Diplomacy, Dominance and Deference: The Foreign Relations of the Mughals with other Islamic Powers in Asia

“The agony of International Relations is the need to practice politics without the basic conditions for political order”

-Bernard Crick[1]

INTRODUCTION

The metaphor of the multi-cultural environment one finds oneself in at an airport, would be appropriate to explain the magnitude of the surprise one should experience; but due to the habituation of our interaction with those of another country or of another race, one rarely does. The peaceful and cohesive mix of ethnicities, races and peoples in the waiting room of an airport, would otherwise be an unlikely congregation a mere 1000 years into the past, when encounters with strangers were rare, dangerous and likely to turn violent.[2] Yet, the crowd maintains itself, merely because the crowd knows that none of the other strangers wish to attack them and that each stranger did not have to compete with the other in a harsh, brutish environment governed by the rules of “might is right” and “winner takes all”, and that resources could be procured in a manner that was agreeable to all and sanctioned by law.[3]  So where in history did this understanding among people of different backgrounds come about? Was it tacit and sporadic in its origin in the different parts of the globe, or was it something explicit and universally agreed upon?

The majority of our 2.5 million-year-old existence constitutes of our hunting-gathering past, characterized by our constant movement fueled by a paucity of food, seasonal changes and omnipresence of predators, which led to the prospect of meeting the “other”.[4] Land or resources were not possessed solely by one individual or their clan and possession of every natural asset was settled by means of brutish conflicts. It was only when humankind embarked upon agriculture 10,000 years into our past that the understanding of resources belonging to us and the other came into being, giving rise to the idea of private property and attachment to that piece of land, leading to an immobility of humankind.[5] [6] Due to geographical constraints and those related to the geo-politics in the vicinity, resources that could have otherwise been procured by a wandering hunter-gatherer now seemed beyond reach by virtue of them being present in another’s property or in regions unknown.[7] Humankind, due to the insufficiency and inefficiency of an agrarian lifestyle, embarked upon an age of territorial expansion where the boundaries of nations as we know them today, were blurred and made redundant, by virtue of the constant need to conquer new territories and acquire new resources.[8] It is here that the “political animal” in man, gained precedence over the “social animal”, and reaching out to the “other”, now became a matter of force or that of friendship.

Amicability and the respect for the other’s sovereignty was constantly weighed against territoriality and expansion. However, upon reaching a comfortable level of sustenance, there was a resurgence of friendlier alliances amongst peoples of different cultures. The very existence of a culture or a dynasty’s coins, objects and records in a space geographically removed from what has been described to be the extent of their frontiers, adds testimony to diplomatic endeavours and alliances assuming an international nature and humankind eventually interesting themselves in reaching out to those different from them for purposes that were not antagonistic. Sovereignty and statehood, not being concepts unfamiliar in history even before the Renaissance, did not necessarily mean anachronism and lawlessness in the absence of an apparent universal recognition of one’s boundaries, people and regime.[9] It is thereby the broader definitions of thinkers such as Mathiesen and Wright that enable us to appreciate the role of what one today designates as “international relations” by acknowledging human contact in an age of “uncertain sovereignties.”[10] Mathiesen aptly states that - International Relations embrace all kinds of relations traversing state boundaries, no matter whether they are of economic, legal, political or any other character and includes all human behavior originating on one side of the state boundary and affecting human behavior on the other side.[11]

With regards to the aforementioned definition, this paper, by focusing on Mughal Medieval India (the timespan for which is broadly stated as 1526 C.E - 1707 C.E.), shall attempt to present the history of foreign relations in a new light. While Europe, during its medieval age was a miserable backwater, riddled with ignorance and disease, India represented the opposite and embodied the very values the Europeans came to rediscover and appreciate during the Renaissance.[12] The paper shall furthermore and more importantly address the nature of Mughal international relations and diplomatic measures and address the questions of their origins, their evolution, their effects and the key players involved. The paper shall acknowledge the changing priorities of the empire, but shall consistently prove how the Mughal zeal for expansion and economics was always secondary to the Mughal desire to ally and establish peace. Mughal peacemaking efforts and attempts to maintain the international status-quo shall be focused on and the avant-garde nature of their efforts, whether as a matter of necessity or that of the monarch’s personal disposition, shall be focused on. What came to be defined as “international” in the Mughal scenario and the subjugation of trade as a secondary priority shall be brought to the forefront, along with its reasons. The relationship of the Mughals with the Sāfavids, the Uzbeks and the Turks shall be analyzed in the historical context of India’s ties to the Islamic world of Central and West Asia. That being said, following is our hypothesis for this paper:

The Mughals actively prioritized political alliances to preserve their sovereignty, over economic ties to promote trade, with respect to their ties with Central and West Asian Islamic powers.

OBJECTIVE

The objective of writing this paper is to understand how the tacit understanding of the extent of one’s empire and the defining of one’s boundaries came about between the Mughals and the other West or Central Asian Islāmic powers. This shall ultimately be linked with our understanding of the Islāmicisation of the administration and how a co-operative rather than competitive relation was not only sought after, but also gained success in its establishment. It is also our objective to understand the changing nature of Mughal relations and the motives behind their actions, in the context of their relative military strength, soft power, political stability and state structure.

METHODOLOGY

In order to conduct the required research for this paper, the libraries of St. Xavier’s College, along with that of the Heras Institute shall be consulted extensively in order to obtain material for analysis and presentation. Online repositories of academic journals and papers such as Sage, Jstor, Academia, EPW and the IJHSS, to name a few, shall be consulted. Both the writers of this paper shall debate, discuss and deliberate over the subject matter of each aspect of this paper and only the information agreed upon as a result of the amalgamation of ideas shall be entered. Each section of the paper represents a joint effort by both the writers. The citations used in this paper shall be those of the Modern Language Association’s 7^th edition.

OBSERVATIONS

Since the 7^th Century C.E., Islām has been the driving force for state structures in West and Central Asia. In this context, the Mughals, as well as other Islamic powers in Asia, that existed at the time, did not exist in separate vacuums with isolated pasts, but rather in a web of inter-state and inter-imperial dealings, surrounded by rituals, conventions and elaborate forms of cultural exchange. The various Islāmic powers of Central Asia strived to gain a stronghold in the area, which witnessed a lot of conflicts fueled by various racial and cultural reasons. Each dynasty claimed itself to be the rightful overlord of the region, by tracing its ancestry to previous Islamic powers. The Sāfavids considered themselves to be the true successors of Prophet Muhammad and therefore considered themselves superior to other Islāmic dynasties; the Ottomans were the true successors of the Caliphate of Baghdād; while the Mughals traced their lineage to the powerful Mongol rulers and Timūr. 

UZBEKS
The Uzbeks were a clan of Sunni Muslims that hailed from Central Asia and occupied the northern regions of Persia and Afghanistan, primarily the Trans-Oxania valley where the river Oxus flowed. The empire’s frontiers touched Turkey in the West, Persia in South-west, and regions occupied by the Mughals in the East. The strategic significance of this area was primarily in terms of geo-politics and this fueled their initial conflict with Mughals. The first instances of Mughal-Uzbek interactions can be traced back to as early as the 16th century C.E. The Uzbeks have been credited for driving Bābur out of Central Asia, who after having lost Samarkand to Muhammad Shaybani Khān in 1501 C.E., occupied the North-Western regions of the Indian subcontinent and eventually established the Mughal Empire in India.

Trade routes of Medieval Asia[14]

The Uzbeks were the most immediate and proximal antagonists of the Mughal Empire. Initially, the territories of the Mughals and the Uzbeks shared soft borders, which existed as a set of loosely administered areas between the two powers that often led to minor and insignificant skirmishes. The boundaries between the Uzbeks and the Mughals came to be formalized with the extermination of the Yūsufzai Afghān tribes and the treaty between Abdullāh and Akbar in 1586 C.E. The Persian Empire had grown weak due to Ottoman invasions, rebellious nobles and incompetent rulers. This led Akbar to maintain a more conciliatory attitude towards the Uzbeks. The Treaty of 1586 C.E. had the following clauses:

1.      The Mughal ruler was to not take any interest in Badakśān and Balkh.

2.      The Uzbek ruler was to not interfere in Kābul and Kandāhār.

3.      Akbar promised to remain neutral during the Uzbek invasion against the Sāfavids, for Khurāsān.

4.      Abdullāh Khān agreed to refuse to subsidize, support or offer refuge to the Yūsufzai tribes.

The Uzbeks maintained friendly alliances with the Ottomans, who had defeated Persia, thereby influencing Babur to support Persia initially, which led to the creation of two major factions of Islamic powers in Central Asia. Later, the Uzbek ruler wished for Akbar to have no friendly alliances with Persia, which the Mughal emperor refused as he wished to not take part in the partitioning of Persia by the other Central Asian powers. The successors of Akbar maintained mixed relations with the Uzbeks, with Shāh Jahān attempting to capture Bukhārā while Aurangzeb attempted to sustain friendly relations with Uzbeks.

SĀFAVIDS
The Sāfavid Empire, at its height, spanned over contemporary regions of Iran, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, North Caucasus, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, Turkey, Syria, Bahrain and Kuwait. The rise of the Sāfavids in Persia and the Mughals in India were almost synchronous.[15] The first instances of Mughal-Sāfavid interactions can be traced back to as early as the 16th century C.E., when Ismail I provided military assistance to Bābur in Central Asia.In 1540 C.E., his son – Humāyūn – sought refuge in Persia when he was defeated by Sher Shāh Sūrī. Shāh Tahmasp of Persia helped Humāyūn regain his empire in India, but on the conditions of conversion. Many Iranis from the Sāfavid Empire migrated to Mughal India and had considerable influence on the politics, economy and society of the Mughal Empire.[18] Nearly 70% of the Mansabdārs listed in the Ain-i-Akbari were foreigners whose families hailed from Central Asian lands of Turkey and Persia.[19] Most of these Persian migrations to India were forced, due to Uzbek attacks on eastern frontiers and Ottoman raids on western frontiers.

Due to friendly alliances between the Mughals and the Sāfavids from the time of Babur and refuge of Humāyūn in Persia, the boundaries between them were not a matter of contention. The region of Kandāhār was the only issue of contention between the two powers, due to its importance in Central Asian land trade and proximity to Samarkand – the ancestral homeland of the Mughals. Post Humāyūn’s death in 1556 C.E., Kandāhār was captured by the Sāfavids, but Akbar captured it shortly. However, Jahāngīr lost Kandāhār to Persia yet again and his successors – Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb – were unsuccessful in capturing Kandāhār during the Mughal-Sāfavid War lasting from 1649 C.E. to 1653 C.E.

OTTOMANS

The Ottomans, a dynasty of Sunni Muslims, were the true successors of the Caliphate of Baghdād. During the 16th and 17th centuries C.E., the empire reached its peak under Suleimān- ‘the Magnificent’. During this time the empire covered a vast territory that included regions of West Asia, Central Europe, Southeast Europe, Eastern Europe and Caucasus, North Africa and Horn of Africa. The relationship between the Mughals and the Ottomans was one of cordiality with occasional outbursts of spasmodic hostility. Bābur was steeped in Turkish culture and spoke and wrote beautiful Turkish (Chagtai).[21] His conquest into the Indian mainland was possible only due to the military support of the Ottomans, who provided him with military tactics and methods, the most important resource being gunpowder. However, Bābur never really recognised the Ottoman Sultan as the Caliph of the Islāmic world. His successor, Humāyūn, maintained a diplomatic relationship with the Ottomans by exchanging letters, but he never really acknowledged the supremacy of the Suleimān ‘the Magnificent’. The Ottomans did not appreciate the Mughals supporting the Shiā Sāfavids – who the Ottomans were in conflict with.

It was Akbar who considered it important, during his early years, to strengthen a friendly alliance between the Mughals and the Ottoman Turks. Later, however, he too like his ancestors, did not accept the Sultān as the caliph of the Islāmic world but advanced his own claim as the caliph of the age.[23] Under the reign of Jahāngīr, the Mughals allied with Turks and the Uzbeks against the Sāfavids. However, this Mughal-Uzbek-Turk alliance was short-lived. The reign of Shāh Jahān witnessed amicable relations between the two Islamic powers. When Shāh Jahān visited Baghdād, the Ottoman ruler Sultān Murād IV gifted the Mughal with finest of weapons, saddles and kāftāns (tunics). The Sultān also provided forces to accompany the Mughals when they were on their way back to Sūrat.[24] Aurangzeb was too embroiled in the domestic affairs of his empire and thus, was unable to initiate such friendly alliances with the Turks.

ANALYSIS

In order to be able to analyze the Mughal Empire’s foreign relations, military might and extent of their territories, it is necessary to acknowledge the historical and geopolitical context of the facts in order to gain a more macro understanding of the actions of monarchs. Three rulers from India’s Ancient and Medieval past can be spoken of in order to gain a better understanding of Mughal hesitancy to engage in expansion. Chandragupta Maurya, Rājendra Cōḷa I and Muhammad Bin Tughluq; all did, to varying degrees of success, attempt to engage with foreign powers militarily and annex their territories. Chandragupta Maurya successfully vanquished the remaining Macedonian Śaka Kśatrapas to modern-day India’s north west; Rajendra Cōḷa I annexed several parts of Sri Lanka, Maldives, Indonesia, Burma and Malaysia, thereby defeating the Śrivijaya Empire; and Muhammad bin Tughluq only harboured plans for an elaborate and ambitious Khurāsān expedition to annex territories in Iran. [25] [26] [27]

There is a common thread in state structure and economy that enabled these powers to even envision the possibility of expanding beyond the typical frontiers of one’s empire and furthermore, displace dynasties regarded as “foreign.” All three monarchs, arguably represented their empires at their zenith and all the territories under them were under a centralized or centralized bureaucratic state structure; thereby representing the lack of a need to be a sedentary, centrifugal or centripetal administration that appeases local powers and grants them autonomy.[31] Military superiority over others augmented their confidence with regards to taking on foreign powers and a parity in status, if not superiority was observed when engaging with such powers. Trade flourished as well in each of the three empires with commodities even being exchanged with the Hellenistic Empires in case of the Mauryas, and Burma, China and Maldives in case of the Tughluqs (who traded via Bengal) and the Cōḷas.[32] [33] [34] Owing to their military superiority, territorial vastness and political stability; three factors that shall be analyzed in relation to other smaller factors in this analysis, such powers could afford to maintain favourable trade relations as a conspicuous priority in the functioning of their foreign affairs. Having subjugated the foreign powers via armed conflict, a system of political alliances seeking appeasement or subservience in order to ensure the non-infringement of one’s sovereignty was not needed and instead, trade and economic relations could predominate one’s dealings with those outside of the empire. [35]

In order to put these anecdotes within context, the victory of the Mauryas over the Kśatrapas of European origin came approximately 800 years prior to the advent of the Mughals in India.[39] It is in this interim that we can observe the decline of the military superiority of the powers in South and East Asia, relative to the advances made in West Asia, especially by the Islāmic Renaissance in the 8th and 9th Centuries CE.[40] The advances made in weapons manufacturing in consonance with the Prophetic and Caliphate zeal of proselytization and crusades necessitated the subsequent advances made in the disciplines which laid the foundation for such advancements in weaponry.[41] The development in such an important arena in the era of conquests and expansion was marked by a lopsided nature with the South and East Asian nations being rendered vulnerable to armed conquests and subsequently the tide of Islam.

One of the primary reasons the Mughals could not afford to engage militarily with the other Islamic powers of Central Asia and West Asia, and had to pursue a path of political alliances to safeguard their boundaries, is due to this inferiority in their artillery and firearm technology and subsequent reliance on the Ottomans for their manufacture and the Sāfavids and Uzbeks for their transportation.[42] The liberal patronage provided by Caliphs and Sultāns created the conducive conditions for what we can now term as The First Renaissance or the Islāmic Golden Age; which, some historians theorize, by virtue of the spread of Islam to the Iberian Peninsula and Southern Europe, laid the foundation for the succeeding European one.[43] The development of disciplines such as geometry, trigonometry and physics produced weapons that employed gunpowder and possessed great mathematical accuracy in their firing, range and damage.[44] The very fact that Bābur employed two expert Ottoman gunners and used their expertise, alongside the revolutionary nature of the Ottoman cannons themselves is a testimony to the superiority in firearms emanating from West Asia and declining eastwards due to lack of innovation and scientific discoveries.[45] The Mughals thereby were not pioneers in the revolutions in the development of weaponry.   

Similar to most modern-day arms manufacturing nations, the powers such as the Ottomans who were considered pioneers in such technology never provided their purchasers, especially those of another empire, with arms that were in consonance with the power of their most powerful ones.[47] It was always those which were outdated or at times in disuse that were provided to the Mughals, furthermore along an unpredictable route that spanned across other empires. The lack of firearms initially that could be fired from the back of an elephant or camel and that necessitated their unloading before usage, as compared to the Ottoman weapons that could be fired from horseback, rendered the Mughals a poor match in case of an armed conflict.[48] The Mughal flintlock guns and muskets, as compared to the new and improved matchlock arms that the Uzbeks and Ottomans possessed, represented a less foolproof and less accurate mode of dealing damage due to phosphorus in the matchlock guns representing a material that ignites almost immediately and explosively. [49] 

The navy was the poorest, most ill-equipped and smallest section of the Mughal armed forces, which was not developed to its fullest potential even after Akbar’s acquisition of Gujarāt and its several ports and long, amenable coastline.[51] Most trade under the Mughals was carried out over land and no new initiative with regards to seaborne trade was initiated under any monarch, probably due to preoccupation with internal strife and the acquisition of all desired commodities via the silk route.[52] The Mughal navy was merely supplementary in nature and existed with the primary objective of ushering pilgrims to and from Meccā for the Haj Pilgrimage, instead of trade.[53] Contrasting this with the Ottomans and the Sāfavids, who exploited to the fullest the potential of their respective access to the Black and Mediterranean Sea, and the Persian Gulf, Mughal efforts to engage in trade over the sea represent a priority that is extremely low on their agenda.[54] Evidence for foreign trade ranking extremely low on the Mughal agenda is witnessed not only by their nonchalance towards seaborne trade, but also their indifference towards the already existing silk route trade that stretched from their north-western frontiers and extended to the Mediterranean.[55] Unlike monarchs such as Sher Shāh Sūrī or Alā-ud-dīn Khilji, who made efforts to facilitate trade and the influx of foreign traders and commodities into their realm by building extensive roads, constructing safehouses for travelers and combating dacoity and banditry en route, there was no such conspicuous effort on behalf of the Mughals.[56] On the other hand, the few records of road construction beyond one’s frontiers were in fact done with the intention of political subjugation by Akbar in 1586 C.E., in order to combat the dacoitry of the Afghan tribes who often looted and plundered Mughal caravans.[57] The mention of the burning down of the entire market of Peśāwar in 1585 C.E. due to neglect by the authorities under Akbar is another example of such a tendency of the Mughals.[58]

It is upon analyzing the Treaty of 1586 C.E. between Akbar and the Uzbeks, as explained in the Observations section, that one can explicitly understand the subservience of economic motives to politics and power structures. Akbar arrived at Kābul in 1585 C.E. in order to crush the growing menace of the Yūsufzai Afghān tribes who had inflicted misery on the people of the north west frontier of his empire by routinely looting and plundering.[59] It was however the construction of a road over the Khyber Pass and several bridges above the Indus that finally piqued the Uzbek, Abdullāh, to now reach out to Akbar for an alliance due to the threat such actions caused him.[60] Trade is not a priority as seen in the absence of its mention in the clauses. Although the Afghān tribes harassed the Mughal caravan trade, there is no attempt made by Akbar to alter the existing status quo or to expand his economic outreach by demanding favours in trading. Instead, there is an element of continuity and the maintenance of the political status quo by a policy of mutual non-interference in each other’s existing territories and subsequent expansionist activities. 

However, the crux of Mughal interest in such a measure was constituted by the capture of Kandāhār; often known as the gateway to India. The geo-political significance of its capture was due to the fact that it effectively connected the Mughal boundaries to the Sāfavids, their closest ally at this point.[62] This provided Akbar reassurance not only due to the fact that the capture of Kandāhār was of symbolic significance considering his ancestral roots in Central Asia, but also because of the direct geographical connect it provided, as against the nascent, uneasy and precarious peace with the Uzbeks, who had only acquiesced to a Mughal treaty to stop their minor encroachment and to exterminate the pestilent Afghān tribes. Akbar’s masterful diplomacy was beneficial on two fronts: with the Uzbeks and with the Sāfavids, along with both of whom there now prevailed peace and with the latter existed a more profitable setting in case of obtaining military aid.

The Mughals also had a policy of not easily responding to skirmishes or provocations made by other powers along their borders. The capture of Kandāhār itself by the Sāfavids under Jahāngīr’s reign, the blatant non-interference commanded of the Mughals by the Uzbeks in Badakhshān and Balkh, Bābur’s inability and subsequent nonchalance towards the recapture of Farghānā and Shāh Jahān’s ill equipped and almost half-hearted expeditions to capture Bukhārā betrayed Mughal hesitancy and reticence towards regions beyond their north west frontier.[63] 

The Mughals preferred allying themselves advantageously and opportunistically with the most powerful power at any time. This is witnessed in Jahāngīr’s 1626 reversal of the pro-Persian policy followed since the reign of Bābur, in consonance with the decline and temporary weakening of the Sāfavid Empire.[67] The attempted, yet failed 1626 tripartite alliance between the Mughals, Turks and Uzbeks against the Sāfavids, with the objective of partitioning the almost disintegrated empire never actually materialized due to Jahangīr’s death the following year and the resurgence of the Sāfavids, by way of their assertion of dominance and beating back of the swelling Uzbek and Turk forces.[68] This was then followed by, in agreement with our hypothetical argument, of the Mughals switching sides again in order to maintain political and opportunistic subservience to the most powerful political power at the time. Shāh Jahān’s envoys to Persia to re-establish relations, now emphasized along cultural and socio-religious lines was parallel to his attempts to antagonize the Uzbeks by skirmishing for Bukhārā, thereby representing a reversal in policy. 

Mughal preoccupation with domestic strife and continuous infighting further pushed trade down the agenda for the state. With several civil wars, wars of succession and petty politics playing in the ever-expanding domestic arena, the easiest way to deal with them in a focused manner by the monarch, was to establish peace along the frontiers and to postpone activities like trade and exchange for a later time, after having established stability. With several Mughal monarchs such as Humāyūn, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzeb rising to power only after a protracted power struggle with their siblings and initial displeasing of the nobles, the monarchs had to concentrate their energies within the boundaries of their empire and also to cultivate trade within in order to strengthen the economy.[71] To trade with those in foreign lands was a prospect that would have not occurred to any able administrator in such circumstances. 

The rise of regional powers further hampered Mughal stability and thereby reflecting poorly on their emissarial activities. With the insurgence of the Rājpūts under Mahārāṇā Pratāp under Akbar, the Bāhamanīs in the Deccan, the Sīkhs under Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān and the Marāthās under Aurangzeb, trade further suffered.[73] Such circumstances further add testimony to our hypothesis by means of Mughal cautiousness and restraint on expansionist and economic ambition. Cartography in Mughal India suffered as well, with most major advances being made only with the advent of the Europeans into India. No conspicuous attempts to formulate maps to foster trade with newer lands or even to expedite trade routes with existing partners, whether over land or over sea, was also a factor that often-rendered Mughals vulnerable in battle in unknown lands, due to minimal surveying and research done upon the area. [74]

Lastly, irrespective of military might, internal disturbances and geographical boundaries, the Mughals also sadly lacked in soft power and cultural influence. The tendency to mimic the Persian court, language, functioning, practices and lifestyle by the Mughals, was not one that unfortunately mirrored by the Persians.  Cultural inferiority was not conducive Mughal domination or even receiving favourable terms of trade.[78]

 

CONCLUSION

The Islāmic Renaissance’s effects petered out by the time the zeal of knowledge acquisition and innovation spread to the east of Asia. Politically precarious circumstances, combined with military and strategic inferiority produced a vulnerable and subservient empire. The Mughals displayed caution, diplomacy and tact in their dealings with aggressors, instead of chauvinism and force, since the time of Humāyūn’s expulsion from India and his survival at the mercy of the Sāfavids. Economic activities thereby always took the backseat in terms of Mughal priorities and their preference for safeguarding their sovereignty. The Mughals, at the end of the mid-20^th Century, now being non-existent, met their end in the same manner as that of the other powers it tried so hard to maintain peace with: the extermination and subjugation by the even superior arms of European powers.

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JOURNAL ARTICLES

-      Alam, M., ‘Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations, c. 1550-1750’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient XXXIII, March 1994.

-      Ashraf, R., 'Ottoman-Mughal Political Relations circa 1500-1923', The Eurasia Studies Society Journal, Volume II, Issue 1, 2013.

-      Athar Ali, M.,‘Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume 110, Issue 1, January 1978.

-      De la Garza, A., ‘The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605’, Journal of Military History, Volume 78, Issue 3, July 2014.

-      Deshpande, A.,‘Limitations of Naval Warfare: Naval Warfare on the West Coast’, Economic and Political Weekly, volume 27, Issue 17, April 1992.

-      El-Ashker, A.,‘Islamic Economics’, Themes in Islamic Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, October 2006.

-      Farooqi, N. R., ‘Six Ottoman documents on Mughal-Ottoman relations during the reign of Akbar’, Journal of Islamic Studies VII.1, May 1996.

-      Farooqui, N.R., ‘Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure under the Mughals’, The Medieval History Journal, Volume 7, Issue 1, April 2004.

-      Gommans, J.,  ‘The Horse Trade in Eighteenth-century South Asia’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient XXXVII, June 1994.

-      Habib, I.,‘The Potentialities of Capitalist Development in the Economy of Mughal India’, the Journal of Economic History, Volume 29, Issue 1, March 1969.

-      Haider, M., ‘Relations of Abdullah Khan Uzbeg with Akbar’, Cahiers du Monde Russe et Sovietique XXIII.3-4, September 1982.

-      Hasan, F.,State and Locality in Mughal India: Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572-1730, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

-      Islam, R., 'Iran and the Mughal Frontier Provinces', Farhang-i-Iran Zamin, Volume XXI, 1976.

-      Rahim, A., 'Mughal Relations with Persia', Islamic Culture, Volume VII, 1934.

-      Robinson, F.,‘Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and Connective Systems’, Journal of Islamic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, July 1997.

-      Kaur, N., ‘Cattle in agriculture: a never-ending continuum’, Heritage: Journal of multidisciplinary studies in archaeology, Volume 4, Issue 1, November 2015.

-      Moosvi,S.,  ‘Numismatic Evidence and the Economic History of the Delhi Sultanate’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Volume 50, Issue 4, March 1989.

 

WEBLIOGRAPHY

-      ‘Foreign Policy of the Mughals (Medieval India)’, History and General Studies, <https://selfstudyhistory.com/2015/01/03/25-medieval-indiaforeign-plicy-of-the-mughals/>, 3 January 2015, 24 December 2018.

-      ‘Foreign Policy of the Mughals and their Relations with Central Asia’, History Discussion, <http://www.historydiscussion.net/history-of-india/foreign-policy-of-the-mughals-and-their-relations-with-central-asia/2842>, n.d., 24 December 2018.

-      ‘Mughals’ Foreign Policy’, Tutorialspoint, <https://www.tutorialspoint.com/medieval_indian_history/medieval_indian_history_mughals_foreign_policy.htm>, n.d., 24 December 2018.

 

ILLUSTRATIONS USED

-      “Bay of Bengal Trade Route – The Origins of Shipping in the Indian Subcontinent.” Sea News Global Maritime News, 15 Nov. 2017, seanews.co.uk/features/bay-of-bengal-trade-route-the-origins-of-shipping-in-the-indian-subcontinent/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:14pm.

-      “Biography of Muhammad Bin Tughluq | Tughluq Dynasty | Indian History.” History Discussion - Discuss Anything About History, 8 Mar. 2017, www.historydiscussion.net/history-of-india/tughluq-dynasty/biography-of-muhammad-bin-tughluq-tughluq-dynasty-indian-history/6578. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:12pm.

-      “Chandragupta Maurya.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 21 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chandragupta_Maurya. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:08pm.

-      “File:Herman Moll. Persia, Caspian Sea, part of Independent Tartary. 1736.A.jpg", Wikimedia Commons, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Herman_Moll._Persia,_Caspian_Sea,_part_of_Independent_Tartary._1736.A.jpg>, 30 January 2011, 24 January 2019.

-      "Map of Afghanistan during the Safavid and Mughal Empire, from the 16th century to 1747 when the current nation-state was created. Extracted from Bowen's A new & accurate map of Persia, with the adjacent countries (1747)", Imgur, <https://imgur.com/qpFyJcN>, 11 June 2017, 24 January 2019.

-      “Map of Moghul India -- Akbar and Aurangzeb | Mughal Empire | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, Empire and Ottoman Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/778137641840564544/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:17pm.

-      Roolvink, R., Historical Atlas of the Muslim Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1957.

-      Shepherd, W. R., "Medieval Commerce from the Historical Atlas", Art.com, <https://www.art.com/products/p34990970678-sa-i9409948/william-robert-shepherd-medieval-commerce-from-the-historical-atlas.htm?RFID=990319>, n.d., 24 January 2019.

-      "The Maps of Ottoman Empire From Several Sources", Ottoman Souvenir, <http://libertyparkusafd.org/Franklin/Ancient%20Empires/The%20Maps%20of%20Ottoman%20Empire.htm>, n.d., 24 January 2019.

-       “Where Is Balkh, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/bal/where-is-balkh.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:55pm.

-      “Where Is Bukhara, Uzbekistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 15 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/uz/04/where-is-bukhara.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:46pm.

-      “Where Is Kabul, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/kab/where-is-kabul.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:59pm.

-      “World History PowerPoint #27: Transformation of Gunpowder Empires in 1800s.” Teachers Pay Teachers, www.teacherspayteachers.com/Product/World-History-PowerPoint-27-Transformation-of-Gunpowder-Empires-in-1800s-2851741?aref=69yc7v3k. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:30pm.

-      “WSR1 BABUR Timeline.” Timetoast, www.timetoast.com/timelines/wsr1-babur. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:39pm.

-      Ajithkumar. “The 1000th Coronation Year of Rajendra Chola – One of the Greatest Kings of India.” Ajith Kumar. CC, 5 Aug. 2015, www.ajithkumar.cc/my-thoughts/the-1000th-coronation-year-of-rajendra-chola-one-of-the-greatest-kings-of-india/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm.

-      IlmFeed. “Cool Map Shows the Spread of Islam.” IlmFeed, 15 Apr. 2014, ilmfeed.com/cool-map-shows-spread-of-islam/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:20pm.

-      India History Map - 1600 Mughal Empire | Maps - Historical Maps | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, India and Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/530650768576525791/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:04pm.

-      MAPS & ATLAS - SILK ROAD TRADE ROUTES MAP, Jan. 2013, www.silkroutes.net/orient/mapssilkroutestrade.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:19pm.

-      My India, My India, www.mapsofindia.com/history/maratha-empire.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:09pm.

-      Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-chola.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:16pm.

-      Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-bahmani.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:12pm.

-      The Battle over Afghanistan.” Afghanistan, www.moesmus-afghanistan.dk/?p=3429. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:34pm.

-      WHKMLA: The Economic History of Italy During the Renaissance, www.zum.de/whkmla/region/centrasia/xbadakhshan.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:43pm.

Notes

---

[1] Bernard Crick, Essays on Citizenship, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2002, p. 7.

[2] Jared Diamond, The World Until Yesterday, New York: Penguin Group, 2012, p. 4.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, London: Penguin Random Book House, 2011, p. 91.

[5] Ibid, p. 92.

[6] Yuval Noah Harari, op.cit., p. 93.

[7] Jared Diamond, op.cit., p. 16.

[8] Niall Ferguson, Civilization: The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, London: Penguin Random House, 2011, p. 91.

[9] William Bain, The Medieval Foundations of International Relations, Oxon: Routledge, 2017, p. 9.

[10] Peu Ghosh, International Relations, Delhi: PHI Learning Private Limited, 2011, p. 3.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Niall Ferguson, op. cit., p. 4.

[13] “India History Map - 1600 Mughal Empire | Maps - Historical Maps | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, India and Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/530650768576525791/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:04pm.

 

[14] William Robert Shepherd, "Medieval Commerce from the Historical Atlas", Art.com, <https://www.art.com/products/p34990970678-sa-i9409948/william-robert-shepherd-medieval-commerce-from-the-historical-atlas.htm?RFID=990319>, n.d., 24 January 2019.

 

[15] Abolghasem Dadvar, Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606 - 1658), 1999, p. 34

[16] “File:Herman Moll. Persia, Caspian Sea, part of Independent Tartary. 1736.A.jpg", Wikimedia Commons, <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Herman_Moll._Persia,_Caspian_Sea,_part_of_Independent_Tartary._1736.A.jpg>, 30 January 2011, 24 January 2019.

[17] "Map of Afghanistan during the Safavid and Mughal Empire, from the 16th century to 1747 when the current nation-state was created. Extracted from Bowen's A new & accurate map of Persia, with the adjacent countries (1747)", Imgur, <https://imgur.com/qpFyJcN>, 11 June 2017, 24 January 2019.

[18] Abolghasem Dadvar, Iranians in Mughal Politics and Society (1606 - 1658), 1999, p. 21

[19] R. Islam, ‘Iran and the Mughal Frontier Provinces’, Farhang-i-Iran Zamin, Vol. XXI, Tehran, 1976, p. 10

[20] Roolvink, R., Historical Atlas of the Muslim Peoples, Harvard University Press, 1957, p. 32

[21] Razi Ashraf, 'Ottoman-Mughal Political Relations circa 1500-1923', The Eurasia Studies Society Journal, Volume II, Issue 1, 2013, p. 4.

[22] "The Maps of Ottoman Empire From Several Sources", Ottoman Souvenir, <http://libertyparkusafd.org/Franklin/Ancient%20Empires/The%20Maps%20of%20Ottoman%20Empire.htm>, n.d., 24 January 2019

[23] A. L. Srivastava, Akbar the Great: Evolution of administration, 1556-1605 A.D,  Shiva Lal Agarwala, 1962, pp. 349-50.

[24] N. R. Farooqi, Mughal-Ottoman Relations: A Study of Political & Diplomatic Relations Between Mughal India and the Ottoman Empire, 1556-1748, Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, Delhi, 1989.

[25] Radhakumud Mookerji, Chandragupta Maurya and his times, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1988, p. 63.

[26] Vijay Sakhuja, Nagapattinam to Suvarnadwipa: Reflections on the Chola Naval Expeditions to South East Asia, Singapore: Institute of South East Asian Studies, 2009, p.66.

[27] J.L. Mehta, Advanced Study in the History of Medieval India, Noida: Sterling Books, 2017, p. 208.

[28]“Chandragupta Maurya.” Wikipedia, Wikimedia Foundation, 21 Jan. 2019, en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chandragupta_Maurya. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:08pm.

[29] Ajithkumar. “The 1000th Coronation Year of Rajendra Chola – One of the Greatest Kings of India.” Ajith Kumar. CC, 5 Aug. 2015, www.ajithkumar.cc/my-thoughts/the-1000th-coronation-year-of-rajendra-chola-one-of-the-greatest-kings-of-india/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:09pm.

[30] “Biography of Muhammad Bin Tughluq | Tughluq Dynasty | Indian History.” History Discussion - Discuss Anything About History, 8 Mar. 2017, www.historydiscussion.net/history-of-india/tughluq-dynasty/biography-of-muhammad-bin-tughluq-tughluq-dynasty-indian-history/6578. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:12pm.

[31] Hermann Kulke, The State in India: 1000-1700, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997, p.134.

[32] Moti Chandra, Trade and Trade Routes in Ancient Routes, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1977, p. 157.

[33] Prakash Charan Prasad, Foreign Trade and Commerce in Ancient India, New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1977, p. 143.

[34] Shireen Moosvi, ‘Numismatic Evidence and the Economic History of the Delhi Sultanate’, Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, Volume 50, Issue 4, March 1989, p. 211.

[35] Hermann Kulke, op.cit., p. 34.

[36] “Bay of Bengal Trade Route – The Origins of Shipping in the Indian Subcontinent.” Sea News Global Maritime News, 15 Nov. 2017, seanews.co.uk/features/bay-of-bengal-trade-route-the-origins-of-shipping-in-the-indian-subcontinent/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:14pm.

[37] Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-chola.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:16pm.

[38] MAPS & ATLAS - SILK ROAD TRADE ROUTES MAP, Jan. 2013, www.silkroutes.net/orient/mapssilkroutestrade.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:19pm.

[39] Radhakumund Mookerji, op. cit., p.4.

[40] George Saliba, Islamic Science and the Making of the European Renaissance, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007, p.135.

[41] Ibid.

[42] Jos Gommans, Mughal Warfare: Indian Frontiers and High Roads to Empire, 1500-1700, London: Routledge, 1995, p.35.

[43] Abdus Salam, Renaissance of Sciences in Islamic Countries, Singapore: World Scientific, 1994, p.183.

[44] George Saliba, op.cit., p.155.

[45] Satish Chandra, History of Medieval India, Hyderabad: Orient Blackswan Private Limited, 2007, p.206.

[46] IlmFeed. “Cool Map Shows the Spread of Islam.” IlmFeed, 15 Apr. 2014, ilmfeed.com/cool-map-shows-spread-of-islam/. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:20pm.

[47] Jos Gommans, op.cit. p.51.

[48] Andrew de la Garza, ‘The Mughal Battlefield: Personnel, Technology, and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500-1605’, Journal of Military History, Volume 78, Issue 3, July 2014, p.234.

[49] Andrew de la Garza, op.cit., p.236.

[50] “World History PowerPoint #27: Transformation of Gunpowder Empires in 1800s.” Teachers Pay Teachers, www.teacherspayteachers.com/Product/World-History-PowerPoint-27-Transformation-of-Gunpowder-Empires-in-1800s-2851741?aref=69yc7v3k. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:30pm.

[51] Anirudh Deshpande, ‘Limitations of Naval Warfare: Naval Warfare on the West Coast’, Economic and Political Weekly, volume 27, Issue 17, April 1992, p.901.

[52] Muzaffar Alam, ‘Trade, State Policy and Regional Change: Aspects of Mughal-Uzbek Commercial Relations, C.1550-1750’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, Volume 37, Issue 3, March 1994, p. 211.

[53] Barbara T. Metcalf, Muslim Travellers: Pilgrimage, Migration and the Religious Imagination, London: Routledge, 1990, p.80.

[54] Ahmed el-Ashker, ‘Islamic Economics’, Themes in Islamic Studies, Volume 3, Issue 1, October 2006, p.90.

[55] Muzaffar Alam, op.cit., p.212.

[56] Satish Chandra, op.cit., p.221.

[57] Irfan Habib, ‘The Potentialities of Capitalist Development in the Economy of Mughal India’, the Journal of Economic History, Volume 29, Issue 1, March 1969, p.54.

[58] Ibid, p.55.

[59] Mansura Haider, ‘Relations of Abdullah Khan Uzbeg with Akbar’, Cahiers du monde russe et soviétique, Volume 34, Issue 4, December 1982, p. 320.

[60] Ibid, p.321.

[61] “The Battle over Afghanistan.” Afghanistan, www.moesmus-afghanistan.dk/?p=3429. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:34pm.

[62] Muzaffar Alam, op.cit., p.89.

[63] N.R. Farooqui, ‘Diplomacy and Diplomatic Procedure under the Mughals’, The Medieval History Journal, Volume 7, Issue 1, April 2004, p.174.

[64] “WSR1 BABUR Timeline.” Timetoast, www.timetoast.com/timelines/wsr1-babur. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:39pm.

[65]WHKMLA: The Economic History of Italy During the Renaissance, www.zum.de/whkmla/region/centrasia/xbadakhshan.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:43pm.

[66] “Where Is Bukhara, Uzbekistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 15 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/uz/04/where-is-bukhara.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:46pm.

[67] Francis Robinson, ‘Ottomans-Safavids-Mughals: Shared Knowledge and Connective Systems’, Journal of Islamic Studies, Volume 8, Issue 2, July 1997, p. 162.

[68] Ibid.

[69] “Where Is Balkh, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/bal/where-is-balkh.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:55pm.

[70] “Where Is Kabul, Afghanistan?” World Atlas, Worldatlas, 2 Oct. 2015, www.worldatlas.com/as/af/kab/where-is-kabul.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 4:59pm.

[71] M. Athar Ali, ‘Towards an Interpretation of the Mughal Empire’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Volume 110, Issue 1, January 1978, p.41.

[72] “India History Map - 1600 Mughal Empire | Maps - Historical Maps | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, India and Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/530650768576525791/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:04pm.

[73] Farhat Hasan, State and Locality in Mughal India: Power Relations in Western India, c. 1572-1730, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, p.45.

[74] Susan Gole, Maps of Mughal India, Delhi: Manohar Press, 1988, p.7.

[75] My India, My India, www.mapsofindia.com/history/maratha-empire.html. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:09pm.

[76] Pike, John. “Military.” Texas Revolution, www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/history-bahmani.htm. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:12pm.

[77] “Map of Moghul India -- Akbar and Aurangzeb | Mughal Empire | Pinterest | Mughal Empire, Empire and Ottoman Empire.” Pinterest, in.pinterest.com/pin/778137641840564544/?lp=true. Accessed on 23/1/18, 5:17pm.

[78] Muzaffar Alam, The Culture and Politics of Persian in Precolonial Hindustan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003, p.34.