I.FATE OF DARA
His father and ex-emperor, “the most magnificent of the Mughul emperors’’, had to pass the remainder of his life as a prisoner in the Agra fort. Aurangzib’s youngest brother, Murad, had been arrested on 25 June, and confined as a state-prisoner in the fort of Gwalior. But, even then, the new emperor did not feel secure about his own position, as many of his enemies were still active to strike him.
From Samogarh, Dara had proceeded to Delhi and thence to the Punjab where he expected more co-operation and assistance than in any other place, while his eldest son, Sulaiman Shukoh, after defeating his uncle Shuja‘ at Bahadurpur, five miles north-east of Banaras, on 14 February, 1658, and concluding a peace with him at Monghyr, was marching towards Agra.
Had Dara, instead of moving to the Punjab, marched eastward and, uniting with his son, advanced against Aurangzib, he might have created an alarming situation for his brother. But that was not to be, and his wrong move ruined his cause. An astute general as Aurangzib was, he guarded against the possible junction of the father and the son. The followers of Sulaiman found their path to the west blocked, and disheartened by the news of Daria’s dis¬ comfiture at Samogarh and his flight to the north-west, deserted in large number, making his position very precarious.
Reaching Lahore, Dara raised his men to 20,000 and despatch¬ ed some of them to guard the ferries at Talwandi and Rupar on the Sutlej, as well as to keep him informed of the enemy’s movements. But as he was wanting in requisite courage and also did not get time enough to rally proper opposition to his brother’s forces, hefled from place to place as soon as he heard of the enemy’s ap¬ proach. The emperor had deputed Bahadur Khan to pursue him. Then he appointed Khalil-ullah Khan, the governor of the Punjab, with orders to take up the pursuit more vigorously. When “Bahadur Khan crossed the Sutlej by surprise at Rupar... .Dara’s generals fell back from that river to Govindwal on the Beas. But when Aurangzib from Delhi reached the Sutlej, Dara fled from Lahore (18 August) to Multan, with his family and treasure, by boat. Once more Dara’s courage failed before Aurangzib; he des¬ paired of success and his despair infected his troops.”1 From Multan he fled from one place to another in Sind, all the while losing large number of his troops from desertions, and finally, he left this pro¬ vince at Badin, proceeding over the Rann of Cutch towards Gujarat. Meanwhile, the alarming news of Shuja°s advance towards Agra had forced the emperor to turn back from the environs of Multan for Delhi.
After his coronation (21 July, 1658), Aurangzib had assured his brother Shujia‘ of the possession of Bihar in addition to that of Bengal, but the latter, finding the deplorable plight of his father as well as of his brother, Murad, could not place reliance on his brother’s promise, and when he heard of Aurangzib’s absence far away from the capital, he considered this a suitable opportunity to conquer as far as Agra and release his father. Early in November, 1658, he marched out of Patna with an army of 25,000 cavalry and a park of artillery. Taking possession of the forts on the way, he reached Khajuha, in the Fatehpur district, in Uttar Pradesh, on 30 December, 1659. Here his path was barred by Muhammad Sultan, the eldest son of the emperor.
Arriving at the environs of Delhi in November, 1658, Aurangzib sent reinforcements to his son, and himself advanced to meet his brother at Khajuha. On the night before the battle, Maharaja Jasvant Singh, who was the commander of the emperor’s right wing, all on a sudden, attacked and plundered the imperial camp and thereafter went back with his 14,000 Rajput followers to his own country. But the imperial position was saved by the emperor’s wonderful coolness and tactful handling of the situation and Shuja‘’s hesitation to act in time.
In the encounter (5 January, 1659) the imperialists assembled 50,000 to 55,000 men whereas Shuja°s army numbered 23,000. The battle started at 8 a.m. by an offensive from Shuja‘. The imperial¬ ists were driven to such an unfavourable position that they would have given way, but the cool courage, promptitude and superior tact of the emperor turned the impending defeat into a decisive victory, and Shuja* was compelled to take recourse to flight. His army also fled away, leaving their camp equipage and artillery as the victor’s prize.
Aurangzib sent Muhammad Sultan and Mir Jumla in pursuit of Shuja‘ who fled to Monghyr, via Banaras and Patna, and thence to the Malda district through Sahibganj and Rajmahal.
After making Tanda2 his base of operations, Shuja* tried to check the advance of the imperialists and won over Muhammad Sultan, by offering him the hand of his daughter Gulrukh Banu. He also succeeded in recovering Rajmahal and compelled Mir Jumla to fall back from his position at Belghata, opposite Jangipur, towards Murshidabad. But when the information of the approach of an¬ other imperial army under Daud Khan, the governor of Bihar, to the assistance of Mir Jumla, reached him, he left Rajmahal and came back to Tanda (January, 1660). Sometime after, Muhammad Sultan deserted him and joined the imperialists but only to pass the rest of his life in imprisonment. Now all was over with Shuja‘. He had no other alternative but to take a precipitate flight to Dacca before Mir Jumla’s net could completely close round him. But even there, his position was not secure because of enmity of the local zamm ddrs. As such, he was forced to leave Bengal and take shelter with the Magh Raja of Arakan. Here he conspired to seize the throne of his benefactor and then to proceed to recover Bengal. But the plot having leaked out, he tried to take to his heels but was pursued and slain (February, 1661).
After great hardship, Daria had arrived at Ahmadabad where, with the assistance of Shah Navaz Khan, the governor of the pro¬ vince, he raised his army to 22,000 and marched towards Agra. On the way, on receipt of an invitation from Jasvant Singh who pro¬ mised to join him with his Rajput followers, he proceeded in the direction of Ajmer. But Jasvant Singh was meanwhile won over by the emperor, and Dara had no alternative but to fight with his brother who had already arrived at the vicinity. At the pass of Deorai, four miles south of Ajmer, he was once more defeated by Aurangzib (March, 1659) and compelled to go back towards Ahma¬ dabad. But unable to find refuge anywhere in Gujarat, he crossed the Rann once again and entered the southern coast of Sind (May, 1659). Here, too, his position was miserable, as Aurangzlb’s pur¬ suing army and local officers closed his path from the north, east and south-east. Dara moved towards the north-west, crossed the Indus and proceeded towards Persia, via the Bolan pass and Qandahar.
While on the way to Dadar, nine miles east of the Bolan pass, his beloved wife, Nadira Banu, succumbed to terrible hardship and ill¬ ness. Overwhelmed with grief, the bereaved prince sent her corpse to Lahore for burial, accompanied by his most faithful officer, Gul Muhammad, the soldiers still remaining with him. But to crown his misery, the ungrateful Malik Jivan, the chieftain of Dadar, whom he had once saved from death sentence and whose hospitality he accepted, seized him along with his second son Sipihr Shukoh and two daughters, and delivered them to Aurangzlb’s general Bahadur Khan.
Brought to Delhi, Dara and Sipihr Shukoh were paraded through the streets with ignominy, and subsequently the former was tried by the court theologians on a charge of apostasy from Islam. He was found guilty and put to death (30 August, 1659).
Dana’s eldest son, Sulaiman Shukoh, who had taken refuge in Garhwal, was captured and brought to Delhi in January, 1661. He was then sent as a state-prisoner to Gwalior where he was put to death (May, 1662) by overdoses of opium.
At the instigation of Aurangzlb, a complaint was instituted against Murad by the second son of ‘All Naqi for the murder of his father, and the prince, having been declared guilty, was beheaded in the fort of Gwalior on 4 December, 1661. Thus, after removing his rivals one by one, Aurangzlb firmly secured his position, al¬ though the means to the end are open to severe criticism.
He had celebrated his coronation for the second time on 5 June, 1659, after his decisive victories against Shuja‘ and Dam at Khajuha and Deoriai, respectively. On this occasion, not only grand banquets and dazzling illuminations enlivened the function, but many officers and nobles were promoted and new appointments made.
II. AURANGZIB AND NORTH INDIA
The long “reign of Aurangzlb is naturally divided into two equal parts of about 25 years each, the first of which he passed in Northern India and the second in the Deccan. During the earlier of these two periods the centre of interest lies unmistakably in the North.... because the most important developments, civil and mili¬ tary, concerned this region. ... In the second half of the reign the situation is reversed: all the resources of the empire are concentrated in the Deccan; the Emperor, his court and family, the bulk of the army, and all his best officers live there for a quarter century, and Hindustan sinks back to a place of secondary importance . .. . the administration in Northern India naturally falls into decay at the v/ithdrawal of the master’s eye and the ablest officers; the people grow poorer; the upper classes decline in morals, intelligence and useful activity; finally, lawlessness breaks out in most parts”,3 indi¬ cating the beginning of that great anarchy which prevailed through¬ out the eighteenth century.
After his second coronation, the emperor gave his attention to alleviate the economic distress of the people. The prolonged war of succession and consequent disorder and confusion in the civil ad¬ ministration threatened the economic ruin of almost the whole of Northern India and grain was selling at exorbitant prices, beyond the reach of the ordinary people. The inland transit duties (rahdafi) at every ford, ferry or provincial boundary, and the octroi (pandari) levied in large towns like Agra, Delhi and Lahore, on articles of food and drink brought for sale from outside, enhanced the troubles as they not only hampered free movement of commodi¬ ties within the country but also increased their prices. The em¬ peror abolished both of them in the crown lands, and the assignees (jdgirdars) and landholders (zaimndtirs) were asked to do so in their respective estates. By the abolition of ruhdurl alone, the govern¬ ment suffered a loss of twenty-five lakhs of rupees in revenue in the crown lands per annum. As a result of these measures, there was free movement of commodities from one place to another and their prices fell considerably. Many oppressive and burdensome abwubs (cesses) over and above the regular land revenue and customs duty were also abolished. Although forbidden again and again by various rulers like Firuz Tughluq, Akbar and Jahangir, they re-appeared every time after some intervals. The important abwubs or cesses were perquisites, gifts and subscriptions exacted by the officials in their own interest, fees and commissions realized for the State on various occasions, licence-tax for certain trades, duties on local sale of commodities and some special imposts on the Hindus, viz., the pilgrim’s tax, a tax on the occasion of the birth of a male child, and a tax for throwing the bones of the dead into the Ganges. Although they were abolished by Aurangzib and his actions showed his pious intention to do good to the people, his edicts could not be duly enforced in all regions, especially in far off places where the people suffered almost as before.
From 1661 to 1667 the emperor received embassies from many Muhammadan powers outside India which had trade relations with Mughul India, congratulating him on his victories over his rivals and accession to the throne. Such embassies came from the Sharif of Mecca, the Safavi king of Persia, the kings of Balkh, Bukhara, Kashghar, the petty chieftains of Urganj (Khiva), Shahr-i-nau, the Turkish governors of Basra, Hadramaut or Southern Arabia to the north-east of Aden, Yaman and Mocha, the ruler of Barbary and the Christian king of Abyssinia. One embassy also came from Con¬ stantinople in 1690. Aurangzib’s “policy at the beginning was to dazzle the eyes of foreign princes by the lavish gift of presents to them and their envoys, and thus induce the outer Muslim world to forget his treatment of his father and brothers, or at least to show courtesy to the successful man of action and master of India’s un¬ told wealth, especially when he was so free with his money.”4
Although Shah ‘Abbas II, the Safavi king of Persia, sent a grand complimentary embassy in 1661, his relation with Aurangzlb became strained later on, leading to a complete rift due to the former’s overweening pride, and aggravated by the religious differ¬ ence between the two sovereigns, Shiah ‘Abbas II being a Shiah and Aurangzlb an orthodox Sunni. Parbiyat Khan, the Indian envoy, was rudely treated and humiliated at the Persian Court, and the Persian emperor threatened an invasion of the Mughul empire; though it did not materialize, Aurangzlb had to be very vigilant on the north-western frontier. With the death of Shah ‘Abbas II in 1667, the danger of Persian invasion disappeared, as during the rest of the reign of Aurangzlb, Persia was too weak to strike.
The relation between Aurangzlb and Shah Jahan since the latter became a captive in the Agra fort on 18 June, 1658, was very bitter. During the period of this captivity of the father, the son never visited Agra and his treatment of the former was a pitiable instance of open disregard for decorum and canons of morality and justice. Shah Jahan gradually realized the position into which he had been cast by the cruel hand of destiny. He was closely sur¬ rounded by the emperor’s guards and his movements within the fort were watched with strict vigilance. Acrimonious letters were ex¬ changed between the father and the son, and when the attempts of the former to correspond with Daria and Shuja‘ were detected, they made his position worse still. His bonds of captivity were tightened and writing materials were withheld from him; whatever he desired to write, had to be written through government staff, and such corres¬ pondence passed through government agents. There were sordid wranglings between the father and the son over the crown jewel¬ leries and those left by Dara in the Agra fort, and Aurangzlb took possession of them in spite of Shah Jahan’s remonstrances. The cor¬ respondence between them became so bitter that the father, without further complaint, at last resigned to the inevitable. The heart¬ rending news of the sad end of Dara, Shuja‘, Murad and Sulaiman Shukoh gave him rude shocks, one after another, but he bore them with extraordinary patience. He spent his time in prayer1, reli¬ gious discourses, reading the Qur'an and performance of all other duties according to the canons of Islam. It was a great solace to him to receive till the last moment of his life the loving care of his eldest daughter, Jahanara, who shared with him all sorrows and miseries, consoling him with tenderness of a mother and daughter combined in one. Deprived of liberty, bereft of all powers and stricken down with bereavements, he only waited for deliverance from such a sad and gloomy existence, and at last it came on 22 January, 1666, at the age of seventy-four, after an illness continuing for about fifteen days.
During the first decade of Aurangzib’s reign there were a few disturbances in his empire, but they were local and not of much importance, and were easily put down. Champat Rai of Bundel khand, who had rebelled against the emperor, was hunted from place to place and eventually, unable to defend, he stabbed him¬ self to death (1661). A disputed succession in Navanagar in Sau rashtra led to the intervention of the Mughul suzerain. The faujdar of Junagarh after a desperate fight against the usurper Rai Singh, killed him, and restored Raja Chhatra Sal, Jam of Navanagar, in his possession (A.D. 1663). Rao Karan of Bikaner, who had de¬ fied the emperor's authority, was forced to submit and pardoned.
The territorial expansion of the Mughul empire, initiated and continued by the predecessors of Aurangzib, went on during his re¬ gime also, and the early years of his reign witnessed the extension of the empire in various directions. In 1661, Daud Khan, the gover¬ nor of Bihar, invaded Palamau in South Bihar, then inhabited mostly by the Cheros, a Dravidian people, and conquered it. It was an¬ nexed to the Suba of Bihar. In 1665, as the result of a mission from the Mughul governor of Kashmir, the ruler of little Tibet or Ladakh, out of fear, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughuls, built a mosque at his capital and minted coins in the name of the emperor.
A great military expedition was undertaken by the imperialists on the north-eastern side, in Assam. A branch of the Shan race, the Ahoms, who had been originally inhabitants of Upper Burma, migrated to Assam in the thirteenth century, conquering a part of the Brahmaputra valley. They went on expanding their kingdom in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries till they held sway up to the Bar Nadi river on the north-west and the Kalang river on the south-west. They were very hardy, worshipped demons and were feudally organized, but in the course of their stay in Assam, they began to be influenced by Indian civilization and the Hindu reli¬ gion. By the conquest of Kuch Hajo, embracing the present districts of Goalpara and Kamrup in Assam, in the early part of the seven¬ teenth century, the eastern boundary of the Mughul empire had extended up to the Bar Nadi. Thus a conflict between the Mughuls and the Ahoms was almost inevitable, and as a matter of fact, much desultory fighting went on between them in the course of which the Ahoms raided the eastern frontier of the Mughul empire. At last, a peace was concluded in 1638, according to which the Bar Nadi was recognized as the boundary between the two kingdoms.
During the war of succession, taking advantage of the defence¬ less condition of the frontiers, the Ahoms as well as the Raja of Cooch Behar sent expeditionary forces to occupy the Mughul dis¬ trict of Kamrup from the east and west, respectively. Afraid of attacks from two sides, and without any hope of reinforcement from Ben¬ gal, Mir Lutf-ullah ShirazI, the faujdar of Gauhati, fled away to Dacca, leaving the district in a defenceless state. The Ahoms oc¬ cupied Gauhati, without any resistance, and much booty, including 140 horses, 40 pieces of canon and 200 matchlocks, fell into their hands. They plundered the whole district and drove away the troops of Cooch Behar, and thus the whole of Western Brahmaputra valley came into their possession (A.D. 1658).
After the civil war, the emperor appointed Mir Jumla as viceroy of Bengal (June, 1660) with orders to punish the miscreants and re¬ cover the Mughul territories. Having completed necessary prepara¬ tions, the viceroy started from Dacca early in November, 1661, with 12,000 cavalry, 30,000 infantry and a flotilla of more than three hundred war-vessels. At first he went to Cooch Behar, the capital of which was occupied without any resistance, as the Raja and his officers had fled away in terror. After a successful campaign in this kingdom and annexing it to the Mughul empire, Mir Jumla proceeded against Assam. Although his path lay through forests and innumerable streams, he marched forward bearing all hard¬ ships and captured many forts of the enemies, viz, Joglgupha, Gau¬ hati, Srlghat, Pandu, Beltala, Klajali, Sadhara and Simla-garh. In a naval engagement he destroyed their navy and finally reached Garhgaon, the capital of the Ahom kingdom, on 17 March, 1662. The Ahom king, Jayadhwaj, had fled away, leaving his capital at the mercy of the invaders. Immense booty was captured by the impe¬ rialists in the course of theAssam campaign.
The Mughul general made necessary arrangements for keeping hold over the conquered territories during the ensuing monsoon. A strong garrison was maintained in the occupied Ahom capital and outposts were established for guarding the routes. As the river near Garhgaon was shallow, the Mughul fleet had to be anchored at Lakhau, about eighteen miles north-west of that town, while the general himself with the main army halted at Mathurapur, a village on a high ground, seven miles south-east of Garhgaon. Such a separation of the land army and the navy became the cause of terrible sufferings of the imperialists.
The Ahoms still retained sufficient strength to give blows to their enemies. They resumed offensive and surprised the Mughul outposts by night attacks; even Garhgaon was not spared. During the rainy season the Mughul occupation of Assam was extremely precarious; the country was flooded, communications were cut off, the outposts isolated and the imperial army remained practically “in a state of siege”. Communications between the Mughul army and the navy were also cut off by the enemies who concentrated their attacks on Garhgaon, which was repeatedly attacked and saved only by the exertions and gallantry of the Mughul soldiery.
To add to the misery of the Mughuls, a serious epidemic broke out at Mathurapur, levying a heavy toll of lives in Mir Jumla’s camp. The disease spread to the whole of Assam and 230,000 of its inhabitants succumbed to it. The life at Mathurapur being intoler¬ able, the Mughul army came back to Garhgaon, leaving many of the sick who could not be carried for paucity of transport. But the refugees infected the army at Garhgaon, making the situation worse.
“Through all these dark months of alarm, suspense and even despair”5 the Mughul navy at Lakhau successfully maintained its touch with Gauhati and through it with the headquarters of Ben¬ gal. When the monsoon was over, Mir Jumla with great difficulty succeeded in re-opening communication with the fleet and provisions were sent in large quantities under escort from Lakhau to Garhgaon. In place of famine, the Mughul camp was now in plenty.
Resuming operations against the enemies, the Mughul general marched to Tipam via Solaguri. But he was attacked with fainting fits which were soon followed by high fever and pleurisy. His troops refused to proceed further and enter the pestilential hills of Namrup where Jayadhwaj, the Ahom king, had taken refuge. The situation of the latter, too, became very miserable by the deser¬ tion of many of his notables and he made overtures of peace to Mir Jumla, who gladly received them, and a treaty was concluded between the two parties. By it, Jayadhwaj consented to send a daughter to the imperial harem, pay an annual tribute and a heavy war-indemnity including 20,000 tolas of gold, 120,000 tolas of silver,53 to give hostages for full payment of the indemnity, and to cede more than half of the province of Darrang.
Thus “judged as a military exploit, Mir Jumla’s invasion of Assam was a success.”6 It was no doubt gained at great hardships and immense loss of lives but the Mughul general shared all suffer¬ ings with the common soldiers and steered successfully through all adverse circumstances with uncommon perseverance and fortitude. He was attacked with a serious malady, consumption, which had developed from his pleurisy. Over-exertion and unhealthy climatic conditions of the country ruined his health beyond recovery, and when he was on his way to Dacca after his successful expedition, he expired on 31 March, 1663.
The Mughuls retained the conquests of Mir Jumla till 1667 when the Ahom king, Chakradhwaj, after sending two detachments down the banks: of the Brahmaputra, succeeded in capturing the Mughul forts one after another, in rapid succession. Even Gauhati itself fell into his hands and its faujdar was taken prisoner. It be¬ came the headquarters of an Ahom viceroy. The Mughuls were thus driven back to the river Monas. For many years the attempts of the imperialists to recover their lost position failed, in spite of the appointment of Raja Ram Singh, the son and successor of Mlrza Raja Jay Singh, with supreme command over the expeditionary forces in Assam and his stay at Rangamati for several years. He was ultimately recalled in 1676. Although in 1679, the Mughuls recovered Gauhati by bribery, the Ahom king, Gadadhar Singh, re¬ took it in 1681, and thus Kiamrup was finally lost to them.
In 1662 the raja of Cooch Behar had reconquered his kingdom by expelling the Mughul army of occupation, but, in 1664, out of fear, he again offered his submission to the imperialists and paid an in¬ demnity of five and a half lakhs of rupees to Shayista Khian, the new Governor of Bengal. Later on, taking advantage of serious dissensions and disorders within the kingdom, the Mughuls con¬ quered its southern and eastern portions, including the present dis¬ tricts of Rangpur and Western Kamrup.
One of the most brilliant achievements of Shayista Khan as governor of Bengal was the conquest of Chittagong. The Fenny river formed the boundary between the Mughul empire and the Magh kingdom of Arakan but the Magh pirates, in conjunction with the Feringis or Portuguese adventurers and their half-caste off springs, who used frequently to come to Bengal by the river-route, not only committed depredations and other heinous acts here, but also carried off the people, some of whom were employed in pillage or some other degrading pursuits, and sold others as slaves. The raids of these pirates rendered Deltaic Bengal desolate, causing serious damage to imperial prestige and heavy loss of revenue. Situated between Arakan and Bengal, Chittagong was a convenient base of operations of these miscreants, and it was of utmost neces¬ sity to bring it under the control of the imperial administration. With this end in view, Shayista Khan built a new navy of three hundred war-vessels and made proper arrangements for the protec¬ tion of Dacca against any possible attack by water. Next, in November, 1665, he captured the island of Sandwip. Meanwhile, he had been trying hard to win over the Feringis by liberal offers of service, and a serious quarrel between them and their Arakanese chiefs facilitated his design. All the Feringis of Chittagong fled with their family and property to the Mughul territory, where they were treated with liberality.
A strong expeditionary force was then sent from Dacca to Chittagong under Buzurg Ummed Khan, a son of Shayista Khan, and admiral Ibn Husain. The imperial fleet consisted of 288 vessels of their own and about 40 vessels of the Feringis, as auxiliaries. It was planned that the land army and the navy should co-operate with each other. The Maghs were defeated in three naval engage¬ ments, and in the last of these, fought near the fort of Chittagong, the Arakanese navy suffered a heavy discomfiture; several ships were sunk and one hundred and thirty-five captured by the imperial¬ ists. The fort of Chittagong was then besieged and captured, the garrison having surrendered after the resistance of a day only (26 January, 1666).
The conquered territory was placed under direct imperial ad¬ ministration. The name of Chittagong was changed to Islamabad and it became the headquarters of a Mughul faujdar. The most im¬ portant benefits of the victory were the release of thousands of Bengal peasants who had been kidnapped and held there as serfs and the increase of cultivation in the areas so long rendered deso¬ late by the oppressions of the Maghs and Feringis.
The north-western frontier had all along been a source of trouble to the Mughul empire. The various Afghan clans like the Afrldls, Yusufzals and Khattaks living in that hilly region were noto¬ rious for highway robbery from time immemorial. Their lands being arid and less productive, they found it more profitable for their sustenance to plunder the inhabitants of the plains and rich traders who happened to pass through their country. Finding it too diffi¬ cult to keep them under control by force of arms, the Mughul em¬ perors bribed these hillmen with a view to maintaining peace and keeping the routes in the north-western frontier open to traffic. Aurangzib paid the various border chiefs six lakhs of rupees annual¬ ly, but even these bribes did not always succeed in maintaining peace in that hilly region where new leaders arose and used to plunder the Mughul territory. The trouble commenced early in 1667, when the Yusufzais living in the Swat and Bajaur valleys and the plain of northern Peshawar, rose in arms under their leader Bhagu who crowned a pretender under the title of Muhammad Shah and crossed the Indus near Attock. Entering the Hazara district he attacked the Mughul outposts there, while other Yusufzai bands ravaged the western Peshawar and Attock districts, and then com¬ ing over to the south bank of the Indus at Harun, they attempted to hold the ferry there with a view to preventing the Mughul army from crossing into the tribal territory. But they were severely beaten back by Kamil Khan, the commandant of Attock, and the Mughul territory on the south side of the Indus was thus cleared of the enemies (April, 1667). In the following month Shamsher Khan, another commander, crossed the Indus, and, marching into the Yusufzai country, gained several victories over them and des¬ troyed many of their farms and homesteads. Muhammad Amin Khan who was next invested with the supreme command to punish these rebels, inflicted such severe blows on them that they remain¬ ed quiet for some years.
In 1672 there was another rising in the frontier region. The Afrldi Chieftain, Akmal Khan, crowned himself king and declared a holy war against the imperialists, inviting all the Pathans to join him in this national struggle. The Khyber pass was closed and the rebels attacked Muhammad Amin Khan, then governor of Afghanistan, at ‘All Masjid, cutting him off from the stream from which he received his supply of water. Their severe assaults in the hilly region were too much for the Mughuls to bear and they were thrown into utter confusion. The imperialists suffered heavy discomfiture and immense losses in men and property. Muhammad Amin Khan and some of his high officers somehow succeeded in escaping to Peshawar. Such a grand victory enhanced the fame and resources of Akmal Khan and lured more recruits to his banner. The rebellion spread in the entire frontier regions; the Khattak clan, also, joined the Afrldis, and Khush-hal Khan, the poet and leader of the former, became the guiding spirit of this national struggle of the Pathans.
The defeat of Amin Khan gave a rude shock to Aurangzib who degraded him and sent Mahabat Khan as governor of Afghanistan. But the new governor avoided any risky action and entered into a secret understanding with the rebels not to molest each other; and so the Khyber pass remained closed as before. Highly displeased, the emperor sent Shuja‘at Khan with a large force to punish the rebels but he was defeated and killed in the Karapa pass on 22 February, 1674.
The situation became so alarming that the emperor himself proceeded to Hasan Abdal, near Peshawar, for directing the opera¬ tions. Mahabat Khan was removed from the governorship and all possible actions were taken against the rebels. The emperor used both arms and diplomacy with much success. Many clans were bought over with presents, pensions and posts in the Mughul army, while the more refractory clans like the Ghorai, Ghilzal, Shirani and Yusufzais were crushed by arms. The imperial commander, Uighur Khan, won repeated victories over the Afghans and created awe and panic among them. The position of the Mughuls improved sufficiently by the end of 1675 and Aurangzib left Hasan Abdal for Delhi after his stay at the former place for a year and a half.
He appointed Amffi Khan, the son of Khalil-ullah, governor of Kabul in 1677. This choice was most befitting. Amir Khan, who had already distinguished himself by his capabilities, governed Afghanistan with singular tact, energy and efficiency till his death in 1698. By his diplomacy and conciliatory policy he succeeded in restoring order in the frontier and keeping the Khyber pass open to traffic. His success was to a great extent due to the tact and wise counsel of his wife.
His policy of paying subsidies to the tribal leaders and creat¬ ing dissensions among the clans bore fruit, leading to the break-up of the confederacy under Akmal Khan, and on the death of the latter, the Afrldls submitted and came to terms with the emperor. But the unbending and high-spirited Khattak leader, Khush-hal Khan, continued the struggle for many years more, undaunted by the inimical actions of the Bangashes, Yusufzais and his own son Ashraf who had joined hands with the Mughuls. Alone did he fight for the cause of Pathan independence till he was betrayed by his son, culminating in his capture and imprisonment by his enemies. The war of Aurangzib on the north-west frontier thus came to a suc¬ cessful end, though at a heavy cost. Sir Jadunath Sarkar is per fectly justified when he says: “Ruinous as the Afghan war was to imperial finances, its political effect was even more harmful. It made the employment of Afghans in the ensuing Rajput war impos¬ sible, though Afghans were just the class of soldiers who could have won victory for the imperialists in that rugged and barren country. Moreover, it relieved the pressure on ShivajI by draining the Dec can of the best Mughul troops for service on the N.W. frontier.”7 Taking advantage of this diversion of the imperial forces, the Maratha king conquered Carnatic (1667) without any opposition.
III. ORTHODOXY AND BIGOTRY
No one can possibly underestimate the great influence exerted on the life and activities of Aurangzib by the orthodox reform move¬ ment in Indian Islam started by Mujaddid Alf-i-SanI Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindl (1563-1624), the aims of which were regeneration and re¬ juvenation of Islam in strict accord with the shar’iyat and “the es¬ tablishment of a true Islamic State conforming to Islamic ideas and practices in all its activities. . . . ”.?a While a prince, Aurangzib came into contact with Khvaja Muhammad M‘asum, son of Mujaddid Ah¬ mad Sirhindl. He held him in high esteem and sought his advice on important matters of Muslim theology. After his accession to the throne also, he maintained his contact with the Khvaja and his son Muhammad Saifuddln as well, and their influence had much to do in bringing him within the fold of the orthodox school and shaping his puritanic state policy.
Aurangzib had claimed the throne as the champion of Sunni orthodoxy against the liberal-minded Dara whom he considered to be a heretic. It was neither his personal caprice nor any political or material gain that shaped his policy. As a zealous Sunhi Muslim, he believed in the Islamic theory of Kingship according to which the ruler is to enforce strictly the Qur’anic law in the administration of his empire, or in other words, as a pious Muslim, he considered it to be his duty to “exert himself in the path of God” i.e., to carry on jihad (holy war) against infidels and convert his realm from ddr-ul harb (non-Muslim land) to dar-ul-IslcLm (realm of Islam). In pur¬ suance of this ideal, he reversed the policy enunciated by Akbar, the Great, in regard to his non-Muslim subjects, who, in consequence, suffered from various social, political and economic disabilities and felt degraded because of the inferior position they held in the empire. Such discriminatory measures alienated the sympathy and good will of the vast majority of his non-Muslim subjects, eventually under¬ mining the foundation on which rested the political fabric of the empire.
In 1659 he issued a number of ordinances for restoring the Mus¬ lim law of conduct according to the teaching of the Qur’an. He dis¬ continued the practice of inscribing the kalima (Muhammadan con¬ fession of faith) on the coins lest they were defiled by men of other faiths, and abolished the celebration of the new year’s day (nauruz) of the Zoroastrian calendar—a custom followed by the Mughul emper¬ ors in imitation of the Persian kings. The cultivation of bhang (cannabis Indica) was forbidden throughout the empire. Censors of public morals (muhtasibs) wetfe appointed in all big cities to en¬ force the Qur’anic law and put down the practices forbidden in it, like drinking of wine, gambling and illicit traffic of women. Their duties also included punishment of Muslims for heretical opinions, blasphemy, omission of obligatory prayers and Ramzan fast. In en¬ forcing orthodoxy the emperor did not spare the Sufis and Shiahs, where deemed necessary. Among the important sections of the Muslim population who suffered serious persecution for heresy was the Isma‘ilia or Bohra community of Gujarat.
In 1668 the emperor forbade music at his court and the court musicians and singers were pensioned off. The royal band was not, however, discontinued. The ceremony of weighing the emperor1 on his two birthdays, according to the lunar and solar calendars, against precious articles like gold and silver, and the practice of Jharokd darsan, a custom according to which the Mughul emperors used to appear every morning at the outer balcony of their palace to receive the salute of the subjects, were discontinued, as these were un Islamic. The emperor also forbade the customary rejoicings on his birthdays and on the anniversary of his coronation.
Although every endeavour was made to enforce his regulations and elevate his subjects, it was not possible to achieve the desired result, as they were not yet prepared to follow his high ideals of puritanical morality. Drinking and gambling were so much deep rooted in the country that it was simply impossible to stamp out these evils by a stroke of the pen. The orders regarding the cour¬ tesans and dancing girls either to get themselves married or leave the empire were also not effective. Similarly, the emperor’s edict prohibiting the rite of satl or burning of a Hindu widow along with the dead body of her husband, could not be duly enforced owing to strong opposition of the people.
In a farmdn gr'anted to a priest of Banaras in 1659, Aurangzlb ‘avowed that his religion forbade him to allow the building of new temples, but did not enjoin the destruction of old ones’. In 1664 he forbade old temples to be repaired, and on 9 April, 1669, an order was issued to the governors of the provinces “to demolish the schools and temples of the infidels and put down their teaching and religious practices strongly.”8 Besides innumerable temples through¬ out the empire, even the famous Hindu temples of Viisvanatha at Banaras, of Keshav Dev at Mathura, and Somnath at Patan were destroyed. Even the loyal State of Jaipur was not spared, and sixty-six temples were razed to the ground at Amber.
An order was issued re-imposing the jizya tax on the Hindus from 2 April, 1679, “with the object of spreading Islam and over¬ throwing infidel practices.”9 It was a commutation tax, i.e., the price of indulgence, and had to be paid by an assessee in person with marks of humility. For its assessment and collection the non Muslim population was roughly divided into three grades; the first grade having an income above 10,000 dirhams had to pay 48 dirhams, the second, whose income was from 200 to 10,000 dirhams paid 24 dirhams, and the third, i.e., those whose income fell below 200 dirhams paid 12 dirhams a year, the value of a dirham being a little more than a quarter of a rupee. It appears that the jizya hit the poor non-Muslim population most, as the rate of taxation in their case was heavy in proportion to their income. Women, chil¬ dren below fourteen, slaves, beggars and paupers were exempted from this tax. Of the monks, the heads of wealthy monasteries only had to pay; government officials were however, exempted from this tax.
Aurangzlb ignored all protests and remained adamant in rea¬ lizing the jizya. He felt gratified when many Hindus, unable to pay it, embraced Islam.
Various other measures were adopted to put pressure on the Hindus with a view to increasing the number of converts to Islam. By an edict in April, 1665, the customs duty on the commodities brought in for sale was fixed at 2\ per cent, ad valorem for Muslim merchants and 5 per cent, for the Hindu merchants. In May, 1667, this duty in the case of Muslim traders was abolished, whereas it was retained at the old rate of 5 per cent, on the Hindus. The em¬ peror offered rewards and posts in the public service, liberation from imprisonment and even succession to property under dis¬ pute in favour of those who would embrace Islam. In 1671 an order was passed for the dismissal of all Hindu head-clerks and accountants, and replacing them by Muslims, but due to paucity of qualified Muhammadans the emperor, later on, allowed half of these posts to be held by the Hindus. In 1668 all Hindu religious fairs were prohibited, and in March 1695 another order was passed for bidding the Hindus, except the Rajputs, to ride in pallets (palan¬ quins), on elephants and good horses; they were also forbidden to carry arms.93
All these discriminatory measures of the emperor produced far reaching and disastrous consequences, impairing the stability of the empire. The affected Hindu community became highly discontent¬ ed, and opposition to the destruction of their holy temples was of¬ fered in Rajasthan, Bundelkhand, Malwa and Khandesh, and many converted mosques were demolished or the call to prayer was stop¬ ped. In certain places the jizya collectors were assaulted and driven out.
IV. REACTION AGAINST BIGOTRY
The first great Hindu reaction against the emperor’s policy of persecution occurred in the district of Mathura. Early in 1669, the sturdy Jat peasantry under their leader Gokla of Tilpat took up arms against the imperialists and killed ‘Abd-un-Nabi, the oppressive faujddr of Mathura. They then sacked the parga^a of Sadabiad and created disorder and confusion in the neighbouring district of Agra also. A strong reinforcement under Ra‘dandaz Khan was of no avail and the emperor himself proceeded to the disturbed area. Gokla mustered 20,000 men and fought valiantly but was at last overpowered by Hasan ‘All Khan, the Mughul commandant of Mathura. The Jat leader was put to death and the members of his family were converted to Islam.
In 1672 the formidable rising of the Satnamls took place in the districts of Narnaul and Mewat. The Satnamls were a peaceful sect, believing in the unity of God, mostly employed in agriculture. They were honest, industrious and formed a brotherhood, calling themselves Satnamls, Satniam meaning good name. As they used to shave their head and face including eye-brows, they were popu¬ larly called Mundiyas. A petty quarrel near Narnaul between a Satnami cultivator and a Mughul foot-soldier of the local revenue collector led to the outbreak. The high-handedness of the soldier was too much for them to bear and the wrangling soon developed into a religious war against the Mughuls. The Satnamis defeated the imperialists on several occasions and took possession of the town and district of Narnaul. When these alarming news reached the em¬ peror, he sent there a large force under Ra‘dandaz Khan, equipped with artillery. The Satnamis fought with courage and determina¬ tion but could not succeed against the well-organized and well-equip¬ ped Mughul force. Two thousand men of this sect fell fighting on the field and many of them were killed during the pursuit. The rebellion was thus crushed and the affected areas brought under control.
Aurangzib’s policy of intolerance and religious persecution rous¬ ed the Sikhs to take up arms against him. He passed an order for the demolition of the Sikh temples and expulsion of the Sikh Guru’s agents from the cities. Tegh Bahadur, the Sikh Guru, offered open opposition and encouraged the Hindus of Kashmir in their resist¬ ance against forcible conversion to Islam. But he was siezed and taken to Delhi where he was imprisoned. On his refusal to em¬ brace Islam, he was put to death after torture for five days (De¬ cember, 1675).
The Sikhs were thus turned into bitter enemies of the Mughul government. Govinda Singh, the next Guru and the only son of Tegh Bahadur, was determined to avenge his father’s cruel murder. He devoted his time and energy in transforming the Sikhs into a military community and instituted the custom of baptism wth a new oath. Those who accepted this baptism were known as the Khalsa (pure) and the members were required to put on a distinct¬ ive dress, keeping five things on their person, viz., Kesh (hair), Kangha (comb), Kripdn (sword), Kachha (underwear) and Kara (iron bangle). They were to give up all restrictions about caste, food and drink. “The Sikhs felt themselves to be a chosen people, the Lord’s elect. Everything was, therefore, ready for converting the sect into a military body obedient to its chief to the death,.... and ever ready to surrender the individual conscience to that of the guru.”10
In the hilly regions of the northern Punjab, Guru Govinda fought against the local Muslim chiefs and Hindu rajas who had been asked to co-operate with the imperial forces in suppressing him, and won some victories over them. His stronghold at Anandapur was be¬ sieged five times, and at last he had to leave it to take refuge in the plains, hotly pursued by the imperialists. His four sons were slain and he had no alternative but to proceed to the Deccan through Bikaner. He came back to Northern India after the death of Aurangzib and joined Bahadur Shah in the war of succession with his brothers. He also accompanied Bahadur Shah to the Deccan and, while encamped at Nander on the Godavari, he was murdered by an Afghan follower (1708).
He was the tenth and last Guru of the Sikhs. Before his death, his instruction to his followers was to get themselves organized into a military democracy, without having any more need of a Guru.
V. FIGHT WITH THE RAJPUTS
Aurangzlb was on the look-out for a suitable opportunity to establish direct control over Marwar, one of the most powerful Hindu States in Northern India. The reasons behind his motive were that it occupied a position of strategic importance, as through it lay the shortest military and commercial routes from the Mughul capital to the rich cities and ports of Gujarat, and, secondly, such a power¬ ful State was not only a menace to the safety of the empire but it might also offer stubborn opposition to his cherished religious policy. Its Maharaja, Jasovanta Singh Rathor, who had fought against Aurangzlb in the battle of Dharmat and committed treachery against him prior to that of Khajuha, was afterwards appointed by the em¬ peror in responsible positions. Since the death of Raja Jay Singh of Amber in 1667, he occupied the foremost place among the Hindu peers in the Mughul court. While commanding the Mughul frontier posts in the Khyber pass and the Peshawar district, he died at Jamrud on 10 December, 1678, without an heir. This offered Aurang zib an opportunity to give effect to his contemplated design. On hearing of the Maharaja’s death, he took steps to seize Marwar and place it under direct rule of the Mughul government. He himself went to Ajmer to supervise the actions. As the State was then without a head and many Rathor officers and troops were in Afgha¬ nistan, no resistance could be offered, and Marwar was easily brought under imperial control. The emperor then went back to Delhi (2 April, 1679), and on that very day re-imposed the jizya on the Hindus. Meanwhile, he learnt that the two widowed queens of Jasovanta had given birth to two posthumous sons, but he remained adamant in his purpose without any thought of legitimate succession. Indra Singh Rathor, the chieftain of Nagaur and grand-nephew of Jasovanta Singh, was recognized as the Maharaja of Marwar on pay¬ ment of a succession fee of thirty-six lakhs of rupees, and as he had no local support, the Mughul generals and other officers in occupa¬ tion of the country were kept there for his assistance.
Towards the end of June, the family of Jasovanta Singh, includ¬ ing the surviving son Ajit Singh, reached Delhi, the other child having died a few weeks after birth. The rights of Ajit Singh had been urged before the emperor more than once. According to one opinion, Aurangzlb ordered that the child should be brought up in the royal harem till he would come of age when his rights would be duly recognized; and according to another version, “the throne of Jodhpur was offered to Ajit on condition of his turning Muslim. Such a proposal would be quite in keeping with Aurangzlb’s past policy, as he had lately given the zamlndaris of Jogigarh, Deogarh, and Mau to those among rival claimants who had agreed to accept Islam.”11 In 1703, also, we find the same policy pursued by the emperor when he offered the Maratha throne to the captive Maratha prince Shahu.12 This extraordinary proposal was too much for the loyal Rathors who made up their mind to rescue Ajit even at the cost of their lives. At such a critical juncture, they were fortunate in having a leader of rare ability like Durga Das, the son of Jasovanta’s minister Askaran, and “the flower of Rajput chivalry.” He was a man of undaunted heroism, inflexible determination, unswerving loyalty, and combined in himself all the requisite qualities of an efficient general.
Aurangzib sent a strong force to seize Ajit and the Ranis. While the Mughuls besieged the mansion of Jasovanta in Delhi, a band of brave Rathors opposed them with all their might, and another party under Durga Das stealthily came out of the mansion with Ajit and his mothers in male attire and rode away towards Marwar. Al¬ though he was overtaken by the imperialists at a distance of nine miles, a band of Rajputs under Ranchhor Das Jodha opposed them to the last man and, overcoming all opposition, Durga Das and his party reached Marwar. Ajit was kept in a safe place of hiding. Baffled in his attempt to seize Jasovanta’s son, Aurangzib took a milkman’s baby in his harem and proclaimed him to be true Ajit. Durga Das’s protege was declared fictitious and Indra Singh was removed for his incapacity; but Marwar was far from subdued. The Rathors had taken up arms against Mughul oppression, and Aurang¬ zib again went to Ajmer (25 September, 1679), despatching his son, prince Akbar, with a large army against the Rathors. Success attend¬ ed Mughul arms and all the great towns including Jodhpur were plundered and temples destroyed.
Maharana Raj Singh of Mewar realized the gravity of the situa¬ tion, and could well understand that his State would be the next victim of imperial aggression. He had been asked to pay the jizya tax for his entire State and this was as humiliating as vexatious. Added to these was also his deep concern for the safety of Marwar whose queen and mother of Ajit was a Mewar princess. But ere he could strike, the Mughul general, Hasan ‘All Khan, with seven thousand chosen troops attacked Mewar. Unable to defend the plains, the Maharana deserted them and retired with his men to the hills. The Mughul army occupied his capital Udaipur and the fort of Chitor, and destroyed the temples there. Pursuing the Maharana, Hasan ‘All defeated him and inflicted heavy losses on him (22 Janu¬ ary, 1680).
The emperor who had been guiding the military operations then left Udaipur and returned to Ajmer, leaving prince Akbar in Mewar and another force in Marwar. But the Mughul troops in Mewar and Marwar were too far to combine for any united action, if need be Moreover, the troops under prince Akbar were too small for the territories to be controlled. The Rajputs carried on guerilla warfare, raiding the Mughul outposts, cutting off their supplies and thus creat¬ ing terror among the Mughuls. Even Akbar’s camp near Chitor was once surprised at night. After this the Mahiarana proceeded to the Bednor district, threatened Akbar’s communications with Ajmer and defeated him; the losses suffered by the imperialists on this occa¬ sion were very heavy. These reverses infuriated the emperor who transferred the prince to Marwar for his slackness and incapacity, placing prince A‘zam in charge of Chitor. A grand plan was made to enter into the hills of Mewar from three directions under the leader¬ ship of three princes, A‘zam, Mua‘zzam and Akbar, but it did not even¬ tually succeed, as the princes could not act up to the plan. As Akbar could not fare better in Marwar than in Mewar, he despaired of suc¬ cess. Disgusted with censures from his father and removed from Mewar, and finding no other means of improving his situation, he hailed the invitation of the Rajputs in wresting the crown of Delhi from his father with their assistance. Both Durga Das and Maha rana Raj Singh assured him of their support but the death of the Maharana (22 October, 1680) delayed the project for some time. Jay Singh, the son and successor of Raj Singh, also agreed to lend his support to the prince who, on 1 January, 1681, proclaimed himself emperor of Delhi, and on the following day, marched with his Rathor and Sisodia allies against his father who was then at Ajmer, Aurangzlb had great affection for this son and was rudely shocked by his conduct. He had then a meagre force with him, and had Akbar arrived at Ajmer in haste without whiling away his time in pleasure, the emperor’s position would have been extremely critical. But a fortnight’s delay, which was solely due to his care¬ free movements, was fully utilized by Aurangzlb in calling reinforce¬ ments and strengthening his position. Meanwhile, despite paucity of his men, he had gone out of Ajmer and taken up his stand at a place ten miles south of it.
As Akbar advanced nearer his father, desertions followed from his camp in large number, but 30,000 Rajputs remained faithful to him. Arriving at a distance of three miles from his father’s camp, he halted there for the night for a battle on the next morning. During the night the shrewd emperor took to diplomacy for win¬ ning over the prince’s adherents. Tahavvur Khan was the right hand man of Akbar, but the father-in-law of the former then held a high office under Aurangzlb, who had a letter written by him to his son-in-law, promising him pardon, in the event of his coming over to the side of the imperialists, but in case of his non-compli¬ ance, his family then held as hostages in the imperial camp, would be materially injured. Highly perturbed, Tahavvur Khan secretly left his tent to meet the emperor but was slam by the imperial attendants.
Meantime, the emperor had written a false letter to his re¬ bellious son, commending him for bringing the principal Rajputs with him, according to his (emperor’s) plan, so as to have them crushed between the imperial army and those of the prince in the next day’s battle. As intended, the letter was dropped near the Rajput camp, and it upset Durga Das when he read it. He went to Akbar for an explanation, but when informed that the prince was asleep, he sent men to call Tahavvur Khan only to learn that the latter had already left for the imperial camp. Believing treachery on the part of the prince, the Rajputs fell on his camp, looted as much as they could and hurried towards Mewar. After this, most of his other troops also deserted him and joined the emperor. When Akbar awoke and found himself in a helpless condition, he retreated hurriedly towards Mewar with some members of his family and the treasure he could carry.
As soon as the real matter came to light, Durga Das lent his helping hand to the prince and took him under his protection. Evading the Mughul pursuers, he escorted Akbar successfully through Rajasthan, Khandesh, and Baglana to the shelter of the Maratha king, Shambhuji.
Aurangzffib’s plan of action in Mewar was considerably affected by the prince’s flight to the Deccan, and he was eager to patch up a peace with the Maharana for personal supervision of strong mili¬ tary operations against his son in the Deccan. On the other hand, the Maharana also earnestly desired peace, specially because of ex¬ tensive devastation of his cornfields by his enemies, threatening the whole population to starvation. He visited prince Muhammad A‘zam (14 June, 1681) and concluded a treaty with him. Accord¬ ing to its terms, Mewar was restored to Jay Singh with the title of Rana and a mansab of 5,000. He had to cede the pargands of Mandal, Pur and Bednor to the Mughuls in lieu of the jizya im¬ posed on his kingdom. But Aurangzlb’s war with Marwar con¬ tinued for about twenty-seven years more. After the treaty with Jay Singh, the emperor sent a powerful force under prince A‘zam to pursue Akbar and he himself proceeded hurriedly towards the Deccan, reaching Burhanpur on 13 November, 1681, and Auranga¬ bad on 22 March, 1682.
VI. AURANGZlB AND SHIVAJ!
During the first half of his reign, as the emperor had been busy in the north, he left the administration and military operations of the Deccan in the hands of his viceroys. The two States of Bijapur and Golconda were then in process of decay, but on account of pau¬ city of fighting forces in the Deccan, absence of firm determina1- tion and a strong and vigorous policy on the part of the Mughul viceroys, as also lack of mutual co-operation and support of their officers, these States could not be annexed to the empire till the emperor’s personal presence there in the second half of his reign.
The third kingdom in the Deccan was that of the Marathas created by the zeal and untiring efforts of their leader Shivaji, whose father, ShahjI Bhonsle, originally a small jdgirdar under the Sultan of Ahmadnagar, became later on a king-maker there, but after his defeat by the imperialists in 1636, entered the service of the ‘Adil Shahll Sultan as a leading Hindu general.
A detailed account of Shivaji will be given in the next Chapter. Imbued with an uncommon spirit of adventure and love of inde¬ pendence from his early life, Shivaji! moved freely among the sturdy people of the Mavals or western belt of the Poona district, “hard¬ ened himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion”, and after gathering recruits from these healthy and brave men, he com¬ menced his activities for the building up of an independent kingdom.
The continued illness of Muhammad ‘Adil Shah from 1646 to his death in 1656 afforded Shivaji a good opportunity to carry out his designs and he captured, one by one, several Bijapur forts, viz., Torna, Kondhana (Sinhgarh), Rohira, Chakan, and Purandar and built the fort of Raigarh, three miles from Torna. He also surprised Shambhuji Mohite and took possession of Supa, south-east of Poona. The year 1656 saw his conquest of the State of Javll in the Maha baleswar range and this acquisition not only opened his path for further conquests in the south and south-west but also secured him the service of many Mavle infantrymen from it. Here he acquired also a vast accumulated treasure which immensely increased his financial resources. Two miles west of Javll, he constructed a new fort for the protection of this area and named it Pratapgarh. These were followed up by his important exploits in north Konkan where the rich towns of Kalyan and Bhiwandl and the fort of Mahuli came into his possession, and in this way he got a firm footing in northern Konkan. “By the year 1659 he had extended his domi nions in the uplands or Desk to the southern limit of the Satara dis¬ trict, and in Konkan from Mahuli to near Mahad.”13
The Bijapur government sent Afzal Khan in 1659 to capture the Maratha leader dead or alive, but Afzal Khan himself was slain and the Bijapur army sustained severe losses. This wonderful feat not only enhanced the self-reliance of the Maratha chief but also in¬ creased his power and prestige, and rudely shocked the ‘Adil Shah! Sultanate. Next he took possession of South Konkan and the Kolhapur district.
But next year (1660), he was besieged in the fort of Panhala by the Bijapur general, Sldl Jauhar, and compelled to evacuate it.
Taking advantage of the Mughul invasion of Bijapur and the diversion of the imperial forces, ShivajI had raided Mughul terri* tories in the districts of Ahmadnagar and Junnar (1657) and even plundered the wealthy city of Junnar. Aurangzib, who was then viceroy of the Deccan, took prompt action against him. He was sur¬ prised and routed, and Maratha villages ravaged. When Bijapur con¬ cluded peace with the imperialists, ShivajI, too, submitted to them. Although Aurangzib forgave him for the time being, he could not place reliance on his adversary’s plighted words and waited for an opportunity to strike him after the war of succession.
After his accession to the throne, Aurangzib sent Shayista Khian as viceroy of the Deccan with instruction to crush ShivajI. Com¬ mencing his campaign early in 1660, the new viceroy took posses¬ sion of Poona, the fort of Chakan, Kalyan and north Konkan in the course of about a year and a half, but the Maratha chief gave him a serious blow by a surprise night attack on his residence in Poona on 5 April, 1663, wounding him and slaying, among others, one of his sons and six women of his harem. In January, 1664, ShivajI sacked Surat, a very wealthy port in the Mughul empire, and returned with a rich booty exceeding one crore of rupees in value.
Highly perturbed, Aurangzib transferred Shayista Khan to Bengal and sent Jay Singh of Amber, one of the greatest generals and diplomats of the age, with Dilir Khan, an efficient general, to put down ShivajI and chastise ‘All £Adil Shah II for his evasion of the conditions of the treaty of 1657 and his secret aid to the Maratha chief. By his wonderful tact and skilful handling of the situation, Jay Singh succeeded in securing the support and ungrudging assist¬ ance of those whom ShivajI had antagonized in one way or the other, and thus creating a ring of enemies around the latter, the Mughul viceroy and generalissimo of the Deccan made Shivaji’s position extremely precarious. Next, the fort of Purandar, where the families of the Maratha officers had been kept, was besieged, while another Mughul detachment was sent to plunder and burn the villages of Maharashtra.
At last, finding it very difficult to defend the fortress any longer, ShivajS personally visited Jay Singh and concluded the treaty of Purandar with him (12 June, 1665), whereby he ceded twenty-three of his forts to the imperialists, retaining twelve only for himself, acknowledged the suzerainty of the Mughul emperor and promised to serve him loyally in the Deccan. The Maratha chief served the imperialists with complete loyalty during their in¬ vasion of Bijapur shortly afterwards.14
On Jay Singh’s advice and assurance of safety, Shivajif paid a visit to the emperor in his court at Agra on 12 May, 1666. There he was ranked as a mcmsabddr of 5,000 only, and feeling highly humiliated at this, he made a loud protest in the open court accus¬ ing the emperor of breach of faith, and swooned. For this un¬ usual conduct, he was kept under guard and forbidden to attend the court. It was after three months of captivity at Agra that eluding the vigilance of the guards, he managed to escape with his son in two baskets of sweetmeats (19 August, 1666) and reached Raigarh in the guise of a mendicant on 12 September.15
After his successful termination of war with the Maratha chief, Jay Singh had proceeded against Bijapur and conquered, one by one, many of ‘Adil Shah! forts. In spite of harassments by the gue¬ rilla tactics of the Bijapur army, he advanced within twelve miles of the fort of Bijapur, but was unable to capture it by a coup de main, on account of timely and energetic actions of the ‘Adil Shah! Sultan by strengthening its defences and taking other measures to the detriment of the imperialists. Consequently, Jay Singh decided to retreat and this he had to do against severe harassments by his enemies, besides two severe battles with them. He returned to his headquarters at Aurangabad incurring heavy losses and without achieving anything. His irate master censured and recalled him to court. His disgrace and recall were also partly due to the suspi¬ cion of the emperor about his secret aid to the escape of ShivajI from his confinement at Agra. Broken-hearted at this humiliation and disappointment, the unlucky general died on the way at Burhanpur on 28 August, 1667.
For more than three years after his return to Raigarh, Shivaji did not take up any offensive against the Mughuls, and a formal peace was effected in 1668 with the emperor who conferred on him the title of Raja. Rut in 1670, he renewed his military operations against the imperialists and captured the fort of Sinhgarh which was followed up by his seizure of Kalyan and other places of north Konkan. The quarrel between Shah ‘Alam, the Mughul viceroy of the Deccan, and his general Dilir Khan rendered it difficult for the imperialists to oppose the Maratha chief effectively, and the latter moved on with his plundering raids from place to place. He sacked Surat for the second time in October, 1670, and carried away rich booty in cash and kind. Next, he conducted most daring raids on Aurangabad and the Mughul provinces of BaglJana, Khandesh and Berar, and captured Salher, an important fort on the borders of Khandesh and Gujarat.
The emperor was much worried by his daring successes and, recalling Shah ‘Alam, appointed Bahadur Khan as viceroy of the Deccan (1672). But during the five years of his viceroyalty Baha¬ dur Khan could not improve the position of the Mughuls there. Shivaji achieved success after success. He conquered Jawhar and Ramnagar, the two States in the KoR country, south of Surat, and levied chauth (blackmail, one-fourth of land revenue) in various places of the Deccan. Confusion and disorder in the Bijapur king¬ dom, following the death of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II in December, 1672, and the Afghan risings in the north-west frontier, necessitating the transfer of the best Mughul troops from the Deccan, gave the Maratha chief opportunities for successful military operations. From 1672 to 1678, the Mughul generals carried on desultory fightings with him without any tangible result. On 6 June, 1674, he per¬ formed his formal coronation ceremony at Raigarh with great pomp and grandeur, spending a huge sum of money on the occasion.
In 1677 he concluded an alliance with Golconda, and conquered Gingee and Vellore with a vast territory in the Madras, Carnatic and the Mysore plateaus which greatly augmented his power, pres¬ tige and financial resources. His successful career came to an end with his death in April, 1680, but the spirit he had infused into the people of Maharashtra survived his death, and Aurangzlb could not cope with them even after his strenuous efforts for a quarter of a century with his headquarters in the Deccan.
Appendix
1. J. N. Sarkar, A Short History of Aurangzih, 3rd edn. Calcutta, 1962, p. 72. 2. Four miles west of the old fort of Gaur.
3. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzih, Vol. Ill, Calcutta, 1916, pp. 1-3. 245
THE MUGHUL EMPIRE
4. Ibid, p.115.
5. Ibid, p.196.
5a. Ibid, Ch. XXXI, Section 18, According to CHI, 420,000 tolas of silver (IV. 235). 'Phis Statement in CHI is also by J. N. Sarkar. As this was published (pro¬ bably also written) later, it may be taken as his later view and a more correct one. (Ed.)
6. Sarkar, p. 203.
7. Ibid, pp.281-282.
7a. Mohammad Yasin, A Social History of Islamic India, (1605-1748), Lakhnau, (1958), p.150.
8. Cambridge History of India, Vol. IV, p.241.
9. Ibid., p.242.
9a. For a detailed account of Aurangzlb’s bigotry, cf. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, Vol. Ill, Ch. XXXIV, Sections 9-17 and Appendix V. 10. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, Vol. Ill, p. 358. For a detailed account, cf. Ch. XI.
11. Ibid., p.374.
12. CHI. IV, p.,247.
13. J. N. Sarkar, History of Aurangzib, Vol. IV, Calcutta, 1930, p. 42. 14. For further details, cf. next Chapter.
15. For discussion on this date, cf. next Chapter.
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