. Similarly in another letter to the Khan-i-A‘zam, the Shaikh, in a pathetic manner, draws his attention to the evil and un Islamic practices introduced in Islam and expresses the fear that though at present the emperor is not hostile to Islam yet he may revert to the policy of his forefathers. It was in an atmosphere charged with such hopes and fears that Jahangir ascended the throne. In addition to the fear of internal disintegration, the infiltration of a large number of Shiahs had alarmed the pietists. During this period, therefore, not only was an attempt made by the orthodox to re-establish the laws of shar’iyat but also to fight the Shiah heresy.
Jahangir, in spite of the promises that he had made, remained tolerant in religious matters like his father. In his Memoirs he says that an “audacious speculator” suggested to him the reimpo¬ sition of the jizya. Jahangir repudiated this suggestion and punish¬ ed the speculator. In the subsidiary regulations issued some time after his accession, he ordered his officials not to enforce Islam on anyone. Like his father; he was fond of religious discourses, though he did not give as much time to them as Akbar had done. Roe and Terry testify to the fact that he accorded equal welcome to Christians, Jews and Muslims. Hindu festivals like RakhI, Dasahra etc. were celebrated as in old days. The tula dan (weighing of the emperor against gold) was also observed.
Certain cases are cited as evidence of Jahangir’s orthodoxy and fanaticism born of the fear and suspicion of the times. For exam¬ ple, it is asserted that Jahangir allowed daily allowances to new converts. When he learnt that in certain localities Muslim girls were converted to Hinduism and married to Hindus, he put a stop to it and punished the guilty. From this it is inferred that Jahangir attempted to stand forth as a protector of the true faith. In this he was only following an old custom, for Muslim law does not per¬ mit the marriage of Muslim girls to non-Muslims. The protection of the Muslim minority obviously was a source of strength and vita¬ lity to the Mughuls. That he declared the forcible conversion of Hindus to be illegal93 shows that he stood forth equally as their de¬ fender.
New temples and Christian churches were freely built during his time, though now and then, during a campaign, religious places suffered at the hands of zealous or fanatical soldiers, Hindu pil¬ grims freely visited their shrines. Coryat puts the number of per¬ sons visiting Hardwar at 4,00,000 while Roe puts it at 5,00,000. Jahangir' was particularly tolerant towards the Christians.
Jahangir’s attitude towards the Sikhs has been a matter of con¬ troversy. A careful perusal of contemporary evidence shows that the Sikh religious leaders suffered because they interfered with politics, which was a dangerous game and might have constituted a menace to the State unless suppressed in time. There is no evi¬ dence to show that he persecuted the Sikhs as such. The following remark of Dr. Beni Prasad deserves attention: “The melancholy transaction (punishment of Guru Arjun) has been represented by Sikh tradition as the first of the long series of religious persecutions which the Khalsa suffered from the Mughal emperors. In reality, it is nothing of the kind. Without minimizing the gravity of Jahan¬ gir’s mistake, it is only fair to recognize that the whole affair amounts to a single execution due primarily to political reasons. No other Sikhs were molested. No interdict was laid on the Sikh faith. Guru Arjun himself would have ended his days in peace if he had not espoused the cause of a rebel.”9b
It should be borne in mind that it was the explicit policy of Akbar to compose religious differences and Jahangir followed this policy consistently90 without interfering with the Muslim creed. His attitude towards the Sikhs was part of the same policy. He con fined Shaikh Ahmad of Sirhind in the Gwalior prison, first, because the Shaikh was accused of considering himself equal to the Pious Caliphs and, secondly, because he refused to perform the sijda (prostration) to the Emperor. Jahangir later on realized his mis¬ take and released the Shaikh and made amends for the punish¬ ment meted out to him. Similar treatment was meted out to Shaikh Ibrahim Baba. In both cases the punishments were due to the jealousy and the fear excited by these Muslim divines amongst the less important members of their profession and the in¬ fluence which they wielded on their devoted Afghan and other Muslim disciples. Dr. Beni Prasad is wrong in asserting that Ahmad Sirhindi repented or promised loyalty.10 It was Jahangir who realized his mistake.